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THEOMONISM TRUE



*Apologetics Lib 497*

# THEOMONISM TRUE:

GOD AND THE UNIVERSE IN  
MODERN LIGHT

A SEQUEL TO  
'HAECKEL'S MONISM FALSE'

BY  
**FRANK BALLARD**  
M.A., B.D., B.Sc., F.R.M.S., &c.

AUTHOR OF  
'HAECKEL'S MONISM FALSE,' 'THE MIRACLES OF UNBELIEF,'  
'CLARION FALLACIES,' 'REASONABLE ORTHODOXY,'  
'THE MISSION OF CHRISTIANITY,' ETC.

*London*

**CHARLES H. KELLY**

2 CASTLE STREET, CITY ROAD, AND 26 PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

PRINTED BY  
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,  
LONDON AND ATLESBURY.

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TO

ALL WHO SEEK

'ONE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE'

(cf. p. 491)

'Oh, where is the sea?' the fishes cried  
As they swam the crystal clearness through.  
'We have heard from of old of the ocean's tide,  
And we long to look on the waters blue.  
The wise ones speak of an infinite sea:  
Oh, who can tell us if such there be?'

The lark flew up in the morning bright,  
And sang and balanced on sunny wings;  
And this was its song: 'I see the light,  
I look on a world of wonderful things;  
But flying and singing everywhere  
In vain have I sought to find the air.'

---

'How the divine unity can be consistent with the free play of the life of man may be a hard problem, but in our anxiety about its solution let us not forget the conditions of the problem itself. Man is free, in so far as he is free, just *because* he partakes of the divine nature, i.e. because he cannot be conscious of himself except in relation to God; and if he could cut the bond of union, neither the consciousness nor the problem of freedom could exist for him at all. To see all things in God, is thus not the pious dream of an idealist philosophy.'

EDWARD CAIRD, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. i. p. 167.

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'There come regularly to the Patent Office at Washington men who wish to take out patents for perpetual-motion machines. Such a man is never argued with. He is told, "You must bring a working model." And he goes away and does not come back. This is the test for all reality. That which works is real.'

PROF. DROWN, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1906, p. 531.

## PREFACE

IN a former volume the extravagant claims of Haeckel's Monism have been shown to be unwarranted.<sup>1</sup> The aim of that work being avowedly negative, criticism from some quarters to the effect that it lacked positive elements, was scarcely justified. Yet even a negative with reasons becomes a virtual positive; and seeing that no real inaccuracies have been pointed out, the assumption that the essayed refutation is effectual becomes permissible and modest. As for the charge of misrepresentation, made by Haeckel's English champion, the only reply called for is to ask the reader to take in hand the works mentioned, and verify every reference for himself.

Proceeding from this starting-point, it may be freely acknowledged that the positive construction of Theism to-day is as difficult as the needed negation of anti-theism is thankless. It has been said that 'a man needs proof only of that which has become doubtful to him. Hence, even in the world as we find it, the overwhelming majority of mankind have not the slightest personal interest in a demonstration of the divine existence.' Especially amidst the cross-lights of modern thought, any attempt to justify Theism

<sup>1</sup> *Haeckel's Monism False* (Charles H. Kelly).

is as likely to incur the aversion of the uneducated for being too abstruse, as to be despised by the educated for being too simple. But the sincere quest of truth can no more consent to be deterred by difficulty, than to be disheartened by ingratitude. It may, indeed, appear immodest to venture to add anything to the already overwhelming library of Theism. A twofold apology must here suffice.

1. Thoughtful honesty, after long years of watching, may hope to make some small contribution to this vast theme, without the least idea of emulating a Kant, a Lotze, or a Martineau. Even a truthful summary may be of value, as showing the gain and loss of the past, together with the weakness and strength of the present position.

2. Meanwhile, we see that renewed assaults are continually being made, in the name of science and philosophy, upon the three great Christian postulates of God, freedom, and immortality. Which of these is most vehemently attacked, it would be difficult to say. But it is impossible for any candid observer to deny that the combined effect is quite serious enough to show the unwisdom of the 'masterly inactivity' which the Churches generally deem sufficient reply, and to demand in regard to each of these august themes a re-statement of the grounds of Christian belief. The fact that these three are as inseparable in theology as in religion, rather emphasizes than diminishes the necessity for considering each separately on its merits. Such a task would, however, be far too great for one volume. The two latter, therefore, are reserved for future consideration. The pages following concern



themselves solely with the meaning and worth of Theism in the light of the Twentieth Century. Hereupon Canon Henson has truly said that 'before the Gospel can be reasonably considered there must be at least agreement in the postulate of Theism, and, as following from that, in the moral responsibility of man.'<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, no such agreement is at hand. How far many able thinkers are from it, is sadly illustrated by Dr. McTaggart's recent volume.<sup>2</sup> The extent to which such academic subtleties may be popularized by a cheap press, until their inferences are quoted as axioms by the man in the street, is indeed little acknowledged by church officials, but is well known to those who have actual acquaintance with the respectable artisan population of our great cities.

The chief difficulty in a serious effort to meet the modern situation, is that any attempt to supply 'proofs that God is the best and only possible solution of the problem suggested by the survey of man and nature'<sup>3</sup> must now be intricate rather than simple, philosophical rather than scientific, metaphysical rather than physical. To clothe such reasonings in language which shall always be intelligible to the general reader, is wellnigh impossible. Yet the most lucid speech which lacks the firm framework of a valid philosophy, is as useless as the most accurate thinking befogged by numbers of technical terms. It were too much to hope that the following pages have always avoided both these mistakes. All that can be averred is that

<sup>1</sup> *Notes on Popular Rationalism*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, by Prof. J. E. McTaggart (Arnold).

<sup>3</sup> Dr. J. J. Tigert, *Theism*, p. 3.

whether Theism or Atheism be the true explanation of the universe, at least the consideration of such a question demands and deserves the very best that every honest mind can bring to bear upon it. This being assumed, the writer must be content to hope that where he has failed to express the truth, the reader may yet succeed in finding it.

To lay claim to originality in such a realm would be preposterous. One's obligations to other thinkers are too many and too great to be specified in detail, but careful references have been given to all quotations. In very many cases I have, indeed, deliberately preferred to express facts and principles in the words of others, in order that the reader may have at least a glimpse at the real consensus of theistic thought which abides and develops in the midst of modern logomachies. I regret that the kindly reviewer in the *Guardian* does not approve of what he terms a 'mosaic of quotations.' That my method in this respect would not commend itself to all, I am of course well aware. But on further reflection it still commends itself to me. And in the main for two reasons. (1) In stating conclusions which appear to me quite sound, I am saved from a loneliness which, in dealing with themes so vast and in face of distinguished opposition, would savour of immodesty. (2) It seems also very desirable that numbers of readers who have neither time nor opportunity to keep pace with the literature of the subject, should yet know to some extent who amongst modern writers worthy of regard are definitely on the side of faith, and in what terms they express their convictions. So long, therefore, as an

author makes his own position clear, and gives genuine reasons for what he affirms, I cannot see that there is anything but gain in making known, as one passes along, the judgement also of others to the same effect. For the convenience of students a list of the most helpful works from the Christian standpoint is also appended.

How far and in what respects the necessary restatement of the grounds of Theism affects Christian theology, does not here come into consideration. The consequences of the Theomonism to which the only valid theory of the universe leads us, can only be hinted at in the closing paragraphs. The best known and most precious of all Christ's reported sayings, is probably that found in the Gospel of John—'Let not your hearts be troubled : believe in God, believe also in Me.' If, in days when so many are troubled, the following imperfect summary shall at all help to bring home His words to mind and heart, the aim of its publication will have been answered.

I am indebted to my friend, the Rev. R. Christie, of Glasgow, for kindly reading the proof-sheets.

F. B.

HEATON, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,  
*November, 1906.*

‘There is such a thing as truth, for otherwise the supposition that there is no truth would itself be false; there is such a thing as untruth, for otherwise contradictory beliefs would be true; and the world is a rational system, or otherwise all thought would be empty. Now, necessity reduces every belief to a necessary effect of past states of mind which have nothing to do with truth and untruth. No means is left for distinguishing them, and reason and science disappear in idle speculation.’

PROF. H. M. GWATKIN, *The Knowledge of God* (Gifford Lectures), vol. i. p. 65.

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‘We sin the sin of sins only when we turn our back on truth, as we do when we make authority our refuge from the first duty of reasoning men.’

PROF. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, 1904-5, vol. ii. p. 329.

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‘The theism that science will corroborate, or that thorough philosophy can approve and establish, must be a theism that assumes into its conceptions of God and man all the irrefutable insights of materialism or of deism, and of pantheism most of all. These insights, reached on the planes of lower philosophies, have an unquestionable reality and pertinence, even if they are also marked by undeniable insufficiency. Their insufficiency, when they are seen in the higher light of genuine theism, is indeed so great that they seem by themselves to have hardly any religious import at all. By themselves they afford the soul neither outward hope nor inward peace. Still, the religious conviction that does make hope and peace secure, is not to be attained without their aid. The mind that has never discerned the meaning in these lower levels of thought upon religious problems, has not yet entered into the inner meaning of theism, nor seen it in the light where its proofs become transparent.’

DR. HOWISON, *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 100.

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‘Human personality has attributes, self-consciousness and freedom, which distinguish it in kind from the world of mere animals and things, and relate it to a spiritual order, of whose eminent reality it is itself at once the witness and the proof. With this conviction in his mind, man looks at the universe outside him, and divines there, with an instinct which age or argument cannot eradicate, the presence of a Person whom he feels, but may not see.’

DR. ILLINGWORTH, *Personality, Human and Divine*, (cheap ed.), p. 101.



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I  
INTRODUCTION



‘Changes in theology, then, are in no sense denied by theologians, and may be said to testify to the vitality and growth of theology, rather than to its gradual attenuation under the criticism of science.’

DR. N. H. MARSHALL, *Theology and Truth*, p. 214.

‘It may indeed be said that while man’s action is uncertain, God cannot be supposed to vary from His own law. But the law of the physical world is not a self-acting force; it is only a theory of our own to describe sequences imperfectly known; and there is no reason to think that with our present powers we shall ever come to a perfect knowledge of them. Natural law not including personal action, cannot be a perfect expression of God’s nature or will, though it must be true so far as it goes. At all events the part of it known to us cannot be more than an imperfect expression which leaves room for a further expression by other means, if other means there be.’

DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 24.

‘To sum up, there are a number of “isms” which we scornfully call fads. They express a loss of perspective—intellectual, emotional, or practical, the dominance of some fixed idea which distorts or obscures vision. It is easy to scoff at one or other of these fads, but the chances are that we are ourselves victims. It is more in the line of progress to study their meaning, and then we see that they are often reactions against some denial of the unity of life, the unity of science, the unity of nature, or some greater unity than these.’

J. A. THOMSON, *Progress of Science in the Century*, p. 40.

‘Enough has been said to indicate the probability that the patient study of evolution is likely soon to supply the basis for a natural theology more comprehensive, more profound, and more hopeful than could formerly be imagined. The Nineteenth Century has borne the brunt, the Twentieth will reap the fruition.’

J. FISKE, *Life Everlasting*, p. 87.

‘There is nothing in the conception of design to limit it to finite beings. Doubtless design on God’s part must differ from design of ours, but it is still design. Infinite wisdom which sees all the conditions of the problem may work very differently from the finite wisdom which has to pick its way from step to step. It may move to its end with unfailing certainty, but it will choose an end and co-ordinate means to ends as finite wisdom does. The alternative is that a perfect Being either cannot design anything at all, or cannot work out a design by law—which seems a strange idea of perfection.’

DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 68.

## I

## INTRODUCTION

It is one of the tragic surprises of youth brought up under Christian auspices, to discover, all too soon, that there are those around him who impugn the character, and even question the existence, of the God whom he has from the beginning been taught to regard as always near and always good. Such surprise is apt to deepen into disappointment when he finds that there is really no short and easy method with such questioners. He looks about in vain for some succinct demonstration which shall finally silence all gainsayers, or even hush to rest all his own heart's misgivings. As his range of thought and reading widens, he meets with ever more contradictory pleadings, until at last he is confronted by an Agnosticism which, with equal confidence and inconsistency, assures him that the further quest is vain. As Mr. James Mill taught his illustrious son that of the origin of things nothing whatever could be known, so did Mr. Herbert Spencer proclaim to the latter half of the nineteenth century that 'the infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed, is absolutely and for ever unknowable.' When for comfort of mind he turns to Christian

advocates,<sup>1</sup> he finds to his perplexity that some even of these assure him with unbounded confidence that science and faith are hopelessly at variance, although science, he plainly sees, can no more now be banished from human thought than religion from human life.

From the despair which might well result amid such conflicting counsels, he is perhaps saved by the suggestion of some wise friend, who may remind him that the way of rigid definition and exact logic is by no means the only way of arriving at moral and spiritual truth.<sup>2</sup> He may call to mind once more Tennyson's oft-quoted tribute to his friend :

Perplexed in faith but pure in deeds,  
At last he beat his music out.  
There lives more faith in honest doubt,  
Believe me, than in half the creeds.

Even if here, however, his sliding footsteps are stayed, he finds that he has said good-bye not only to the method of rigour and vigour, but to the pristine

<sup>1</sup> 'Must we therefore as reasonable beings give these doctrines up'—i.e. God, freedom, and immortality—'with all the associations, judgements, principles, and hopes that depend on them? If we have nothing to turn to but the arguments of the ordinary religious apologist, there can be no doubt that we must.'—'All the facts of the universe, as science and observation reveal them to us, unite in showing that the primary doctrines of religion are superfluous as hypotheses, unsupported by evidence as assertions, and not to be reconciled with the nature of things as ideas.'—'Both these beliefs, that the cosmic mind is good, and that man is a free agent, we have seen to be beset by difficulties which are for the intellect insoluble, and must be frankly accepted as such.'—Mr. W. H. Mallock, *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, pp. 185, 242; *The Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 291.

<sup>2</sup> 'For us human beings rigour and vigour apply only to mathematics, which is a purely formal and subjective science.'—*Theism*, by Dr. Borden Bowne, p. 17; see also pp. 16-22.

simplicity of his faith. He is in a condition of mind and heart which is becoming more and more common throughout Christendom, but for which there is, all too often, little or no help in ordinary Christian methods. The old-time charge of special moral depravity which used to be hurled at every doubter, is now perforce rolled back. Yet it remains true that what are called the 'public means of grace,' are, almost without exception, intended for and adapted to untroubled minds. It would be well, indeed, if large numbers of worshippers were troubled. The estimate of a recent writer is sadly true. 'Very many of those who profess to believe in God do not really so believe. They only believe that they believe, and sometimes not even that. A general real belief in God would wake the world into newness of life. Nothing is so greatly wanted. But at present the honest mind that will not be satisfied with make-believes, that must have reasons relevant to rely upon, and firm ground whereon to stand, often finds itself in very great difficulty.'<sup>1</sup>

In most cases sheer affirmation of belief in God, is accounted the best and only safe way of meeting modern theistic difficulties. If this method fails, as it always does where help is most needed, then the retreat of the affirmer is covered by dark hints as to the perversity of human nature. But the least honest reflection shows that such affirmations are only the

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, by W. L. Walker, p. 10. This is a valuable work recently published, which merits the special study of every thoughtful inquirer. The present work was practically complete before Mr. Walker's volume on so kindred a theme appeared, but special attention is gladly called to it by means of quotations and references.

reiteration of pure subjectivity, unless the corresponding counter-assertions of other minds equally intelligent and sincere are fairly faced. Whether we lament it or not, Dr. McTaggart's statement is beyond controversy that 'no dogma—at any rate no dogma of religion—is asserted, which is not also denied by able students.'<sup>1</sup> Further reflection makes equally manifest that it is no longer possible to provide a few succinct and final reasons why every intelligent man should become at once and without vacillation a Theist, rather than a Pantheist, or Atheist, or Agnostic. All such attempts to remove doubt by a wave of the orthodox hand, only show that the great questions involved have never been really faced. In an age of growing mental restlessness it cannot but often happen that just those difficult phases of the subject which are ignored, are open to recur at any moment. The only method, therefore, of Christian advocacy which has any chance of helpfulness, is that which begins at the beginning and takes pains to view the whole case for Theism steadily, and view it whole.

The suggestion that such processes of thought are necessary for every modern preacher, to say nothing of the ordinary believer, will doubtless seem to many minds rather a counsel of despair than of perfection. But without conceding Dr. McTaggart's demand that men must be steeped in metaphysics before they have a right to be religious, it must be acknowledged that the rational way of faith is the only reliable way. The fact that ordinary Christian worship cannot be turned into evidential lectures, no more lessens the need for

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 292.

a reasoned basis of belief, than does the peaceful aspect of any city warrant the closing of all fire-engine stations, or the beauty of a summer's eve mean that there will be no more need of medical men. For along with the disappearance of simple certainty from the mind of youth, comes the injection of questions into the thoughts of their elders. It is a well-worn fiction, which becomes more flimsy every year, that doubts are engendered in believers' minds by unskilful pulpit defences of faith. The blight of doubt is so manifest in all directions, that to ask whence particular instances come, betrays an obtuseness of vision which is almost hopeless.

The popular plea for an easy demonstration is scarcely more hopeful. When even Mr. Walker in his valuable work says that 'belief in God cannot be dependent upon reasons which are recondite or difficult of apprehension,'<sup>1</sup> his own previous statement that 'at the present time especially, it is very difficult for many a one to believe in God,' shows that the demand for simplicity may be overpressed. Without corresponding depth and solidity, simple arguments are only suited for simple minds, and these increasingly tend to diminish in modern populations.

Nor is anything more noteworthy in the religious thought of to-day, than the growing extent to which some of the ablest writers on Theism lay stress on methods of proof which until recently were regarded as too airy to merit much attention. The Theism of the future will undoubtedly rest more and more upon the metaphysical and the ideal, rather than upon the

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

physical and the real. It is here that the difficulty arises for its modern exponent. To most people, even in these days of education, the very word 'philosophy' is unintelligible, if not obnoxious. Even if science be released from the bands of phenomenalism in which not a few purists would confine it, the valid reasons for belief in God would still have to be sought and found along the paths of philosophy rather than of science. But by the plain man, though he be highly intelligent in other respects, metaphysics are curtly dismissed as but a profitless jargon of meaningless words. Idealism is certainly by the popular mind deemed very unreal, in an unphilosophical sense. To cast any slight upon the independent reality of the external world, appears to ordinary intelligence the very climax of confusion. The whole controversy between dualism and monism is to the popular mind as little appreciable as Esperanto. Such philosophy does indeed, as Mr. Tennant says,<sup>1</sup> 'labour under an enormous disadvantage. To the plain man its teaching is a stumbling-block, to the man of science it is foolishness.' But he rightly adds, 'None the less is it increasingly true that the reconciliation between science and religion—the practical need for which is not dissolved away by any exact defining of terms—must be brought to pass, if at all, *in profundis*. All skimming over the surface in conventional terms, is mere waste of time and energy.'

Thus what we see taking place around us is explained. On the one hand vast numbers of otherwise intelligent and honest people are being seriously affected by

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, pp. 65, 67.



Prof. Haeckel's Monism and Mr. Blatchford's 'Determinism,' whilst on the other, really educated men, and thinkers such as Sir Oliver Lodge and Prof. Lloyd Morgan, not to mention a host of others, meet both with unhesitating rejection and philosophical contempt. The contradiction is definitely instructive. The practical man, whether biologist or journalist, looks upon metaphysics much as a tyro in mathematics looks upon a page of Newton's *Principia*.<sup>1</sup> The symbols with which a Sylvester or a Carey work, appear, we know, to the man of business as meaningless as a page of Tennyson's poetry to a dog. But popular ignorance does not in the least diminish the significance of the higher mathematics to a trained student. It is the training, not the real sense, which is lacking elsewhere. When, therefore, Mr. Tennant asserts<sup>2</sup> that 'it is only by refusing to open the debate until the realistic has been exchanged for the idealistic standpoint, that Theism can entertain the prospect of ultimate success,' the subtlety of philosophical reasoning which is involved, no more becomes a just object of contempt for pious simplicity than bacteriological investigation merits the scorn of a plague-smitten village. Yet think what this exchange of standpoint means for the ordinary man! Two typical writers may be taken as representing the two great streams of tendency to-day. First we have the dogma of Dr. McTaggart :

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Bowne's remark (p. 248) that 'the race has been universally religious but only moderately metaphysical,' is abundantly confirmed. Amongst others, Mr. R. Blatchford tells how he 'never laughed so much in all his life,' as over Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. (!) See *Literary Guide*, September, 1903.

<sup>2</sup> *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 86.

‘The only way of coming to any conclusions on matters of religious dogma, is by means of metaphysical arguments.’<sup>1</sup> Then we meet with the avowal of Mr. Walker that ‘if we can only be sure of God after we have mastered the intricacies of Science and Philosophy, we are in a bad case.’<sup>2</sup> Here are two views both of which merit regard. When the great question is propounded as to the reality of God and the nature of His relations to men, surely ‘an answer on which so much depends, ought to be simple and within easy reach of all rational beings.’ But again is there not equal reason to ask, ‘Is knowledge so easy to get that the highest and deepest of all knowledge is likely to be had for the asking? Or is everything good so common that we should expect that religion—almost the best of all earthly things—should never be absent where it is desired?’<sup>3</sup>

The truth is that to-day as much as ever, or rather more than ever, there are two distinct classes of mind to be contemplated from the standpoint of the Christian Church. The main concern of Christian workers appears to be the ‘masses,’ and not unnaturally, when the vast numbers of human beings so described are considered. But if for a moment only we accept the social division connoted, and speak also of the ‘classes,’ it must be acknowledged that these need all the best influences that can issue from a valid Theism, quite as much as those who occupy socially an inferior position. It were difficult indeed to say which needs

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 291.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> McTaggart, *Some Dogmas*, &c., p. 298.

most all that true religion can do for him, the man in the street or the university graduate. The genius of Christianity, we know, no more despises the unlettered man than it fawns upon the scholar. To accept without demur the transient dogmas of the latter, would be but a species of foolish flattery. To think that for the former anything will do so long as it is sweet and easy, is a mere counsel of contempt. Too much knowledge and too little, may equally be stumbling-blocks in the way of a real faith. In regard to the highest truths, the clever man sometimes cannot see the wood for the trees. The average man of modern society, whether high or low, needs to have the 'eyes of his heart' opened as well as those of his mind, if he is to see anything beyond his bargains and his meals. Certainly, it is no real kindness, any more than it is general gain for truth, to seek to relieve him, either in the name of an infallible church or of an infallible book, still less under the guise of a blindly practical Pyrrhonism,<sup>1</sup> of all difficulties in thinking out for himself a valid foundation of belief. 'In malice be babes, but in mind be men,' said an enthusiastic believer of old. Such good counsel was never more needed than now. Its adoption will mean quite as much that the literary man must be taught to feel, as the practical man to think. Assuredly to-day the more zeal a man has for Christian things, the greater is his need not only of clear thought, but of thought in modern categories. Dr. Bowne may be right that 'theistic arguments in general are never the source of

<sup>1</sup> Such as is advocated in Mr. Mallock's *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, and *The Reconstruction of Belief*, *passim*.

our theistic faith, but only reasons for a faith already possessed.<sup>1</sup> Yet such reasons are increasingly required as education spreads, alike to assure one's own mind that the assumed possession is not a mere subjective illusion, and to open doors of possible conviction for those who avowedly have no such possession.

The best helper of men towards the religion which Dr. McTaggart pronounces 'almost the best of all earthly things' ought undoubtedly to be the Christian Church. But this supposes that, to an extent which does not at present prevail, the recognized exponents of faith must be men of their own generation. They cannot influence modern men unless they themselves are modern, alike in knowledge and in teaching. This is not to say that they are to follow the latest critical novelty, or accept as Christian doctrines the mere results of scrambling in a fog. Yet one must honestly acknowledge that it is a much more difficult matter to set forth definite religious truths in the light of modern science, than it is to glorify revivals, or spend oneself in the practical philanthropies of missions. These may all be good beyond cavil, but they do not in the least diminish the plain truth that the revival which is most of all needed throughout society to-day, is the revival of Christian conviction. The man who turns suddenly from vice to virtue, may well find in his changed experience sufficient grounds for continued belief. But the majority of our fellow countrymen are no more vicious than they are convinced believers. Sin to them, if real at all, must mean something more than drink, or dishonesty, or lust.

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 272.

Yet it can only mean more by the definite acceptance of God as the source of the universe, and the true basis of moral law. And the conviction that He is such must come in the main through mental channels, not practical or social. The appeal to modern men must still be as intellectual as that of Christ to His contemporaries.<sup>1</sup> Faith that is not rational is but misnamed superstition.

But to be rational, prolonged metaphysical research is no more necessary than classical learning is to sanity. It is true that the rationality of belief must be developed through thought, even as muscular strength through exercise. But this does not necessitate either an exact definition of the nature of God, or a logical demonstration of His existence. In regard to ourselves we have neither of these. Yet it will be agreed that the man who on such a pretext denies his own being, may well be left out of account. In regard alike to the divine existence and our own, 'we have no longer to seek for an impossible demonstration, but only for a rational interpretation.'<sup>2</sup>

Whilst, however, Dr. Rashdall is entirely warranted in affirming that 'we can only think of the divine consciousness by the analogy of our own,'<sup>3</sup> it must never be overlooked that our own consciousness is as directly certain as it is analytically unfathomable. And as applied to God, we may not start our rational interpretation by assuming that He is as directly real to us as we are to ourselves. Such assumption would be but a form of the long-discredited Anselmic argument that

<sup>1</sup> Luke xii. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 24.

the idea of God may be identified with the being of God. When, therefore, an able writer from the theistic standpoint concludes thus: 'We must begin with belief in God, by recognizing that He is no inference or hypothesis, and that we must not hope to reach Him by putting a chain of reasoning between us and Him. At that distance spiritual communion becomes a remote possibility, whereas we know it in experience as the most immediate fact,'<sup>1</sup> such a position limits itself to a narrowness which is virtually useless for all purposes of theistic advocacy. Not only are those who will be thoughtfully prepared to say 'we know Him as the most immediate fact of experience,' a very small and some would say insignificant minority, but the rest are excluded from any possibility of knowing Him. It would be only too easy to mention by name<sup>2</sup> numbers of men whose intelligence and sincerity are equal to any exhibited in the Christian Church, who would most definitely repudiate any such experience. If we must begin our theistic plea with belief in God, for all such there can be no beginning at all.

But the fullest acknowledgement of large powers of mind and genuine purity of motive, on the part of cultured unbelief, cannot in any case amount to the concession of infallibility. There is abundant room for the Christian rationalism which may be described as the endeavour to do justice alike to the experience

<sup>1</sup> Dr. F. B. Jevons, *Religion in Evolution*, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> Merely as types, say Prof. McTaggart, Sir Michael Foster, Mr. John Morley, M.P., Mr. J. M. Robertson, M.P., &c., amongst living authors.

which is beyond words, definition, or demonstration, and the objective realities which are ever necessary to justify or correct experience. In this sense a cultured Theist is well warranted in setting forth the grounds of his own conviction<sup>1</sup> by an endeavour to show that Theism is not contradicted by science, is in harmony with philosophy, and may be shown to be rational for all ordinary minds. The Theomonism to which—as the following pages seek to point out—modern knowledge, forming the basis of philosophy, appears to lead us, may seem to be alike too little for the theologian and too much for the naturalist. Such a result appears inevitable. By way of appeasing both these, it may be acknowledged that a complete and consistent delineation of Theism on evolutionary lines is not yet possible. But it may be truly affirmed that the process of accurate thought is proceeding. The connotation of the thought of God necessarily broadens and deepens with advancing knowledge. Augustine's vision of the little child trying to put the ocean into a little sand-hollow<sup>2</sup> becomes more impressively true every century. The faith that is equally real and instructed, tends ever to a reverent agnosticism. But two things stand out clearly.

1. A partial faith is better than nothing. We are by no means driven as yet to think of accepting that

<sup>1</sup> 'I believe with all my heart that the existence of God is demonstrable, and appeal to the gulf stream of the history of philosophy in vindication of my conviction. In this contention, I am undoubtedly keeping the best of philosophical company.'—Dr. Tigert, *Theism*, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Succinctly related, with appropriate comment, by Mr. Mallock, *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 257.



most pitiful of all mirages to which Dr. McTaggart would kindly direct us, as compensation for the loss of our faith.<sup>1</sup> For whether we know much or little, a belief that is valid enough to live by, is 'a pearl of great price.' Without committing ourselves to the imaginative excesses of cheap religious novels,<sup>2</sup> we may well have overwhelming reasons for holding that the general destruction of belief in God would be, as Strauss and Romanes found it, an unmeasured tragedy. The prevention of such a calamity, even if it be but partial and practical, is itself a benediction. 'Our insistence upon unity,' says Dr. Caldecott, rightly—and the unity is that which issues in Theomonism—'is addressed not only to philosophy as guardian of truth, but to philosophy as giving us guidance for good and happy life.'<sup>3</sup>

2. In the very struggle towards the convictions which bring such guidance with them, is large part of their value. There may be paradox, but there is not contradiction, in asserting that the function of reason is not to demonstrate but to illustrate theistic faith, and at the same time pointing out that such faith is 'itself an ideal rather than a fully realized possession.'<sup>4</sup> The unfathomed mystery and unmeasured capacity of human nature are such as to make the discipline of difficulty an essential part of man's higher development. The reported request of Christ's disciples that

<sup>1</sup> 'It must be remembered that the man who has no religion, cannot have a bad one.'—*Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 294.

<sup>2</sup> Such as *When it was Dark*—which was surely unworthy of the imprimatur of a bishop.

<sup>3</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 146.

<sup>4</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 323.

He would by some immediate process 'increase' their 'faith,' was as childish as unanswerable. So long as a man is a person and not a thing, a mechanical endowment of belief is a contradiction in terms. Faith to be real must be active. 'The will to believe' is an indispensable condition of believing.<sup>2</sup> It is here, alike on the individual and the social scale, that the element of cost comes in. No pain is more real than honest doubt. There is no fight more keen than the fight for faith. No struggle is more terrible than the clutching at a noble and inspiring hope which seems about to be snatched away. When individual character is considered, it is the struggle for right, the conflict for truth, the pain of relinquishing enjoyable error, which lift manhood above the animal, as no participation in easy sweets could do throughout a whole eternity of comfort. And as regards the race, Mr. Fiske has truly said that 'it is only after long ages of social discipline fraught with cruel afflictions and grinding misery, that the moral law becomes dominant and religious aspiration intense and abiding in the soul.'<sup>3</sup>

Such a process of spiritual evolution includes the accumulated effect of innumerable struggles, at incalculable cost, on the part of untold myriads of those who have sought for truth as for hid treasure. No treasure that ever was or will be presented to the mind of man, is to be compared with the assurance of the reality of God, freedom, and immortality. We cannot

<sup>1</sup> Luke xvii. 5.

<sup>2</sup> 'There is no argument which shall by mere force of logic make the divine existence an inference which a man even against his will must draw.'—Dr. F. B. Jevons, *Religion in Evolution*, p. vii.

<sup>3</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 53.

be surprised, therefore, and ought not to be grieved, that such assurance should be far too costly to drop into the careless lap of every one who merely sighs for it. Here falls unmeasured emphasis upon the Master's word that 'the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence.' The man who in his pride of intellect has made a god of his knowledge, will have to do violence to his idol, and become in teachableness, through other means, as a little child. Nor less will he who, full of childish pride at his ignorance, has worshipped mental vacuity, have to do violence to his fetish and become a man. Only then will either be able to understand, let alone appreciate and endorse, what has been wisely written with an eye to both necessities—'The conclusion is that Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It cannot indeed be demonstrated without assumption, but it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests.'<sup>1</sup> That all this is summed up in the truth of Theomonism, as the expression of the latest, fairest, and fullest thought concerning God and the universe, including ourselves, it is hoped the following pages will help to establish.

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. iv.

## II

### THE GENERAL GROUNDS OF THEISM

‘The word “God” is one that ought not to be ambiguous. Theists and Anti-theists are generally agreed that it means a personal Being of infinite rightness and infinite goodness, wielding infinite wisdom and infinite power. The existence of such a Being the Theist affirms and the dogmatic Atheist denies, while the Pantheist refines away His personality, the Polytheist His attributes, and the Agnostic tells us that with our faculties it is futile to discuss the matter. The answers are various enough; but there is no ambiguity in the question, Is there such a Being, or is there not?’

DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 40.

‘Were man only a beast, he would go the way of the beasts and be satisfied; but being a beast he is something more than a beast; and that something whereby he differs from the beasts, belonging of necessity to a higher order, can be nothing else than some such an element of the divine as is theologically called the image of God.’

DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 44.

‘We are absolutely forced by science to believe with perfect confidence in a Directive Power—in an influence other than physical or dynamical or electrical forces. There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in a Creative Power, and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. . . . Do not be afraid of being freethinkers. If you think strongly enough, you will be forced by science to the belief in God which is the foundation of all religion.’

LORD KELVIN, *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1903, p. 1069.

‘Thus no positive hypothesis can be offered as a substitute for ■ personal God, which is not either an abstraction from personality and therefore demonstrably unreal, or an abstraction inconsistently personified and therefore demonstrably untrue.’

DR. ILLINGWORTH, *Personality, Human and Divine*,  
(cheap ed.), p. 99.

‘We need no long discussion of the so-called “chance variations” by which evolution is said to be carried on. The phrase may pass, but only as a confession of ignorance, not as an anti-theistic assumption. Chance means obscure causes, not no causes at all. Given the throw, the toss of a halfpenny might be calculated as accurately as the fall of a stone, if our analysis were equal to the task.’

DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 59.

## II

## THE GENERAL GROUNDS OF THEISM

IN some fashion or other, our ablest anthropologists tell us, men have always believed in God. But they have never believed without cause. Crude, childish, and misleading may have been their reasons, but they have been reasons notwithstanding. The confused rumours of their beliefs float down to us from ages past like the murmur of some vast crowd in the distance, equally unmistakable and indistinguishable. Yet it is made up of individual voices. The beliefs of nations resolve themselves ultimately into innumerable cases in which men believed in some god because they felt that they had grounds for so doing. In this connexion the history of Theism is intensely interesting and vastly pathetic.<sup>1</sup> The evolution of the idea of God constitutes truly a noble study. Whether it proceeded upward from animism, through fetishism, polytheism, henotheism to monotheism, or, as some think possible, downwards from a primitive monotheism into

<sup>1</sup> 'When we study the entire religious movement of humanity, noting not only the crude forms in which it began, but also the higher forms to which it grew, we get a deeper sense of the universality and ineradicability of the religious element, and also a valuable hint of the direction in which its normal development lies.'—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 11.

corruptions requiring afterwards to be corrected,<sup>1</sup> need not here concern us. Whatever the course of evolution, or deterioration, we have to do with the latest and best. It is the highest, not the lowest, which has to be appreciated and accounted for. The Theism of to-day is not that of the ancients—unless, as Bacon said, we are the true ancients, having in ourselves the ‘experience of the ages. Through all the ages men have been groping after God—‘if haply they might feel after Him and find Him.’ Modern Theism avows that there are good and sufficient reasons for believing that in a larger sense than the speaker on Mars Hill could know, ‘He is not far from each one of us.’ The acceptance of Theomonism means an assured conviction of the reality of God, alike immanent and transcendent, whose personality culminates in an infinite Fatherhood which men may know and love, and which they ought to trust and obey.<sup>2</sup>

Against such an ideal only one objection can be raised, namely, that it is too good to be true. The ablest thinkers on the side of unbelief have acknowledged this.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Religion in Evolution*, by Dr. F. B. Jevons, Lecture 3. ‘The question dealt with in this Lecture is whether religion has been evolved out of or preceded by a non-religious or pre-religious stage in the history of man. A pre-religious stage cannot yet be said to have been satisfactorily proved.’

<sup>2</sup> ‘If these arguments be sound, we have already reached the theistic inference that the world exists in and for an infinite Spirit, a Being characterized by Mind and Will, a Being transcending the world which exists for Him, and immanent in the world which exists in Him.’—F. R. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 88.

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the loss of such a belief Dr. McTaggart says, ‘In spite of the alleviations which I have pointed out, we are here confronted with one of the great tragedies of life.’—*Some Dogmas, &c.*,



Hence the task before us is to inquire whether such a conception of God, confessedly the highest, can be justified in the light of our latest knowledge. Unless philosophy can furnish at least a sound basis for such belief, theology becomes, for the modern mind, only a castle in the air. It is necessary to point out once more that it is not a question of 'conflict between religion and science,' because the only science which can be in conflict with religion is not really science, but scientific philosophy, or the philosophy of science.<sup>1</sup> So that when a man of science such as Prof. Haeckel turns philosopher, which he has a perfect right to do if he so chooses, his acknowledged eminence in science is no pledge whatever of the validity of his philosophical judgements. It is the business of science, strictly speaking, to provide the facts as the raw material for philosophy to work upon.<sup>2</sup> It has the right to insist that these shall be used up in any philosophical

p. 297. It would be much more true to say, the greatest tragedy of life. For if faith in God, as Christian Theism portrays Him, be warranted, there is ground for hope and comfort in every other tragedy. If this fails, there is no hope anywhere.

'That God is love is a very lofty, poetical, and gratifying conception, but it is open to one fatal objection—it is not true.'—R. Blatchford, *God and My Neighbour*, p. 73.

<sup>1</sup> 'The newer physical science, which is slowly but surely making headway against the prejudices of scientific orthodoxy, proclaims that its rôle is not explanation at all, but only description, and having cleared itself of all metaphysical implications it professes to be no more than a systematized shorthand account of natural events as they happen.'—F. R. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> 'A philosophical system in interpreting nature, in giving content to its concept of God, and in attempting to formulate the relation of God to the world, must take into account the established facts of natural science, keep in touch with them, and abide by them.'—F. R. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 74.

structure, but what shall be the form or design of the structure is altogether beyond its province to decide. This being understood, there is no reason whatever why the student of science should not also be a philosopher. And if it may be assumed that such is generally the case, we may speak indifferently of scientific philosophy or of philosophical science. The question then becomes as pressing as legitimate, Does modern scientific philosophy tend to confirm or to oppose Theism? A fair answer seems to involve two things. (1) A careful and succinct summary of the generally alleged reasons for a belief in God; and (2) a survey of each of these in the fullest, or even fiercest, light of present knowledge. The former of these will occupy us here, and the latter in the ensuing chapter.

Several distinct arguments are usually advanced as rational grounds for theistic faith. These naturally appeal with varying force to different types of mind. A thoughtful writer <sup>1</sup> has well said recently that 'men only agree completely upon that to which they are indifferent, such as the roundness of the earth; it is neither right nor possible that they should all experience or conceive God in the same manner.' And this is no less true concerning the methods by which the thought of God, as really existing, is attained. No one argument will appear equally conclusive to every man. Nor certainly can the fullest statement of some one phase of a complexity of interblending reasons, be a sufficient representation of the whole case. Rather

<sup>1</sup> R. B. Arnold, *Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality*, p. 303.

as the strength of a wheel depends not upon any one spoke, but upon the combined and converging strength of all, so is the only fair representation of the grounds of theistic belief to be found in an estimate which not only considers them all, but all in their inseparable relations.

To-day, in spite of the constant progress in science, it appears, as already hinted, that metaphysical rather than purely scientific arguments tend to prevail.<sup>1</sup> This will perhaps scarcely appear reassuring to many minds which share the common impression that metaphysics are but a distracting maze of meaningless words. A little patient attention, however, soon serves to dispel such an illusion. As Dr. Rashdall has well said, 'The common-sense arguments for theistic beliefs are only the metaphysical arguments imperfectly thought out. The metaphysician is simply the man who thinks out the problems about which all who think carefully of things in general have thought to some extent, who thinks them out in a systematic and more thorough manner than other people, and who has acquainted himself with the best that has been thought and written about such subjects by others.'<sup>2</sup> Thus the appeal to-day is still to common sense, even as the appeal of astronomy is still to vision—but vision aided by instruments. Philosophy, which of course includes metaphysics, is but the instrument

<sup>1</sup> 'The witness of science, in so far as science can be suggestive of philosophical theory, to that idealistic view of the universe which forms the basis for theistic theology, is increasing and may further increase.'—F. R. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, pp. 6, 7.

of mental vision ; it represents neither more nor less than common sense cleared, extended, expanded.

(1) *The Cosmological Argument*

Hence we may take as the first reason for belief in God, that which is not only most common and most popular, but is also logically at the basis of the rest, seeing that it involves the basal axiom without which no argument at all can be constructed. It is not necessary for our present purpose to enter upon an elaborate disquisition as to the nature and warrant of causation. In full view of all that may be learned from Kant or Hume, we are yet compelled to affirm that if we were at liberty to speak or think of any thing, or event, as issuing uncaused out of nothing, there would be an end of all our processes of reasoning. Such a postulate could only land us in chaos, whether in the light of experience or observation. For the uneducated man it may be said, without hesitation, that here his common sense is a safe guide. But the principle involved becomes more deeply impressive to the educated mind. The man in the street knows, if he knows anything, that the street did not make itself, and he is perfectly if unconsciously logical when he infers that for himself, as really as for the paving-stones, there must be some maker and arranger. The metaphysician only states this in clear and general terms, when he says, 'It is a necessity of thought to suppose that nothing which has a beginning can be without a cause why it should begin to be,'<sup>1</sup> or why

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 27.

it should be as it is, and not otherwise. Truly 'no experience could make us believe that something happened without some reason why it should happen.'<sup>1</sup>

It must also be clearly seen and stated here, that the necessity of a cause involves the adequacy of that cause. That is to say, the less can never be the true cause of the greater. Nor can anything be in the effect which was not also in the cause. Thus, in technical language, not only have we the old axiom, *e nihilo nihil fit*, but *e parvo nil nisi parvum fit*. In other words, the effect cannot be more or greater than the cause. Hence it must follow that whether we think of a bacillus, or a man, or a universe, in every case both the actuality and the quality of being demand adequate cause. The suggestion which now is becoming common, that the universe is eternal,<sup>2</sup> does not in the least affect the main plain principle. It is indeed itself encumbered with fallacies. (i) Science can only say that it is 'almost certain' that matter and motion have no end. But upon an 'almost' no final conclusion

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 29. This is capable of statement in many ways. As one other specimen take that of Dr. Schurman. 'Whatever has begun to be, whether a thing or an event, must have a cause or antecedent which accounts for it. So much may be admitted as self-evident. And its self-evidence is not affected by Hume's irrefragable demonstration that we can give no reason for the necessity which always attaches to our thought of the relation between cause and effect. For everything that has come to be, there is a cause of its coming to be.'—*Belief in God*, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> Take as a fair specimen of this the following from Mr. Dennis Hird's *An Easy Outline of Evolution*. 'Neither matter nor motion can be destroyed, so that it is almost certain, as they can have no end, that they had no beginning.—Recognizing always that matter and motion are eternal, we no longer look for a beginning, neither do we look for an end to the universe.'—pp. 184, 186.

can logically be based.<sup>1</sup> (ii) We have no manner of right on other grounds to postulate the eternal existence of the universe, as an independent and self-sufficient reality. (iii) Even if an eternally existent universe were supposed, it would but point to the necessity for an eternal cause. For causality is not a category of precedence in time, but of dependence in being. The timeless being of the universe requires a reason for its distinction from not-being. Its self-causation is unthinkable.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> How far from being 'axiomatic' are the two scientific 'laws' out of which Haeckel constructs the 'law of substance'—as the basis of his assertion of the eternity of matter and motion—Sir Oliver Lodge has well shown in chap. ii. of his little volume on *Life and Matter*. In regard to the assumption that these two 'recent generalizations of science solve the main problem of the universe and suffice to replace the Deity Himself,' he well says, 'To curb these extravagant pretensions it is only necessary to consider soberly what these physical laws really assert.'

The student is also earnestly recommended to procure Prof. Chwolson's recently published work—*Hegel, Haeckel, Kossuth und das zwölfte Gebot*—in which Haeckel's would-be demonstration of infinite space and eternal motion by appeal to his 'law of substance' is exposed as an utter fallacy by the eminent Professor of Physics at the Royal University of St. Petersburg. We shall be obliged to return to this subject presently. Suffice it here to suggest that if the Rationalist Press Association is as anxious to promulgate the truth as it avows, it should commission Mr. Jos. McCabe to give to the English-speaking world as vigorous a translation of this booklet as of Haeckel's *Riddle*. Alas for the conclusion to which this physical expert comes! 'The result of our investigation is startling—indeed one may say it makes one's hair stand on end. All, yes! verily all that Haeckel says, explains, affirms, in his dealing with physical questions, is false, rests on misapprehensions, or displays an almost incredible ignorance of the most elementary physical questions' (p. 76).

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, by the present writer, pp. 490-3. Prof. Lloyd Morgan has also well said that Cause is not 'an initial Force at the back of time, but an underlying omnipresent Power of which the sequences of science are manifestations in time and space' (*Contemporary Review*, June, 1904, p. 788).

(iv) Eternal evolution by means of intercurrent devolution, is itself so tremendous a conception as to demand for its justification a correspondingly tremendous cause. So that the utmost logical effect which the assumption of an eternal universe would have upon theistic doctrine would be nothing, seeing that Theism already postulates such an eternal Being as is adequate, and alone could be adequate, for the causal production of an eternal universe.

This principle of causation, upon which all here depends, does not require argumentation, seeing that it is conceded by the most distinguished advocates of naturalism. Thus in pleading for 'mechanicism' Prof. Haeckel urges that 'it alone can give us a true explanation of natural phenomena, *for* it traces them to their real efficient causes.'<sup>1</sup> So that what we have to do is to apply this principle to all phenomena, alike on the smallest and the largest scale.

1. If first we think of the mikrokosm of our own conscious being, we cannot say less than Descartes. His famous formula, 'I think, therefore I am,' confessedly assumes that which it seeks to demonstrate. But that does not in the least affect the fact that two realities are here connoted—physical being, 'I am,' and mental being, 'I think,' for both of which reason demands adequate cause. In other words, in our own consciousness we have both actuality and quality of existence. These include all the complexities of the body, all the functions of mind, all the mysterious but actual interconnexions between the two.

<sup>1</sup> *Riddle of the Universe*, cheap ed., p. 92; italics mine.



2. When we turn to the makrokosm, or external universe, the conflict between realism and idealism need not here trouble us, for the distinction between a kosmos and a chaos is manifest, whether we attribute much or little of it to objective, as distinguished from subjective, reality. If we know anything at all, we know that we are surrounded by phenomena exhibiting order, law, harmony, intelligibility, beauty, beneficence. For each of these reason demands an adequate cause. Elaborate illustration is scarcely required. Dr. Fleming has well pointed out that 'the postulate which lies at the root of all our scientific study of Nature, is a conviction of its intelligibility.'<sup>1</sup> But we cannot possibly think of that which is intelligible as issuing from non-intelligence. The inference is incontrovertible that 'if Nature as a whole or in part is intelligible to us, it can only be because it is the product of intelligence.'<sup>2</sup>

Again, as to order expressed in law. No one now suggests that we should think of nature as simply a succession of accidental antecedents and consequents.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Evidence of Things not Seen*, by J. A. Fleming, D.Sc., F.R.S., p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12. In passing, one may point out that this alone puts an end to the suggestion of Haeckel's 'mechanicism' as a sufficient cause of anything. For it certainly requires mind to appreciate its working. But that which requires mind to appreciate, cannot be brought to pass without mind. A really mechanical cause is itself necessarily an effect.

<sup>3</sup> 'A real system, in order to be anything for us, must be a system of law, so that definite antecedents shall have the same definite consequents, and this in turn demands an exact adjustment or correspondence, of each of the interacting members to all the rest. Otherwise anything might be followed by everything or by nothing.' —Bowne, *Theism*, p. 67.



But when manifest order is recognized as law, we have the interworking of two factors, both equally necessary, both alike demanding explanation. Law, as such, involves intention, even in the definite selection of certain consequences and not others to follow certain antecedents, with power to enforce their actual concurrence. For all ordinary purposes, the language of the Psalms expressed this forcefully enough.<sup>1</sup> Our modern speech only says the same thing in another way, when it affirms that 'the nearest approach made by science to our hypothesis of the existence of God, lies in the assertion of the universality of law.'<sup>2</sup>

As regards beauty, one may appeal again to the validity of ordinary appreciation. Prof. Tyndall only assumed sane perception when, to his audience at the Royal Institution, he pointed out that 'by allowing carbonate of lime to crystallize, nature produces these beautiful rhomboids.'<sup>3</sup> The more perfect the description of the process of crystallization, the more the fact is emphasized that here, where there is no struggle for existence nor sexual selection, is unquestionably present that symmetry of form which requires mind to appreciate it. How, then, can the laws which result in such beauty be the result of less or other than mind? Kant's acknowledgement that 'for the beauty of nature we are obliged to seek a cause external to ourselves,'<sup>4</sup> is equally warranted in whatever degree we find that cause working

<sup>1</sup> Ps. cxix. 90, 91, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> *Fragments of Science*, vol. i. p. 357.

<sup>4</sup> *Natural Theology*, J. H. Kennedy, p. 163. See also the whole chapter.

through our own minds, as distinct from objective realities.

The beneficence of nature is also indisputable. The tragic easiness with which exceptions to such an estimate may be produced, does not avail to contradict it. The exception here only emphasizes the rule.<sup>1</sup> Apart from other considerations to be mentioned presently, the mystery of pain, be it ever so great, cannot possibly blot out the immeasurable manifestation of beneficence with which nature abounds. One might as well question the actuality of sunshine because of April clouds, as deny the ubiquity of benevolence in the correlations of nature in all directions. The harmonies and adaptations which everywhere abound, are not merely admirable and beautiful and useful, but contribute to an amount of enjoyable existence utterly beyond all human powers of calculation. To deny either the quantity or the quality of nature's gladness is simply to refuse the manifest truth.

Now all these, intelligibility, order, law, harmony, beauty, utility, beneficence, demand adequate cause, and there are only five possible ways in which it may be found. Each and all of these must (i) be self-caused; or (ii) arise from chance; or (iii) come of necessity; or (iv) exhibit mere phases of the eternal existence of the universe; or (v) result from intelligence expressing itself in volition. Of these alternatives the first four are cancelled by rational reflection.<sup>2</sup> That

<sup>1</sup> For the remarkable testimony of Sir Henry Thompson, from the standpoint of pronounced heterodoxy, if not Agnosticism, see *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> The allegations to the contrary will be examined in the next chapter.

any thing or event should be self-caused is unthinkable, for that would involve action before existence. Chance is irrational, because order and law are ever more and greater than chaos and confusion, and the greater cannot issue from the less. Necessity is not only pure assumption without warrant, but is itself—unless direction is surreptitiously introduced—nothing but chance plus force. It is, indeed, doubly self-contradictory in that it postulates the might of law as arising from no source whatever, and provides no direction in which such might shall work. It simply says to some imaginary ‘protyle,’ ‘thou shalt.’ But the echo throughout the universe is, ‘Thou shalt—what?’ Force, without direction, is as useless as it is unthinkable. Eternal existence we have seen to be merely an assumption itself requiring explanation.<sup>1</sup>

The last of these five alternatives is thus the only one upon which reason permits us to dwell. It is at the same time one which, on the minute scale, is made familiar to us in consciousness day by day. Here, however, scale is irrelevant. As the mathematical properties of the ellipse are utterly independent of size, so is the rational conviction valid that, measurelessly beyond our experience as really as within it, the cause of causes is an intelligently working will. Mr. Spencer’s short formula is true: ‘The assumption of the existence of a First Cause of the universe is a

<sup>1</sup> ‘Go back as far as science and imagination can carry you, and this external sphere, however changed in aspect, remains still a kosmos. To posit therefore the eternity of a chaos of atoms is a sheer absurdity.’—Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 154.

necessity of thought.' But it is not the whole truth.<sup>1</sup> When Theism affirms that 'this universe, with all its numberless adjustments, adaptations, and correlations, must have owed its origin to a cause, itself uncaused, adequate to its production,'<sup>2</sup> the stress which necessarily falls upon the term 'adequate,' carries us far beyond a mere 'energy.' Energy need not be human, but we ourselves, as being human and embodying mind, are compelled to attribute mind to the cause from which we have been derived. 'Thus the causal argument,' well says Dr. Schurman, 'points to anthropocosmic Theism.'<sup>3</sup> Truly, it can never do less.

## (2) *The Teleological Argument*

Concerning this Kant says that it 'always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.'<sup>4</sup> So too Mr. J. S. Mill pronounces it 'an argument of a real scientific character which does not shrink from scientific tests, but claims to be judged by the established canons of Induction.'<sup>5</sup> And Dr. Bowne adds, as wisely as truly, that 'it has been

<sup>1</sup> It may be well to bear in mind the fuller statement. 'Amid the mysteries which become more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that man is ever in the presence of one infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed.' See for good succinct comment hereupon, Orr's *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 80-6.

<sup>2</sup> C. A. Row, *Christian Theism*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 169.

<sup>4</sup> See Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 213.

<sup>5</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, cheap ed., p. 72.

over and under estimated. It does not give us the full idea of God, but with the non-speculative mind it will always be the main argument for the intelligence of the First Cause.<sup>1</sup> The popular designation of it is 'the design argument.' But however familiar such a name may be, it is equally unsatisfactory. It is, indeed, both ambiguous and illogical. It does not say whether the argument is from design or for design; and in either case the word 'design' almost necessarily begs the question to start with.<sup>2</sup> It will be seen on a moment's reflection to be a particular case of the argument from causation, but it certainly merits separate treatment, seeing that it not only points to a cause, but to a very special kind of cause, viz. mind expressing itself in purpose.

In regard to anything which bears the marks of adaptation or contrivance, there are always two questions to be asked, How was it constructed? and Why? In technical language the former refers to the efficient cause, the latter to the final cause. These are never to be confused, though they can never be separated. Final causes express themselves through efficient causes. Efficient causes are meaningless without a final cause. We can with our mental powers no more imagine that a tool or a table was made for no purpose, than we can think of either as having made itself. Every piece of mechanism we see implies not only an efficient cause in the mechanic who constructed it, but a final cause in the intention with which he did it. Whether we think of the first watch or the

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> See Bowne's *Theism*, p. 77, and Row's *Christian Theism*, p. 66.

latest dynamo, the principle is manifestly the same. When, therefore, we think of the world, or the whole kosmos of which it forms part, one may well say concerning the teleological argument that 'it is better adapted to convince common sense than the more speculative arguments.'<sup>1</sup> There is no conceivable answer to the theistic assertion that the more mechanical the working of nature is shown to be, as efficient cause, the greater is the need of both an efficient and a final cause for such efficiency.<sup>2</sup>

All adaptations imply both purpose and power, though not necessarily in the same degree. In our own efforts the purpose is generally much more clear and sufficient than the power. In the degree in which the power fulfils the purpose we speak of a perfect or a successful adaptation. But for the teleological argument, the degree of perfection is irrelevant. 'Nuremberg eggs,' as the first watches were styled, involved a purpose—that is, mind expressed in will—as surely as the most accurate modern chronometer. Nothing can touch this as a mental fact. Only insanity can deny it. It is illustrated everywhere and always. Even the savage, so far as he thinks at all, knows that it requires a being with a purpose to make a tomahawk. Still more clearly the modern man of science knows, and owns, that it requires a skilled optician, with a very definite intention, to make a microscope. In such a case no intelligent man dare suggest the absence

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> None too strongly does Dr. Bowne say concerning those who 'have naïvely transformed the assumed mechanism of nature into an eternal and self-sufficient necessity,' that 'this is less a logical than a pathological procedure' (p. 81).

either of the final or the efficient cause for the beauty and perfection of the finished instrument. But in full view of all that Helmholtz said hereupon,<sup>1</sup> the eye is a much more wonderful and beautiful and specially adapted instrument. And certainly the human mind will always believe that the more complex and beautiful result must have had the greater intelligence and purpose for its cause. Similarly, any one who has examined a linotype or a monotype machine, cannot but be impressed with the definite purpose no less than the marvellous ingenuity which such constructions involve. But there is still more purpose manifest in the page of print which appears as the leader of the daily paper, for here the intention is not the mere adaptation of mechanical parts, but the suggestion of thought and the communication of ideas.

It is said, however, that 'the objections to this method of proof are manifold.'<sup>2</sup> These will presently be considered. Here it is only necessary to mention one, namely, that the argument is purely based on analogy, and that the analogy neither holds good, nor is sufficient for theistic purposes. The former may well be answered in the words of Mr. Mill: 'The argument, therefore, is not one of mere analogy. As mere analogy it has its weight, but it is more than analogy. It surpasses analogy exactly as induction surpasses it. It is an inductive argument.'<sup>3</sup> Further-

<sup>1</sup> For which see *Miracles of Unbelief*, pp. 51-3, 78, 79, or *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 265-73.

<sup>2</sup> Knight's *Theism*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, cheap ed., p. 73.



more, seeing that teleology does not profess to give us the full idea of God, all objection as to its insufficiency falls to the ground. For the present, therefore, this whole argument may be left in Mr. Mill's words: 'It must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence.'<sup>1</sup>

### (3) *The Ethical Argument*

Every student knows how Kant, having most elaborately dismissed what he terms the 'only three modes of proving the existence of Deity on the grounds of speculative reason,'<sup>2</sup> proceeds in his *Critique of Practical Reason* to build up an ethical theism mainly on his doctrine of the 'categorical imperative.' The process he adopts is indeed, as Prof. Knight has said, 'excessively roundabout and altogether inferential.'<sup>3</sup> The imperative of duty being assumed 'for every will within the universe,' there ought to be perfect virtue here along with perfect happiness as its consequence; but seeing that this is not the case, nor is in many cases possible, there must be some future opportunity

<sup>1</sup> *Three Essays, &c.*, p. 75. Dr. Bowne also sums up the case well when he says, 'There is first an inductive inquiry whether there be activity for ends in nature, and then the speculative question how such finality is to be explained, is answered by referring it to intelligence.'—*Theism*, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> See *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 179, 220. Of the three modes Kant says, 'The first is the physico-theological argument, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More there are not, and more there cannot be.'

<sup>3</sup> See his *Aspects of Theism*, p. 175.



for working out the fitness of things. That is, there must be human immortality, and in order to this, there must be a Divine Being capable of ensuring it. 'Thus God, as well as immortality, was a corollary of the practical reason in man.' One wonders, certainly, that so acute a mind could ever have been satisfied with such an argument. In spite of his great name, its only permanent worth is in the stress which it lays upon the moral nature of man. This latter is assuredly no less real now than in Kant's days, but for various reasons it is decidedly in need of emphasis.

The perennial question of questions for philosophy, equally with theology, is, What is man? And there can be but three answers from which to choose. He must be a person, or an animal, or a thing. That a thing is not an animal, needs no demonstration. That an animal is not a person, ought to need none. That a man is a person, something more than an animal, is necessarily a postulate of all moral philosophy.<sup>1</sup> As modern Determinism does not generally deny the possibility of morality, we may here assume it.<sup>2</sup> The better class of Determinists not only allow the possibility of morality, but insist upon developing it, in their

<sup>1</sup> The whole subject of 'Determinism' is too complex and extensive to admit of fair treatment save in a separate volume, which the writer hopes to issue hereafter, as intimated in the preface. Here it must suffice to enter a protest against the unwarrantably assumed name. As the Theist is the true Rationalist, so is the advocate of moral free agency the only true Determinist.

<sup>2</sup> The position of those who say with Mr. Cotter Morison (*The Service of Man*, cheap ed., p. 111), that 'the sooner we get rid of the notion of moral responsibility the better,' must be left to the ethical common sense of the community.

own way.<sup>1</sup> And when it comes to the strangely inconsistent acknowledgement that 'scientific determinism is far less likely to injure morals, for it teaches that our wills are not forced by an external power, but are regulated by our own consciences, and these in turn are susceptible of indefinite improvement as social evolution proceeds,'<sup>2</sup> we may at all events find in such an attitude abundant warrant for the general avowal that man is a moral being. When this is understood to be beyond controversy, we have a sound basis for the ethical argument on behalf of Theism. Its main elements may be thus summarized.

(i) A moral nature—and for the moment the method of its acquirement is irrelevant—involves these items. (a) The perception of right as distinct from wrong. (b) The appreciation of the oughtness of right, with the corresponding sense of obligation to do it. (c) The acknowledgement of the wrongness of wrong, as something quite apart from that submission to custom or to law which a community has power to enforce. (d) The possession of power to do the right and refuse the wrong; i.e. the consciousness that 'I ought' includes 'I can,' and so involves guiltiness when wrong is done.

(ii) From all these, in active exercise, we cannot but infer the objectivity of moral truth. Not for a moment may it be conceded that the 'essence of morality is the necessity of subjecting the individual to the

<sup>1</sup> Thus Dr. Callaway (*Agnostic Annual* for 1905, p. 21) says that 'from social life comes the necessity of subordinating the individual to the community, which is the essence of morality.'

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

community.' That is a mere matter of compulsory utility, which is quite a different thing. The morality which simply involves submission to a superior force, is a contradiction in terms. Neither the wish of the individual, nor the will of the community, can make any action morally right or wrong. Morality claims to rule, not to be decided by rule. As Dr. Rashdall says, the very essence of a moral conviction 'is that things are right or wrong, quite independently of my judging them to be so, quite independently of my likings or dislikings,'<sup>1</sup> or those of the community.

Dr. Martineau has only expressed the same truth in saying that 'it is the peculiarity of all properly moral verdicts that they are not the expression of individual opinions which we work out for ourselves by sifting of evidence, but the enunciation of what is given us ready made and has only to pass through us in speech. In other words, the moral law is imposed by an authority foreign to our personality, and is open, not to be canvassed, but only to be obeyed or disobeyed.'<sup>2</sup>

(iii) This moral objectivity is systematic—that is to say, it is not only real, but continuous and universal. Exceptions and abnormalities no more disprove this, than the existence of lunatics disproves general rationality. A sufficiently wide induction shows also the

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 39. 'And when a man says "this is right," he equally implies an objective assertion; the essence of his assertion would be gone if he were to suppose that "right" simply meant the course of action which happens to commend itself to him'—or to the community.

<sup>2</sup> See *Selections from Literature of Theism*, p. 392. Cf. also Dr. Knight's remark (*Aspects of Theism*, p. 188), 'The phenomena of conscience point to that which transcends phenomena.'

following. (a) In the individual the greatest happiness results from the largest measure of obedience to the right. That standards of right and wrong vary is, indeed, a commonplace. But the principle remains that no man can happily do that which he believes to be wrong. The actual thing he does may not trouble him; but the wrongness of it, if recognized, could not but trouble him.<sup>1</sup> (b) The experiential superiority of right is confirmed in the whole structure of society, civic and national. As Prof. Knight puts it, 'When we pass from the individual to society, the moral evidence for Theism becomes cumulative. It is the whole moral life and order of the world—not individual consciousness alone—which suggests the theistic interpretation.'<sup>2</sup> (c) On the scale of history it is vividly manifest. The words of the old seer, 'Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people'<sup>3</sup> have been so overwhelmingly confirmed, as to make it difficult indeed to understand how any intelligent man can deny it as Prof. Haeckel does.<sup>4</sup> It is doubtless easy to make mistakes in the moral estimate of history. 'Here a scanty stream of progress is discovered, and the swamps and marshes of humanity through which it finds its doubtful way are overlooked.'<sup>5</sup> But be this as it may, two things are surely beyond controversy. There has been unmistakable moral progress through the ages, and it has always been associated

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 110, and Conder's *Basis of Faith*, pp. 333-45.

<sup>2</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 184.

<sup>3</sup> Prov. xiii. 34.

<sup>4</sup> *Riddle of the Universe*, cheap ed., pp. 80, 97.

<sup>5</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 256.

with the development of right, and never with the open following of wrong. Upon the whole the world is better morally to-day than it has ever been, and, however much men's judgements differ as to what is right, the fact that there is a right which cannot be ignored, let alone contemned, is writ larger in human consciousness than ever. 'The awful lessons of history are that not knowledge and wealth but virtue and religion are the central pillars of the commonwealth.'<sup>1</sup>

(d) The testimony of all literature is to the same effect. It is a great deal, but not too much, to say, that the conviction of the universality of the intellectual and the moral order, grows with the deepening life of the race.'<sup>2</sup>

(iv) Certainly the sensitiveness of conscience is keener to-day than ever, and in its development of 'the sharp and keen antitheses that occur in moral experience,' there is the manifestation of a preceding and latent potentiality which is quite as real as that of the oak in the acorn, and equally demands adequate explanation. We are not now concerned to ask merely for the sufficient source of the savage's taboo; what true philosophy requires is adequate cause for the moral consciousness of a Gladstone or a Morley, a Garrison or a Wilberforce, a Wesley or a Paul.

(v) What can be the adequate cause of such

<sup>1</sup> See Conder's *Basis of Faith*, pp. 346-54.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 259. It is of course necessary to add, as he does, that 'this meaning is not to be gathered from the dictionary, but from a study of the whole life of custom, rite, history, and literature. Then we discern humanity's deathless faith in the divine righteousness. Experience is held to testify not only to a cosmic reason but also to a cosmic righteousness.'

unquestionably moral personality, other than a personality sufficiently large and indubitably moral? Certainly the following principle must be endorsed by all true rationalism: 'As there is no known way of deducing intelligence from non-intelligence, so is there no known way of deducing the moral from the non-moral. Hence spontaneous thought has generally regarded the moral nature in man as pointing to a moral character in God as its only sufficient ground.'<sup>1</sup>

(vi) For as we cannot conceive of morality in ourselves except as the expression of personality, so in the degree in which, both in ourselves and in the world-order, the reality of an objective moral law is found to correspond with the potentiality for response to it within, we are bound to infer that the only possible source of our experience and observation is a moral personality, whom, as God, we identify with 'the infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed.'

#### (4) *The Ontological Argument*

The bare mention of the word 'ontological' suffices in many cases to ensure its curt dismissal. Everybody, as Dr. Tigert says, at once begins to suspect a snare. How short a shrift the associated argument generally

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 251. Kant's conclusion is somewhat wordy, yet worthy. 'All we can say is that consistently with the nature of our intelligence we cannot make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of such an adaptation of nature to the moral law and its object, as is involved in the final end which the moral law commands us to aim at, except by assuming the existence of a Creator and Governor of the world who is also its Legislator.' See Orr, *Christian View*, &c., pp. 109, 110.

receives, is well illustrated in Dr. Bowne's latest edition of his plea for Theism. 'The ontological argument in its common form rests on the notion of the perfect being. The idea of the perfect necessarily includes the idea of existence, and would be a contradiction without it. Hence it has been concluded that the perfect exists. There is not a shadow of cogency in this reasoning. It only points out that the idea of the perfect must include the idea of existence, but there is nothing to show that the self-consistent idea represents an objective reality.'<sup>1</sup>

Still, when one remembers the number and the kind of intellects which have found in *a priori* arguments genuine grounds for belief,<sup>2</sup> it is scarcely sufficient to dismiss all consideration of this case with a contemptuous wave of the hand. Prof. Fraser's protest is warranted. 'Expressed in its cruder form this argument looks like the childish fallacy that merely because I fancy that a thing or a person exists, that thing must therefore actually exist. But to say that the eternally real existence implies eternal thought or reason, is very different from saying that men's

<sup>1</sup> p. 47. Dr Knight gives also a succinct summary in his *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 42, 43. 'Anselm was the first who definitely formulated the ontological proof. Our idea of God, he said, is the idea of a being than whom we can conceive nothing greater; but inasmuch as real existence is greater than mere thought, the divine existence is guaranteed in the very idea of the most perfect being. Otherwise the contradiction of the existence of one still more perfect would emerge. The error of Anselm was the error of his age, and the main blot in the whole of the mediaeval philosophy. He confounded the necessities of thought with the necessities of the universe. He passed without a warrant from his own subjective notion to the region of objective reality.'

<sup>2</sup> See Prof. Flint's *Theism*, p. 425, for the principal of these.



contingent fancies about finite things must be objective realities, or as in Kant's caricature by analogy of the ontological argument—that because I imagine that I have money in my purse it must be true that I have it.' <sup>1</sup>

Kant's representation is indeed doubly misleading. If, as he insists, the ontological argument were the foundation of the cosmological and teleological, and had no more validity than the Anselmic fallacy yields, his insistence upon the ethical argument as alone reliable would be intelligible, although in turn ineffectual. But it is not so. The basal axiom of reason is that which constitutes the essence of the cosmological argument, and when Kant says 'the ontological or Cartesian argument,' a confusion of things widely apart is conveyed to his readers. The Anselmic argument is not the Cartesian, and the reasons which suffice for the rejection of the former, do not apply in the same way to the latter. Two modified forms, at least, of the ontological argument merit modern attention.

(i) The distinctively Cartesian plea based on mankind's possession of the idea of God.<sup>2</sup> 'If it can be shown,' says Prof. Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg, 'that the idea of God in us is (a) necessary and (b) cannot

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 107. Kant's statement is, 'The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient, and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account.'—*Selections from the Lit. of Theism*, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> An excellent summary of this is given by Dr. Tigert, *Theism*, pp. 30–80.



be our effect, the point in question is made out.' In other words, 'If God is thought by us, God has given the thought; if God is the only sufficient source of the thought, God is.'<sup>1</sup> That is manifestly rather a portion of the cosmological argument than purely ontological. None the less it deserves fair consideration.

(ii) Another putting of the *a priori* argument is known as 'rational realism,' and this 'in varied forms has been accepted by the deepest thinkers, and finds widespread acknowledgement in literature.'<sup>2</sup> Its substance is that 'thought is the necessary *prius* of all else—that is, even of all possible or conceivable existence.' We are ourselves conscious of definite laws of thought, 'necessary and eternal in their nature, yet they have not the ground of their existence in my individual mind.' 'Whence can these be derived save from an eternal and absolute reason, the absolute *prius* of all that is, at once of thought and of existence?'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'The proposition Descartes sets out to prove is, that God is the only sufficient cause of the idea of God, i.e. the Infinite and the Perfect. Such an aim is widely removed from Anselm's view that God's existence is demonstrated *a priori* from the elements of our thought of Him.'—p. 66. See also Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 9, for a succinct statement.

<sup>2</sup> See Orr's *Christian View*, &c., pp. 103-8.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Orr quotes Pflaiderer to the same effect. 'The agreement of the ideal laws of thought which are not drawn from the outer world, and the real laws of being which are not created by our thought, is a fact of experience of the most incontrovertible kind; the whole certainty of our knowledge rests upon it. But how are we to account for this agreement? There is only one possible way in which the agreement of our thought with the being of the world can be made intelligible—the presupposition of a common ground of both in which thought and being must be one. This is the meaning of the ontological argument, as indicated even in the word.'—p. 419.

Although this, again, is, strictly speaking, an argument based upon the principle of causation, yet it will be seen that the effect to which appeal is made, is in very real sense necessary. It is bound up in the nature of things, so that there is equally good ground for holding the argument to be essentially ontological. And in face of all that is honestly involved in the foregoing suggestions, one cannot wonder that not a few competent thinkers should still be found to echo Dr. Orr's avowal: 'I cannot but maintain, therefore, that the ontological argument, in the kernel and essence of it, is a sound one, and that in it the existence of God is really seen to be the first, the most certain, and the most indisputable of all truths.'

There are, however, other forms of the *a priori* argument, which appear to be rather gaining than losing force. They might be grouped with fair accuracy under the general term 'idealism,' but it is necessary for our purpose to distinguish four phases of it, viz. idealism proper, transcendentalism, the argument from intuition, and that known as psychological. In more popular language these might be termed mental, spiritual, mystical, and instinctive, reasons for Theism. We will take a brief statement of each, according to its best advocates.

#### (5) *The Argument from Idealism*

'Idealism is the necessary basis of Theism for minds which want to get to the bottom of things.'<sup>1</sup> So writes Dr. Rashdall, supported by a large consensus

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 8.

of modern thinkers. To the ordinary mind, however, such a statement is anything but inviting. 'For the unsophisticated realism of everyday life, knowledge presents no problems.'<sup>1</sup> To the plain man, the real is real and the ideal is unreal, imaginary, delusive. But a very little careful conversation suffices to put the common-sense realist into hopeless confusion.<sup>2</sup> When we sit down to dinner and find plates on the table, 'surely,' he may say, 'that plate is a reality independent of me.' But what is the plate? Any answer will necessarily include mention that it is white, smooth, round, that it rings true when tapped, &c. But suppose all those present at table are blind—what becomes of the whiteness? If all are deaf, what is the sound? If no one has any sense of touch, what is the smoothness? All that could be said would be that these properties would be appreciable to *some one else*. That is, they would *exist for some one else*. But if there were no one else, what then? Or, to put it in the familiar form, how would the dinner-table look when no one was in the room? The thoughtless answer is, 'just the same.' But the only true reply is that it would not 'look' at all. In other words, these properties only exist for those who can appreciate them. As Dr. Rashdall puts the case, 'It would

<sup>1</sup> Tigert, *Theism*, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> 'Those who have never reasoned on the subject are apt to imagine that the nature of matter is of all things the easiest to understand, and they unhesitatingly invest it with their own sensations and perceptions. That is the so-called common-sense view of matter; but the slightest inquiry proves it to be delusive and nonsensical.'—Flint, *Theism*, p. 100. A good general putting of the case will be found in *Contentio Veritatis*, pp. 9–20.

certainly be meaningless to say that it exists, if nobody ever had seen, or ever would either see it or think of it as being seen.' <sup>1</sup> No man, again, can explain to his dog what it means to catch a train. No idea of a train can be formed in the dog-mind. Suppose, then, that to-morrow all men were removed from the earth and yet that trains ran automatically, would there be any trains in existence for dogs? Manifestly there would not. What a dog thinks of a train we have no means of knowing. That would remain, but trains, as such, would not exist. Thus in brief and concrete form we may get a glimpse of the general principle that 'there is no such thing as matter apart from mind, that what we commonly call things are not self-subsistent realities, but are only real when taken in their connexion with mind—i.e. that they exist for mind, not for themselves.' <sup>2</sup>

The fundamental difference between Realism and Idealism, then, may be expressed in a question. Does *existence* involve *apprehension by some mind*, or not? Idealism says, yes: if a thing is not, never has been, never will be apprehended by any mind, it does not exist. Realism says, no: a thing may exist without ever being apprehended by any mind as existing. Or, still more simply. Can being be, without being known to be?—which would seem to answer itself. For certainly we cannot know that a thing is without know-

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Rashdall in *Personal Idealism*, p. 370. An excellent summary will also be found in Principal Caird's *Gifford Lectures on The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 144-53. See also Prof. Lloyd Morgan in *Contemp. Review* for June, 1904, pp. 780-6.

ing that it is. Or, as Dr. Bowne puts it, 'extra-mental reality is just as unaffirmable as it is unknowable.'<sup>1</sup>

The usual reply to this is, that assuredly the existence of the world does not depend upon our knowing it, any more than the beauty of a landscape depends upon our seeing it. Which is true.<sup>2</sup> 'But there is a great difference between existing apart from our intelligence and existing apart from all intelligence. The world of sense-qualities may exist apart from the sensibility of A or B, but it cannot exist apart from all sensibility. The world of literature also may exist apart from the intelligence of few or many, but it exists nevertheless only for and in intelligence. Now the universe, as we know it, is essentially a vast system of relations under the various categories of the intellect ; and such a universe would have neither meaning nor existence apart from intelligence.'<sup>3</sup> If this be so, only one conclusion is possible, viz. that that which is true on the minute scale of our own mentality, is no less true on the infinite scale of the universe. We can escape rational contradiction 'only by giving up the extra-mental things altogether, and making the thing-world the expression of a thought-world behind it or immanent in it, which thought-world again is the expression of a supreme intelligence which founds and

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> 'Philosophy does not evaporate the common-sense conviction that the world and all that is therein would be as real and fair though we were not here to perceive it. But to say this is by no means inconsistent with the assertion that a world outside of thought is a contradiction in terms.'—Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 150, 151.

<sup>3</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 143. See also Dr. Rashdall's summary in *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 21.

co-ordinates both the thing-world and the world of finite spirits. This is possible only on the plane of idealistic Theism. The dualism of our human knowing is founded and transcended in a monism of the infinite, the source of both the finite spirit and the cosmic order.<sup>1</sup> Thus, without asserting a logical demonstration, the existence of God becomes a necessity of thought, because without it all our own experience is inexplicable.<sup>2</sup>

### (6) *The Argument from Transcendentalism*

The preceding argument manifestly does not give us a complete theistic conception. Thought and intelligence do not necessarily involve divine personality, even though in our own case these are inseparably associated. We are, however, by no means without reasons for proceeding further. Mention has been made of 'spiritual' idealism and 'personal' idealism, but transcendentalism involves more than either of these. In the former case, 'spiritual' suggests an antithesis to 'material.' In the latter, stress falls upon the reality of human individuality. But transcendentalism is a spiritual idealism in which 'spiritual' covers the whole ground of human personality, and rises from this to the recognition and contemplation of a divine personality. As the human transcends alike the material and the merely mental, so the divine transcends the human. But this tran-

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 145.

<sup>2</sup> 'All finite thought, every manifestation and movement of mind, implies and rests on the presupposition of an Absolute intelligence.'—Caird, *Gifford Lectures*, i. p. 152.

scendence, instead of being a suggestion of infinite distance, is seen to be rather a reason for inferring the closest nearness. Such transcendentalism is, as Dr. Caldecott says, 'new and not new; it has gathered suggestions which have appeared at various times in the past, and has given them new power through its explicit formulation by Kant and Hegel. It is now the most potent instrument of constructive and interpretative thought.'<sup>1</sup>

For when human nature is said, with most real significance, to be spiritual, certainly personality is involved. What, then, does that include? Not merely power of thought, but unity, permanence, self-consciousness, individuality, will, moral quality.<sup>2</sup> The knowledge of these as realities within ourselves, yields at once the highest possible and the truest estimate of human nature. But even at our best and highest we know ourselves to be incomplete, manifestly finite, unfinished, and limited personalities. How, then, can these highest and yet imperfect elements in us be explained, except by reference to some transcendent yet none the less real personality, in whom they all exist perfectly?<sup>3</sup> There must surely be some complete reality answering to and fulfilling our incompleteness. Even as from a bud we infer the necessary existence of a flower; whilst, from the

<sup>1</sup> *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> See *Personal Idealism*, pp. 371, 372.

<sup>3</sup> 'A method of proof may be called transcendental when resort is made to a higher sphere than that occupied by the thing to be explained, to a sphere which surpasses it in range or excellence. We may explain a child's tentative intelligence, for example, by referring to human intelligence in maturity.'—*Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 127.



knowledge of childhood, with its potentialities and imperfections, we necessarily proceed to the thought of a really existent manhood in which they find completion. The question thus becomes in the highest sense rational—how can our personality, in its turn, do other than lead us in thought to a greater and indeed infinite personality, in whom we live and move and have our being? ‘What other course is possible than for a man to regard himself, together with these finitudes, as living within a reality which has the whole series of forms of the infinite as its attributes?’<sup>1</sup>

But personality involves will, and will carries with it moral quality. Our small power of will is definitely a moral power. If we aim at the good by means of our ability to choose, such ability is both derived and limited. Our moral aims and attainments therefore bespeak One underived and unlimited from whom we come, and in whom we are. ‘We place ourselves and the whole spiritual world within the sphere of the Infinite Spirit. We are free with the power He entrusts to us, and our good is good because it is included in the absolute good, that which proceeds from and expresses the good pleasure of God.’<sup>2</sup>

Further, as the attainment of good means gladness, that is, feeling, and we are what we are in an infinite personality, we cannot but attribute feeling also to Him. ‘If the finite spirit enjoys the limited life in which it manifests itself, the legitimate inference is that the Infinite Spirit too rejoices infinitely in His own perfect

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 129.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133



life.’<sup>1</sup> This, therefore, answers to the ‘irrepressible demand by humanity for a reality which shall be infinitely loving.’<sup>2</sup> The final issue is, that ‘in our knowledge of God we may say that we know Him as immanent and believe in Him as transcendent; and so we may hope to see philosophy and theology winning back the minds of men, by exhibiting not pure being alone, nor almighty power, nor eternal law, but the Infinite Spirit, in whose love, for Himself first, and then for those whom He has called into being, men find their life in all its phases both grounded and consummated.’<sup>3</sup>

#### (7) *The Argument from Intuition*

This is variously estimated, even by theistic advocates. No less careful a thinker than Martineau held that ‘there is in the human soul provision for immediate apprehension of God’<sup>4</sup> by direct mystical knowledge. It is said that ‘the act and fact of man’s apprehension of God, preceded his meditating after-thought of it.’<sup>5</sup> And, manifestly, thousands believe unshakably in God and their own soul, who have never spent an hour in logical or speculative scrutiny. Yet again: ‘That the human spirit is, as a matter of fact, in possession of the idea of God, is an argument for the existence of God unless it can be shown that certain ideas, though

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132. See the whole section on the interpretation of human nature, pp. 123–35.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 134.

<sup>4</sup> See *Selections from Lit. of Theism*, p. 387.

<sup>5</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 132.

uniformly produced, are insubstantial pageants of the phantasy.’<sup>1</sup> Some, like Prof. Knight,<sup>2</sup> are inclined to lay supreme stress upon this argument, and account it ‘the Theist’s stronghold from which he cannot be dislodged.’ At other times it is estimated as of the very humblest rank. ‘It is the lowest rung in the ladder of evidence, although it may ultimately be the highest.’<sup>3</sup> Its main characteristic is said to be that ‘it announces the existence of a transcendent Being whom it apprehends in the act of revealing itself.’

But the division of judgement hereupon, does not permit of any great stress being laid upon this argument. On the one hand, indeed, it is accepted as the *fons et origo* of faith, which it is the business of philosophy to expand and justify.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand it is pronounced ‘the merest dogmatism,’<sup>5</sup> and a ‘mysticism which is illegitimate and must be repudiated.’<sup>6</sup>

It must, however, be acknowledged that it is to a certain extent reinforced to-day from two directions.

(i) It is increasingly manifest that all things, especially the best and highest, cannot be demonstrated

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Aspects of Theism*, chapter viii., *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> See Knight’s *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 112, 119; Jevons’ *Religion in Evolution*, pp. 153, 154.

<sup>5</sup> Flint, *Theism*, p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> ‘We mean by Mysticism the claim of some philosophers that our knowledge can rise to intuitive apprehension of unrelated and unconditioned reality, and of some religious minds that we can have wholly unmediated experience of the presence of essential Deity.’—*Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 142.

by logic.<sup>1</sup> Hence there is room for the assertion that 'beyond the court of logic there is the court of Intuition, where the ultimata of belief are borne witness to, by evidence that is direct and final.'<sup>2</sup>

(ii) The difficulties arising out of the relations between modern religious and scientific thought, drive some minds to a practical Pyrrhonism which repudiates demonstration altogether. This is most forcefully—though sometimes truculently—expressed by Mr. Mallock. 'Is the spiritual, intellectual, and social development of the human race a fact which has any meaning, or has it none? This is a question which cannot be answered by an appeal to external evidence. It can be answered only by an act which is at once an act of belief, of common sense, and of will—an act which, for practical purposes, creates the truth which it affirms.'<sup>3</sup> Dr. Schurman too reminds us that 'if we cast out our belief in God because it is prescientific, the same logic will forbid us to believe in the existence of self, or of an objective world.'<sup>4</sup>

These reminders of the limitations of our powers

<sup>1</sup> 'Life is richer and deeper than speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by which we live. The law the logician lays down is this: nothing may be believed which is not proved. The law the mind actually follows is this: whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective instincts and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of positive disproof.'—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 127.

<sup>3</sup> *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, pp. 249, 259, 276.

<sup>4</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 133. This comports with Hume's avowal that, as regards belief in an objective world, 'nature has not left this act to man's own choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our imperfect reasonings.'

of reasoning, may at least serve to prevent the scornful impatience with which not a few modern thinkers would toss away every suggestion of an actual intuition of the divine. Certainly to demand for the belief in God, that which we never have for the belief in ourselves and our surroundings, can never be itself a logical proceeding.

### (8) *The Argument from Psychology*

A definite plea for the divine existence, known as the Instinctive argument, has sometimes been drawn from the reality of humanity's sense of dependence upon a Higher Power, and more or less intense craving to know that Power better. The very essence of religion is said to be this feeling of absolute dependence. The most influential advocate of this argument in modern times has been Schleiermacher.<sup>1</sup> In his 'mystico-romanticism' he argued passionately that the seat of religion is neither in reason, conscience, nor will. Religion is feeling, the feeling of absolute dependence. According to Hoffding, he 'never abandoned the conviction that the innermost life of men must be lived in feeling, and that this and this alone can bring men into immediate relation to the Highest.' Such conviction is really a modern echo of ancient voices which found their deepest and highest expression in the Psalms.<sup>2</sup> There have confessedly been and yet are many and notable exceptions ;

<sup>1</sup> For an instructive summary of his position and plea, see *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 255-304. See also Walker's *Christian Theism*, &c., pp. 20, 29 ; Orr's *Christian View*, &c., p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Psalms xlii., lxxxiv., cxxxix., &c.

but on the whole it must be affirmed that this sense of dependence is a human instinct, and has been felt most by some of the noblest and most sensitive minds.

Hence is drawn the inference that it must have some source outside self, and should surely find some real satisfaction. If the lower instincts in lower creatures have all their corresponding answer and satisfaction, why should the highest instinct in the highest creature be a mere delusion of the imagination? 'Shall we say that man alone is deceived when he yields himself to the guidance of his highest and best instincts?'<sup>1</sup> All the religions of earth have been and are, in differing degrees, variations of this craving. Can it be that the general yearning of the race is nothing more than universal self-deception? Religion may be truly defined as the search of the soul for an adequate spiritual object, together with the conviction that such an object exists. Whence it certainly seems easier to believe in the reality of God—especially when other arguments are taken into account—than to think that the highest aspiration of the latest and highest product of evolution, is but 'the baseless shadow of a wistful human dream.'<sup>2</sup> Such wistfulness remains, at all events, the greatest and most ineradicable factor in the higher life of mankind. Nay, further, as the human soul cannot be satisfied with an object of reverence inferior to itself, all its noblest instincts lead it to look for a personal, infinite, knowable, ethical God, to whom, beyond all else, it can turn for comfort and hope. Against the argumentative worth of such a yearning, it is nothing to

<sup>1</sup> Tigert, *Theism*, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> R. Blatchford, *God and My Neighbour*, p. 78.

allege that it cannot stand alone, and would be an insufficient basis of belief if it could. It is enough if it can truly be said to form a valid contribution to the solid grounds of theistic faith.

(9) *The Argument from Universality (e consensu gentium)*

What is known as the argument *e consensu gentium* is similar to the preceding, save that the stress falls here upon the extent, rather than the content, of the human yearning after the highest. It has been urged from time immemorial as a genuine testimony to the reality of the divine existence, and to some minds it carries great weight. Dr. Tigert says, 'If the universal consent of the nations of the earth may be claimed for any truth, it is for that of the being of God,'<sup>1</sup> seeing that 'among all peoples in every part of the world, and through all times from the beginning of history until the present, man has been a worshipper of deity.' There is really no room for controversy, either as to the fact that man is a religious animal, or that he is the only religious animal. Whatever we may find reason to believe concerning evolution, no fraction of a relic of a connexion between man and brute exists in this respect. The lowest and simplest taboo known to savage life, is utterly unthinkable as applied to the most sagacious animals, even when in closest connexion with men.

Cicero's words are well known: 'There is no people so wild and savage as not to have believed in a God, even if they have been unacquainted with His nature.'

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 81.

They have been abundantly confirmed in later times.<sup>1</sup> And in face of the actual facts, one must feel that an argument calling attention to their significance, merits at least more than the contempt with which Mr. J. S. Mill dismisses it.<sup>2</sup> Indeed it may be fairly said to be illustrated in his own case, seeing that after his rejection of Theism, he acknowledged that the memory of his wife became his religion. On a wider scale we see the same instinct, refusing to be annihilated, transferred under the guidance of Comte to the 'worship of humanity.' Many other such instances of transferred worship might be quoted, as testifying to the universality and virtual indestructibility of the worshipping instinct which can only have God—when rightly conceived—as its legitimate or sufficing object.

Dr. Flint is doubtless right in his protest that 'in no form ought the argument from general consent to be regarded as a primary argument.' But it need not be pressed as such, any more than that from intuition. Facts may be real and of considerable force, meriting

<sup>1</sup> Thus Prof. Tiele says: 'The statement that there are nations or tribes which possess no religion, rests on inaccurate observation or on a confusion of ideas. No tribe or nation has yet been met with destitute of belief in any higher beings, and travellers who asserted their existence have been afterwards refuted by facts. It is legitimate therefore to call religion in its most general sense a universal phenomena of humanity.'—*History of Religion*, p. 6.

So too Prof. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture*: 'The assertion that non-religious tribes have been known in actual existence, though in theory possible and perhaps in fact true, does not at present rest on that sufficient proof which for an exceptional state of things we are entitled to demand. The evidence given is often mistaken and never conclusive.' See also Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 288.

<sup>2</sup> *Three Essays*, pp. 67, 68. See Prof. Flint's *Theism*, p. 348.



fair estimate, without claiming to support the whole case ; even as each spoke in a wheel is of no less value because it would be manifestly insufficient to bear the whole strain alone. Mr. Harris has, therefore, fairly summarized the position in saying that, whether the knowledge of God is innate or not, ' it is certain that the facts of the universe combine to produce in the mind of the ordinary man, an almost overwhelming conviction that there is a God, and this is sufficient for the argument.' <sup>1</sup>

(10) *The Argument from Accumulation and Convergence*

Whether the worth of each of the preceding arguments be taken as great or small, it is necessary to survey them for a moment, from the standpoint of ordinary intelligence, as a complex and organic whole. In the nature of the case it is not enough to enumerate them. Justice to truth demands that they should be multiplied rather than added together. No one of them need be or ought to be put forth as conclusive, or sufficient for the whole purpose of theistic justification. It is the convergence of all from many directions upon the same centre, which yields the total rationality of Theism.<sup>2</sup>

It would truly be an unenviable task to prove that there is really nothing worthy of regard in any one of these arguments, taken separately. They

<sup>1</sup> *Pro Fide*, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Dr. Orr says truly (*Christian View*, &c., p. 111), ' It is not one line of evidence only which establishes the theistic position, but the concurrent force of many starting from different independent standpoints.'



may, indeed, be divided into inductive and metaphysical, and the appeal of each series will naturally come with varying force to every man's mind, according as he is disposed towards science or philosophy. But when all are linked together in their proper articulations, the total accumulative effect would certainly seem to be overwhelming. They draw manifestly and rightfully from the whole of human experience and observation, and then so definitely contribute to one conclusion, as to justify Dr. Bowne's summary: 'In short, while Theism is demonstrated by nothing, it is implicit in everything. It cannot be proved without begging the question, or denied without ending in absurdity.'<sup>1</sup>

It might well seem that in all the foregoing, when thus logically united, we have solid and sufficient grounds for theistic belief. Whilst, however, the substantiality of these foundations cannot be denied, their sufficiency in these days is another matter. It becomes inevitable, therefore, that we should retrace our steps, so as to view each and all again more minutely, in the fierce light of our fullest modern knowledge.

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 318.



### III

## THE INFLUENCE OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

‘The theory of an eternal universe is burdened with the absurdity of an eternal succession of events. Had there been nothing to account for but simply matter and motion, the theory of an eternal universe would have been about as probable as the theory of God; for eternal matter and eternal motion are in themselves just as conceivable as an eternal Being. But there is more to be accounted for than eternal existence; there is a succession of orderly events with a plan and a purpose running through them, and this cannot be explained by mere matter and motion; more is required.’

DR. JAS. CROLL, *The Basis of Evolution*, p. 168.

‘Closer reflection upon the true character of machinery would thus suggest a very different interpretation of the analogy between the uniformities of the physical order and the regular working of our machines, from that adopted by the mechanical view of nature, as elaborated into a metaphysical doctrine. It would lead us to conceive of the apparently mechanical as playing everywhere the same part which it fulfils in our own system of social life. We should think of the mechanical as filling an indispensable but subordinate place in processes which in their complete character are essentially teleological and purposive.’

PROF. A. E. TAYLOR, *The Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 237.

‘This argument—against special creation—has nothing whatever to say against the possibility of God’s foreknowledge of all that was to take place as the result of evolutionary processes. The scientific man and the scientific theist are agreed that their business is in the first place to discover what the actual phenomena of nature are; physical science goes no further, and leaves to the philosopher or the theologian to hold any faith he may formulate concerning the Divine Being, on the condition that these theories shall not contradict the discovered facts of nature.’

C. C. COE, *Nature versus Natural Selection*, p. 499.

‘Natural Selection is not an agent; a something which acts. It is, in the case of the eye, nothing more than the simple fact that in the struggle for existence the individuals possessing the best eyes survived whilst the rest perished. Natural Selection was the occasion or more properly a condition in the evolution of the eye; not the efficient cause. Were much that has been written on the efficiency of natural selection divested of its figurative dress, it would assume a very different appearance.’

DR. JAS. CROLL, *The Basis of Evolution*, p. 130.

‘Organic evolution is not identical with Natural Selection.’

‘Organic evolution is not proved by Natural Selection.’

‘Organic evolution is not aided by Natural Selection.’

‘Natural Selection is not manifested in organic evolution.’

C. C. COE, *Nature versus Natural Selection*,  
pp. 451, 475, 490, 524.

## III

## THE INFLUENCE OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

IN his latest volume Dr. Flint has remarked that 'what are known as proofs for the divine existence have from the time of Kant to the present been represented as sophistical and useless.'<sup>1</sup> Representation, however, and reality, are by no means necessarily the same. It is the duty of the modern student to be equally respectful and fearless. The very faith of the Theist not only makes for all that is noblest and happiest, but compels him to set highest value upon truth. He endorses to the uttermost Strauss's pathetic query—'What avails it to have recourse to an illusion?'<sup>2</sup> Only the illusion must first be shown to be such. If Theism can be proved to be contrary to fact and unwarranted by reason, it must be given up. As Dr. Schurman well says, 'Hopes and fears are strong, but stronger still in the modern mind is the love of truth.'<sup>3</sup>

There is only too much reason for the remark of Ulrici<sup>4</sup> that since the time of Kant the opinion has

<sup>1</sup> *Agnosticism*, p. 589.

<sup>2</sup> *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 435.

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 70.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted by J. H. Kennedy, *Natural Theology*, p. 235.

grown in Germany, that the existence of God cannot be proved. And 'even theologians join freely with the rest in deriding all attempts at proof as vain, and suppose that they are thus rendering a service to the faith they preach.' It is a significant fact, that not only in Germany, but amongst those who write in English, almost every new work on Theism commences with the more or less emphatic dismissal of former attempts to show cause for such belief, apparently in order to lay all possible stress upon some other suggestion by the author. Kant's avowal that the ontological argument proves nothing, and that the cosmological and teleological arguments rest upon it, whence all are together so worthless that there cannot be any intellectual reasons for belief, is almost wholly conceded. Thus Prof. Knight practically dismisses the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, as inadequate and partial theories, and even characterizes the last as 'fallacious, illusory, and incomplete.'<sup>1</sup> This is done with a view to make way for emphasis upon intuition. Dr. Schurman, again, does much the same in order to emphasize 'anthropocosmic theism.'<sup>2</sup> Dr. Bowne bids us 'abandon the traditional classification of arguments as unedifying in any case, and work our way into the problem from the standpoint of the thought of to-day.'<sup>3</sup> Whilst Mr. Mallock leaves all others behind in the virulence with which, in his two volumes hereupon, all theistic arguments alike are held up to scorn, and theologians generally are

<sup>1</sup> p. 75 ; chs. iv. and v. *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> *Belief in God*, pp. 169, 187, &c.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 50.

denounced as wanting alike in intelligence and in honesty.<sup>1</sup>

This tendency is to be regretted, as being no more true in its general implication than helpful to the purpose alleged by the writers. Even if in days past too much stress has in some respects been put upon one or another of the foregoing arguments,<sup>2</sup> the way of truth and wisdom certainly is not to cast the whole as a sop to the modern Cerberus, but

<sup>1</sup> 'No philosophic proof exists that the supreme mind, or the God of philosophy, is either conscious or purposive. The idea that the cosmos indicates any ethical qualities in the supreme Mind, is purely fanciful. The boasted order of the cosmos is no proof of purpose or wisdom,' &c.—*Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, pp. x, 153, 155, 163.

<sup>2</sup> 'Current evasions of the difficulties in all theistic belief. The trickeries of theological argument.—Such are the methods and such are the only methods employed by theologians up to the present time, in their efforts to deal with the fundamental difficulties in the way of Theism. What, then, is the moral to be drawn from this fact? It is not that theologians as a class have been exceptionally incompetent thinkers, but that they have attempted a feat which is in its nature impossible; the utmost that the keenest intellect which attempts such a solution can do, is to disguise the difficulties by some more or less skilful trickery.'—*The Reconstruction of Belief*, pp. 210, 226, &c. Concerning such Pyrrhonic iconoclasm Mr. McCabe is well warranted in his rejoinder that 'theology is not more likely than science to give any ear to such a proposal.'—*Haeckel's Critics Answered*, ch. xii. p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Fraser puts the case fairly when he says, 'The discredit is probably not undeserved if any one of these arguments, or even all collectively, is so misconceived, as to be taken for the conscious source of man's moral and religious faith in the constituting principle of the universe. They are discredited when regarded as conclusive arguments that are able to determine a conclusion which, being infinite, is not in this way determinable. Yet theistic proofs may each in its own way uncover the speculative and practical principles which underlie theistic faith, and final faith thus finds that it has been tacitly sustained.'—*Philosophy of Theism*, p. 41.

to re-examine and re-state each, according to later knowledge.

Prof. Clerk Maxwell rightly protested in his day against the interpretation of Genesis 'in accordance with the science of 1876, which may not agree with that of 1896.'<sup>1</sup> The growth of scientific knowledge here hinted at is well illustrated in his own view that the 'molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction,'<sup>2</sup> when compared with the present conception of the atom as subject to continual disintegration.<sup>3</sup> But his plea for scientific caution in regard to Biblical interpretation, applies equally to Theism. The full and complete demonstration of the divine existence may be granted to be intellectually impossible. But that is quite irrelevant in regard to the right or wrong of personal belief. Evidence may be entirely sufficient without being exhaustive. The modification and readjustment which are rightly demanded in the name of increasing knowledge, are very different from the scornful rejection of all by unbelievers, or the timid surrender of essential parts by believers. Thus merely to mention such names as Paley, Momerie, Flint, &c., is sufficient in some quarters to procure instant repudiation. But careful study soon shows that to jettison the contributions of all such thinkers, at the behest of naturalism or Pyrrhonism, is nothing less than ridiculous from a rational standpoint.

It is easy enough to object to the cosmological argument, on the ground that it does not give us

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Jas. Clerk Maxwell*, p. 394.

<sup>2</sup> *Life*, p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> See *Romanes Lecture on The Nature of Matter*, by Sir Oliver Lodge, *passim*.



an infinite Creator ; or to the teleological argument, because it does not lead us to divine personality ; or to the ontological, as begging the real question at issue. But all that this really amounts to is that each, when taken separately, suffices only to establish that which it professes to establish ; and that no one alone warrants the full theistic conception. But as this is not asserted, it need not be defended. Dr. Schurman remarks that 'it is by traversing and transcending the successive stages of the old theistic argument that thought most naturally, if not inevitably, ascends to the all-surveying altitude of anthropocosmic theism.'<sup>1</sup> But the point of vision for the true estimate of a vast and complex theme, is much more surely reached by transcending than by traversing the honest and careful thought of the past. And as regards present conceptions, the first step towards transcending them is to do them justice.

That which modern science may be assumed to offer us has been well expressed recently by Sir Oliver Lodge.<sup>2</sup> 'Orthodox modern science shows us a self-contained and self-sufficient universe, not in touch with anything above or beyond itself, the general trend and outline of it known, nothing supernatural or miraculous, no intervention of beings other than ourselves being conceived possible.' Or, again, as Mr. Tennant puts it: 'Science is commonly believed to present to us a universe which is a vast machine characterized by the reign of rigid and invariable law : a universe in which the minds that investigate it are themselves dependent upon matter, a product stumbled

<sup>1</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 136.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1902, p. 49.

upon during the process of the world's evolution, an accompaniment bound like a shadow to the primary mechanism: a world independent of anything but itself for its origin and maintenance, its meaning and intelligibility.' <sup>1</sup> Now such a conception must necessarily be subjected to destructive criticism—that is, must be shown to be unwarranted and insufficient—before the ground is clear for a positive structure. This, however, having been done,<sup>2</sup> positive re-statement of old reasons for theistic faith, in full view of all the scientific facts upon which anti-theistic philosophy bases itself, becomes a plain necessity. The question is both crucial and pressing, What, in the name of truth, are we called upon to retract or to subtract, what to modify, what to give up, of all the former reasons for theistic belief just summarized?

To begin with, we cannot dismiss as lightly as Dr. Bowne suggests, the traditional classification of these arguments. There is no sufficient reason that we should do so. It may sometimes be well, in face of the modern tendency to monism which we must presently estimate, to commence by showing that 'the ground of all reality, or the fundamental reality of the world-ground, must be one and not many.' But this cannot alter the constitution of the human mind, which will always demand sufficient cause for any thing or event, and will persist in employing its own experience and observation as means and methods for solving the everlasting problems of being. We will therefore reconsider the ostensible grounds of Theism, in the order already adopted.

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> See Preface, p. v.

(1) *The Cosmological Argument*

Concerning this, two truths may be unhesitatingly laid down as axiomatic : viz. (i) that the principle of causality is unquestionable ; and (ii) that the mystery of its mode is irrelevant. As to the former, Mr. Storr has well said, 'That nothing can happen, that is, that no event or change can come into being, without an appropriate and adequate cause for the same, is of all truths the one perhaps most firmly held by man.'<sup>1</sup> Whilst, therefore, the Theist acknowledges that this is an assumption, he asserts also that it is a necessary assumption. 'If any assumption can claim to be self-evident, this surely may. Thought implies the truth of it every moment. To deny that the principle of causality is true, would be to deny that reason is reason. It would be equivalent to affirming that to seek for a reason is always and essentially an unreasonable process.'<sup>2</sup> We cannot contradict it if we would. That out of nothing nothing can come, is an axiom of thought which does not admit of denial. All science assumes it ; all philosophy demands it. To reject it would be to give up at once all practical life and all rational thinking.

The actuality and importance of this principle is not in the least affected by its insoluble mystery. 'How causal action is produced, how it comes about

<sup>1</sup> V. F. Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 270.

<sup>2</sup> Flint, *Theism*, pp. 98, 99. So too Dr. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 29 : 'No experience could make us believe that something happened without some reason why it should happen.' See also Dallinger's *Fernley Lecture*, p. 1.

that the realization of a certain condition effaces one state and superinduces another in the real world, no philosophy can pretend to explain.'<sup>1</sup> The acknowledgement that this is so, that the actuality of causation is as inexplicable as undeniable, rather confirms than weakens its axiomatic worth, seeing that all reality is alike inexplicable, from our own simplest consciousness to the most conflicting emotions or complex conceptions.<sup>2</sup>

On what grounds, then, is it now alleged that the 'cosmological argument speaks a strange language which is not adapted to produce conviction until translated into the speech of to-day'<sup>3</sup>? To answer fully would require a treatise. Here a plain enumeration will suffice. The objections raised are many and various, including such as the following. That the

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 165. Dr. Romanes has expressed this more fully in the section upon causality in his *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 116. 'That everything which happens should have a cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes the same interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly exact system of energizing should be found to present all the appearance of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions each involving billions of separate causes for our hereditary passage from an invertebrate ancestry,—that such things should be, would surely strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.'

<sup>2</sup> This inexplicableness, of course, is only strictly true so long as we survey phenomena from the naturalistic, or neutral, standpoint. It is at once the reason for and justification of Theism, that it supplies a real and sufficient—even if ultimately unanalysable—explanation of causality, viz. the immanence of God, the ceaseless energy of the supreme and all-pervading Mind.

<sup>3</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 49.

principle of causality, being indemonstrable, is inapplicable.<sup>1</sup> That casuality is after all merely a subjective notion, or, as Hume spends the greatest care in showing, 'it is nothing but the product of custom and experience.'<sup>2</sup> That a first cause is logically inadmissible because it would itself then require a cause. That the assumption of a First Cause cannot save us from the necessities and difficulties of an infinite regress.<sup>3</sup> That creation out of nothing is absolutely inconceivable. That all reference to a beginning is useless and unthinkable. That the universe is eternal, and therefore no cause for it is required, matter and force being self-existent. That evolution thus takes the place of creation. That no cause outside the universe—i.e. distinct from the universe—is either admissible or discoverable. That all things may be explained upon mechanical principles. That the hypothesis of mind is quite unnecessary, because the whole of this potent mechanism works from necessity. That even if causation did demonstrate the working of mind, as the great First Cause of all, it would be useless for the purposes of Theism, seeing that such a cause is certainly not God, as generally conceived and represented by theistic writers.

This enumeration is by no means exhaustive, but it certainly appears to show a formidable array of difficulties. Such might, indeed, on first thoughts

<sup>1</sup> McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 195-6.

<sup>2</sup> Huxley's *Hume* (English Men of Letters Series), p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> McTaggart, *Some Dogmas*, p. 191. 'Why should we not derive one event from another and this again from another, backwards through unending time, without any first cause at all?' See also p. 193.

incline us to dismiss the cosmological argument as, after all, too much beset with objections to be of any real service to Theism.

But if intellectual honesty demands that all such should be fairly stated, it no less requires that justice should be done to the replies which have been made on grounds of equal intelligence and sincerity. When it is asked what remains valid and unshakable for theistic foundations, after such an application of modern knowledge to ancient thought, the answers are neither few nor feeble. When, even in succinct summary, each objection is met with a fair and true reply, the effect of a full reconsideration may well be as impressive for the whole case as Dr. Flint intimates, when he asserts that the cosmological argument 'has been in no respect discredited by recent research and discussion. It is in substance accepted, not only by theists, but by pantheists, and forms the basis even of the philosophy of Herbert Spencer.'<sup>1</sup> Let us see on what grounds such a statement may now be substantiated.

(i) Nothing in the least avails to shake the main principle that a supreme Cause for all we see and know is absolutely necessary, if we are to remain rational beings. Mr. Spencer's well-known words concerning the 'infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed,' may be taken as final. 'The positive existence of a First Cause,' he asserts in his *First Principles*,<sup>2</sup> 'is a necessary datum of consciousness.' We are, therefore, really entitled to affirm that the

<sup>1</sup> *Agnosticism*, p. 590.

<sup>2</sup> Revised ed., p. 85, &c.

actual question is not whether there is a Cause of all, but what is its nature ?

(ii) The inference which immediately follows is not so much an inference, as an echo of the same principle. It signifies, as already intimated, that the first suggestion we have as to the nature of this Cause, is that it must be adequate to produce all that we see and know, including ourselves. 'If every event must have a cause, every event must have a sufficient cause. If every event have not a sufficient cause, some events have no cause at all. Thus, we necessarily know that the efficient cause of every event is a sufficient cause, however vague may be our knowledge of efficiency and sufficiency.'<sup>1</sup> If *e nihilo nihil fit* be true, so too, we may repeat, is *e parvo parvum fit*.

(iii) Neither of these main principles is really affected by the division (suggested by Prof. Upton)<sup>2</sup> of causes into phenomenal and noumenal, and apportioning the former to science, the latter to philosophy. For from the standpoint of science, these principles are simple fact continually; whilst from that of philosophy, they are actual necessity. Our minds are no more able to think the contrary, than to explain the method.

(iv) Although there is every reason to predicate a beginning in time for the universe as a phenomenon,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Flint, *Theism*, pp. 100-1.

<sup>2</sup> *Bases of Religious Belief* (Hibbert Lects. for 1893), p. 201.

<sup>3</sup> For as Dr. Flint shows (*Theism*, p. 108): 'The law of parsimony of causes directly forbids the belief that both matter and mind are



yet even if the eternity of the universe were conceded, it would not diminish, let alone destroy, these two main principles. A beginning in time is not the necessary condition of their validity. An eternal universe would simply, though absolutely, demand an eternal cause. We have already seen that cause, as a philosophic principle, is timeless, and is sufficiently no less than truly expressed in Kant's definition: 'Intelligence endowed with will is causality.'<sup>1</sup> It may thus be truly affirmed that 'if the universe be eternal, or one of an eternal series of universes, this only leads us to affirm an eternal and constantly operative Source or Cause. Beyond this it is impossible to go.'<sup>2</sup>

eternal, unless we can show that one cause is insufficient to explain the universe. And that we cannot do. We can show that matter is insufficient—that it cannot of itself account even for the physical universe—but not that mind is insufficient, not that mind cannot account for anything that is in matter.' In which case, as Mr. Tennant says (*Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 88), 'If mind be the prior element, and matter and energy only its constructions, the ascription of the world's course to the eternal action of energy or matter becomes absurd.'

<sup>1</sup> See Tigert, *Theism*, p. 229; Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 28. To the same effect Prof. Lloyd Morgan says (*Contemporary Review*, June, 1904, p. 788), in addition to the passage quoted above (p. 28): 'This, I beg you to note, does not imply the denial of the existence of God, nay, rather, it is a protest against the limitations imposed on the exercise of His power, restricting it to certain specific phenomena on certain specific occasions.'

As this point is of great importance, and is often mentioned with an air of finality by anti-theists, both in print and on platforms, it may be well to add the statements of two other competent thinkers hereupon.

Dr. W. N. Clarke says (*Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 111): 'Even if we accept the hypothesis that the universe has never had a beginning, but has always existed, and always been passing through



(v) The suggestion of an infinite regress of causes as a substitute for God, is logically invalid. For even if it were admitted as a possible scientific conception, the proper answer is, as Prof. Upton points out, 'That the existence of this infinite regress of causes, in your scientific sense, is precisely the fact which demands for its adequate explanation, the belief in God as the ultimate Ground or Cause, in the philosophical or theological sense.'<sup>1</sup>

When, therefore, the conception of a self-existent Cause is mentioned as a definite antithesis to that of an infinite regress of scientific causes,<sup>2</sup> it would appear quite right to urge on the contrary, with the writer just quoted, 'that both beliefs are rational, and so far from being incompatible with each other, are so related that in an intelligible universe each implies and

an unbegun and endless round of change, still we must assign to it a cause. We are relieved of the necessity of asserting a cause antecedent in time, but not of the necessity of asserting an underlying and determining cause. If the universe is eternal, we still have to inquire how there came to be an eternal universe. If the universe is ever changing and unfolding, we ask how there came to be an ever-changing and unfolding universe, and by what the character and direction of its endless movement is determined. A cause still underlies it.'

And Mr. W. D. Ground also puts the case truly in his *Spencer's Structural Principles examined*, p. 181: 'A self-existent universe implies a universe without a beginning, but its existence without a beginning is inconceivable. Even if it were conceivable it would not be in any sense an explanation of the universe. The existence of an object is made no more comprehensible by proving that it existed years ago, or an infinite period ago. Thus the hypothesis of atheism—a self-existent universe—is unthinkable, and even if it could be thought, would still be no explanation.'

<sup>1</sup> *Bases of Religious Belief* (Hibbert Lectures), p. 207.

<sup>2</sup> See Flint, *Theism*, p. 120.

logically necessitates the validity of the other.’<sup>1</sup> But a causeless, infinite regress of causes is unthinkable.

(vi) This, however, brings us to a kindred and somewhat common anti-theistic objection, which yet requires but a moment’s clear thought to show its inapplicability. When we see plainly that an indefinite regress explains nothing, but must itself be explained,<sup>2</sup> we seem to be driven to the acknowledgement of a supreme First Cause. Here, however, it is at once objected that on the same principle this cause itself would require a cause, and so the argument would fail. But really nothing fails except the logic of the objector. For how can a cause be ‘first,’ if any cause precedes it? Or, to adopt Prof. Lloyd Morgan’s terms, how can a cause be *the* underlying timeless Cause, if for it also cause is demanded? The very demand for the cause of a first or prime cause, is thus a contradiction in terms. When, therefore, it is said that ‘the least philosophical attempt to solve the difficulty connected with an infinite regress of causes, is that of arbitrarily postulating a First Cause, with no preceding cause,’<sup>3</sup> the answer is

<sup>1</sup> *Bases of Religious Belief*, p. 208. The words of Dr. W. N. Clarke are, however, worth quoting here (*Outline, &c.*, p. 113): ‘The process of inferring cause for anything that exists is perfectly valid, but it must stop somewhere. Back of all causation that we can trace there must be one source—and that can be nothing else than a mind. Here is mystery to us; but nothing can be conceived as self-existing, except a mind great enough to cause all other existence. If our search for cause cannot rest here, it can rest nowhere.’

<sup>2</sup> In Prof. Taylor’s words (see *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 81): ‘It is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance, should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of intelligibilities.’

<sup>3</sup> Prof. Taylor—as just quoted.

that the term 'arbitrarily,' as here employed, is itself quite unwarranted. It is much more true to say that such a solution of the difficulty is as true as inevitable, seeing that it rests upon a solid foundation of logical necessity. In the words of Prof. Flint, 'To say that the idea of cause can never demand belief in an uncaused cause, sounds self-evident; to say that the idea of cause can find no satisfaction save in the belief of an uncaused cause, sounds as a paradox. But let a man meditate for a little with real thoughtfulness on the meaning of these two statements, and he cannot fail to perceive that the former is an undeniable falsehood, and the latter an undeniable truth. An uncaused Cause, a First Cause, alone answers truly to the idea of a cause.' <sup>1</sup>

It is only necessary to repeat that in speaking of a

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 123. A clear and emphatic confirmation of this principle is quoted by Romanes (*Mind and Motion and Monism*, p. 152) from Canon Mozley: 'Clarke brings out simply at bottom the meaning and significance of an idea in the human mind, that there is implied in the very idea itself of cause, first that it causes something else, and secondly that it is uncaused itself. An infinite series of causes does not make a cause. The very idea of cause implies a stop, and wherever we stop is the cause. A true cause is a first cause.' And he adds (p. 165): 'Hence it is obvious from the very meaning of what we call an explanation, that at the base of all possible explanations there must lie a great inexplicable, which, just because more ultimate than any of our possible explanations, does not itself require to be explained. . . . Theism supposes that it is an intelligent Person who is held—and logically enough—not to be able to give any explanation of his own existence. He is, it is said, self-existent, and if asked to give any account of his being, would only be able to restate the fact of his being in the words "I am that I am."' See also W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 27.

'first' cause, it is not the order of time but of thought, that is contemplated. As Prof. Lloyd Morgan puts it, 'In the language of metaphysics Cause is regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*. Time and space are in and for experience, not for that which, timeless and omnipresent, underlies experience.'<sup>1</sup>

(vii) Another common objection is that, as a conception, creation 'out of nothing' is unthinkable. But this is far too hasty a settlement of the case. Even Prof. Huxley has pointed out<sup>2</sup> that 'creation' as meaning 'caused to come into existence,' is perfectly conceivable, and 'no one can deny that it may have happened.' When, however, it is asked, 'What is the world made out of?' and the common answer is, 'out of nothing,' Dr. Bowne is warranted in saying that 'both question and answer are worthy of each other.'<sup>3</sup> There may, certainly, be a rational as well as an irrational statement of the case. Clerk Maxwell's words, as endorsed by Miss Clerke in her latest work,<sup>4</sup> were, that 'we have reached the utmost limit of our faculties when we have admitted that because matter cannot be eternal and self-existent it must have been created.' Yet creation does not mean 'that God took a mass of nothing and made something out of it, but rather that He caused a new existence to begin; and that too in such a way that He was no less after creation than before. Creation simply means the dependence of things

<sup>1</sup> *Contemp. Rev.*, June, 1904, p. 787.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 491.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 206.

<sup>4</sup> *Modern Cosmogonies*, p. 161.

on the divine activity for such existence as they have.' <sup>1</sup>

Nor does this imply what is termed the 'outsideness' of the divine First Cause.<sup>2</sup> For Theism equally requires and insists upon the divine immanence, which means not only an ever-proceeding creation, but a proceeding from within, so that in God all things are, and are as they are, from moment to moment. Thus the whole case is best put by Dr. Schurman: 'God did not first exist and then, as though in need of something else, create a world. It is of the essence of spirit to manifest or reveal itself. And just because God is spirit, the world is His constant expression. Creation is the eternal self-revelation of God.'<sup>3</sup>

(viii) Although Hume's estimate of the causal judgement has often been shown to be fallacious, a reference to it is inevitable. Prof. Huxley has indeed done his best to represent Hume's position in its most favourable light, but there still appears to be some real reason for Prof. Curtis's remark, 'Hume, it seems to me, never understood the principle of causation.'<sup>4</sup> Even if we take his own assertion that causation is nothing more than the 'offspring of experience engendered upon custom,' the question must immediately arise, What does experience include? To which the answer

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 206. 'Any change whatever is really created change and involves the emergence of something which was not there before.'—V. F. Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 282.

<sup>2</sup> 'The all-powerful external God.'—R. Blatchford, *God and my Neighbour*, p. 87. See Schurman's *Belief in God*, pp. 156, 157.

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 139.

<sup>4</sup> Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 97.

can only be that necessarily and always, besides consciousness or thought in general, it distinctly includes the consciousness of power and purpose. Every man who is at once sane and intelligent, knows himself to be the efficient cause of his own actions. No subtlety of metaphysics can for a moment make that dim or doubtful. How, then, with a conviction so real, so sure, so immediate, so undeniable, concerning causation in his own experience, can he be called upon to believe that precisely analogous phenomena outside his experience, are nothing more than an endless series of mere happenings, as between antecedent and consequent? Such a notion suggests the despair of determined scepticism, and well deserves the censure of Romanes when he wrote that 'of all philosophical theories of causation the most repugnant to reason must be those of Hume, Kant, and Mill, which while differing one from another agree in this—that they attribute the principle of causality to a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is anything objective in the relation of cause and effect—i.e. in the very thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular cases of it.'<sup>1</sup>

(ix) The mystery of the causal relationship, we have already seen, rather confirms than makes doubtful its reality. But that is not all. In our own inexplicable experiences of volition we do at least know that

<sup>1</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 119. The connotation of the term 'objective' here may be gathered from the expression on the preceding page: 'There is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a will objective to us.' See also *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 31.

we are exercising power in combination with purpose. As Mr. Storr has rightly pointed out, 'analysis reveals that sequence is the least important element in our conception of causality. Power is a more important element than sequence. A cause, as we say, does something. A causal action involves an expenditure of force and energy.'<sup>1</sup> But even if for a moment the purpose be left out of consideration, the power exercised is a reality for which adequate cause must be found. In ourselves we find it, without hesitation, in will. Why should we not infer that it is equally so in things outside ourselves? But when on deeper thought we mark that causality, in all its complications in ourselves, means nothing more or less than the union of power with purpose proceeding from definite volition, no other conclusion seems open to us than that the world of events or phenomena around us 'is only intelligible in a purposive or a causative intelligence—i.e. a will. This fact by itself, even apart from other metaphysical presuppositions, supplies a strong argument that the ultimate reality—the ground, or source, or cause of all that happens—must be a rational Will.'<sup>2</sup>

(x) This is moreover confirmed by fair consideration of the meaning of the interaction which all causality involves. This unlimited interaction, as a ceaseless process, is simply taken for granted by the popular mind. The most natural and easiest of all ordinary conceptions, appears to be a number of independent realities constantly coming into contact and influencing one

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Cont. Veritatis*, p. 31.



another. Yet this is but one of many instances in which popular thought is a delusion definitely requiring true philosophy to correct it. 'How is a unitary system of interacting members possible? This is the problem,' says Dr. Bowne. And his answer is borne out by science and philosophy alike. 'Only through a unitary Being which posits and maintains them in their mutual relations.—The interaction of the many is possible only through the unity of an all-embracing One, which either co-ordinates and mediates their interaction, or of which they are in some sense phases or modifications.'<sup>1</sup> The more carefully this whole matter is considered, the more inevitable will become Dr. Schurman's conclusion: 'Nothing remains for us, therefore, but to surrender the vulgar belief in the existence of a multiplicity of independent things. There is but one real being, and of it A and B and all existing things must be conceived as parts, moments, or functions.'<sup>2</sup> Modern thought thus puts more meaning than was ever before conceivable, into the ancient

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, pp. 53, 59, also pp. 51–63. Similarly Mr. Tennant (*Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 84): 'If the structure of the world is at bottom discontinuous, as is presupposed in atomistic hypotheses, how is the transition from cause to effect brought about? This question assumes a very important place in the philosophical system of Lotze, and its solution seemed to him absolutely to demand a universal Being as the background of all individual things, constituting their bond of union and alone rendering their interaction possible.' Thus 'The analysis of causal interaction in terms of which science makes the universe relatively intelligible, has led us to affirm that such interaction between individual things is unthinkable without the assumption of an ultimate Being, a One embracing the many, which might possibly though not necessarily be identified with what the theist means by God.'—p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 166.



avowal that 'in Him we live and move and have our being.'

(xi) If in the name of what is now known as 'naturalism,' the foregoing theistic explanation of the inter-working causality which we witness is rejected, what is suggested as truer? Judging from recent publications there is an increasing tendency to refer all to 'mechanicism.'<sup>1</sup> This seeks to 'trace back all phenomena, without exception, to the mechanism of the atom.'<sup>2</sup> So that the world and the universe become, in such case, nothing more than the indescribably complex working of a vast machine, made up of innumerable lesser machines, in all of which there is neither need nor room for mind.<sup>3</sup> But from whatever standpoint such a notion is surveyed, it does but serve to show the severity of the straits of the anti-theistic position. For one may say fearlessly that no mindless conception of the mechanical, as an efficient cause, is possible. Assuming only what is on all hands conceded, viz. that the world and the universe, so far as we know them, constitute a kosmos, not a chaos, in the former as distinct from the latter there is manifestly another element to be accounted for, viz. an orderly relation of parts. This is ever the difference between 'mechanism' as a fact, and 'the mechanical' as a principle. No mechanism known to us is thinkable except as the expression of final cause. The very term connotes it. Purposeless

<sup>1</sup> See Haeckel's *Riddle*, &c., cheap ed., p. 92.

<sup>2</sup> Haeckel's *Confession of Faith*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> For similar statements by Mr. Clodd, with comments, see *Miracles of Unbelief*, pp. 57-64; also *Haeckel's Monism False*, chap. v.

mechanism is for human thought inconceivable. And the mechanical—which is in itself purposeless—only becomes the explanation of mechanism, in the degree in which it is made an efficient cause by mind's employment of it as a means to an end. Dr. Momerie's remark <sup>1</sup> that the more mechanical his body's construction, the greater was the need of a mechanic to account for it, is unanswerable. This will become still more apparent when we are considering teleology. Meanwhile, we may boldly say that mere mechanical contact between an infinite number of independent atoms, is an explanation of the universe compared with which the old Hindu cosmogony of elephant on tortoise, and tortoise on nothing, was clear and reasonable.

(xii) We must, however, go farther. Not only is mechanism, as involving an orderly and intentioned arrangement of parts, unthinkable without mind, but also the mechanical *per se*. For even the mechanical necessarily assumes the existence and potentialities of matter. But whence do these come? We have seen that whilst mind can account for matter, matter cannot account for mind. But it is sometimes hinted that later knowledge concerning the nature of the atom goes to invalidate such an assertion. Let us then frankly ask, wherein? Sir John Herschel, we know, referred to the atom as a 'manufactured article,' and 'Clerk Maxwell held it to be a solid result of science that the atom has been made, and made by none of the processes which we call natural.'<sup>2</sup> Now,

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 217-18.

<sup>2</sup> *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 78.

however, we learn that the 'ultimate' atom is not ultimate, being composed of electrons; and that it is not made, but is in the process of making, or un-making. But as Mr. Tennant adds, 'This fact, while it destroys Clerk Maxwell's premiss, does not in itself supply evidence either for the creation of matter, or for its eternal existence.'

It is quite open to us to ask plainly, Why should this conception of matter as the outcome of mind, now be given up, or indeed why 'dissociated from the unhappy analogy between manufacture and creation which formerly underlay it'? The new knowledge does but take us a step further back into the mystery of mind. What is the electron but an infinitesimal store of energy? If, then, by its means science is to be credited with showing us the atom in the course of construction, is that any less a process of 'manufacture'? So far as science is concerned, the whole case is met by representing the atoms as articles being manufactured—or being taken to pieces. Is then chance, or necessity, or mindless mechanism, any more an explanation of such a process than of the finished article? Surely the only reason for predicating mind in a manufactured article is that it is the result of a process in which mind was working. There cannot be any less reason to do so because in such a process mind is still working. That being so, the article can be wholly left out of account—we are only concerned with the process. And all we know of that, though it be little, points to mind as the absolute condition of matter. In the recently published words of Miss Clerke, 'The break-up of matter,

in fact, does not render its construction the more intelligible. Running down is an operation of a different order from winding up. It is an expenditure of a reserve force. It needs no effort; it accomplishes itself. But to create the reserve for expenditure demands foresight and deliberate exertion; it implies a designed application of power.' <sup>1</sup> That is why Dr. Flint has said so boldly that 'a Theist has certainly no need to be afraid of researches into the ultimate nature of matter. Our knowledge thereof is exceedingly small and imperfect, but all that we do know of it leads to the inference that it is not self-existent, but the work of God.' <sup>2</sup>

(xiii) From the inferred existence of mind we may well proceed to its manifestation in the intelligibility of nature and the universe, so far as we are able to explore them. Such intelligibility can scarcely be questioned, seeing that all science takes it for granted and builds upon it. If the universe be not in any sense or degree intelligible, the past of science is a delusion, its present a snare, and its future a mere will-o'-the-wisp. To the very extent, therefore, to which science is regarded as valid and authoritative, is it equally necessary to postulate the intelligibility of the universe, and to demand a source for it. But there can be possibly only one source of intelligibility—viz. intelligence. 'Is it thinkable,' well asks Mr. Storr,<sup>3</sup> 'that blind, unconscious force should result in the production of conscious beings who can turn round and view and interpret the process by which they

<sup>1</sup> *Modern Cosmogonies*, p. 164.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 93.

came into existence?' And all that is rational within us echoes the reply of Prof. Ward, that 'the first cause of a kosmos, to be an adequate cause, and to deserve the name, must be a supreme intelligence.'<sup>1</sup> Prof. Baden-Powell also writes to the same effect. 'That which requires thought and reason to understand, must be itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express, must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained be but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the student.'<sup>2</sup> This is indeed so plain, that the only possible way of anti-theistic objection is to deny the validity of the inference from the human to the divine. Now, we know how strongly Mr. J. S. Mill protested against such a denial in the moral realm—why should it be any more permitted in the intellectual sphere? Surely Dr. Bowne is warranted when he also protests that 'the demurrer that while intelligibility in human action points to intelligence, intelligibility in cosmic action does not point to intelligence, is an act of caprice, not of reason.'<sup>3</sup>

(xiv) Besides the intelligibility of nature, its unity may to-day be assumed without hesitation. This will appear more fully in the next chapter, but we are quite warranted here in taking it as a manifest fact

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 269. So, too, p. 265: 'This non-ego, we say, is orderly and so intelligible. Either, then, it is itself intelligent or there is intelligence beyond it.'

<sup>2</sup> See Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 46. Also Mr. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, pp. 91, 95. Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., pp. 57, 58.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 118.

which demands adequate explanation. Yet the naturalism which insists upon the eternal existence of matter, and its development by means of mindless mechanism into the kosmos as we now know it, affords no explanation at all. What rational thought requires is to know 'how the universe came to be a universe—how it came to have the unity which underlies its diversity—if it resulted from a countless multitude of ultimate causes. Did the atoms take counsel together and devise a common plan and work it out?'<sup>1</sup> The question is a perfectly fair one, and the more it is considered, the more the failure of all kinds of pluralism to account for the manifest world-unity is apparent. Dr. Rashdall has well pointed out how, with the progress of knowledge, men have come to appreciate that unity more and more. And with such appreciation has also deepened the conviction that the unity plus intelligibility of the kosmos, can only be rationally explained as the result of the working of a single mind.<sup>2</sup> 'Manifestly, then, the desideratum of thought is that causality shall be construed as the immanent operation of one single being, as infinite as the universe,

<sup>1</sup> See Flint's *Theism*, p. 107: 'Grant all the atoms of matter to be eternal, grant all the properties and forces which, with the smallest degree of probability or plausibility, can be claimed for them, to be eternal and immutable, and it is still beyond all expression improbable that these atoms with these forces, if unarranged, uncombined, ununified, unutilized by a presiding mind, would give rise to anything entitled to be called a universe.'

<sup>2</sup> 'The discovery that all changes in nature are interconnected and interdependent, that the world is a whole, all the parts of which are mutually interdependent, made it impossible to explain it as the result of independent jarring and mutually hostile wills. If the universe was to be referred to minds, science made it evident that it must be referred to a single mind.'—*Cont. Verit.*, p. 27.

whose processes we apprehend through the notion of causal efficiency.' <sup>1</sup>

(xv) The more thoroughly the principles here outlined are considered, the more valid becomes the theistic inference. For nature's intelligible unity is expressed to us as order by means of laws. Here, however, once more, popular thought is too loose to be trusted without philosophical correction, and yet law, in ordinary human usage, unquestionably combines the notions of thought, purpose, power. Conception, intention, will, are incarnate in all human laws. The only difference between human law and natural law is—that in the human the power is often unequal to the intention, whereas in nature's laws the power is irresistible. The ends of human law can be thwarted: those of natural law cannot. The inference, therefore, that nature's laws no less than human laws require a law-maker, seems inevitable. If this principle were accepted for the kosmos as unhesitatingly as it is for the community existing under any government, there would seem to be a simple and direct confirmation of Theism. But every student knows that a measureless maze of words has been created around this suggestion. It is not, however, necessary that we should lose either ourselves, or theistic conviction, therein.

Law, we are told, is after all nothing but the co-existence and succession of phenomena, and that between these no causal nexus can be demonstrated. To which a double reply must be made. (i) If that

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 165.



be so, the immediate inference must be that there are no laws of nature at all, but only accidental sequences. That, however, would involve the nemesis of science even more surely than it would remove all objection to miracle. At present, even under the acknowledged régime of law, science has never any right to speak of laws as invariable, but only as unvarying. This, however, is quite sufficient for the theory and practice of science. But if there be no causal nexus between antecedent and consequent, then the whole theory of science is a baseless myth, and every practical application of it is a mere venture with the risk of failure. But (ii) even if the mystery of a causal nexus be left out of consideration, if we say with Dr. Rice<sup>1</sup> that for science 'law in nature has absolutely no causal significance,' yet, so far as Theism is concerned, 'it is enough to take our stand upon the general fact that nature is a system, and that the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally enduring, and infinitely exact.'<sup>2</sup> It is always true that 'the prime foundation of all life and intelligence, is that perfect orderliness of nature which science mistakes for brute mechanical necessity.'<sup>3</sup>

Out of this undeniable orderliness emerge two things which must be accounted for: (a) The actuality of the relations between phenomena, and (b) the constancy of those relations. But, as Dr. Ward adds, 'So soon as laws are defined as constant relations, so soon reason compels us to look beyond them.' Friction

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*, p. 336.

<sup>2</sup> Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 72.

<sup>3</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 278.



not only does produce heat, but science takes it upon herself to say that it always has done so, and always will. This is but one case out of myriads of that uniformity which is the *sine quâ non* of science. But, for rational thought, uniformity is as distinct from mere sequence as being from not being. Whence, then, comes such uniformity? If it means, as Prof. Huxley hinted, that nature is a perfect logical machine, the question is only varied. Whence the machine, the logic, the perfection? There are, at least, uniformities real enough, numerous enough, reliable enough, to constitute uniformity a principle of interaction as real as gravitation, and as imperatively demanding adequate cause.<sup>1</sup> The more this is pondered the more emphatic becomes the summary of Dr. Romanes. 'We are thus driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing the only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say, by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far as we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one integrating principle, and that this, so far as we can see, is most probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can conceive of it under no other aspect.'<sup>2</sup>

(xvi) From such a conclusion the latest attempt

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to understand how any man claiming to be at all acquainted with science or philosophy, can imagine that there is any anti-theistic force in the remark, 'Universal law is not a product of a universal mind, because there exists no known mind without a brain.'—Dr. Gore, in *Scientific Basis of Morality*, p. 27. Was there ever such an instance of a universal conclusion from an infinitesimal premiss?

<sup>2</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 72.

to escape is found in the tendency to appeal to necessity. It is, however, worse than useless for the purpose.<sup>1</sup> If intelligibility, unity, uniformity, cannot but be predicated of the phenomena of the universe, there is only one possible conception of necessity, viz. the resistlessness of the power which is mysteriously but undeniably inherent in causality. Of this there is really no better expression than the old words—‘Be not deceived, God is not mocked; whatsoever a man sows that shall he also reap.’ And even if these be here ruled out of consideration, the plea of ‘necessity’ is none the less an actual and inevitable rejection of all reasonable explanation of the universe, on the ground of a colossal assumption. Apart from mind, the universe being as it is, necessity is but the final word of irrationality. Dr. Ward’s trenchant summary, at the conclusion of the searching investigation of his Gifford Lectures, is abundantly warranted.<sup>2</sup> Truly ‘Naturalism can do nothing without it, and Agnosticism can do nothing with it.’ For what is such necessity, divorced from intelligence, but the mere apotheosis of chance? There is absolutely nothing in it beyond the sheer assumption of just such energy and directivity as naturalism finds to be utterly inevitable, in order at once to get rid of ‘the God hypothesis’ and retain the facts of nature. And agnosticism can only take part in the process of expulsion with its hands so tied, and a bandage so covering its eyes, as to make it even more an object of pity than of intellectual revulsion. Mr. Walker’s succinct statement thus deserves all possible emphasis.

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel’s Monism False*, pp. 279–311.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 283.

‘What are the forces and laws of evolution? Modes in which energy acts according to rational necessity. Reason is behind it all, and in it all. The whole evolution has proceeded under not blind but rational necessity. There can be no blind necessity. There is a reason for the existence and mode of action of every single force in the universe, and its action only reveals that divine rationality which governs all things.’<sup>1</sup>

(xvii) In connexion with evolution, again, some have affirmed that all the changes which take place are so gradual as to be imperceptible, and therefore to require no further explanation than the laws of nature without God. This finds its most pertinent application in regard to teleology, as we shall presently see. For the present it is enough to point out that no valid objection to the cosmological argument can be based hereupon. For (i) Gradualness or immediateness, and slowness or suddenness, have nothing to do with causality. The notions are incommensurable. Time can never be a measure of mind. But (ii) The alleged slowness or imperceptible gradualness of evolution, is by no means an axiom in nature. The old maxim, *natura non facit saltum*, was but a hasty guess, and it is quite as much ‘honoured in the breach’ ‘as in the observance.’<sup>2</sup> When Dr. Martineau says that ‘it is but a single degree of temperature that handing a body over from solid to liquid, from liquid to gaseous, enables it to leap from science to science, and seek the new protectorate

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 111.

<sup>2</sup> See Storr’s *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 234, and Prof. Upton’s *Hibbert Lects.*, p. 155.

of hydrostatics and of pneumatics,' he does but point to myriads of instances—one might, indeed, truly say to all nature—in which the very essence of nature's general slowness is the particular suddenness out of which it emerges, so that the gradualness of evolution which does not involve the immediateness of transition, is simply inconceivable. (iii) The rational principle which is found to be necessary as the only true explanation of nature's intelligibility and unity, becomes even more vividly manifest when closer scrutiny reveals the fact that the development of a kosmos out of the gradual growth of ages, is all the time dependent upon an incalculable series of changes which cannot be other than momentary.

(xviii) The stress of the cosmological argument may seem thus far to fall upon physical phenomena, but it is especially important to make clear that psychological actualities, no less than physical, point to a divine reality and unity. 'Each individual mind,' says Prof. Upton truly, 'is compelled by its very nature to believe that it is neither self-existent nor self-originated, and therefore it must depend upon some principle or being whose nature it is to be self-subsistent or eternal.'<sup>1</sup> We need not, however, here dwell upon this, because it will come under fuller consideration presently.

(xix) Yet mention, at least, must also be made of the cognate fact that the interaction which, when physically considered, we have seen to be unthinkable

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Lects.*, p. 202.

without the all-comprehending intermediacy of some unitary mind, is even more significant when psychologically considered. Dr. Caldecott's summary of this will be at once succinct and sufficient. 'Wireless telegraphy has given us an analogue in the physical world in which the ether is indispensable for communication. Lotze, with his mastery of both physical science and spiritual, has claimed that in neither sphere can interaction be conceived without reference to a common ground of being. For interaction of spiritual beings the guiding law that the conclusion of an inference must lie within the same material in nature as the premiss or premisses, compels our inference to a spiritual consciousness as the necessary ground of its possibility.'<sup>1</sup>

(xx) The only matter that merits further notice under this head, is the rejoinder from some quarters<sup>2</sup> that even if all the foregoing be conceded and the cosmological argument allowed its full strength, it would still be insufficient for the theistic purpose. In

<sup>1</sup> *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Dr. McTaggart in *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 191: 'This argument, even if valid, would not be sufficient to prove the existence of God. Even if it proved the existence of a being who was a cause, without being itself causally determined, it could not prove that such a being was either personal or good. The nature of the effects that it produced might prove its personality and goodness, but the mere fact that it was a cause would be consistent with no personality or with an evil personality. Thus the argument could not reach the desired conclusion without calling in the aid of the argument from design.' For the way in which the writer here strangely falls into the old fallacy—'the desired conclusion'—of expecting the whole theistic conclusion from only one of its tributaries, see also pp. 327-32 in this work.

other words it would not logically give us God, as Christian Theism thinks of Him. To this there is a threefold and sufficient reply.

(a) Theism does not profess to rest wholly and solely upon the cosmological argument. It merely insists that the principles of reason warrant such an argument, and make it exceedingly forceful.

(b) Its main and plain witness is to the reality of a rational mind as the supreme source and support of the universe, so far as we are able to know it. The facts of nature, fairly interpreted, exhibit to us an all-powerful mind and will, both transcendent and immanent in nature. Although this is confessedly not the Christian conception of God, yet, as it stands, it not only permits but leads us to think of this all-pervading will as analogous to our own, thus involving self-consciousness and—on a transcendent scale—all that is included in personality.

(c) Upon such a conception as this, manifestly Christian Theism, in its fullest significance, must ultimately rest. Whence it is abundantly worth while to see that such foundations are firm and enduring. 'It is something to have seen that both the universe around us, and the presence of reason in ourselves, bear indisputable witness to the reality of a reason prior to our own, from whose workings reason in ourselves has been derived. We have thus one aspect of God so clearly revealed to us, that the question of the nature of the source of our being, may be truly said to be an open secret to all who care to read it.'<sup>1</sup> Hence the words of the writer to the Hebrews become as

<sup>1</sup> Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 60.

philosophical as religious. 'By faith'—on rational evidence—'we understand that the worlds came into being and still exist, at the command of God, so that what is seen does not owe its existence to that which is visible.'<sup>1</sup>

Thus, generally, in regard to the cosmological argument whilst we are more than willing that it should be restated with careful clearness, and in full modern light, we find that, so far from being ruled out of thought as obsolete, it gains really far more than it loses by the broader vision and the farther-reaching scrutiny. We may assent to Prof. Lloyd Morgan when he urges that 'the adequate grasp of the distinction I am trying to help you to draw between scientific causation in terms of antecedence and sequence within the field of experience, and metaphysical causation as the underlying reason for or *raison d'être* of the sequence as given, is essential.'<sup>2</sup> Yet, after all, the difference is only that the latter goes farther than the former. To take our Professor's own illustration. If we ask why two material bodies attract one another, the answer may be expressed in terms of mass and stress, or it may go on beyond that and inquire why there should be any such attraction at all. Manifestly there is no contradiction between the two questions. The one is physical, the other metaphysical. The one is but phenomenal, the other noumenal. So that if all purely scientific causation were left out of thought, there would only remain greater reason for the inquiry as to the philosophical cause of the phenomena whose relations were simply treated as antecedent and

<sup>1</sup> Heb. xi. 3, Weymouth's translation.

<sup>2</sup> *Contemp. Rev.*, June, 1904, p. 779.



consequent. With such treatment science *per se* may and must be content. But philosophy cannot : and in this respect common sense is ever allied with philosophy.

When a match, for instance, is struck, the cause of the flame is undoubtedly the friction set up. But the human mind will never cease to penetrate beyond that with the inquiry, Why does friction set up heat, and what is the cause of friction itself ? The scientific question, therefore, is necessary, as leading on to the philosophical. The phenomenal introduces to the noumenal. They become rational in supplementing each other. Where, then, we ask, with Mr. Storr, 'is the contradiction between the theistic view and the view of physical science ? There is none. Science gives you her view of physical natural causation without regard to the spiritual significance of the same. The Theist adds on to the scientific view other elements which he derives from a consideration of man's place in the universe as a moral personality. He admits the explanation which science has to offer as to the mechanism by which physical changes come to be, but he urges that these explanations are not self-explanatory, and need in their turn another explanation, which he finds in the postulate of a divine will which works through the mechanism of nature to reach moral ends. The only quarrel which the Theist has with the man of science, arises if the latter offers his partial and abstract explanations as complete explanations.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 284. So too Dr. Fraser well says : 'Religious thought and physically scientific thought about the world, instead of destroying really strengthen one another, in the recognition of continuous divine activity, or endless creation,



Thus after a long detour through all the scientific researches, philosophical investigations, and anti-theistic oppositions of a century and a half, we come back only the more surely to the words of Hume himself. 'The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent Author, and no rational inquirer can after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and religion.'<sup>1</sup> In full view, therefore, of all our latest knowledge, the cosmological argument stands firm, as at least one pillar in the temple of theistic truth.

## (2) *The Teleological Argument*

The cosmological, or, as it is sometimes termed, the aetiological, argument, which is concerned with the

under the form of natural law order. For the natural order of procedure may be interpreted as one form of the universal revelation of the perfectly reasonable Will' (*Philosophy of Theism*, p. 64). Yet another succinct statement merits consideration. Says Dr. W. N. Clarke (*Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 112): 'This is not an argument that has force in the childhood of thought, but grows less cogent with the advance of knowledge. The vaster the sum of matter and motion, force and life, spirit and meaning, that we discover in existence, the more urgent the necessity of recognizing some adequate source, spiritual, intelligent, and purposeful, from which it has proceeded. The universe as known to the scientist demands God for its cause far more urgently than did the heavens and earth as known to the patriarch or the psalmist. The earliest assumption of human thought that an adequate producing power is implied in the existence of what we see, is also the testimony of the visible universe, with its immeasurable vastness and its infinite variety. Nothing is more certain than that science in its maturity will affirm one spiritual cause for the universe.'

<sup>1</sup> Huxley's *Hume*, p. 144.

principle of causality, may be said to have fulfilled its function, when it brings home to us the reality of mind as the supreme source behind phenomena. But mind, to be mind, must be conceived as active. And mental activity, if manifest in phenomena, must also involve purpose and will. From time immemorial it has been thought that to this effect the argument for a Supreme Cause was abundantly confirmed and measurelessly extended by the argument from design. The latter, indeed, manifestly assumes the validity of the former, and constitutes a special case of it. The assertion is not only that there is design in nature, but that design must have adequate cause, and that the only adequate cause is a living, thinking, purposing, designer. In its popular form the argument would stand thus: All design implies a designer; all nature exhibits design: therefore nature must have a designer. But there is little need, in these days of cheap anti-Christian literature, to point out that the major premiss here is by no means universally conceded, whilst the minor is in many quarters vehemently denied. It must be confessed that to assert that nature exhibits design, begs the question that should be proved, for which reason the teleological argument ought rather to be called the argument for design than from design. So much importance attaches to this whole matter that it becomes imperative to reconsider, fairly and fully, the real claim of Theism on this basis, and the chief present-day objections to it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a full and valuable statement hereupon, see Mr. V. F. Storr's *Development and Divine Purpose*, passim; and for reply to naturalistic criticism, *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 256-311.

Kant acknowledged that by means of this argument 'our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction. For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. We have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it.'<sup>1</sup> All the same, from his dismissal of this 'physico-theological' argument, as merely an introduction to an ontological argument which could not be sustained, dates unquestionably the diminished reliance upon this theistic plea which finds expression in so many modern works. Even able writers on behalf of Theism appear now not seldom to shrink from it.<sup>2</sup> In some cases it is openly rejected. 'We shall find,' says Mr. Mallock, 'that the facts of the universe, so far as science can ascertain them, not only do not prove the existence of such a God—one possessed of moral and intellectual perfections and definite purpose as to man—but are also, when considered in their completeness, utterly incompatible with it.'<sup>3</sup> Whilst on the

<sup>1</sup> *Selections from the Lit. of Theism*, p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> 'All that I am maintaining is the greater difficulty of establishing the presence of purpose in the world under the changed conditions of contemporary science. We have gained so much more knowledge of nature's operations, that even the correlation of parts and functions in living organisms, has no longer that unique inexplicableness that stamped it for earlier thinkers the special product of creative purpose.'—Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 185. So too even Mr. Storr (*Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 267), 'It is an attitude rather than an argument. We must admit that the argument from design cannot logically prove the existence of an intelligent God who acts for ends.'

<sup>3</sup> *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 160. See also Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 59-76.

part of naturalism and agnosticism, the most succinct statement of objections would involve a lengthy chain with many definite links. Thus, it is roundly asserted that there is no real evidence of purpose in nature,<sup>1</sup> and that even if there seem to be, it all 'comes to nothing. It proves nothing, and it disproves nothing; and even if it proved the utmost that the Theist desires to prove, it proves nothing of what he is specially concerned to assert.'<sup>2</sup> There is said to be neither room nor need for purpose, now that we know what natural selection can do. The gradualness of evolution, we are told, means a self-acting mechanism, so that all instances of adaptation are only delusive appearances. There are too many trifles, too much waste, too many rudimentary organs, too manifest imperfections, too really dangerous and hurtful contrivances, to permit of any thought of divine intention. At the utmost only a great architect external to nature could be inferred from such an argument, even if the assumed analogy between human and divine work were allowed. Whilst, on the other hand, there is so much of evil and suffering in the world, that if the argument were pressed it would only lead to a deistic monster.<sup>3</sup>

Such a list of difficulties, though far from exhaustive, is confessedly formidable enough to give pause to the most light-hearted believer. Full reply could perhaps

<sup>1</sup> Haeckel's *Riddle*, pp. 92, 94.

<sup>2</sup> Mallock, *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> In Mr. Mallock's choice language, a 'God who is either a dolt or a monster, so far as we judge of him by the light which the process of evolution throws on him' (p. 74, *ibid.*)—'instead of a holy and all-wise God, ■ scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent monster' (*Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 176).

only be given in volumes. None the less it may be well to indicate, in swift yet careful summary, the main reasons why so many in our day, learned and unlearned alike, still decline to give up the teleological argument as either useless or invalid. We will not argue concerning evolution, but start from the assumption that all educated persons are to-day, in some real sense, evolutionists.<sup>1</sup> Huxley, we know, affirmed that 'the doctrine of evolution is neither anti-theistic nor theistic.' It simply has, in his words, 'no more to do with Theism than the first book of Euclid has.'<sup>2</sup> Many utterances of Darwin himself might be quoted to show that he did not deem evolution incompatible with belief in God. But such an attitude of benevolent neutrality is in some quarters so definitely rejected, and in certain recent works so emphatically denounced, that we must show cause for such an avowal as that of Prof. Upton: 'It still remains true that if account is taken of the universe as a whole, and the question is asked whether the whole process of biological development, including the fortunate tendency in the offspring to variation, is intelligible apart from the assumption of a rational principle at the heart of the process, the position of the teleologist remains substantially unaffected by all that Darwin and the Darwinians have established.'<sup>3</sup> Without attempting any logical order we will consider seriatim all the main allegations

<sup>1</sup> Although it must be borne in mind, as Mr. Newman-Smyth says, that this 'magic word'—to quote Büchner—'may cover alike much science and considerable ignorance.' There are, manifestly, many kinds of evolutionists.

<sup>2</sup> Darwin's *Life*, &c., ii. 303.

<sup>3</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 230.

under this head against the theistic position, and then state succinctly the considerations which remain unshaken and even confirmed by modern knowledge.

(i) The objection to causality on the ground of the gradualness of evolutionary processes, has been already noticed above. But it is put much more pointedly in regard to teleology. Thus Dr. Romanes says, 'It would be proof positive of intelligent design if it could be shown that all species of plants and animals were created, that is, suddenly introduced into the complex conditions of their life—whereas if they were slowly evolved, that evidence has been utterly and for ever destroyed.'<sup>1</sup> But what has been already said as to the incommensurability of time and thought, applies here also. 'If any particular organ, say an eye, shows signs of being specially designed to perform its particular function, it is no reply to this to say that the eye took a hundred million years to evolve, and that it passed through many stages before it reached its present form.'<sup>2</sup> No better answer, indeed, to Dr. Romanes' suggestion could be desired than his own words: 'Of course the teleologist will here answer, The fact of such a gradual building up is no argument against design; whether the structure appeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks of design occur in the structure as it stands. All of which is very true.'<sup>3</sup> To assert the contrary is not only against reason, but sheer begging of the question.

<sup>1</sup> *Scientific Evidence of Organic Evolution*, pp. 12, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 62.

Every change of condition is ultimately sudden, and, as Mr. R. A. Proctor wrote years ago,<sup>1</sup> 'There may not have been a single link in the chain of biological progression which—for aught science has proved to the contrary—might not have required special intervention to cause it to be precisely such as it was.' Without a wholesale assumption, therefore, that there is no divine worker in nature, the suggestion of gradualness is entirely irrelevant. Even if we could mark every infinitesimal step in the process of evolution, 'divine intention does not become an accidental result when you have described its manner of working, however surprising that manner may be.'<sup>2</sup>

(ii) It is asserted that there are in nature and in human life, innumerable instances in which thought and purpose are altogether out of place, trifles in which design is no more present than when we wink or breathe. But it is always sufficient to reply with Dr. Bowne that 'mere bigness in space or time has nothing in it to change the laws of logic.'<sup>3</sup> It would be absurd to say that an elephant involves design, but a bacillus does not. There are really no trifles in nature. And as for the lesser acts of life which appear so utterly automatic as to involve no thought, such automatism is always the result of practising what was initially most definitely intentioned. Meanwhile the smallest relic of design is quite enough

<sup>1</sup> *Knowledge*, February 23, 1883.

<sup>2</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 195. See also Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 118.



to demonstrate its reality. There is scientific as well as philosophical justification for the significance of the well-known figurative phrase, 'the very hairs of your head are all numbered.'

(iii) Again, it is asserted that nature exhibits such wanton waste on all hands that, in Lange's phrase, 'the purblind teleologist can think no longer of purpose.' Tennyson is generally invoked here as witness to this effect :

That I considering everywhere  
Her secret meaning in her deeds,  
And finding that of fifty seeds,  
She often brings but one to bear,  
  
I falter where I firmly stood. —

But the poet's modesty is somewhat lacking in his prose abettors. They stand firmly to the confident avowal that the non-fertilization of a million seeds can only signify enormous waste, and must be wholly irreconcilable with purpose.<sup>1</sup> But, in sober truth, this whole attitude

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Mallock appears really anxious to outdo all others in the violence of his conceptions and the vehemence of his language. Hence he says, 'Every time a woman conceives a child, God, in order to secure that the act of conception shall take place, blindly and recklessly throws away enough spermatozoa to populate the whole city of London.' This is said to be evidence that His means, as a rule, are 'wanton and miserable failures. It is evidence that he is not only a stupid God, but is also a morally reckless God thus to play ducks and drakes with his own most precious materials.' How the writer can imagine that such reckless talk as this subserves the cause of Theism, I leave the reader to discover. Enough to point out that the conclusion is as unwarranted as the representation is one-sided. The principles above outlined are perfectly applicable here also.



is only another assumption based upon pre-judgement. There is no necessary waste at all in the non-employment of potentiality. Contingency belongs to the very conception of potentiality. And if a method of fertilization, whether as among the vertebrates or the Conifers, involves the production of countless numbers, the fact that only comparatively few pollen grains or spermatozoa actually fructify an ovum, is not a case of waste at all,<sup>1</sup> but simply of a particular method of attaining an end. That there may be and are other means of reproduction, is nothing to the point. It would be quite sufficient rejoinder to all such allegations, to say that, for aught we can see, the presence of the million non-fructifying spermatozoa is mechanically necessary to the work of the one fructifying. Whilst as to anemophilous flowers, the non-fertilizing pollen-grains become in their very decay, a means indirectly ministering to the life of those that have found a waiting stigma and there developed.

(iv) Further reference is also made to the imperfections which confessedly characterize many things in nature, as being contrary to divine design. It seems so simple and easy to affirm that if God be God He must be perfect, and that therefore all work that is really His must be perfect too. But it is as superficial and fallacious as many other such popular suggestions. A myriad illustrations might be given, but the whole case

<sup>1</sup> The unjustifiable recklessness of Mr. Mallock's attitude is sufficiently seen in his reference to human spermatozoa, *per se*, as 'holy things,' and 'potential souls,' with the comment 'he burns down the house in order to roast the pig.' If Theism required such advocacy as this, it would be in a poor way indeed.

may be fairly judged from the instance usually selected—viz. the human eye.<sup>1</sup> The theoretic imperfections of this wonderful organ have been often emphasized, and as often answered, in the very words of the great physiologist who is generally quoted.<sup>2</sup> It is not necessary here to repeat the well-known quotations. There are always four considerations to be borne in mind. (a) An imperfect work may involve as real design as a perfect work. There was as real a purpose in Stephenson's Rocket, as in the latest modern type of locomotive. (b) The cause or degree of the imperfection is irrelevant. There may, indeed, be even more design in an intentionally imperfect instrument, than in a perfect one, granted that there is some special reason for the imperfectness. (c) Perfection is always and necessarily a relative term. If our instruments of music were tuned perfectly, according to theory, concerts would all be impossible. In this case, as with the eye, theoretical imperfection is practical perfection, and it is the latter, not the former, which is desired and intended. (d) A stage of imperfection may well be, relatively, a step towards a higher perfection, and the worth of the stage is to be judged by the worth of the consequent and final end. These considerations alone, when fairly applied, are in themselves quite sufficient

<sup>1</sup> See *Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Helmholtz, *Popular Scientific Lectures*. See Haeckel's *Monism False*, p. 272; *Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 78; Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 69. The conclusion of the great scientist is significant enough, perhaps, to bear repetition. 'The result which may have been reached by innumerable generations under the Darwinian law of inheritance, coincides with what the wisest wisdom may have devised beforehand.'

for the justification of the teleological argument in this respect.

(v) We come next to the case of rudimentary organs. The objection that these disprove design, is best answered from evolution itself. Unless the whole question at issue be begged by the simple assumption that evolution cannot under any circumstances manifest purpose, one may quite legitimately point out, that it is precisely in this way that teleology may be exemplified in evolution. An organ, say, has the potentiality for further development when needed, as well as for sinking into abeyance when no longer required for the maintenance of the organism in a certain environment. Apart from sudden creation, how could design be more plainly expressed? No one to-day will deny, as Prof. Le Conte says, that rudimentary organs 'are among the most obvious and convincing proofs of the origin of organic forms by derivation.' But the very fact of derivation, with variation involving the atrophy of some organs and the development of others, may be quite as really the expression of intention that the species should be continued, as any supposed sudden creation could be that it should exist.<sup>1</sup> Darwin's own comparison of these organs to the letters which in many an English word reveal its etymology, although never pronounced, does not for a moment question that these now silent letters had once a distinctly purposive signification.

<sup>1</sup> 'For, if a designing cause determined that organic forms should be modified by means of natural selection to suit the conditions under which they exist, then rudimentary organs must of necessity in course of time make their appearance, unless specially prevented by other means.'—Croll, *Basis of Evolution*, p. 165.

If they had not at some time fulfilled an intention, they would not have been present in the derived form at all. So, too, if the splint bones in a horse's foreleg are now inoperative, that does not in the least detract from the wonderful potentiality through which the last joint of the middle digit of a handlike extremity has become the horse's foot, and the finger-nail has become the hoof. Purpose in such potentiality may be as latent as the oak in an acorn. It is none the less real.

(vi) Much stress, again, has been laid by some writers in recent years upon what Prof. Haeckel has named 'dysteleology'—i.e. 'the science of those extremely interesting and significant biological facts which in the most striking fashion, give a direct contradiction to the teleological idea of the purposive arrangement of the living protoplasm.' As the Professor's words give us in the keenest and weightiest fashion the worst that can be said against Theism in this matter, it will be well to complete the quotation. 'All the higher animals and plants—in general, all organisms which are not entirely simple in structure, but are made up of a number of organs in orderly co-operation—are found on close examination to possess a number of useless or inoperative members, sometimes indeed hurtful and dangerous. In our own human organism we have similar useless rudimentary structures in the muscles of the ear, in the eyelid, in the nipple and milk-gland of the male, and in other parts of the body; indeed, the vermiform appendix of our caecum is not only useless, but extremely dangerous, and inflammation of it is

responsible for a number of deaths every year.' <sup>1</sup> Now, even if this indictment be taken at its worst and utmost, what have we? Nothing more than Mr. Storr acknowledges when he says, 'There are such maladjustments, and they have to be reckoned with, but they do not destroy the force of the total impression which nature leaves upon our minds.' <sup>2</sup> So far as these maladjustments are in ourselves now useless, as rudimentary organs, we have already considered them. If in addition they become dangerous, they ought still to be no great perplexity to the evolutionist who believes that, on the whole, the method of life-progress by the survival of the fittest, is not unworthy of divine intention. But even if they should then be deemed contrary to what we might expect from divine purpose, how can any fair or true induction be drawn if, as Mr. Storr hints, 'we confine our attention to the apparent maladjustments'? Is the purpose of any vast machine either disproved or likely to be unravelled, by confining our attention to such parts as seem to us unnecessary or inexplicable? On such principles every man who is not a watchmaker ought to throw away his watch. One might as well deny the musical genius of Beethoven on the ground that there are not a few passing discords in a sonata, as impeach the reality of benevolent design in the human body because of the appendix. As a matter of simple fact, the number of persons who die

<sup>1</sup> *Riddle*, p. 94. Without entering upon minute biological criticism, one cannot but ask whether it is true that our eyelids are to be reckoned among useless rudimentary organs. Certainly one thinks with a shudder of the tortures of *Regulus* in Roman history, to say nothing of the regular necessity of sleep.

<sup>2</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 128.

from inflammation of the appendix—apart even from the very pertinent question whether they would do so if they lived sober and healthy lives as far as they were able—is an insignificant trifle compared with the innumerable hosts of those who, through long and active and enjoyable lives, would never know that they possessed such an organ, but for modern anatomy. It must be pronounced a poor or a prejudiced philosophy which cannot see the wood for the trees. As the appendix constitutes the worst case that anti-teleologists can allege, its utter unreasonableness for their purpose may well absolve us from the necessity of considering more. Looking at nature fairly, Mr. Storr is warranted in saying ‘we receive a general impression, which is at any rate confirmed by the judgements of reason, of a world shot through with purpose; an impression powerful enough to overcome the opposite impression which certainly might arise if we confined our attention to maladjustments.’<sup>1</sup>

The outcry often raised against the natural weapons with which birds and beasts of prey, &c., are furnished, is here out of place. It may need consideration in reference to the divine character, but so far as teleology is concerned, the more effective they are, the more conclusive is their testimony to the working of a purposive mind through all the potentialities of their development.

(vii) We come now to a strange suggestion which would in itself scarcely deserve notice at all, were it not for the support of great names like Mill, and learned authors like Profs. McTaggart and Knight.

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 128.

That purpose contradicts omnipotence, is a notion one would think sufficiently self-contradictory without further reply. But Mr. Mill affirms boldly 'that it is not too much to say that every indication of design in the kosmos, is so much evidence against the omnipotence of the designer. For what is meant by design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity for contrivance, the need for employing means, is a consequence of the limitation of power. Who would have recourse to means, if to attain his end his mere word was sufficient?'<sup>1</sup> Perhaps if Mr. Mill had had any children he would never have asked this last question. Be that as it may, in the interest of truth one must point out that the boldness of the assertion here is only equalled by the unwarrantableness of its assumption.<sup>2</sup> Such an attitude is but an exhibition of anthropomorphism to a degree that Theism utterly repudiates. Because we, as limited beings, employ contrivance to overcome difficulties, therefore God must not employ contrivance for any purpose whatever, on pain of being pronounced limited! Strange argument from a logician! Surely ordinary intelligence must see that the limitation here is put into the above query, not drawn out of it.

<sup>1</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, cheap ed., p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> The same assumption is found in Prof. Knight's objection. 'Design is a plan to overcome hindrance, to effect a contemplated end by conquering difficulty, and by adjusting phenomena each to each. But it is only a limited being that requires so to act or work. The omnipotent can have no hindrance to overcome, no difficulty to surmount.'—*Aspects of Theism*, p. 66. But whence comes the notion that there is necessarily hindrance or difficulty in the employment of means to an end? Certainly not from the nature of the case.



Prof. Flint may well say, 'This seems to me very strange and worthless reasoning. According to it, the ability of God to form and execute a purpose, is evidence not of power but of weakness. I confess I cannot see how ability to contrive things is weakness, or inability to contrive them power.'<sup>1</sup>

Nor must we allow our respect for academical position and literary reputation, to prevent our speaking plainly concerning even stranger and more misleading reasoning of later date. When for instance a Fellow and Lecturer of Cambridge writes thus— 'We may go further than this. If a wise and good being has used means to an end, this is a positive proof that he is not omnipotent. For means are those things which have no worth in themselves, but which it is right to use because, without using them, some end which has worth in itself cannot be attained. Now there is nothing which an omnipotent God cannot do—otherwise he would not be omnipotent. He could get the end without the means, if he chose to do so'<sup>2</sup>—one is simply amazed, that such a series of fallacies should be perpetrated in the name of learning. Professional philosophy at least might be expected to acknowledge that a definition cannot include a contradiction in terms. Two points, at least, must here be made clear.

(a) Omnipotence does not consist in the power to do anything, but—if one may be forgiven for pointing

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 179. As to the compatibility of any kind of limitation with the nature of God as Absolute, further consideration will be given to it in the pages that follow.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. J. E. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 201.



out the manifest—the power to do anything that can be done. It is never required of omnipotence to accomplish the impossible. To say that if God cannot make a round square, He is not omnipotent, would be more imbecile than irreverent.<sup>1</sup>

(b) Correspondingly curious, to say the least, is also the implied assertion, that omnipotence necessitates not being able to do something which is perfectly possible ! For here, in order to God's omnipotence, it is said to be essential that He should not be able to use means to accomplish an end. But is there anything naturally impossible in the divine employment of means ? Assuredly there is not. If, then, it be in accordance with the purpose of God to accomplish things by means—for reasons which may or may not be manifest to us—that is, to work in such a world as this by evolution rather than by special creation, is it scientific or philosophical to affirm that only the most magical special creation could demonstrate omnipotence ? Unless it be, the whole of the strange metaphysical meandering of chapter vi in Mr. McTaggart's recent work, is so much wasted printing.

Unfortunately, this does not end the case as here presented. Its special reference to man has also to be considered. We are by no means compelled to

<sup>1</sup> The succinct statement of Dr. Thompson (Gresham Lectures, *Prof. Huxley and Religion*, p. 83), may be commended to the learned Professor. 'To Theist and Christian alike, there is no such thing as an absolute almighty power, unfettered by any principle, and free to effect any imaginable thing.' Which sentence alone contains—if one can say it as courteously as emphatically—more truth, philosophic no less than religious, than the whole of the chapter on 'God as Omnipotent' in Dr. McTaggart's volume.

dismiss the moral capacity of human nature at the behest of misnamed 'determinism.' But a moral being is a free being, and a free being cannot by any possibility be compelled. In such a case—as is illustrated every day in ordinary education of children—means are not 'those things which have no worth in themselves,' for they may be both means and useful. The only means whereby a free agent can be led to form a character, are such as imply a limitation of omnipotence. Upon this it will be necessary to dwell presently. Meanwhile it must suffice to say plainly, that God *cannot* train a moral being without the employment of means, i.e. opportunities in which his moral freedom may find scope.

Prof. Knight's avowal, again—that 'the omnipotent can have no hindrance to overcome, no difficulty to surmount ; working with supremest ease and adequacy there can be no adaptation of phenomena in his procedure, or any adjustment of means to ends ' <sup>1</sup>—is but the same fallacy in other words. From so thoughtful a source it is passing strange. Hindrance and difficulty are foisted into the case ; real omnipotence is turned out. One cannot but suggest that the very fact that there are no difficulties to omnipotence, should have left it open to omnipotence to use means to ends, if for any reason it were desirable so to do.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> The words of Prof. Flint are worth quoting in full. 'God if omnipotent, it is said, did not need to contrive ; His mere word must have been sufficient. Yes, is the obvious answer ; His mere word, His mere will, was sufficient to produce all His contrivances and has produced them all. There is no shadow of reason for suspecting that anything was difficult to Him or for Him. No such suspicion

omnipotence which works through evolution, thereby creates with equal ease—and for sufficient reason—the hindrance and the means of overcoming it. If it be true, as has been said,<sup>1</sup> that ‘this is the criticism which is more than any other directed against the argument from design,’ it is scarcely worthy of the intelligence of the age. For it is ultimately nothing more than a misrepresentation based upon excessive anthropomorphism. Its only worth is to warn us against itself, i.e. ‘against applying to God the idea of design in the precise form in which it is applied to human activity.’ To demand that omnipotence, in order to be omnipotent, should be unable to do what every rational being can do, is the very extreme of irrationality. Mr. Storr’s summary is clear and sufficient: ‘Until man becomes God he cannot hope to make clear to himself the precise nature of God’s manner of operation—yet we may reasonably postulate a unity of purpose and execution in which design in the lower sense is transcended, and taken up into a higher mode of activity whereby it is made not less than design, but more.’<sup>2</sup>

(viii) It is, however, further alleged that, even at its best and utmost, teleology can only point to a great architect, not to an infinite Creator such as Theism

is entertained by those who employ the design argument, and those who would rationally object to that argument must find something else to insist on than the power of God’s mere will. The will of God is everywhere as efficacious as He in His omnipotence and omniscience chooses that it should be.’—*Theism*, p. 179.

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

supposes. This may be quite true, but it is equally irrelevant. For the argument for and from design does not profess to yield such an infinite result. If every argument which does not prove what it never seeks to prove, is to be given up, there is manifestly an end of all reasoning.<sup>1</sup> The teleological plea is but one amongst others, and its function is amply fulfilled in supplementing the rest. Thus neither the actuality of creation nor the infinitude of the Creator, is necessary to the validity and usefulness of the truly stated design argument. The teleological question simply is whether nature shows mind, involving purpose, working through phenomena. The teleologist's reply is that he 'finds in nature order, adaptations, adjustments, and argues that these things can have their origin only in a mind and will which called them into being, and acts with intelligent purpose.'<sup>2</sup>

(ix) Similarly, when it is urged that Theism involves an all-wise and an all-good God, and that such a conception is no more yielded by teleology than that of an infinite Creator, it is again a true and sufficient reply that the argument in question does not profess to give such result. It certainly points with definite emphasis to the reality of benevolence expressed in myriads of the apparently purposive arrangements of nature. All that must be added to such conception, both in quality and quantity, before

<sup>1</sup> 'We must not criticize the argument from design for failing to establish a conclusion which, when the argument is rightly stated, it never sets out to establish.'—Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

the theistic conclusion can be rationally drawn, is left to come from other sources.<sup>1</sup> This whole objection, therefore, to the validity of teleology, on the ground that it does not *per se* logically demonstrate God in the full theistic sense, is itself quite insufficient for its purpose. It is bound first to show that this argument makes such a claim, before accusing it of failure.<sup>2</sup>

(x) The next objection which calls for notice, is the allegation that the teleological argument proves too much. In other words, that the inevitable inference from it is the exact resemblance of the divine nature to the human. This, however, is very far from the truth. A certain measure of anthropomorphism is manifestly inevitable in all our thought and speech concerning God, even as a child's thought concerning its father is of necessity childish. But to argue from that fact the childishness of the father, would be manifestly absurd. So says Prof. Ward truly enough, that 'when positive science scoffs at anthropomorphism, it is playing a dangerous game.'<sup>3</sup> But it is a still more dangerous game to turn anthropomorphism into an absolute despotism. Whether it be expressed in ancient or modern figures, the suggestion that if horses could think of God at all they would necessarily conceive of Him as a kind of horse, and that the human

<sup>1</sup> 'We see enough of nature to make us argue to the existence of a divine mind, whose operations are so vast and wonderful that we readily predicate of that mind the attribute of perfection, even though we may not be logically justified in so doing.'—Storr, *Development, &c.*, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> See Prof. Flint's *Theism*, p. 73. Storr, *Development, &c.*, p. 200.

<sup>3</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 263.

thought of a purposive God is similarly inevitable and unjustifiable, is as illogical as it is flippant. It is flippant in appealing to an utterly impossible illustration. It is illogical in assuming that a cause can be no greater than its effect. That would mean that every effect must exhaust the whole of that which caused it. Whence it would follow that an infinite cause could not possibly have a finite effect. Which is absurd, as Euclid would say.

Nor is there any more truth in the implication that an effect must be entirely like its cause.<sup>1</sup> This would involve that the infinite must be absolutely homogeneous, in which case it would not be infinite at all. There is thus no shadow of logical justification for the assumption, or assertion, that the teleological argument points only to a magnified man.<sup>2</sup> Rather does sound sense, no less than logic, confirm the attitude of the Theist, who on the one hand acknowledges that the exact method of God can never be adequately represented in the thoughts of men, and on the other, believes that he will 'do more justice to its real character by substituting for the calculating activity of the designer the thought of an activity which works by free, spontaneous impulse, and which is not compelled to think out beforehand each detail of the scheme, or laboriously co-ordinate means to reach a remote end.'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Bowne is well warranted in his summary dismissal of this anthropomorphic spectre. Through it 'the design argument has been much belaboured. It has been called the carpenter theory—a phrase which, while missing the true nature of the argument, does most happily reveal the wooden character of the criticism.'—*Theism*, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 201.

(xi) On the other hand there is warrant for an analogical inference. Naturally the pendulum of objection swings from one extreme to another. If precise resemblance cannot be predicated, then, it is said, there can be no analogy. But this by no means follows. That is to say, whilst the design argument is not committed to crude anthropomorphism, it does involve and endorse anthropocosmism. From the unmistakable instances of adaptation in nature, we are not obliged rationally to infer that a magnified human mind is thereby evidenced. But we are obliged to infer intelligence and will. For to assert 'that whilst intelligibility in human action points to intelligence, intelligibility in cosmic action does not point to intelligence, is an act of caprice, not of reason.'<sup>1</sup> But certainly when it is affirmed that 'the design argument derives its force from the consciousness of our own free effort,' there is no necessity whatever that this should simply mean the enlargement of the human mind. It would be mere perversity to insist that because we know our own minds to be real, there can be no other mental reality other than the human. Rather, as Dr. Bowne says, 'Epistemology, when it understands itself, must assume the validity of thought for the entire universe, and Theism is only an implication of this assumption when it argues from intelligible effects to an intelligent cause.'<sup>2</sup>

(xii) Again: nothing can be more useless and helpless for the support of modern anti-theism, than the frequent tendency to refer everything back through

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.



a measureless process of evolution to some dim, distant, elementary, and confused beginning. Such retrogression does nothing but condense and intensify the irrationality of every honest atheistic suggestion.<sup>1</sup> Evolution without involution is indeed unthinkable; and involution is unthinkable without God. If evolution proceeds by constant differentiation, then there is no logical escape from the position thus expressed by Dr. Bowne: 'If any differentiation manifests itself, it has always been implicit. The present grows out of the past only on condition of being in the past.' Without this, evolution would be nothing more or less than an incalculable series of repetitions of the miracle of creation of something out of nothing. 'The high emerges from the low, only as it is implicit in the low. The homogeneous that is to develop into the heterogeneous, must itself be implicitly heterogeneous from the start.'<sup>2</sup>

Thus the simple affirmation by naturalism<sup>3</sup> that all things were 'implicit in the original protyle,' is neither more nor less than the begging of the whole question at issue, by means of the hugest and most unwarranted assumption.<sup>4</sup> To say 'give us matter and force, and we will explain the universe,' is at once the most audacious and least warranted of all pseudo-scientific hypotheses. Manifestly everything turns upon what is contained in the matter, and what is intended by

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 230-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> J. McCabe, *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup> See *Huxley and Religion*, by Dr. Thompson, p. 110.



force.<sup>1</sup> What, then, is the method of naturalism? Just take for granted that matter is everything in objective reality that is required, in order to get all else out of it; assume that force, spirit, thought, energy, are all one and the same; and then claim to have explained the whole universe! The utmost that can be fairly said of such a proceeding, is that it is merely a verbal hocus-pocus. The helplessness of naturalistic philosophy to supply any adequate cause for the kosmos as we know it, is well summarized and exposed when Mr. Mallock points out that, on its principles, 'everything that is is the equivalent of all that was, and conversely all that ever has been has been the equivalent of all that is, so that if the atoms had to clash for a million million years before the arrangement was reached from which modern evolution started, this special arrangement, this and no other, was implied in each prior moment of the seemingly aimless tumult.'<sup>2</sup> This reference, therefore, to implicitness, is manifestly the giving up of the whole case on the part of naturalism. It is the mere substitution of one equivalent for another, without assigning any cause whatever for either. Hence every assertion that the universe is explained by evolution, would find a perfect parallel if one should steal an egg and then claim to have accounted for the ensuing chicken. Whether we think of electrons or nebulae, monera or

<sup>1</sup> For the way in which Mr. Clodd, as a popular exponent, does this, see *Miracles of Unbelief*, pp. 57-64.

<sup>2</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 180. So p. 166, 'Not only is evolution initiated by some definite arrangement and movement of definitely heterogeneous matter, but in that arrangement and movement all the products of evolution were implicit.'

man, life or consciousness, mind or morals, does not in the least affect the case. How far, indeed, we are from fathoming any one of these, the ablest experts are ever readiest to acknowledge. But even if the impossible were possible, and the unthinkable became intelligible, it would not touch the unshakable truth thus expressed by Mr. Storr: 'The world-process cannot be made to yield mind as a product unless mind was present there all the while. Not, of course, your finite mind and mine, but an eternal mind in which we all share, and which is the great supposition of all existence.' <sup>1</sup>

(xiii) The situation is, furthermore, entirely unaffected—evolution unthinkable without equivalent involution, involution unthinkable without God as the supreme Mind—if we allow what Haeckel insists upon, though others deny it,<sup>2</sup> that the universe is not only eternal, but infinite. For this still affords no relief whatever from the dilemma—either all things from nothing, or from God. To talk of going back to the 'original protyle' is sheer delusion, for there is no 'original' protyle. Whatever material condition be supposed for any particular stage in the past, it could be nothing more or less than the last term of a preceding series. Thus we come once more to an infinite regress — with no conceivable starting-point for evolution—which we have already seen to be utterly useless for philosophical purposes.

If, moreover, we attempt to conceive of any other

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 205.

measure of the infinite than mere retrogression, it is utterly irrelevant. Measurelessness, *per se*, can never supply cause for anything. So far as we seek to explore the infinite under the category of time, but one course is open to us. Dr. Bowne rightly says : ' As we go backward we potentialize the actual ; as we come forward we actualize the potential.'<sup>1</sup> This, Theism may do, with reason and with satisfaction. But to the naturalist it is, and must ever be, mere ' barren verbalism.' There is neither warrant for it, nor hope in it.

(xiv) Now, however, we come to the most common, most plausible, and most popularly effective, of all modern grounds of opposition to teleology, so that it must be viewed with equal frankness and care. As ' evolution ' has been pronounced the ' magic word ' for driving out of thought the cosmological argument ; so ' natural selection ' has been again and again belauded as the naturalist's latest and most potent weapon for the annihilation of teleology. The inorganic world is manifestly left enveloped in an impenetrable fog of words and assumptions, but emergence into the organic means the dawning of naturalistic light. Such is the assertion, so often repeated that quotation to illustrate it would be superfluous.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 92.

<sup>2</sup> Two words from Prof. Hæckel may suffice. ' Since Darwin gave us the key to the monistic explanation of organization in his theory of selection forty years ago, it has become possible for us to trace the splendid variety of orderly tendencies of the organic world to mechanical natural causes, just as we could formerly in the inorganic world alone. Hence the supernatural and telic forces to which the scientist had had recourse, have been rendered superfluous. . . . Nowhere in the evolution of plants and animals do we

Now, as to how far Prof. Henslow and others are warranted in their emphatic assertion that the origin of species cannot even be aided by, let alone due to, natural selection, we will not here undertake to discuss. Not only are good reasons for such a statement clearly set forth by themselves,<sup>1</sup> but some of the acknowledged authorities, to whom Haeckel himself appeals, similarly reject natural selection altogether.<sup>2</sup> Even if we accept the more common view that natural selection is one of the main factors—though certainly not the only one—in organic evolution, it may be shown by a little careful scrutiny, that the telic forces which Theism invokes, are not, in spite of Prof. Haeckel's round assertion, thereby rendered superfluous. The main elements in the case, to this effect, are as follows.

(1) Natural selection itself does, and can do, nothing. It is not at all a creative force, but a created channel in which certain forces move. Darwin himself<sup>3</sup> is very careful of words in his statement that 'it may *metaphorically* be said that natural selection is daily and hourly at work.' When, indeed, we are told by Mr. Wallace and others that 'rigid selection at every step of progress has led to the preservation of every detail of structure, faculty, or habit, necessary for the

find any trace of design, but merely the inevitable outcome of the struggle for existence, the blind controller, instead of the provident God, that effects the changes of organic forms by a mutual action of the laws of heredity and adaptation.'—*Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 92, 95. See also for this section *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 257 et seq.

<sup>1</sup> See *Present-day Rationalism Critically Examined*, pp. 145-204.

<sup>2</sup> For the case of Naegeli, see Haeckel's *Wonders of Life*, p. 381. See also *Nature versus Natural Selection*, by C. C. Coe, *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> *Origin of Species*, p. 65.

preservation of the race,' it is indeed metaphorical language. This he himself confesses, when he adds <sup>1</sup> that 'variation and natural selection are ever-present agencies which take possession, *as it were*, of every minute change originated by these fundamental causes.' And this is well represented by Prof. Ward: 'Natural selection taken alone, as Wallace urged and Darwin himself allowed, is only a negative and destructive principle; in struggle for existence and survival of the fittest on the other hand, we found that striving not merely to live but to live well, which first gives natural selection its *point d'appui*. Here we have a teleological factor, and one suggesting not so much a nondescript force called vital, as a psychical something endowed with feeling and will.'<sup>2</sup> But a purely negative and destructive principle is assuredly a poor means by which to display the omnipotence of naturalism. And when the attitude of Darwin himself—in allowing other factors to be co-operative in the work of evolution—is left behind, in that 'Neo-Darwinians elevate natural selection to the dignity of being the sole cause governing organic development,' so much the more difficult, or rather impossible, it becomes for them to give a rational account of such a system of organic structures and relations as the world of which we form part exhibits.

(2) Certainly natural selection can do nothing without an assumed potentiality of organisms for variation. 'What is wanted for natural selection,'

<sup>1</sup> *Darwinism*, p. 444.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 92.

said Prof. Huxley, 'is a theory of variations.'<sup>1</sup> Now it is said that the essence of Darwin's theory is that 'organisms vary without any purpose, and it is a mere chance whether the variations of any organism fit in with the environment.'<sup>2</sup> Hence, as Huxley says, 'an organism exists, according to Darwinism, simply because it is the only one which has been able to persist in the conditions in which it is found.' All this may be conceded. And yet the fact remains that some organisms do persist. They persist, moreover, because in them necessary and useful ends are secured by means of variation. For which reason the following statement is well warranted: 'The true origin of species lies, of course, in the cause of diversities of variations; and by the fact that such variations must be definite or occur in single particular directions, and that repeatedly, if they are to become fixed by selection and to form an incipient species, many thinkers have felt impelled to believe that the evolution of organic forms cannot wholly be referred to blind processes showing no directivity; that Nature, in fact, is playing her game of chance with loaded dice.'<sup>3</sup>

(3) And this all the more, because variation, at its utmost, can do nothing without heredity. For here many and pertinent questions arise.<sup>4</sup> He who would dis-

<sup>1</sup> See *Huxley and Religion*, Thompson, Gresham Lects., p. 77; *Darwiniana*, p. 74. Also Iverach's *Theism in the Light of Modern Science*, p. 74; Henslow's *Present-day Rationalism*, &c., p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> F. R. Tennant, *Camb. Theol. Essays*, p. 94.

<sup>4</sup> 'There is a law of heredity: like produces like. But why is there such a law? Why does like produce like? Why should not all nature have been sterile? Why should there have been any provision for the propagation of life in a universe ruled by blind

prove teleology, must first explain heredity by chance. But how on such lines came the forward-looking co-operation of heredity with variation, for the perpetuation of species? It can never be enough, with the facts before us, to pronounce these to be merely efficient causes. We are bound to ask, efficient for what? And a true answer cannot but be teleological.<sup>1</sup> Nor does it matter here whether sides be taken with Spencer or with Weismann, concerning the theory of heredity. Both alike are simply guesses at method. It is the cause behind the method, for which reason inquires.

(4) Again, it is manifest that, at its utmost, natural selection does not and cannot give us the real origin of species. Let its whole claim be conceded, and what have we? Merely the acknowledgement that in a certain way species are evolved. Take Darwin's own famous words. 'Further, we must suppose that there is a power represented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest, always intently watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers, and carefully preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way or in any degree, tends to produce a distincter image.' The reference, of course, is to the evolution of the human eye. But it is all nothing

force? And why should producer and produced be like? Physical science cannot answer these questions, but that is no reason why they should not be both asked and answered.'—Flint, *Theism*, p. 201.

<sup>1</sup> Here it would seem appropriate to repeat Prof. Huxley's well-known words: 'It is necessary to remember that there is a wider teleology which is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of evolution.'—*Darwiniana*, p. 110.



more than a statement of assumed fact. 'We must suppose that there is a power.' Some such hypothesis as natural selection may be rendered necessary by the phenomena we observe, but it is the 'power' which is represented therein which is the real originator of species. So that, whatever may be said from the standpoint of science, this theory is not philosophy until and unless there is definite acknowledgement of the reality and adequacy of that cause whereby alone this method—however metaphorically expressed—was originated and is still perpetuated.

(5) That it really is nothing more than a method, is manifest in that it not only does not give us the true causation of species, but says nothing whatever about its own causation. Indeed, Darwin's own words are: 'How a nerve comes to be sensitive to light, hardly concerns us more than how life originated.'<sup>1</sup> But surely, for philosophical thought at all events, this is the very question to which we need an answer. No one doubts for a moment the advantage in life's struggle which comes to an animal possessed of sight, as against one that is blind. But why should there be any seeing animals at all? Why not a perpetual struggle between the blind alone? How, as well as why, the first spot on the epidermis began to be sensitive to light, is the foundation query of all, which must not be evaded. And in regard to it, as concerning the origin of life itself, the only possible answer is in the potentiality which forms the very basis of theistic conviction.

The more the causation thus exemplified is insisted

<sup>1</sup> *Origin of Species*, p. 144.



on as a law of nature, the more necessary it becomes to find a reason for it outside itself. For, assuredly, no real law ever yet made itself. If, however, in order to avoid such an inference, it be pronounced only an unvarying series of observed antecedents and consequents, it becomes no law at all, and the whole theory dependent on it is reduced to a mere tendency based on incoherent happenings, the course of which may at any moment be reversed. Hence, if it were conceded to the Neo-Darwinians, as against their master, that natural selection is the whole and sole and efficient cause of the development of species, yet it would be only a second cause for which a prior and adequate cause must be found. A tendency is indeed a reality, but it is a reality that cannot be considered causeless,<sup>1</sup> just in proportion to the extent in which it prevails.

(6) This, at least, we know beyond controversy, viz. that in so far as natural selection can be illustrated as a biological principle, after Darwin's own fashion, by reference to selective breeding in pigeons or horses or aught else, we find definite causation for the alleged results, in the intentional working of the human mind and will. So that we are perfectly warranted in pressing the ensuing questions. If the comparatively trifling changes and modifications, never

<sup>1</sup> Here Dr. Bowne's words are well worth recording. 'In the scientific sense evolution is neither a controlling law nor a producing cause, but simply a description of a phenomenal order, a statement of what, granting the theory, an observer might have seen if he had been able to inspect the cosmic movement from its simplest stages until now. It is a statement of method and is silent about causation.'—*Theism*, p. 104. This is true *a fortiori* of natural selection, which may be said to represent, for the organic world, the evolution of evolution.

amounting to what we term a creation of species, brought about by Darwin himself and his co-workers, demanded such large intelligence and persistent purpose as are ever associated with his name—that is to say, a thoughtful and intentional employment of the already provided principles of variation and heredity—is it rationally conceivable that the immeasurably greater and incomparable production of wonder and utility and beauty with which nature abounds,<sup>1</sup> can have come to pass, in any length of time whatever, through the mere haphazard, incoherent, juxtaposition of unintended changes in individuals? Are we not warranted in asking, moreover, once and for ever, how, out of experiments originating in and controlled by mind, any inference can possibly be rationally drawn that the working of nature is mindless?

(7) But it is more than possible, after all, to make too much of the origin of species. For it is temptingly easy to make too much of species altogether. ‘In reality,’ as Dr. Bowne insists, ‘a species is only a group of more or less similar individuals, and is nothing

<sup>1</sup> Darwin’s own estimate hereupon cannot be allowed to pass out of memory. ‘The more I study nature the more I become impressed, with ever-increasing force, with the conclusion that the contrivances and beautiful adaptations, slowly acquired through each part varying in a slight degree but in many ways, with the preservation or natural selection of those variations which are beneficial to the organism under the complex and ever-varying conditions of life, transcend in an incomparable degree the contrivances and adaptations which the most fertile imagination of the most imaginative man could suggest with unlimited time at his disposal.’—*Fertilization of Orchids*, Revised ed., 1877, p. 351. Truly if all this be but the result of blind chance and mindless mechanism, the miracles of theology are as nothing compared with those of naturalism.

apart from them.' <sup>1</sup> When all generalizations are concluded and all discussions over, the main plain fact is 'the individuals and the power which produces them, through the processes of generation, in such a way that they admit of being classed according to an ascending scale. All else is the shadow of our own minds.' So that the actual, fundamental problem for the naturalism which rejects teleology, is not the production of groups, so much as the production of individuals. And when it comes to the consideration of individualities of all kinds and grades, and in all directions, the inadequacy of natural selection as a *vera tota causa* is too manifest to need emphasis.

It has been suggested, indeed, that Lamarck would not be likely to give the same explanation of the leopard's spots as he would of the giraffe's neck. But even if such variation had been perfected by natural selection, there are myriads of marvels of use and beauty in nature, which natural selection no more touches by way of explanation, than a golden key can unlock a problem. Is it any reply at all to say that they came gradually? Such an assertion virtually attributes them to chance. But whatever may be taking place in Mars or Jupiter, on this planet we have no grounds, certainly, either in experience or observation, for thinking such a result possible.

(8) Prof. Ward asserts <sup>2</sup> that at least three factors are required for the full purposes of biological evolution, and he calls them in a real sense teleological factors. These are: Lamarck's principle of form and efficiency through habits of use and disuse, plus heredity;

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 105.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 278.

Darwin's natural selection; and Wallace's human selection. But apart from the fact that here is no mention of sexual selection,<sup>1</sup> it is plain that the first and last of these demand and employ 'an activity on the part of organisms which involves sentiency and often consciousness.' Hence a further conclusion is warranted. 'Mind is at work as a factor of the evolutionary process. The development of an animal may still be under the rule of natural selection, but in our total estimate of the character of its development and meaning we shall have to take into account the presence of this mental factor, which can only be called teleological.'<sup>2</sup>

Yet again. It is not enough to say that the all-potent force which Neo-Darwinians attach to natural selection, *per se*, is thus disproved. When we reflect further, that these factors are in the higher organisms never found working singly but always together, a new problem emerges, viz. to account for the co-operation through which alone the development of the organism can be attained. This is not a light matter. As Dr. G. F. Wright puts it: 'The difficult question for those who deny any purposive element at the bottom of organic evolution, is how to secure the complicated co-ordination of results involved in the total development of

<sup>1</sup> Concerning which Darwin wrote: 'After having carefully weighed the various arguments which have been advanced against the principle of sexual selection, I remain firmly convinced of its truth.'—Romanes, *Darwin and after Darwin*, i. p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> Storr, *Development, &c.*, pp. 113, 115. See also *Darwinism*, ch. xv.; and Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 288, says, 'Mind is always implicated in life; in other words, a teleological factor, analogous to that of Lamarck, is operative and essential throughout all biological evolution.'

any decidedly advantageous anatomical variations.’<sup>1</sup> In Prof. Weismann’s own words: ‘How shall we account for the occurrence of the right variations at the right place’—unless it be conceded that Dr. Asa Gray was right, in his correspondence with Darwin, when he ever insisted that variations must be ‘*led* along certain beneficial lines’?

When justice is done to all these considerations, the ensuing conviction must surely be that natural selection, so far from being a substitute for teleology, is but a glimpse into the possibilities of nature’s complex working, and is as utterly insufficient even to explain itself, as to supply the whole explanation of organic evolution. Thus it becomes ultimately an added lesson upon the necessity of a supreme and transcendent mind, as the immanent cause and maintainer of all. Whence the attitude of Theism is justified.<sup>2</sup>

(xv) As to environment and its influence. Modern evolutionists are increasingly inclined to attach great importance to environment, biologically no less than socially. Even if they do not attribute to it so potent and direct action as Prof. Henslow, they acknowledge more and more definitely, with Prof. Weismann, that

<sup>1</sup> *Scientific Aspects of Christian Evidences*, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> ‘I can conceive of no other intelligent explanation than that there is a God of wisdom, who designed that the world should be for ages the abode of life; that the life therein should be rich and varied, yet that variation should have its limits; that there should be no disorder or confusion; and who, to secure this result, decreed that plants should yield seeds and animals bring forth after their kind. He who would disprove design must certainly not start with the great mystery of generation.’—Flint, *Theism*, p. 201.

'the ultimate origin of hereditary individual differences lies in the direct action of external influences upon the organism.'<sup>1</sup> But as natural selection can do nothing without assuming the principle of variation, and as the survival of the fittest always assumes that there are the fittest to survive, so the influence of environment is entirely useless for the purpose of biological evolution, without the corresponding but entirely independent factors of potentiality and directivity. If the action of environment be immediate and direct, then there must be directivity somehow, to turn the latent variability into useful channels. Whilst even if the Darwinian and Spencerian view of indirect action be accepted—viz. that 'change is only brought about through the reaction of the organism to the stimulation of the environment,'<sup>2</sup>—yet this reaction assumes a potentiality which is the very core of the whole process of adaptation. But this is, in the broader sense, distinctly teleological. The more thorough rational scrutiny becomes, the more it would seem to 'feel instinctively that an orderly and progressive system cannot have arisen out of the two variables organism and environment; and it demands more evidence that variation is as indefinite as it is assumed to be.'<sup>3</sup> Manifestly, for such orderly evolution five factors are absolutely essential—viz. the organism to start with, the potentiality of variation, the environment, the potentiality of response to environment, the principle of trans-

<sup>1</sup> See Henslow's *Present-day Rationalism*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

mission by heredity. Now—even if for the moment we waive that necessity for directivity in regard to which Prof. Henslow gives reasons for saying, ‘all the way from primitive protoplasmic beings to man there is directivity which refuses to be excluded’<sup>1</sup>—is it conceivable that all these factors should work together for good to the extent which nature exhibits, with no guidance, of any kind whatever, behind their energies?

(xvi) We have seen above that Prof. Haeckel would not hesitate to reply to such a question in the affirmative. To the school of thought which he most prominently represents, it is all purely a case of mechanism. Such an answer, however, is not only what the naturalist just now is most prone to give, but precisely that which the Theist specially wishes him to give. For in so doing he cannot but give away his whole case.

(1) Whether we think of the mikrokosm in an animal organism, or of the makrokosm in the universe so far as we know it, the principle of mechanism must take form in some machine before it can be recognized. In each case the recognition of relation between the parts, and of all the parts to a whole, is beyond question. Monism, whether applied to a human body, or to a world, must mean a whole, a unity composed of parts. But mechanism in such case cannot but bring us to face to face with what Strauss rightly called ‘this vast machine of the universe.’<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Henslow, *op. cit.*, 53.

<sup>2</sup> *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 435.



(2) But as Prof. Ward points out,<sup>1</sup> wherever we see a machine, we are bound to ask who made it. Two considerations imperatively call for something beyond the mechanical. Every machine necessarily involves (i) a preceding idea of its functions, together with (ii) the intentional co-ordination of parts in order to secure the fulfilment of those functions. No machine whatever is conceivable without both of these. The resulting dilemma is simple but inevitable. If nature is not a machine, assuredly it is not mechanical. If it be a case of 'mechanicism,' as Prof. Haeckel so strongly insists, then it is a machine which involves mind as surely as any other machine of which we can conceive. Nor does it in the least degree meet the case to say that 'the central point of the whole mechanical method of explanation, is to be found in the thought of each organism being only a very specially complicated machine, whose interconnexions are closer and more subtle than any with which we meet in the inorganic realm.'<sup>2</sup> Rather does this view emphasize what has just been pointed out. For all that the degree of complication has to do with the principle of mind, regarded as an absolute necessity for a machine, is that the more specially close and subtle the interconnexions exhibited, the more marked is the manifestation of purpose and power. Except under both of the conditions just mentioned, no *primaeval* savage ever made a *palaeolithic* flint-arrow. But will any sane man aver that the modern dynamo, by reason of its incalculably greater complication, fails to show them

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. p. 294.

<sup>2</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 171.



also in its construction ? Common sense is here much more rational when it argues, How much greater must be the mind and intention embodied in the modern as compared with the ancient machine !

But more than this. No dynamo, no monotype, no cathedral organ, has yet been invented which will proceed to repair itself as soon as injured.<sup>1</sup> Yet this is what myriads of organisms are doing around and indeed within us every day. No sooner is a finger cut—to say nothing of deeper injuries—than that process of repair begins which of necessity ‘involves an elaborate division of labour between the cells engaged in the work.’ Mr. Storr mildly says that ‘it is difficult to picture any mechanical explanation of the fact that thousands of cells each contribute their own share of labour in harmonious co-operation.’ But this is scarcely the whole truth. It is not a case of difficulty, but of sheer rational impossibility. No sane mind can possibly conceive of the repair of an organ, or a cottage, by the accumulated mechanisms of a score of independent, undirected, non-co-ordinated labourers. ‘We cannot help asking how they are directed,’ says the writer just quoted. True. But we must also insist that it is utterly irrational to suggest that the work could be done without such direction. Is multiform harmonious co-operation such a trifle that it can account for itself, without a thought from any

<sup>1</sup> It is well known that in the cotton and other mills, machines are constructed to stop automatically as soon as anything goes wrong. But they only emphasize the questions, Does such an arrangement come to pass without mind and purpose, of sheer ‘necessity’ ? And when the machine has stopped, how long will it wait before going on again, if the deft hand of the weaver does not come to the rescue ?

guiding mind? At all events medical practice does not so judge, seeing that the technical phrase for representing such repair, when immediate and unhindered, is 'healing by first intention.' And if the latter word had not expressed an undeniable biological reality, its employment here, 'metaphorically' or not, would never have occurred.

(3) Now, if all this applies resistlessly to the structure of a single organism, as being merely one case of most intricate machinery, how much more does it apply to the known universe! In so far as science stands for the uttermost appreciation of infinitesimals, and for definite connexion between all the parts in an immeasurable whole, it necessarily and increasingly emphasizes the unthinkable-ness of the mechanical in nature, without also the mental, expressed in the purposive.

(4) But, of a truth, there is no need to wander out amongst the stars, or to blind oneself with peering into the infinitely little. The simple phenomenon of consciousness is, always has been, and for ever will be, sufficient to make manifest the utter uselessness of a merely mechanical conception of either the origin or nature of a single thinking being. For mental qualities cannot be explained, under any conditions, in terms of mechanism. 'When the evolution of life reaches the stage at which consciousness and self-consciousness appear, is it not clear that these mental qualities cannot be explained in terms of mechanism?' To such a question there is but one rational answer. 'The attempt to make mind a product of mechanical force is confessedly hopeless.'<sup>1</sup> This should be too

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 180.

plain to need comment. When the multiplicity in unity of every organism—and especially of the highest, by which any theory of explanation must ultimately be tested—is fairly faced, one is driven to acknowledge that ‘mechanism cannot explain it, and if so, neither can it explain the development which has issued from it.’—‘In fact, mechanism explains nothing, but itself everywhere needs explanation.’<sup>1</sup> The statement of Kant is not more emphatic than true—and the intervening years have only confirmed it—‘It is quite certain that we cannot adequately recognize, much less explain, organized beings and their internal possibility, according to mere mechanical principles of nature.’<sup>2</sup> So that the whole case is truly summarized by Mr. Tennant when he says that ‘natural selection, unaccompanied by what are called Lamarckian factors, may or may not suffice adequately to describe the evolution of living things, variation being given. But however mechanical in its character,

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Thus also, more recently, Dr. Bowne puts it: ‘Mechanism and systems of necessity in general, can never explain teleological problems. These can find a real explanation only in a self-directing intelligence. All other explanations are either tautologies or they implicitly abandon the problem. . . . Reference has already been made to the grotesque invention of reason which finds in the rational order a ground for denying a basal reason; the same thing meets us here. We construct our thought of the cosmic mechanism by an inverted teleology. The mechanism is simply teleology read backwards. But the notion of necessity so blinds us that the cosmic mechanism, which is but an incarnation of all cosmic products, is made the ground for denying purpose therein. This utter barrenness attaches to every system of explanation of a mechanical or necessary character, and can never be escaped.’—*Theism*, pp. 89, 91.

and however blindly it may appear to act, there is no reason to assume that it, or indeed the mechanism described by any other law of nature, is anything but the means employed by the designer of the kosmos, and of the goal toward which the evolutionary process tends.<sup>1</sup>

(xvii) Three suggestions for the elimination of teleological Theism yet remain—illusion, natural law, and possibility. A brief glance at each of these will suffice. To object that ‘the fact that the world-ground proceeds as if it had aims, does not prove that it really has them,’ appears so far-fetched as to suggest prejudice rather than reason. The theory of existence which can only be saved by postulating universal illusion, is not worth saving. One can but ask in reply to such a plea, What, then, constitutes proof of anything? Certainly we have no logical or mathematical demonstration of the alleged truths of science, let alone the deeper realities of our own consciousness. If all these are to be dismissed on the ground that they merely look as if they were true, but we must not believe them, then, but not before, may the same doctrine of illusion apply to teleology in nature. But this ancient fiction from the East is not likely to win much favour in the modern West. It may be put aside with the brief summary of Dr. Bowne: ‘It is curious that this argument should seem so profound, so judicious, so indicative of mental integrity when applied to theistic problems, and so unsatisfactory elsewhere. Without

<sup>1</sup> *Camb. Theol. Essays*, pp. 93, 94.

waiting to solve this psychological and logical puzzle, we point out that the theistic "as if" is as good as the scientific "as if." We cannot reject the one and retain the other.' <sup>1</sup>

(xviii) It must also be distinctly affirmed that the suggestion of natural law as a substitute for divine intention, is—in regard to teleology no less than to cosmology—altogether unavailing, and for the simple but sufficient reason, already pointed out, that the very conception of law involves intention, in the kosmos quite as really as in a human community.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Flint's comment hereupon is therefore quite pertinent: 'To ascribe the origination of order to law, is a manifest evasion of the real problem. Law is order. Law is the very thing to be explained. Laws, in a word, are not the causes, but the expressions of order. They are themselves the results of delicately accurate adjustments which indicate the operation of a divine wisdom.'<sup>3</sup> Whence it must follow that to set up natural law as the disprover of design, is only to substitute teleology for teleology. In every respect the Theist has greater reason than the naturalist, or the atheist, to appreciate the laws of nature. Science becomes, indeed, for him the most impressive

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 111; see also pp. 112, 114.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Prof. Ward says: 'The conception of natural law is teleological in its character, first inasmuch as it is hypothetical and every hypothesis is a means to an end, a theoretical organon which may or may not work; secondly and more especially, inasmuch as the hypothesis is that nature will conform to the conditions of our intelligence.'—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 253.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 187.

demonstrator of theistic philosophy. 'The only quarrel which the Theist has with the man of science, arises if the latter offers his partial and abstract explanations as complete explanations.'<sup>1</sup> In the case we are considering, for instance, science insists on law. But law, in the purely scientific sense, explains nothing, because it is nothing. It is a mere registration of antecedents and consequences. The moment law is taken to mean more than this, it becomes both a philosophical and a teleological conception. That science should—in some cases—seek to employ this as leverage for getting rid of Theism, is manifestly a double delusion. It first goes out of its proper realm, and then proceeds to contradict itself.<sup>2</sup>

(xix) The final plea of naturalism against Theism is and must ever be that, given unlimited time, the possibilities of accident are infinite. And this may be conceded as metaphysically true. But it is all the same utterly irrelevant. As Mr. Storr says, 'It is always possible to maintain, without self-contradiction, that if you tossed the letters of the alphabet often enough the combination of them into a lyric poem might take place.'<sup>3</sup> But to urge that any plea avoids self-contradiction is the poorest of justifications. There are a hundred ways in which, notwithstanding, it may be entirely false. It is so here. For mere possibility, in

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 285.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Dr. Fraser well says (*Philosophy of Theism*, p. 92): 'Nothing is too great or too little for natural law, and therefore for providential purposes. Universal Providence is in this sense necessarily special. The very idea of natural law is teleological.'

<sup>3</sup> *Development*, &c., p. 63.

the abstract, can assuredly never be the ground of a reasonable belief in anything. Credibility demands at least some degree of probability. But in the present case there is not the shadow of probability of any kind. The irrefragable truth may be put into a single sentence: 'Throw letters together without thought through all eternity, and you will never make them express thought.'<sup>1</sup> It is really but another application of the foundation axiom that out of nothing nothing can come. Whatever the abstract possibilities of the case may be, it were actually the most stupendous of all miracles, if out of even an infinite series of mindless tossings of portions of matter—for 'letters' have mind already stamped upon them—an Iliad emerged.<sup>2</sup> When it is said in regard to the inorganic world, that if only atom clashed with atom long enough, the potentialities of matter might be evolved, life might arise, the upward processes of evolution might be originated, it is all as non-self-contradictory as many of the babblings of an imbecile, but it is just as senseless and as useless for rational purposes. A castle in the air is firmly founded, in comparison with a theory of the universe built simply upon what might be, and that under irrational conditions.

When we come to the organic world, Darwin himself,

<sup>1</sup> Flint, *Theism*, p. 186.

<sup>2</sup> 'But what is the Iliad to the hymn of creation, and the drama of providence? Were these glorious works composed by the mere jumbling together of atoms which were not even prepared beforehand as letters are to form words, and which had to shake themselves into order without the help of any hand? They may believe that who can. It seems to me that it ought to be much easier to believe all the *Arabian Nights*.'—Flint, *Theism*, p. 186.



we know, says, 'Although belief that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural selection is enough to stagger any one, yet in the case of any organ, if we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for its possessor, then, under changing conditions of life, there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of perfection through natural selection.' And he further asks, 'Let this process go on for millions of years, and during each year on millions of individuals of many kinds, and may we not believe that a living optical instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man?'<sup>1</sup> But with all the respect due to a great name, when Dr. Pritchard, speaking as an expert in optics and astronomy, says emphatically 'No, we may not,' all that is rational within us endorses his denial.<sup>2</sup> For any non-expert can see that in such a case as this, the notion of possibility, through infinite continuance, is as useless as it is inapplicable.<sup>3</sup> In any arrangement, whether of the words in a lyric poem, or of the facts and relations of nature as expressed in the kosmos, mind is necessarily involved. Arrangement, without mind, is unthinkable, a veritable contradiction in terms. But in the 'tossing' of letters, no mind is involved—

<sup>1</sup> *Origin of Species*, pp. 146, 165.

<sup>2</sup> For his exact words, see *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 269.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Darwin, be it observed, speaks of 'the works of the Creator.' But if this attribution of all to natural selection, without guidance of any kind, be taken as typical, where does the work of the Creator come in at all? On the other hand, if His work must and does appear, as Professor Gray says, in the constant leading of such variations to an ultimate issue, that is just such teleology as Theism postulates.



beyond the possible intention of a tosser to see what mindless action will bring about. The very relation of being tossed into juxtaposition connotes mindlessness. In such a case the mere number of tossings becomes as irrelevant as the number of cyphers in any row of the same. The difference between something and nothing is immeasurable. That difference exists between chaos and kosmos. For the something that divides them is order, and the scale is entirely irrelevant. No infinite multiplication of minute portions of chaos can ever issue in a kosmos, without adequate cause. And seeing that order, in the very degree in which it is order, throughout our whole rational experience, is the expression of will working with purpose, what reasonable cause can there be for the order of the universe other than will similarly working with purpose? Surely illustration on the transcendent scale rather confirms than destroys a plain principle. Mr. Mallock, indeed, avers that 'the great truth which Prof. Haeckel, more popularly than any other writer, exhibits as the conclusion of all science is this, that the entire universe, organic and inorganic, solid or nebulous, past, present, and future, is a single system of interconnected causes.'<sup>1</sup> If this be so, the case for teleology is as clear as any Theist could desire. For as long as reason remains to us, definite interconnexion between the elements of a single system, is as inconceivable apart from mind and purpose, as is the telegraph system of any civilized country.

Upon these allegations, therefore, against teleology

<sup>1</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 180.

we need not longer dwell. There still remains, however, the need for a succinct statement of what may be added on its behalf, in the light of to-day.

(xx) Let us first be clear as to what the teleological argument does and does not claim. Modern objections serve well the cause of Theism in clarifying its thought and enlarging its conceptions. They have shown that the former popular representations of the divine mind and method as nothing more than the human on a magnified scale, were as mistaken as sincere. 'All that the teleologist is now concerned to contend for is this, that what we call design in man has a real counterpart in God, inasmuch as the results achieved both by God and man are achieved through the operation of conscious intelligence, though the mode of the divine activity may be very different from the mode of the human.'<sup>1</sup> The main principle here involved is as ancient as Anaxagoras, to whom first in the history of philosophy 'the beauty, harmony, and design in the world seemed inexplicable save as the work of a rational, intending, and omnipotent intelligence.'<sup>2</sup> Science, rigidly interpreted, may certainly be permitted to give up teleology, and be content with the working hypothesis of an unvarying series of antecedents and consequences. But the man in the street will be no more content with such limitation, than the expert in the laboratory. The human mind is too philosophical in its construction to remain satisfied with such an estimate, either of its surroundings or of

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 179.

itself. It will demand first an efficient cause for every phenomenon ; and in the degree in which such cause is found to be efficient, it will go on to demand for it in turn a final cause. To argue against such a proceeding is useless, for the simple reason that ' the design argument derives its force from the consciousness of our own free effort.'<sup>1</sup> So that a man must cease to be himself, i.e. he must lose both will-power and consciousness, before he can be content to believe that things are as they are because they are.<sup>2</sup> The poet's representation of nature's attitude—

Thou bringest thine appeal to me—  
I bring to life, I bring to death.  
The spirit does but mean the breath ;  
I know no more—

will never any more satisfy the human mind, than it has ever satisfied the human heart.<sup>3</sup> Undoubtedly the distinction between the human and the divine, alike in nature and in method, calls for the emphasis which modern thought is putting upon it. But so long as we daily find within ourselves the will-power which makes means to be co-operant to an end, so long will it be impossible to resist the conviction that

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as Prof. Haeckel's English champion prefers to put it, ' they are as they are because they cannot be otherwise.'—*Haeckel's Critics Answered*, pp. 73, 74, &c.

<sup>3</sup> ' When thought is shallow and criticism asleep, it is easy to take spatial and temporal phenomena as self-sufficient facts, revealed by the senses and beyond all question. Then it is gravely announced that nature knows nothing of mind and purpose and goes its own mechanical way. It somewhat relieves our dismay to perceive that nature, in this sense, knows as little of man as it does of God.'—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 117.

the myriad machines around and within us, which are but infinitesimal parts of the universal machine, even more emphatically bespeak unmeasured intelligence working through will to some transcendent and worthy end.

(xxi) Hence it may be affirmed at once that Paley's famous argument, now more often abused than it was formerly belauded, is not to be wholly cast away as an ancient delusion, but adjusted to our fuller and more exact knowledge of the works of nature. Dr. Flint's estimate of the case is sober, and supported by fact, when he says that 'if Paley's famous work be now somewhat out of date, it is not because Mr. Darwin and his followers have refuted it, but because they have brought so much to light which confirms its argument.'<sup>1</sup> It is true that we have no more hesitation to-day in giving up special creation, in the Miltonian sense, than in dismissing the 'biblical chronology' which was so largely due to Archbishop Ussher. But both these popular losses are theistic gains. The magical element in former conceptions of creation, supposed an end to be attained without means. What evolution does is to show us the means whereby the end is gained. It has been thoughtfully said<sup>2</sup> that 'by a wonderful forecast of genius, Paley virtually accepted the modern theory of evolution.' And the remark is true in so far as, both to Paley's main principles and to his argument, the method of creation is quite irrelevant.<sup>3</sup> Whether by means of a myriad agencies

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 208.      <sup>2</sup> See Schurman, *Belief in God*, pp. 193, 195.

<sup>3</sup> See Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 49, 50.

that we can trace, or by none that we can discern ; whether in a day or in a thousand millenniums ; it yet remains true that something more than mere unguided haphazard is absolutely necessary to account for what we are and what we see. It is manifest that neither the question of time, nor that of method, enters into the argument at all.


Furthermore, whereas the cosmological argument proceeds upon the assumption that there must be a cause for every phenomenon—*e nihilo nihil fit*—the teleological plea, which Paley illustrated according to the knowledge of his day, is based unshakably upon the cognate axiom that the cause of every phenomenon must be adequate—*e parvo parvum fit*. This we have already noted, but the point here is in regard to Paley's application of it. His illustrations are no less valid than ours, though they are less abundant and differently expressed. Dr. Carpenter's more recent reference to the formation of the eye of the chick in embryo <sup>1</sup> will not only bear all the stress he put upon it, but certainly endorses Paley's main principle.

The appeal to the human eye, however, is by no means exhausted.<sup>2</sup> We have seen that the oft-quoted estimate of Helmholtz does not in the least lessen its witness as a whole to teleology. Suppose we take now some portion of this wondrous organ to which his oft-quoted criticisms do not apply, what have we ? Six

<sup>1</sup> See *H. M. F.*, p. 273.

<sup>2</sup> See *H. M. F.*, pp. 267-74 ; *Miracles of Unbelief*, pp. 51-3, 78, 79. \ Also, for the application of the same principles to the human ear and its apparatus, see Dr. C. Brooke, M.A., F.R.S., in *Faith and Freethought Lectures*, p. 78.

muscles, we find, are attached to each eyeball for the purpose of moving it in different directions. No language less teleological than this, would do justice to these beautiful contrivances and their functions. Now, of these muscles four work normally, i.e. the pull of the muscle is in the line of direction of its length. But with the other two it is not so. The superior oblique muscle, for instance, is required and used to turn the eye in an oblique direction, intermediate between the horizontal and the perpendicular, by means of a special



1. *External Rectus muscle.* 2. *Superior Rectus muscle.* 3. *Inferior Rectus muscle.*  
4. *Superior Oblique muscle.* 5. *Pulley for the purpose of directing pull of Superior Oblique; no other language will express the facts.*

tendon passing through a pulley in such a way that whilst the contraction of the muscle is in one direction the motion of the eyeball is definitely in another. This the accompanying illustration may help to make clear.

Surely this also is a case in which Darwin's strong words<sup>1</sup> may be definitely challenged.

For numbers of accidental modifications do not here help in the least. Neither a million million years, nor a billion billion variations, can give adequate account

<sup>1</sup> 'If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. But I can find out no such case.'—*Origin of Species*, p. 146.

of such a structure without some kind of guidance somewhere, whether we call it design or 'directivity.'<sup>1</sup> The denial of the working of a purposive mind would seem to be here preposterous, for any rational being, One cannot, at all events, shrink from saying that the world will have to be beyond reason altogether, before it can conceive of such a structure as this, no matter by what method evolved, arising out of the mere haphazard of purposeless variations. 'When thought is clear,' as Dr. Bowne well says, 'it is plain that evolution, while modifying our conceptions of the method and history of creation, leaves the argument for purpose in nature just where and what it has always been. Least of all does it make it possible to equate time, however long, with intelligence.'<sup>2</sup>

But this case is only typical of myriads more. The unfathomable marvel of marvels in the human brain—say of a philosopher—may be passed over as too complex for detailed reference. But what shall we honestly say concerning the stomach of a navvy? How he enjoys and profits physiologically by his plain fare, we know. Shall we then decide that 'the discovery that the stomach does not digest itself because its walls secrete a varnish impervious to the gastric fluid, may be held to remove all wonder from the fact'? Or shall we agree that 'purpose is not held to be purpose, when it works through an order of traceable law'?<sup>3</sup> Surely to call such a decision fallacious, would be far too euphemistic. It is rather philosophical insanity. It

<sup>1</sup> This term will be considered presently. See Henslow's *Present-day Rationalism*, &c., pp. 69-86.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 109.

<sup>3</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 84.

was from this that Paley desired to save his contemporaries. No blame can attach to him for not knowing what then he could not know. But the idea that his main and valid principles should be given up, because his illustrations require readjustment, is discreditable to ordinary intelligence.<sup>1</sup> Rather is the true estimate of his work that expressed by its latest competent editor.<sup>2</sup> 'The argument itself will retain its essential validity, and by no means be robbed of its force or become antiquated and useless.' On such firm ground, the modern Theist must not suffer himself to be browbeaten by dogmatic naturalism under the guise of science.

(xxii) It may be seriously questioned whether the words of Dr. Bowne quoted above, as to the influence of evolution on teleology, are, after all, strong enough. For not only does evolution as a working principle always and necessarily presuppose involution, but the involution which is thus a *sine quâ non* of evolution, is from equal necessity purposive. It is said<sup>3</sup> that 'physical analysis brings us almost within sight of prothyl—a continuous and homogeneous form of matter and force diffused through space.' And what then? 'Out of a simple matter and force have come an immense variety of things. These things were only *implicitly* in the primitive prothyl. The evolution of thought only shows that thought was implicitly

<sup>1</sup> See *H. M. F.*, p. 268.

<sup>2</sup> Paley's *Natural Theology* (S.P.C.K.), edited by Prof. Le Gros Clark, F.R.S., Pres. Royal Coll. of Surgeons of England, Preface, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, by Mr. J. McCabe, pp. 34, 79.



in the first cosmic principles.' It is difficult to understand how, in the name of intelligence, to take such words seriously. They do but exhibit the desperate straits of anti-theistic cosmology. How thought could be implicit in a first principle, whilst the universe displays no marks of mind, is a miracle we will not pause to estimate. But the utter helplessness of the position conveyed by the words 'only implicit,' merits all possible attention. If it means anything, it means that all which now constitutes the known kosmos was then latent in this marvellous 'prothyl.'<sup>1</sup> Be it so. Only reason demands to know how it came to be there, quite as really as to know the source of the phenomena of nature round about us daily. What is the answer of naturalism? The idea that it is to be found in contemplation of the atom on modern lines,<sup>2</sup> is entirely unwarranted. Miss Clerke, speaking from fullest knowledge of latest physical development, says: 'Everywhere throughout the universe atoms are thus in course of degradation into corpuscles. But no information is at hand as to the scene or mode of their reconstitution. The secret of their original construction is impenetrable. That they are composed of protyle—that their clustering members are corpuscles moving under strong mechanical control—is more than probable. And the law of order adumbrated by what are called the periodic relations of the chemical elements shows that their concurrence was very far from being fortuitous.'<sup>3</sup> All that we know beyond this is, in the words of

<sup>1</sup> See *H. M. F.*, p. 230, for further discussion.

<sup>2</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup> *Modern Cosmogonies*, pp. 163, 164.

the Haeckelian school, that 'we can trace the upward growth of our protyle.'<sup>1</sup> Nothing is easier than to multiply such words. But they amount to nothing in the end. It is precisely this upwardness of evolution—together with the non-fortuitousness of the original concourse of corpuscles in which it was latent—that demands efficient cause. And the only efficient cause of such non-fortuitous development, is one which then leads on, irresistibly and unmistakably, to the final cause of evolution as a whole.

Even in regard to the stages of inorganic evolution, which Haeckel so confidently claims as exhibiting pure mechanism, they are so manifestly preparatory for and correlated with the highest products of evolution, viz. life and mind, that one cannot help applying in such a connexion the familiar words,

Yet I doubt not through the ages an increasing purpose runs,  
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.

Or, if poetic phrase be not severe enough, we may adopt the deliberate judgement of a competent astronomer to the same effect. Professor Pritchard thus summarizes the case: 'The great advance of modern human knowledge, and especially the wonderful applications of this knowledge to the purposes of the arts of life, have arisen very much from the existence of iron and coal and sulphur and platina and silica upon our planet. Now tell me what were the anterior chances, prior to the existence of nature, that when a being like man came, after the lapse of ages, upon our earth he would have found stored up for him, and for his development

<sup>1</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 34.

in the scale of being, iron, and coal, and sulphur, and platina, and silica ? To tell me that the co-existence of all these essentially independent existences might be the result of anything short of the intention of a pre-scient will, the evidences of a pre-established harmony, would be equivalent to telling me that after placing sufficient letters of the alphabet into a box, there might be dredged out of it the dialogues of Plato, the dramas of Shakespeare, and the *Principia* of Newton.' <sup>1</sup>

Some few extreme followers of Darwin may accept his reference to the ' Lamarckian nonsense of a tendency to progression.' But it is, as Professor Ward says, ' nonsense of which many great thinkers have been guilty.' <sup>2</sup> And well they may be, for the very essence of evolution is in the tendency of all things to pass from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. ' Development, then, differs from change in that it is change determined towards an end, and we seem compelled to interpret it in teleological terms. If we remove all thought of any goal to be reached by the developing organism, development appears to have no meaning for our minds. Change determined towards an end, which reveals the immanent purpose and meaning of the whole movement, is the first thought which our analysis of the idea of development brings to light.' <sup>3</sup> It is no wonder, therefore, that Mr. Balfour should give his deliberate judgement, under peculiarly impressive circumstances, to the effect that ' as

<sup>1</sup> *Nature and Revelation*, p. 133. See also Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. p. 298.

<sup>3</sup> Storr, *Development*, &c., pp. 219, 221.

natural science grows, it leans more, not less, upon a teleological interpretation of the universe.' <sup>1</sup>

For it is generally quite forgotten or ignored by anti-theistic writers, that 'in the process of evolution effects are continually transcending their phenomenal causes.' <sup>2</sup> No one can deny that the living organism is more and higher than non-living matter, or that consciousness means a fuller and nobler content of life than the unconscious. But how, if we accept the modern insistence upon unbroken continuity, can the greater come out of the less, the higher issue out of the lower, unless already latent therein? The dilemma appears to be as simple as inevitable. Either the higher was latent in the lower, or it was not. If not, then all evolution is nothing but a measureless series of special creations. If it was, then nothing less than purposive involution can give any rational account of it. And purposive involution is only another expression for the will of God, as Theism postulates it. <sup>3</sup>

(xxiii) But so much is said, in some quarters, concerning evolution as a kind of *coup de grâce* for the design argument, that it may be well here to emphasize once

<sup>1</sup> Presidential Address before the British Association, Cambridge, August, 1904, p. 24. So too Dr. Bowne says: 'Intelligence is still the only explanation of the apparent teleology of the world. That evolution of popular thought, according to which something which was not much of anything began to evolve through differentiation and integration, &c., is sheer confusion and illiteracy. It closely resembles reliance on that blessed word Mesopotamia.'—*Theism*, p. 110. Prof. Büchner's phrase (*Last Words on Materialism*, p. 17), is 'the magic word evolution.'

<sup>2</sup> See Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 53.

<sup>3</sup> See Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 108.

more the fact that, at its best and utmost, it merely signifies a process. 'In any case,' as Dr. Bowne says, 'evolution does nothing, but is only a name for a form of procedure. To make it more, is to hypostatize words and abstractions, or to mistake the order of doing for the agent itself.'<sup>1</sup> But to postulate a mere record of what happens, as the efficient and sufficient cause of all that has happened, is about as poor logic as can possibly be exhibited. That evolution is the method of universal development, so far as we can now see, is a lesson we may gratefully learn of modern science. But to call this the explanation of all the order, and adaptation, and harmony, and beauty, we witness in nature, is just as true, and no more, as to say that signalling is the cause of the safety of the numberless trains that pass daily through Clapham Junction. Such a statement is of course no explanation at all, but simply a pointer to the two questions which must be answered in order to get one, viz. who does the signalling? and for what purpose? In other words, method always involves both thought and will, conception and intention. And the more surely evolution is demonstrated to be the method of life and growth in nature, the more teleological it necessarily becomes.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> 'Theism has no interest in one method or order of production rather than another, provided always the facts are duly regarded. It is satisfied to maintain divine causality and leave experience to find the method of procedure. It is concerned, therefore, not with evolution in the scientific sense, but only with evolution as a theory of causality. In this sense evolution is simply a piece of bad metaphysics produced by bad logic.'—*Ibid.*, p. 109.

(xxiv) Certainly no sane man would think, to-day, of attributing the wonderful immunity from accident which generally characterizes our railway system, to either chance or necessity. Which of these alternatives would be accounted the more absurd, we need not decide. It is something to find that naturalism is on occasion ashamed of chance.<sup>1</sup> But Prof. Huxley was decidedly too rash when he wrote that 'none but parsons believe in chance.' For not only are we told that the evolution of mind depended greatly upon 'chance variations' in the use of limbs,<sup>2</sup> but Prof. Haeckel's own explanation of the term as connoting mindlessness, constitutes the very essence of monism's all-potent 'mechanicism.' About this there can be no real question, seeing that, as Prof. Flint puts it, 'chance or accident is what occurs when two or more independent series of phenomena meet, without their meeting having been premeditated and provided for.'<sup>3</sup> Now this is the very core of Darwinian evolu-

<sup>1</sup> Thus it pleases Mr. McCabe to say that "chance" and "fortuitous concurrence of atoms" are phrases which you will not find outside theological schools for the last two thousand years' (*H. C. A.*, p. 72). That this brave statement is quite untrue, scarcely needs proof. One instance out of hosts may suffice, and this from a journal which should be regarded as impartial. Says Dr. P. Carus: 'There are two hostile parties in religion confronting each other. The one explains the mystery of the world-order by the assumption of a personal God, an omnipotent divine personality, in whose image man has been created; a being who, like man, is possessed of will, intelligence, and sentiment, who thinks and plans and acts as we do. The other party reduces everything to chance with its infinite possibilities.' How the *Monist* for January, 1906, can be found inside theological schools, may be left to Prof. Haeckel's advocate to say.

<sup>2</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 184.

tion. 'It is a mere chance whether the variations of any organism fit in with the environment.' But if that be actually all that evolution includes, assuredly it is no theory of the universe. For it gives no more rational account of what we see and know in nature, than a heap of type shot out upon a printer's floor gives of the composition of Shakespeare's plays.<sup>1</sup> Eternity is not long enough for the development of order out of chance without any directing mind.

This, however, does not cover the whole present naturalistic position. The tendency is to dismiss chance with scorn, and turn to necessity with an air of triumph.<sup>2</sup> This is supposed to bring relief from the dilemma so frankly and firmly stated by Lord Kelvin: 'There is nothing between absolute scientific belief in a creative power, and the acceptance of the theory of a fortuitous concourse of atoms.'<sup>3</sup> But it is a verbal shuffle as unavailing as, we will believe, unintended. For what is gained by it? Necessity *per se* is simple resistlessness.

<sup>1</sup> See Flint's *Theism*, p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 285-302, 433. The situation is well summed up by Dr. Bowne. 'Atheistic thought has always been in curious oscillation between chance and necessity at this point. At times everything is absolutely determined; but when the design question is up, an element of indeterminateness appears. Some chaos, which contained nothing worth mentioning, or some raw beginnings of existence, which were so low as to make no demand for an intelligent cause, begin to shuffle into the argument. Being so abject it excites no question or surprise. Being indeterminate it does not seem to beg the question against teleology by implicitly assuming the problem; and then by a wave of the magic wand of necessity, together with a happy forgetfulness of the laws of mental procedure, the nothing is transformed into an all-explaining something.'—*Theism*, p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1903, p. 1069.



And this is merely a measure of energy, the force it involves being assumed.<sup>1</sup> But energy, as Professor Ward says, voicing modern physics, 'is directionless.' What, then, is the interworking of directionless energy but the embodiment of chance? It is itself nothing but an assumption, and it can produce nothing but chaos. Hence the frequent and plausible substitution of necessity for chance in modern anti-theism, is but a 'barren verbalism,' and simply introduces us by another way to the 'hopeless deadlock of all mechanical thinking.' For it is said with truth, that 'Necessity contains no principle of progress or differentiation. Necessity, if it exist, can only unfold its eternal implications.'<sup>2</sup> These eternal implications, so far from dismissing teleology, in a rational appreciation of the universe, make it more necessary and more wonderful than ever. For much more is hereby presented to our mental vision, as demanding adequate cause, than could possibly be inferred from the sole study of self and the environment.

(xxv) But it matters nothing whether we potentialize backwards, or actualize forwards—whether we apprehend involution in the past, or appreciate evolution in the present—it is simply impossible to get the thought of purpose out of our minds or off our lips. Prof. Ward says, as we have noted, that our first question when we meet with a machine, is, Who made it? Which is true; but by no means the whole

<sup>1</sup> 'Matter or mind may act necessarily, but necessity cannot act without matter or mind.'—Flint, *Theism*, p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 92.



truth. It is, indeed, only half the truth; for the next query is inseparable, viz., What was it made for? We have already seen that these two questions are as inevitable as inseparable, whenever we are faced by 'interconnected' mechanism. It is no less plain that, in regard to any such machine, the method of its construction, and the time it occupied, are alike irrelevant. That it has a final as well as an efficient cause, is taken for granted. Any suggestion that a complicated engine, or a beautiful building, or a delicate instrument, was made for no purpose at all, would be regarded as insane. How impossible it is to evade the same conclusion in our thought, as regards the vast machine of the universe, has already been pointed out.

(xxvi) But it is not a little significant to find that, whether from choice or from necessity, the language which expresses this conclusion, is continually upon the lips of those who deny teleology altogether. As Mr. Storr says, 'They wish to do away with any reference to design or purpose, yet they are compelled to use teleological language.'<sup>1</sup> Of this no more vivid illustration need be desired than the words of Mr. Darwin himself. 'The illustration of the swim bladder of fishes,' he remarks, 'is a good one, because it shows us clearly the important fact that an organ originally constructed *for one purpose*, namely flotation, may be converted into one *for a widely different purpose*, namely respiration.'<sup>2</sup>

On the same page, moreover, we find reference to

<sup>1</sup> *Development, &c.*, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> *Origin of Species*, p. 148.

'the *beautiful contrivance* with which the glottis is closed,' so that portions of food may not pass into the trachea. Again ; in referring to lower life, Prof. Huxley still more significantly suggests<sup>1</sup> that the process of development in a tadpole, is such as to make the careful observer 'involuntarily think of a hidden artist *with his plan before him striving with skilful manipulation* to perfect his work.' So too Prof. Haeckel frankly owns that 'we do undeniably perceive a purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism.'<sup>2</sup> His attempt to annul this, by affirming that the theory of natural selection solved the question of the origin of orderly arrangement from purely mechanical causes, we have seen to be a fallacy. That which cannot be looked upon, or thought of, or described, without definite reference to manifest purpose, is assuredly something more than a mere case of 'as if.' The very suggestion of such delusion, would imply a purpose on nature's part to put us to 'permanent intellectual confusion.'

(xxvii) When it is said that, after all, teleology is only an inference, and may be a mistake, the Theist need neither claim nor wish for infallibility. It is enough to reply, first, that as an inference it is as valid as any other which is reasonably drawn ; and secondly, that it is much more than an inference—it is an appreciable fact. For even if we dismiss all thought of the real universe, as being too vast and complex for our apprehension, we have on all hands, and at closest quarters, multiplied instances of organisms which may

<sup>1</sup> *Lay Sermons*, p. 227.

<sup>2</sup> *Riddle*, p. 93.

be truly said to be saturated with futurity. In numberless cases the whole structure only exists with a view to the production of another more complex or biologically important organism. Nothing, to wit, is more common than the reference to 'placental mammals.' But what does this 'placental' characteristic involve? A delicate and complex organ which cannot be truthfully described in any other way, than by saying that its *whole purpose* is to nourish the foetus in embryo, *in order that* it may be at once dependent on, yet increasingly independent of, the parental organism. It is simply impossible for the sane mind to regard the forward look of such a structure as anything else than the embodiment of purpose. So too for lower life: every bird's egg is, from first to last, a proleptic structure every part of which is mortgaged to the future. The shell alone looks back upon the past. The rest, honest observation is compelled to say, is what it is, *in order that* under suitable conditions something greater than itself may result.

Again: if we think of our own bodies in the light of modern knowledge, instances of a similar forward look press upon us from every part. Nothing but space is here required, to direct due attention to the marvels of the bony, muscular, circulatory, respiratory, digestive, nervous 'systems.'<sup>1</sup> A competent specialist has well said hereupon, 'The careful observer cannot but perceive that throughout the whole range of natural objects, the admirable adaptations of means to ends

<sup>1</sup> For special reference to the lymphatic system, and the mechanism of hearing, from the teleological standpoint, see Dr. C. Brooke, *Faith and Freethought Lectures*, pp. 71-4.

are unlimited alike in their number and variety ; but some of the more special and recondite examples of adaptation, are the farthest removed from the possibility of accidental formation, and therefore afford the most conclusive evidence of beneficent design. In order to bring the subject within reasonable limits, we may confine attention to three points in the economy of man, the mechanism of the absorbent system, and of the organs of sight and hearing.' To attribute such structures as these, to mere unguided variation with the chance of survival, is to cast reason to the winds.<sup>1</sup> In presence of such 'beautiful contrivances,' mere reference to unlimited time is but a counsel of despair.

To revert yet once more to the human eye, we are perfectly warranted in still affirming that the eye exists *in order that* we may see. No other language expresses the whole facts. And it is typical of many more such instances. It is, therefore, a true summary which says : 'The positive argument for design begins by showing that many processes in nature are determined by ends. The aim of the eye is vision, that of the ear hearing, &c. In all these cases there is a concurrence of many factors in a common result, and this result towards which they all tend, is viewed as the

<sup>1</sup> Says Dr. Brooke, 'Now if the communication between the chyle receptacle and the adjacent venous trunk had been first formed by any imaginary process of natural selection, by any conceivable attraction or affinity between the fluid contents of the two vessels, they might have been expected to form their junction at the point of nearest proximity : but no ; the chyle-duct is found to pursue for some distance a nearly parallel course with the great vein, and then to mount upwards *in order to reach the point* at which it can empty itself into the venous system at the greatest mechanical advantage.'—p. 73.

final cause of their concurrence. Here, then, is action for an end. But an end as such cannot act, except as a conception in the consciousness of some agent which wills that end. The end as result is effect, not cause. Hence activity for ends demands a pre-conceiving intelligence as its necessary implication or condition.' <sup>1</sup>

(xxviii) But the teleologist may well be expected to take careful notice of the acknowledgement of Prof. Haeckel just quoted. What, then, is the whole truth in regard to this 'undeniable purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism'? It is at least fourfold. (1) Every organism has both form and parts. The parts are the means of the form, but with equal truth the form is the aim and end of the parts. The whole is distinct from the parts, and the parts exist only in order that the whole may be. This conception cannot be reversed. We cannot sensibly say that the whole exists in order that the parts may be. The whole form is the final cause of the juxtaposition of the component parts. (2) The parts not only exist, but have complicated reciprocal relations, as between the leaves, root, trunk, of a tree. (3) All the parts, as well as all the reciprocal relations, are co-ordinated, held together, knit into a unity, by some mysterious power, which we call the 'nature of the

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 87. To which may well be added the words of Prof. Schurman (*Belief in God*, p. 205). 'Though we have in the eye a result which is brought about only in accordance with the inexorable laws of causation, it is a result that cannot be exhaustively explained on a merely mechanical or blind necessitarian theory of the universe.'

organism.’<sup>1</sup> (4) In all this complexity, the organism has to maintain a standard of being in which maturity is attained through growth. The maturity of the organism is the final cause of the working together of all the parts in all their relations. They only exist in order that it may be possible. Such is the irreversible law of the whole. It does not in the least matter whether the organism with its parts is derived from a preceding organism or not. There are the parts; there is their work; there is the result of their conjoint labour. For each and all of these, reason demands adequate cause. To say that it is all mere happening, that it is so because it is so, is only to stultify reason. An aim being conceded, no number or relation of aimless variations can by any rational possibility account for it.

(xxix) It is manifest that in this case the inconceivability of the negative opens wide the door for positive assertion, and good grounds for this are found in the directivity which is alike inevitable in principle and undeniable in fact, throughout all organic nature. Prof. Huxley’s aphorism, above mentioned, that ‘for the Darwinian an organism exists because out of many it is the only one which has been able to persist’ in its environment, may be true, but leads on necessarily to the pertinent question—viz., How was that particular organism itself able to persist? And the answer must

<sup>1</sup> ‘In the case of an organism we have to do with the product not of an external force but of an immanent idea of a final cause which seems to pervade the whole body, and dominate every stage of the process of growth.’—Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 329.

be that the requisite adaptation is but part of the directivity through which it becomes an organism, and not a mere chaotic aggregation of molecules.<sup>1</sup> Four phases of the matter merit special attention.

(1) The conception of guidance is inseparable from that of life. It is true that neither life nor directivity can be defined as to their essence. But judged by what they do, the time has come for saying that, of the two, directivity is the better term for all purposes of accurate description. Thus Dr. J. Cook's definition must be pronounced better than Mr. Spencer's. Not only because it is simpler and clearer to say that 'life is the power that directs the movements of bioplasm,' than that 'life is the definite combination of heterogeneous changes both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external co-existences and sequences,'—but because the former frankly owns what the latter tacitly smuggles in. For how can 'definite combination' come to pass, in reason, without direction? Thus, life and directivity are one. It is the perception of this which has led Sir Oliver Lodge, in his latest attempt to face the same problem, to say that 'life may be something not only ultra-terrestrial but even immaterial, something outside our present categories of matter and energy; as real as they are, but different, and utilizing them for its own purpose.'<sup>2</sup>

We thus see that, for the purposes of teleology, it is

<sup>1</sup> For the exact significance of this term as thus employed, see Henslow's *Present-day Rationalism*, &c., p. 36. Also the whole of chap. viii.

<sup>2</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 198.



quite irrelevant whether life be pronounced a vital or a mechanical force. Purely mechanical it can never be, because it is undeniably a directing power, and in the conception of pure mechanism there is no directing element at all. So that growth in an organism from pure mechanism, is simply inconceivable. All growth is ultimately molecular motion in a given direction—viz. according to the ‘nature of the organism,’ whatever that may be. But unless we have a cause capable of producing that particular motion, we have no explanation of growth whatever. Motion in no direction is unthinkable. But the moment direction is assumed, an adequate cause for that direction, as distinct from all other, is demanded. Hence Dr. Croll’s statement remains beyond challenge. ‘The grand and fundamental question is, What is it that determines molecular motion in organic nature? The mystery is not what are the forces which move the particles, but what is it that guides and directs the action of the forces, so that they move each particle in the particular manner and direction required?’<sup>1</sup> It is manifest that the guidance is not in matter, or in force, *per se*. When it is asserted that ‘we cannot conceive of energies being directed except by energies,’<sup>2</sup> it is at once an acknowledgement and an evasion of the difficulty. The necessity that energies should be guided is acknowledged; whilst energy alone is assumed to be sufficient guide. But this is unthinkable, because, as we have seen, energy itself is directionless. What is absolutely necessary, is directed energy—

<sup>1</sup> *Basis of Evolution*, pp. 15, 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Haeckel’s Critics Answered*, p. 114.



i.e. direction for the energy. And that can only come from mind.

If, for instance, we plant an acorn, we are sure that it will not grow into a fir-tree. But why not? The position is truly put by Mr. Storr. 'Wherever we are dealing with any physical change, the motion of any single particle of matter, we ask what it is which makes that particle move in the direction in which it does move. One cannot ask a more fundamental question. Indeed, so fundamental is it that we are obliged to confess that we cannot answer it. We have to admit that we do not know what controls molecular motion.'<sup>1</sup> But the more frankly this is confessed, the more plain does it also become that 'force can never be the explanation of order.' And this for the simple but sufficient reason, that order necessarily involves guidance, whilst in pure force there is no guiding principle at all. Dr. Croll's words thus find forceful application here. 'The simple truth is that in attempting to account for the determination of motion by referring it to a force, we are attempting an absolute impossibility. When a molecule is to be moved there is an infinite number of directions in which force may be conceived to move it. But out of the infinite number of different paths, what is it that directs the force to select the right path?'<sup>2</sup>

In a word, the production of motion, and the determination of motion, are two things absolutely different in their essential nature. Force produces motion; but it is as impossible that force can determine motion,

<sup>1</sup> *Development*, &c., p. 100.

<sup>2</sup> Croll, *Basis*, &c., pp. 25, 26.

as that two can be equal to three, or that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time.

(2) The scientific conception of this required guidance is said to be law. The reason why we know that a fir-tree will not grow from an acorn, we are told, is that it is the law of nature. In Prof. Huxley's words: 'The whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the powers possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed.' But when this is rationally considered, it manifestly gives us the very foundation upon which Theism insists. For what are these assumed 'powers' and definite 'laws,' which go to make up the system of nature? Law is postulated as a definitely directing power, quite distinct from the powers of the molecules. For such, assuredly reason demands adequate cause. Where can it possibly be found, except in an all-controlling mind? Does any one suggest that the laws of England are nothing more than the aimless variations of words? Or that their definiteness is the result of the mere thoughtless juxtaposition of meaningless terms? But law in nature is much farther removed from mere antecedent and consequence than in human society, seeing that in the former case the definiteness is not only more exact, but resistless. If we have any right whatever to assume that the natural law of to-day will be the natural law of to-morrow, it is because the particular cases of observed phenomena which suggest law, are really and ultimately instances of not merely guided, but enforced molecular motion. But in such unvarying exactness, together with the resistless power behind

it, we are compelled to recognize the directivity which gives to Theism its unshakable foundation. Without such directivity, no suggestion of, or ground for, the thought of law, would be anywhere discoverable in nature.

(3) Thus the prevalence of law simply means the immanence of directivity. It should not need pointing out, that the teleology here involved is as much higher than that exhibited in the direct or magical fashioning of an organism, as the intelligence which could arrange that heaps of brass and glass should be continually fashioning themselves into chronometers, would be higher than that of a workman simply able to make such in the usual mechanical fashion. It has been truly said that 'an activity is no less divine because it is continuous. Intermittency of operation is no proof of specially divine power.'<sup>1</sup> But it is not enough to say. The positive affirmation is entirely warranted, that continuity of operation is special proof of distinctively divine power.

(4) Directivity by means of law being thus a process, not a completed act, relative imperfection is no disproof of design. A degree of perfection sufficient to involve design, is manifest in every organism which is a working whole. It is only a very ancient and simple teleology which, in Huxley's words, 'implies that the organs of every organism are perfect, and cannot be improved.' True teleology neither requires nor suggests such an ideal. There may be many degrees of perfection in various stages of progress, and that degree which is sufficient for one stage would

<sup>1</sup> Storr, *Development, &c.*, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> *Lay Sermons*, p. 263.

be at first necessarily imperfect for another stage, yet none the less indicative of directivity. An organism may be purposive, efficient, wonderful, beautiful, without being perfect. The same principle applies to any part of the organism; perfection is by no means necessary as an indication of purpose. Furthermore, as the whole purpose or ideal of an organism is not to be gathered from any one of its parts taken singly, no more is the purpose of the whole organism to be found in its isolated entirety, but only in its relation to all the rest of the system of nature.

In such a system we may go farther and say that relative theoretical imperfection is the necessary condition of practical social perfection. As we have already noted, if the eye were a theoretically perfect instrument, it would be practically useless to us.<sup>1</sup> This involves not less, but more, divine intention, when taken in connexion, first, with the needs of the whole body, and then with the relations of the individual to the rest of society. Teleology, therefore, does not require the perfection either of a single part or of the whole of an organism. What it does require, is what we actually find, viz. working wholes, whether great or small, contributing to further development. Such upward progress is part of the very conception of evolution. And such upward tendency not only implies relative imperfection, but justifies it.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a simple yet telling illustration of this principle in another direction, see Mrs. Gatty's *Parables from Nature*,—'Imperfect instruments' (Second series).

<sup>2</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. p. 298. 'How in the evolution of the animal kingdom do we suppose this advance from lower to higher forms of life to have been made? The

Thus, in a word, we find directivity everywhere and always in the organic world. 'In attaining the end exhibited in an organism, unity of plan, form, and process, is always observed.'<sup>1</sup> The distinctive, unmistakable, inexplicable, sign of such directivity, is that it co-ordinates means with ends. To attribute this to pure unguided mechanism, is to assert a crass materialism which is alike disowned by true scientific philosophy, and contradicted by our own experience every day, everywhere.

(xxx) But have we, it may be finally asked, any warrant whatever for applying the analogy of our own experience? What if the attainment of ends on our part does mean purposive volition, have we any right to infer that it is so with the sum of things? The answer is that we have; because 'mere bigness in space or time, has nothing in it to change the laws of logic.'<sup>2</sup> Megalomania is sheer delusion. There is no ground whatever for the assumption that the mind must abandon its rational convictions in the face of physical vastness. So long as we are sane, we simply cannot think of any structure involving ends, either as having either come to be what it is without plan, or as having planned itself. The latter would mean that it acted before it existed; the former would involve that something came out of nothing. For

tendency at any one moment is simply towards more life, simply growth, but this process of self-preservation imperceptibly but steadily modifies the self that is preserved.'

<sup>1</sup> Croll, *The Basis of Evolution*, p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 118.

the unity arising out of the co-ordination of parts in any organism, is a most real 'something,' for which the parts, as such, supply no cause whatever.

What, then, is the conclusion to which we are led from the fair though succinct consideration of all these suggestions, against and for the teleological conception of nature's wonderful work? It is this: that when irrelevant details and superficial interpretations are avoided, and the main facts are kept in view—the forward look, the co-operant toil, whether seen in special organic details or the whole biologic system, or the great cosmic movement itself—the argument for and from design 'is seen to be by no means the weak thing it is often proclaimed to be.'<sup>1</sup> The assertion, no matter how often or by whom reiterated, that Paley's argument is 'for ever destroyed,' is simply untrue. No one questions that modifications must be made in his statements by reason of the new standpoints afforded by evolution and natural selection. But this does not affect, let alone destroy, his great contention, that what we actually find is inexplicable save as the result of purposive volition somewhere. The new knowledge has not given us really new problems, as Huxley himself acknowledged,<sup>2</sup> but merely other ways of viewing them. So that whatever we may think of Paley's exact position, it remains and will always remain a

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> 'Not a solitary problem presents itself to the philosophical theist at the present day, which has not existed from the time that philosophers began to think out the logical grounds and the logical consequences of Theism.'—Darwin, *Life and Letters*, ii. p. 303.

valuable contribution to the great question at issue. Meanwhile, the deliberate judgement of Dr. Croll, that 'those who imagine that natural selection has given the death-blow to the design argument certainly fall into error,' is more and more confirmed by sober philosophical thought based upon all the most recent investigation.<sup>1</sup>

Upon the whole, therefore, it must be deliberately affirmed, that the teleological argument stands really where it did. And for this plain and convincing reason : that whilst all the facts of nature to which teleology points, assuredly demand adequate cause, Darwinism—or rather, one should say, naturalism as based upon natural selection—supplies no real cause at all.<sup>2</sup> But this is precisely what theistic teleology does. For which reason its position may be pronounced impregnable, as Weismann virtually acknowledges, when he says, 'There is nothing to prevent our conceiving—if

<sup>1</sup> 'Could it be proved that nature is self-evolved from matter, motion, and force, then natural selection could not be an end determined by an intelligent cause. But it never has been proved that nature has been thus evolved, and it never can be, so long as it remains impossible to account for the determination of molecular motion by means of matter, motion, and force.'—*Basis of Evolution*, p. 161.

<sup>2</sup> 'It is thus evident that none of the so-called Darwinian causes is ultimate. Each of them considered separately requires accounting for, and it is also necessary to account for their harmonious co-operation to produce a common result in the evolutionary process.'—Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 60. So too Professor Upton says, 'I conclude, then, that the force of the design argument is in no way destroyed by recent scientific discoveries ; and that in so far as the principle of variation and natural selection operates in biological evolution, it is to be regarded as itself one of the features of that rational process, by which life on this planet has moved upward to its present level.'—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 233.



conception be the right word to use in such a context—of a Creator as lying behind or within the forces of nature and being their ultimate Cause.’<sup>1</sup>

The words of a recent writer who has given special consideration to this whole theme may, therefore, well close this section. ‘Despite all attacks and all criticism, the common consciousness still regards the total movement of nature as purposive. Our attitude is no whit less teleological than it was before. When we try to put our argument into words we may have to alter our presentation of it, but the attitude is still there and we may confidently assert will always be. . . . The teleological idea is an ultimate category of thought, or at any rate represents what must always remain an ultimate attitude for the majority of men. We cannot look out upon the natural world and not see in it marks of purpose. . . . The argument from design possesses enormous value as being an attempt to unfold the nature of a belief which lies beyond logical demonstration; a belief of which men find themselves possessed when they awake to consciousness of the meaning of their own existence; the belief in an ultimate intelligence, to which they give the name of God.’<sup>2</sup>

### (3) *The Ethical Argument*

There are not a few deep thinkers who share Kant’s conviction that the ethical argument is, for theistic

<sup>1</sup> See Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> F. V. Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, pp. 86, 127, 208.



purposes, more reliable than the two considered above. And truly any fair statement of it seems at first sight unanswerable. 'The primæval atoms, forces, and motions,' says Mr. Row, 'were neither selfish nor otherwise; they pursued their course without taking any heed of consequence. How, then, did they succeed in producing a moral being? The anti-theistic theory here hopelessly breaks down; and the only alternative to it is the theory of Christian Theism, that the existence of a moral nature in man proves the existence of a God who is a moral Being.'<sup>1</sup> But it goes without saying that those who can reject all that has been suggested in the way of cosmology and teleology, will not allow the ethical plea to stand without the severest scrutiny. Hence the assertion, not seldom met with to-day, that the anthropological argument has lost its former cogency, and possesses now only antiquarian interest. The 'ethics of evolution,' in spite of Prof. Huxley's protest,<sup>2</sup> are increasingly represented in many popular books and booklets, as having either compelled us to dismiss the 'God hypothesis' on the ground of its incredibility, or permitted us henceforth to ignore it as unnecessary. These allegations will doubtless not be silenced by anything advanced in the following pages. Nevertheless they may be fairly and fully faced, as it is certainly necessary that

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism*, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> 'The propounders of what are called the "ethics of evolution," when the "evolution of ethics" would usually better express the object of their speculations, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts and more or less sound arguments in favour of the origin of the moral sentiments.'—*Romanes Lectures for 1893*, p. 31.

they should be, if the ethical argument is to retain in modern days its value as a theistic plea.

There are four ways in which this argument is affected by current anti-theistic speculation. (1) In regard to the actuality of man's nature as a moral being. (2) As to the objective reality and significance of morality in general. (3) Touching the validity, or otherwise, of the inference from these to the existence of a moral Being as the source of the universe. (4) As to the full and fair consideration of the apparent contradictions of such an inference. Each of these might well form the theme of a whole volume. But without attempting exhaustive treatment, a succinct summary will be here both pertinent and availing.

#### 1. As to man's moral nature.

Whilst Haeckel's statement is entirely false that 'the great struggle between the determinist and the indeterminist'—in his interpretation of these terms—'between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day after more than 2,000 years completely in favour of the determinist,'<sup>1</sup> there are many indications of a tendency on the part of a certain school of evolutionists, to make on behalf of determinism just such an unwarranted claim.<sup>2</sup> One of the most vivid illustrations of this tendency may be taken from the pages of a professed Theist, who, in order to establish his own plea on the lines of *credo quia impossibile*, spends most of his intellectual energy

<sup>1</sup> *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> In a succeeding volume abundant reasons will be given for affirming that both the name and the claim are alike false.

in pouring scorn upon the methods of other Theists. 'Moral freedom,' we are told, 'as it presents itself to the observation of the psychologist, is a dream—a chimera. In the language of Hobbes, it is nonsense. As a recent writer has said, the last word of psychology is determinism, and on psychological grounds the doctrine of moral freedom is indefensible.' <sup>1</sup> The only answer that such sweeping assertions merit, is simple but emphatic denial. The very voluminousness of the discussion of this great theme, is enough to show the falsity of such extravagant claims. Whole pages might here be filled with quotations to the contrary, from authors of perfect competence, who have surveyed the problem in full modern light, with conclusions entirely opposed to those just cited. Sufficient reference will be made to these as we proceed, to justify our right—waiving such unphilosophic as well as anti-theistic dogmatisms—to lay stress once more upon those main constituents of human experience and observation which are specially relevant to the vast issues at stake.

(i) Human nature, if moral, must assuredly be free.

<sup>1</sup> W. H. Mallock, *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 123. See the whole of chap. vi. It is indeed a curious instance of mental aberration that a writer, apparently as sincere as intelligent, should set himself the task of demolishing in truculent fashion every reason for accepting Theism, and then, when, as he imagines, he has completely pulverized all, should bid us—as Moses made the Israelites drink the water in which their powdered gods were mixed—swallow the débris on the sole ground that we cannot maintain spiritual life without it! It is sufficient answer to his whole tirade to say that the spiritual life which can only be nourished upon ignorance or delusion is not worth having. Such Pyrrhonism may serve the purposes of Romish theology, but can never form the valid basis of Christian belief.

But there ought to be no need to say, for the thousandth time, that free-will, as the *sine quâ non* of moral freedom, does not mean—as some who should know better still affirm—an ‘uncaused force in us which is to overcome both heredity and environment.’<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rice has well said that the simple and final ‘answer to such objection is in the assertion that the very essence of personality is the capacity to act as an independent cause. I am myself the cause of my volition, and no other cause is needed.’<sup>2</sup> This is indeed endorsed by the very writer just quoted, who, after contemptuously spurning moral freedom at the commencement of his plea, concludes by answering himself in the affirmation that ‘scientific determinism teaches us that our wills are not forced by an external Power,<sup>3</sup> but are regulated by our own consciences.’<sup>4</sup> Nor is there herein reason for shrinking because, as we have seen Prof. Ward express it,<sup>5</sup> ‘this lets contingency into the very heart of things.’ For, as he well adds, ‘It is true : I not only admit it, but contend that any other world would be meaningless. For the contingency is not that of chance, but that of freedom. . . . Were we the creatures of a blind mechanical necessity, there could be no talk of ideal standards, either of thought or of conduct ; no meaning in reason at all.’ In a word, all declamations to the contrary notwithstanding,

<sup>1</sup> Dr. C. Callaway, *Agnostic Annual* for 1905, p. 17. When the writer adds, ‘To such loose thinking does vanity condemn mankind !’ one is obliged to point out that such scornful fulmination is decidedly more applicable to his own position.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*, p. 293.

<sup>3</sup> Who, on behalf of Christian Theism, ever said they were ?

<sup>4</sup> *Agnostic Annual*, p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. pp. 280, 281.

there would be and must be an end of morality altogether. That also would be the end of human nature.

(ii) Here, however, we not only may but must appeal to the reliability of consciousness. 'Our one mental certainty,' to quote Huxley's happy phrase, inevitably includes the certainty of our moral freedom. Normal human experience must be affirmed to involve not only sanity but morality. The consciousness of the power to choose between alternatives presenting themselves as right and wrong, is unmistakable and inalienable. As Dr. Illingworth says, 'The sense of freedom is an immediate part of my consciousness. I cannot be conscious without it. I cannot tear it out. It lies at the very root of myself and claims with self-evidence to be something unique.'<sup>1</sup> If this be illusion, then all is illusion, including the reasons for so-called determinism.

(iii) It is this very consciousness of freedom which constitutes personality. Here, indeed, we may safely echo Mr. Mallock's words, 'That this faculty of the self-origination of impulse, is really what we mean by freedom, and what we mean by personality also, is shown by the only supposition which is open to us if we reject this.' If a man is not in any degree the first cause or originator of his own

<sup>1</sup> And he well adds (*Personality, Human and Divine*, cheap edition, pp. 24, 25) that this freedom 'does not mean the ability to act without a motive, as some of its opponents still stupidly seem to suppose. But it does mean the ability to create or co-operate in creating our own motives, or to choose our motives, or to transform a weaker motive into a stronger by adding weights to the scale of our own accord, and thus to determine our conduct by our reason.'

actions or impulses, 'he would have no true self—no true personality at all.'<sup>1</sup> The dilemma is simple, but sufficient. If a man be a person, personality involves freedom. If there be no freedom, there is no conceivable personality, and a man is but a thing.

(iv) In so far as personality includes powers of self-direction, manifestly it is everywhere endorsed by nature. It will suffice to illustrate this in Prof. Huxley's words, when he likens life to a game of chess. 'The chess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know that his play is always fair, just, and patient. But also we know, to our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance.'<sup>2</sup> In a word nature treats us everywhere and always as responsible—that is, as free—beings.

(v) Such freedom is certainly necessary to morality in general. This has been incidentally affirmed above, but its direct and categorical repetition is made obligatory by the frequency with which it is now confidently asserted that 'determinism' does not destroy but recreates morality. When, for instance, theistic philosophy asserts that unless we are free agents moral judgements are meaningless, we are told, even by some professing Theists,<sup>3</sup> that 'such a contention is, as it stands, altogether untrue.' It is for

<sup>1</sup> *The Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> See Dr. Thompson, *Gresham Lectures*, 1904, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> Mallock, *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 74.

such writers to show how, without free agency, a man can be in any real sense a personality, and how, not being a personality, he can be capable of moral judgement or moral action. The morality of a thing is unthinkable.

(vi) Thus the reality of manhood depends upon the personality which, by virtue of its inherent freedom, is capable of moral judgement and action, for without this only thinghood would be left. And as Mr. John Fiske puts it: 'What would have been the moral value or significance of a race of human beings ignorant of'—and incapable of—'sin, and doing beneficent acts with no more consciousness or volition than the deftly contrived machine that picks up raw material at one end and turns out some finished product at the other? We should have been the denizens of a world of puppets, where neither morality nor religion could have found place or meaning.'<sup>1</sup>

(vii) Such an evisceration of manhood would also necessarily include the entire loss of the potentiality for virtue in any form. Without moral freedom, as Dr. Flint well says, 'There might be a certain animal goodness, but there could be no true virtue. A virtuous being is one which chooses of its own accord to do what is right. The notion of a moral creature being governed and guided without the concurrence and approval of its own will, is a contradiction.'<sup>2</sup> Such a loss would, of course, also entail the impossibility of all such human qualities as heroism, or nobility, in any department of life. 'Amongst the consequences which would follow on the loss of our idea

<sup>1</sup> *Through Nature to God*, pp. 38, 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 255.



of freedom, are others more important still. Besides losing our power of condemning ourselves and others, we should lose our power of esteeming ourselves and others likewise. All the higher, the deeper, the more delicate, the more interesting elements in life would be annihilated.' <sup>1</sup> If it be replied that the suggestion of no virtue and no heroism amongst so-called determinists is preposterous, we acknowledge it gladly, but insist that the better they are the worse it is for their doctrine. The thesis which requires contradiction in order to exhibit it in action, is manifestly irrational.

(viii) Thus we are brought to consider the crucial theme of conscience. To make mention of conscience in an automaton would be manifestly absurd. But if moral freedom may be assumed as at least possible to human nature, then conscience becomes at once the most effective illustration of its actuality, and the most

<sup>1</sup> *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 247. Mr. Mallock has put this so forcibly that the rest of his words merit repetition. 'The truth is that nothing that any human beings do or are has any real value for us, except on the latent supposition that it is possible for them to be or to do something different, and that thus what they do or are represents a vital act of personal and spontaneous will, instead of being merely the outcome of a long train of causes which lose themselves in the history of the general evolution of the universe. Apart from this vital element feeling and action would lose nearly every quality for which men have hitherto valued them. Why should a child be devoted to even the fondest mother if it knew that its mother could no more help loving it than the sun on a fine day could help shining in at the window? Could anything more uninteresting be imagined than the fidelity of an automaton friend, or anything less romantic than a passion for an automaton mistress? In short, we have only to eliminate freedom from our conception of human nature, and we shall find that we have eliminated the essence of all moral and all social civilization.'



significant witness to a moral source of the universe. In simplest terms, conscience may be defined as moral consciousness. More fully stated it stands for 'the whole or complex series of our moral judgements, emotions, and convictions, which have grown up gradually within us under pressure from various sources, and differ either more or less from age to age, and from individual to individual.'<sup>1</sup> This moral totality is in normal human nature so real, so manifest, so strong, that a man might be truly defined as a biped possessed of conscience. In view, however, of all the objections which have been raised against the theistic estimate of this fact, it seems necessary to make clear three points.

(a) The usual difficulties, so commonly emphasized and so easily illustrated, as to the differences in the verdicts of individual consciences under varying circumstances, are all alike irrelevant. They do but exhibit the confusion which so often prevails hereupon in popular writings, both religious and irreligious. Of one of the best-known of the latter,<sup>2</sup> the reviewer in the *Times* aptly remarked, 'In speaking of conscience he confuses form with content, the command with the thing commanded.' This is plainly seen when we find it stated that 'if conscience were really a supernatural guide to right conduct, it would always and everywhere tell man what is eternally right or

<sup>1</sup> V. F. Storr, see *Interpreter*, July, 1906, p. 365. See also the Fernley Lecture for 1888 by Dr. W. T. Davison; also an interesting booklet by T. Forrow, entitled *To all at sea in search for God* (Partridge); and another by J. Cowan, *Conscience* (Elliot Stock).

<sup>2</sup> *Not Guilty*, by R. Blatchford

eternally wrong.’<sup>1</sup> But this is only the imagination of opponents. Theistic philosophy never asserts that it is the function of conscience to ‘tell man what is eternally right.’ Its business is to insist that there is a right, and a wrong, such that the former ought to be followed and the latter to be rejected. To object to this on the ground that ‘conscience is geographical,’ is but a confused irrelevancy. It would be as sensible to deny the worth of the compass because the needle points to different quarters on the disk as the ship’s course varies, as to scorn conscience because the direction in which it points varies with age and clime and circumstances. As Prof. Curtis says: ‘Every man makes an intuitive distinction between the right and the wrong. In doubt he may be, or completely misled, as to *what* is right or wrong, but ever he is personally sure *that* something is right and its opposite wrong.’<sup>2</sup> So that when Schopenhauer asks, with a sneer,<sup>3</sup> ‘whether there really is any such convenient code of morality written in our head, breast, or heart?’ it is sufficient to reply that Theism never assumes or asserts ‘any such convenient code,’ any more than educational philosophy assumes a child to be born an expert in literature, or a professor of anatomy. These latter personal developments come to pass through the

<sup>1</sup> p. 150. To continue the quotation—‘But conscience is changeable and uncertain. It is a magnetic needle that points North at one time, and South at another time; that points East on one ship and West on another.’ According to this writer, therefore, what modern navigation requires is a magnetic needle so fastened to the disk of the compass that whichever way the ship may turn the pointing shall be the same.

<sup>2</sup> *The Christian Faith*, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> See Haeckel’s *Wonders of Life*, p. 429.

co-operation of two elements, a capacity and its training. Even so the actual working of conscience is the proof of moral capacity, its precise deliverances are the result of mental and moral training. That a capacity needs education is assuredly no proof of its non-existence, any more than it is an explanation of its origin.<sup>1</sup>

(b) The difference between the intellectual and the moral capacity lies in this, that the former is optional whilst the latter is authoritative. Knowledge a man may acquire or not, as he will. But right a man *ought* to follow, whether he will or not. To man as man, 'the right is right not because it is useful, not because it is beautiful—the right is right simply because it is right.' Poetry is in this case philosophy, when it says :

And because right is right, to follow right  
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.

It is confessedly becoming the fashion to-day to pour high-flown scorn upon Kant's 'categorical imperative.' But when Schopenhauer talks about snatching 'this broad cushion from under morality,' the figure is as untrue as the feat is impossible.<sup>2</sup> That a man's heart

<sup>1</sup> Professor Curtis has put the truth succinctly thus: 'The notion of right and wrong is a personal intuition that there is the right and the wrong; that the two are absolutely antagonistic; and that a person ought to do the right. But this insistence upon the existence of right and wrong, is entirely empty of concrete indication. Conscience never tells us what is right or what is wrong. We have simply the unfilled notion that something is right, and that we ought to find it and take sides with it; and then we ourselves fill up that empty moral form and get a concrete moral obligation.'—*The Christian Faith*, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> It is certainly not accomplished by the mere assertion that the categorical imperative is a 'wholly unjustified, baseless, and imaginative assumption' (Haeckel's *Wonders*, &c., p. 429).

does not beat, may at any time be proved by taking it out of his body and exhibiting it on a table. But it has then ceased to be the heart of a man. It has become merely that of a corpse. Even so the categorical 'I ought,' may be deducted from manhood, but manhood ceases to be before the operation is accomplished. The very writers, such as these quoted, who assert the contrary, answer themselves. For without the perpetual assumption that every reader *ought* to follow the truth, as soon as ever it is shown to him, all the pages of naturalistic argument could be of no more avail than the exhibition of a Turner to a cow. Whatever name be adopted for this moral capacity in men, before the recognition that there is something which, as right, ought to be followed instead of its opposite, can be got rid of, human nature will have to be constructed on different lines. 'No normal man is ever sure of himself without at the same time being sure that there is a right and a wrong.'<sup>1</sup> Of this all history is sufficient illustration.

(c) Modern naturalism, however, lays greatest stress upon the evolution of conscience, as showing that 'there is no need to refer conscience to God as its source, because another origin can be found for it.' 'Morality,' it is urged, 'can be shown to be a derivative product which in the course of a long process of development has arisen out of tendencies or elements which once had no moral colour.'<sup>2</sup> But the great pains spent upon elaborating this point have been quite wasted, so far as the ethical argument for Theism is

<sup>1</sup> Curtis, *Christian Faith*, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> V. F. Storr, *Interpreter*, July, 1906, p. 370.

concerned. It is all as irrelevant as it is interesting.<sup>1</sup> The actuality and potency of conscience are no more affected by tracing its origin backwards to the social instincts, than the reality and value of our sense of sight are lessened, by tracing back the development of the eye to an initial infolding of the epidermis. The physical fact remains that the eye is the guide of the body, although we can turn it in every direction. The moral fact also remains that in the normal man conscience 'affirms the existence of an all-commanding sense of duty which free agents are bound to obey, but which it is possible for them to violate.'<sup>2</sup> And what is more; no man, deserving the name, can deny this without re-affirming it. For his very denial necessarily as well as tacitly goes upon the assumption that we ought to reject it, if it be untrue. Such inevitable oughtness is the very essence of the moral sense, and the summary, in a word, of the function of conscience.<sup>3</sup> Whence and how this moral consciousness has come to pass,

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Flint is warranted in his statement that 'it does not matter, so far as our present purpose is concerned, whether conscience be primary or derivative. It exists; it bears a certain testimony; it gives rise necessarily to moral feelings. The mode in which they have been acquired is in this reference a matter of indifference.'—*Theism*, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Row, *Christian Theism*, p. 197.

<sup>3</sup> When therefore a writer for the people asks (*Not Guilty*—by R. Blatchford—p. 165) 'is it not quite evident that the conscience is not the voice of God,' because 'it is nothing more or less than the action of the memory?' the plain answer is threefold. (1) If the assumption here were true, the inference would not follow. Memory may well be the channel of divine influence. (2) Conscience is never alleged by Theism to be the voice of God as a substitute for the teaching and learning of man; and (3) memory certainly does

may well be a matter for science and history to investigate. But whatever their findings, it is no less true, as Dr. Illingworth says, that 'things are what they are, quite irrespectively of how they came to be. The truth of astronomical discoveries is not affected by the fact that the faculty which makes them could not formerly count four. Neither is the inference from the moral sense to be disregarded, because the process of evolution has been gradual.'<sup>1</sup>

To treat conscience, therefore, with the whole moral sense of which it is the expression, as but the mechanical product of heredity and environment on social lines, is, again, to reduce man to a thing, and thereby to draw from imagination a picture distorted by pre-judgement, and contradicted by every hour's experience and observation. The fact remains unshakable that, in the fullest sense, man is a moral being. Such an avowal is not a theistic assumption, but a true representation of that which we find in the irrefragable testimony of consciousness within ourselves, and are compelled by rational inference to regard as also the consciousness of our fellows. Prof. Curtis gives us, thus, a truthful summary when he says: 'While fundamentally a man is a person, actually he is more—

not fulfil all the function of conscience. If it did, this writer, according to the vivid statement of his childhood's remembrances, ought to be to-day a rigid Calvinist rather than a Socialist. Curiously enough, he does not see that on the opposite page he entirely gives away his own contention. For there we are told, concerning a man who is tempted to be unfaithful to a matrimonial engagement, that 'memory reminds him that he is engaged, *and that it would be wrong to follow his desire.*'

<sup>1</sup> *Personality, &c.*, p. 56.

he is a moral person. At times he is not only self-conscious, but also conscious of a peculiar background of moral demand. This moral background we call conscience. To understand the worth of conscience, it is first of all necessary to see that moral distress never comes from associational mechanism. In moral distress a man is not afraid of any external tribunal. He is afraid of an inner spiritual tribunal.' <sup>1</sup>

2. As to the objective reality and significance of morality in general. If it may now be assumed as true that man is a moral being, we are compelled to go further. No question can be raised as to the reality of his physical nature. Nor is the accompanying corollary denied, that this reality of his physical existence depends upon the corresponding reality of a physical order independent of him, and expressed in physical laws to which he must conform if he would avoid disease and death. Even so, by fair, reliable, inevitable analogy, the actuality of his moral nature points no less surely to the actuality of a moral order external to himself, whose all-environing demands are expressed in moral law. Morality is thus seen to be the authoritative ideal of the moral law, of which the following may be taken as a fair statement. 'Moral law is not an expression of the order of actions such as they actually occur in the moral world; but it proclaims an order of actions such as they ought to be. Moral law, therefore, contemplates an ideal up to which moral beings ought to act; and its conception involves the idea of an authority which

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Faith*, p. 27.



has a right to command, and of a power able to enforce its sanctions.’<sup>1</sup>

This, however, like all things else, has been challenged through the restless probings of modern thought. Even at the price of manifest self-contradiction, philosophers of the Bentham school did not scruple to affirm that ‘if the use of the word “ought” is admissible at all, it ought to be banished from the vocabulary of morals.’ Such an attitude has the merit of being logical, for no other conclusion can be honestly drawn from the premisses. If all the processes of nature be merely mechanical, and man be literally nothing more than the sum total of his heredity and environment,<sup>2</sup> then, as above stated, all oughtness is illogical, and consequently all morality is at an end. But inasmuch as we must regard the premisses as false, the conclusion does not trouble us. It is not according to fact. So far as the ethical argument for Theism is concerned, four main matters demand brief consideration—viz. the objectivity of morality; its real significance; its human illustration; its logical consequence.

(i) As to the objectivity of morality. Postponing for a moment any specific notice of the distinctions between the various conceptions of morality expressed under the modern terms Associationism, Intuitionism, Hedonism, Utilitarianism, &c., the most important

<sup>1</sup> C. A. Row, *Christian Theism*, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> It must be remembered that for the mechanical school of to-day psychology itself is nothing but a branch of physiology, and this again only a branch of physics. The whole case is put with beautiful and all-conclusive simplicity in Mr. R. Blatchford’s latest issue (*Not Guilty*, p. 95), ‘The brain is the mind.’ Here, verily, true psychology may be forgiven its smile.



fact, at this point, is that an objective moral order is conceded by so many thoughtful writers who are little disposed to accept Theism. Kant, we know, said, 'Moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in the world, the ultimate object of my conduct.'<sup>1</sup> But if we waive for the present all definition of the highest good, this summary expresses the truth—even against its distinguished author—that such moral law is not self-created, but imposed from without. It is, indeed, doubly objective, in that it is quite independent of human experience in its source, and no less so in its obligation. Human nature has certainly not created the moral law which it recognizes as an environment authoritatively demanding the utmost possible response.<sup>2</sup>

Nor is the moral law, as thus recognized, made binding merely by our appreciation of it. There is a moral order in nature, and in the universe, so far as we are able to apprehend it, apart altogether from our experience. It will remain such whether we co-operate with it or oppose it. The recognition of this is the very proof of our moral nature, as our treatment of it constitutes our moral responsibility. There are those, confessedly, whom it pleases to say, 'with much emphasis and without any qualification,' that 'the atmosphere of to-day involves a Götterdämmerung'<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Selections from Lit. of Theism*, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup> 'Whatever be the origin of conscience, it is a permanent and residual element in human nature. In its most ordinary utterances it gives evidence that it is not the unconscious creation of the race by an evolutionary process; but that while in us it is not of us.'—Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 183.

<sup>3</sup> The dusk of the gods.

in the midst of which, 'dogmatic religion is on its last legs,' so that moral injunctions are 'rapidly losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin.' Yet even this writer not only acknowledges but strongly asserts that 'this does not entail the eclipse of morality,' because it is 'firm-rooted in cosmic fact.'<sup>1</sup> And the 'cosmic fact' is said to be, that there is an objective morality working from the beginning as a most important factor in evolution. Indeed, it is 'a principle which depends upon neither revelation, tradition, nor custom, but upon certain facts of the living world, a principle so inalienably interwoven with the very construction of the human mind, that it may be recognized, and is recognized everywhere, amidst all differences of time, place, and custom.'<sup>2</sup> So that if we ask the crucial question, 'Is the universe moral?'—and we may 'take the question to mean, Is there in the nature of things any warrant for morality?'—we may fearlessly reply that 'in this sense the universe is assuredly moral.'<sup>3</sup> It is further suggested that 'official moralists' ought to be 'happy to find in the Nature which their God has created, evidence that supports the moral

<sup>1</sup> See *Ethics* (Jack's Scientific Series) by Dr. Saleeby, pp. 44, 65.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> p. 109. To put the matter beyond all doubt the writer adds (p. 96): 'Now if there is a single truth that I would be happy to think I had supported in these pages, it is that right and wrong are not subjective, are not matters of opinion, but inhere in the nature of things. The wrong act is wrong, though all the world acclaim it right. Some may take it upon themselves to judge the actor, according to his estimate of his act: but if the act made for happiness—or blessedness if you like—it was right; if not, it was wrong. Right and wrong are not matters of opinion—else there is no such thing as a scientific ethics.'

assertions which He has also directly revealed.' <sup>1</sup> Whether they are glad or not, the conviction that nature does thus exhibit morality, runs through all history. The desperateness of the case suggested by Robertson of Brighton,<sup>2</sup> as to what we should do if driven to doubt the objectivity of morality, was not only anticipated by Job, but is really ruled out of consideration for Theists by modern science. When, for instance, the double affirmation is roundly made that 'in these days, evolution, organic, psychical, and other, is an established truth,'<sup>3</sup> and that 'morality can itself be proved to have been most important factor in evolution,' the Theist may rest content that the 'foundations' of his faith can never be 'destroyed,' and there will thus arise no occasion to ask, 'What shall the righteous do?' It is something to know in ourselves that we are moral beings. It is more to learn from philosophic science that the universe is moral too. Surer ground, therefore, for theistic faith can scarcely be desired, than that expressed by Mr. Fiske: 'I think it can be shown that the principles of morality have their roots in the deepest foundations of the universe, and that the cosmic process is ethical in the profoundest sense.'<sup>4</sup>

(ii) As to the significance of this objective moral law. Voluminous logomachies have arisen, we know,

<sup>1</sup> p. 23. The 'scientific moralist'—the writer complains—'will often receive scant thanks for his trouble.' But to expect gratitude for vast pains to bring about 'the rapid disposal of creeds outworn,' from those who—with quite as much intelligence and sincerity—do not acknowledge them to be outworn, is scarcely a reasonable attitude.

<sup>2</sup> See Flint's *Theism*, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> *Ethics*, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 79.

from the days of the ancient Stoics and Epicures to modern Hedonism, Utilitarianism, and Intuitionism, as to what constitutes the good and the right, in obedience to which morality consists. It would be as presumptuous as it is happily unnecessary here, to decide authoritatively between these. It is quite sufficient for our purpose to point out, following Dr. Schurman, that 'discarding all surplusage, we find the schools of derivative morality agreeing with the intuitionist in the recognition of an absolutely worthful moral ideal—an ideal that is an end in itself, never a means to anything else.'<sup>1</sup> And if the summary of the 'new morality' be as Dr. Saleeby puts it—'At any rate we are certain that morality is a thing of here and now, and that its sum and substance is this,

Love is the fulfilling of the law'

—its objectivity is beyond dispute, and theistic moralists can afford to rejoice that scientific moralists have come to such a satisfactory conclusion.

Prof. Huxley's famous dictum, 'Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it,'<sup>2</sup> is by no means protected from criticism by its tone of infallibility. In so far as the 'cosmic process' is infra-human, the intuitionist certainly insists that the moral law involves sometimes the opposing but more often the surpassing of a merely animal ideal, if the human is to be developed. But evolutionists rightly object that, in point of fact, altruism has been quite as real

<sup>1</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 245.

<sup>2</sup> *Romanes Lecture* for 1893, p. 34.

and potent a factor in the cosmic process as egoism.<sup>1</sup> And the hope of the future is manifestly not in checking, but in developing, altruism.<sup>2</sup> Be this as it may, two distinctive elements of the objectivity of morality are thus thrown into relief, and each of them is decidedly significant, viz. its potentiality, and its progress.

(a) The endeavour to get rid of Theism whilst laying stress upon the objectivity of morality, is sometimes thus expressed: 'Natural selection proceeds on its impersonal and non-moral way. It is simply concerned to select the fittest, and thus it selects the most moral.'<sup>3</sup> But apart from the significance of the assumption here, that the most moral are the fittest, the problem not to be evaded is how there come to be any moral at all, from which to select the most moral. According to this view it can only be through natural selection. But how the moral can arise from the mere mechanical interplay of the non-moral, is left, like its analogous problems of the genesis of life and consciousness, as an unsolved riddle.

There is manifestly only one thinkable solution—viz. in the tacit assumption of moral potentiality from the beginning. Without that assumption a non-moral physical universe, though it should evolve for ever, could

<sup>1</sup> See Drummond's *Ascent of Man*, passim.

<sup>2</sup> In his note, p. 56, the eminent Lecturer especially includes social life and ethical progress in the cosmic process. A curious example of an able thinker's self-contradiction; seeing that in such case the cosmic process has to be combated by itself, and a portion of the cosmic process is to be substituted for another portion. Whence the combative portion which is to substitute itself for the other portion is to come, the pages of *Evolution and Ethics* do not say.

<sup>3</sup> Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 70.

not produce a single moral being, let alone a universal moral law. It is easy enough to attribute wondrous powers to environment, and talk fluently of instinct. But it must always be remembered that naturalism starts avowedly from physical mechanism. Dr. Schurman is, therefore, well warranted in his negative protest that the 'physical conditions under which any mental product appears, are a very different thing from the nature of that product itself, and they do not in the least touch the question of the innate constitution of the soul that enables it to make this response to those external stimulants.'<sup>1</sup> Hence, positively, the only rational attitude is one which in some way maintains that, 'although evolved, as our whole nature is and must be, the evolution has not created the moral consciousness but rather liberated it; that it has set free an imprisoned power which announces itself as at one and the same time above us, and yet a part of our highest life.'<sup>2</sup>

(b) Progress also is an inalienable part of the objectivity of morality. It is denied, confessedly, that evolution necessarily means progress. We are told that in 1857 Herbert Spencer substituted for 'progress' the non-committal term 'evolution,' in order to escape

<sup>1</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> Knight's *Aspects of Theism*, p. 180. Dr. Andrew Seth has also expressed the same truth in weighty words. 'I cannot for a moment accept the view of evolution which makes it consist in this cunning manufacture of something out of nothing. Man certainly does develop these moral qualities, and develops them himself, for only what is self-acquired is a moral acquisition at all. But in his own strength he can do nothing. It is to misread the whole nature of development, to suppose that man, as an isolated finite creature, could take a single step in advance.'—*Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 41.

the notion that 'all things are on an upward journey under the guidance of Providence.' But even if 'the facts of biology lend no support to the view that what we mean by progress is a necessary consequence of natural law,' but only prove that progress is possible, whilst retrogression is equally possible,'<sup>1</sup> the actuality of progress cannot be denied, whatever be the possibilities to the contrary.<sup>2</sup> Especially in regard to the facts of anthropology does this same writer remark, that 'progress is a term which has reference only to the human ideal.' Whilst, however, we deny the 'only' in such a dictum, we are glad in the interest of truth to emphasize the 'human.' But the reality of moral progress, for the evolutionist, must go back behind the human. As we have been told that 'a cat's care for her kittens implies the seniority of morality over religion,'<sup>3</sup> it will scarcely be denied that from the cat to Florence Nightingale, or Sister Dora, the moral progress is not only real but great. Modern biology, by the mouth of some of its best exponents, speaks strongly enough here to merit attention. 'Thus our ethical difficulty disappears, since the greater steps of advance in the organic world compel us to interpret the general scheme of evolution as primarily a materialized ethical process, underlying all appearance of a gladiatorial show. We have not to pit our little selves against the cosmic

<sup>1</sup> Saleeby, *Organic Evolution*, p. 100.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Profs. Thompson and Geddes, men surely well qualified to speak, say (*Ideals of Science and Faith*, pp. 62, 64): 'The theory of organic evolution discloses what must on the whole be called an undeniable progress. The evolution process seems like a development process orderly and progressive.'

<sup>3</sup> Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 15.



process, but to follow along those lines of the cosmic process which have made for the highest evolution. We see that it is possible to interpret the ideals of ethical progress—through love and sociality, co-operation and sacrifice, not as mere utopias contradicted by experience, but as the highest expressions of the central evolutionary process of the natural world.’<sup>1</sup>

Now evolution cannot both be, and not be, the explanation of morals. If it be not, then the way is open without demur to the intuitionist interpretation. If it be, then the moral progress revealed is alike unquestionable and immeasurable. Yet all this, assuredly the highest phenomenon of which we have cognizance, is left by naturalism entirely without cause. If, indeed, Huxley’s estimate were true, it would be in worse plight still. For then moral progress would not only have arisen from nothing, but have come to pass against unmeasured odds. However, we need not accept his dictum.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, we have good reason for affirming that Theism alone can supply an adequate cause such as reason demands, alike for the potentiality and the progress which are inseparable from the objectivity of morality.

(iii) This contention is confirmed rather than weakened when the oft-mentioned differences between

<sup>1</sup> Profs. Thompson and Geddes in *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> ‘Huxley said that well-doing has only as much natural sanction as ill-doing, for both are products of natural evolution. The facts, however, contradict this view. Huxley indicated that the thief and the murderer follow nature as much as the philanthropist. But we may doubt this—the bay-tree of the wicked may seem to be an evergreen, yet it does die down.’—Thompson and Geddes, *Ideals*, &c., p. 60.



suggested moral standards are carefully considered. Undoubtedly, if it be assumed that for every normal man there is a right which, as such, ought to be obeyed, the question of questions becomes, What is that right? How is the good to be distinguished from the evil? By one school of thought we are told that utility is to be the test applied. By another, that happiness is the final touchstone. Yet another manufactures Ithuriel's spear by blending both these into one, with the assertion that happiness is the most potent biological utility, because the happier animal will be the stronger and therefore the fitter to survive. This may all be true, but if it be, it has yet nothing to do with morality, being wholly a case of the maintenance of physical existence. It is the moral test, the means for maintaining moral existence, that we need to know. The fittest animal that ever survived through abounding happiness, may, for all that, be utterly unmoral. The utter failure of these hedonistic-utilitarian elements of evolutionary machinery to supply any moral standard, is confessed by no one more frankly than by the greatest exponent of Spencer's philosophy. In his Romanes Lecture, Prof. Huxley, with commendable candour, declares that 'cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and evil tendencies of man may have come about; but in itself it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil, than we had before. Some day we shall arrive at an understanding of the evolution of the aesthetic faculty, but all the understanding in the world will neither increase nor diminish the force of the intuition that this is beautiful and that

is ugly.'<sup>1</sup> This last remark, of course, applies *a fortiori* to the morally beautiful and ugly, and points unmistakably to the need of something more than hedonism as the standard of moral rectitude. The plain truth is, that the so-called morality whose last word is happiness, is not morality at all. When we are told, in a manual written expressly for the people, that 'if the act made for happiness—or blessedness, if you like—it was right; if not, it was wrong. We do not say that he was wrong, but it was wrong'<sup>2</sup>—one cannot but grieve to see at once the misleading of our fellows and the dismissal of morality altogether. The misleading is in the unconcerned confusing of the two terms which most of all require to be kept apart—viz. happiness and blessedness;<sup>3</sup> for only the latter can possibly connote morality. The total dismissal of morality necessarily follows from making it to consist in anything less than personal action. If there be no 'he' wrong, assuredly there can be no 'it' wrong. A moral or immoral 'it,' which is not done by a 'he,' is inconceivable.

<sup>1</sup> p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 96.

<sup>3</sup> On another page (38), this writer pronounces Carlyle's plea for such a distinction 'foolish, verbal criticism,' and quotes in support Gen. xxx. 13, from the version of 1611. But if we may not expect a knowledge of Hebrew from a medical man, at least he might remember the Revised Version, which at once disposes of his sneer at Carlyle. So again in reference to 1 Pet. iii. 14, why print it 'if ye suffer (!) for righteousness' sake, happy are ye'; when there is no reason whatever for the inserted note of exclamation (seeing that all history is full of illustrations of it) and the Revised Version puts here also the right word into the right place? Would this writer base his scientific conclusions upon the uncorrected work of Buffon or Agassiz?

The fact that happiness as a physical advantage may contribute to evolution, does not by any means constitute it the essence of morality, unless morality be so defined as to include only that which is physical. The main, plain, contention of true philosophy is, and must be, that something more than the physical is necessary to constitute reality in morality. It is not enough to say, 'Better far deliberately to insist upon the highest meaning of the word "happiness," since thus we may be enabled to show that the lower happiness is not happiness at all.'<sup>1</sup> For if it be not happiness at all, how will it fulfil its biological function? And if there be such a difference between these degrees of happiness that the 'lower' may be dismissed as nothing, then the difference of degree assuredly becomes one of kind. Here, again, it must be noted that the difference between nothing and something, is necessarily immeasurable. And such is precisely what theistic moralists affirm to be the difference between happiness which has no moral element in it, and blessedness of which the very core is the spontaneous action of a human personality.

Nor is such a conclusion in the least shaken by the approval which Hedonists bestow upon the ideal of following right for right's sake, 'in scorn of consequence.'<sup>2</sup> For, in the first place, to insist that right is, and is only, that which makes for happiness, and then to affirm that right is right whether it makes for happiness or

<sup>1</sup> Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 90. 'It is needless to insist upon the essentially materialistic and base nature of punishment-reward morality, or to contrast it with the ideal of Tennyson's Pallas:

And because right is right, to follow right  
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.'

not, is simple self-contradiction and merits no further notice. Whilst to affirm with a sneer that 'the vital matter for the Christian who desires to be saved, is to do what will pay,' is not only false in itself, but is the true representation of the Hedonistic-utilitarian morality, which, from beginning to end, is simply a question of paying and nothing more. A rule of conduct based solely on the desire or fear of physical consequences, whether for self or the community, may be useful, or anything else, but moral it certainly is not. The morality which is real, objective, and progressive, involves something more than the biological stimulus of pleasure. The necessary entrance of personality into the account, confessedly makes it difficult to express in words this super-hedonic essence of morality. Yet it is no more difficult than to express the super-mechanical essence of life or consciousness. This latter, the most thorough-going theory of evolution certainly does not accomplish.<sup>1</sup> No sane man, however, denies the reality of these on the ground of their indefinability. With them, then, as being no less real, may be classed the moral consciousness which does not and cannot find its standard of right in the biological

<sup>1</sup> 'We see, then, that while modern biology no longer postulates a vital force—that is, a hyper-mechanical factor, a mystical power, a non-material agent presiding over the activities of the body—it admits, through probably the majority of its experts, that the phenomena distinctive of life cannot at present be restated in the language of chemistry and physics.'—Profs. Thompson and Geddes, *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 55. Compare this with the words of Prof. Lodge above quoted, and with chaps. viii. and x. in his volume on *Life and Matter*. One may well ask, if life's phenomena cannot be expressed in the language of physics, how it can be anything other than hyper-mechanical. Cannot physical terminology express all physical facts?

advantage of personal happiness, either of self or the community, but in the acquisition of a character which makes for blessedness and so transcends the biological altogether. Assuredly it was not without knowledge and consideration of all the claims of the varied schools, that Prof. Hermann Lotze <sup>1</sup> wrote, 'Only love for the living God and longing to be approved by Him is the scientific as it is the Christian basis of morality; and science will never find a firmer basis, nor life a surer.' <sup>2</sup>

(iv) But as we know the reality of life and its nature, so far as we can apprehend it, from what it does—for this is all that any attempted definition of life ever gives us—so may we know the reality and apprehend the nature of morality, by its practical potency and influence. And this in three distinct directions. (a) In the individual man. (b) In the structure of society. (c) In the course of history. Manifestly, to do justice to these separately would require volumes. Yet sufficient appeal to their blended reality may be based on our own experience and observation. For it is not only true that in every normal man, 'deceit, cowardice, selfishness, injustice, envy, ingratitude, and the like, are felt to be, in themselves and apart from all consequences, morally base and vile; while truthfulness, courage, unselfishness, benevolence, justice, generosity, and gratitude are felt to be in themselves morally excellent' <sup>3</sup>—but no nation whose

<sup>1</sup> " Lotze, the one philosopher of our time who is at once a thinker of the very highest rank and wholly and unquestionably Christian in his thoughts.'—*Contentio Veritatis*, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> See Joseph Cook's Lectures, *Do we need a New Theology? Spiritual Religion in Lotze's Philosophy*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 30.

records are known, has persisted long in the development of the former and the contempt or neglect of the latter. Nor is there any community of men, recognized as human society, that dares or wishes to make such an experiment. Assuredly all these qualities mean and require—even if in varying degrees—something more than the mere obtaining of happiness. Is it not of the very essence of unselfishness to rule out all consideration of happiness? The fulfilment of duty, with all that pertains to devotion, nobility, heroism, patriotism, cannot be truthfully estimated as only a refined notion of happiness. There can be no doubt that humanity's highest exhibitions of character, have been in response to a sense of duty and a call to altruism which left happiness altogether out of account; just as its lowest depths of infamy have been touched by those who took into account nothing but their own happiness.

Furthermore, even if some nation of yesterday, or some individual or community of to-day, should be found to have 'achieved success'—of a sort—by practising the former of the two lists just given, and scorning the latter, it would in turn be scorned by humanity. The modern estimate of Napoleon<sup>1</sup>—not to mention Nero—together with the growing obloquy attaching itself to trusts, combines, corners, and the millionaires manufactured by their means, are sufficient illustrations. No community now exists which could set these nobler qualities at defiance, and cultivate

<sup>1</sup> 'Napoleon, who was responsible, according to the most recent estimate, for the destruction of eight millions of human lives—the supreme criminal of all time.'—Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 39.

their opposites, without incurring the execration of human society. No man, whether on a throne or in a workhouse, can say to himself or to others, in the acts which speak louder than words, that it does not matter which course he adopts.

It is thus no exaggeration to say that the whole constitution of human life, and the whole structure of human society, are permeated, through and through, with a recognition of moral principle which is as much more than mere animal happiness as human duty is than sensational enjoyment. The confessed exceptions to this rule only serve to illustrate it, even as lunatics pitifully emphasize the reality and worth of reason. Whether the mass of humanity can be pronounced moral, or immoral, at least it is quite impossible truthfully to characterize it as unmoral. Whence we are permitted to say, with Prof. Knight, that 'when we pass from the individual to society the moral evidence of Theism becomes cumulative. It is the whole moral life and order of the world—not individual consciousness alone—that suggests the theistic interpretation.' <sup>1</sup>

(v) What, then, does all this amount to? These being the facts, what is the rational inference? Surely nothing less than this, that if physical realities demand adequate cause, moral realities do so in equal degree. What else can be said, in face of all we see and feel and know to be true, than that this is a moral no less than an intelligible kosmos? And, further, if that which is intelligible connotes intelligence as its source, moral quality in the sum of things also involves a moral origin which points on necessarily to a moral being,

<sup>1</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 184.



equal as cause to the production of such effect. Hence we have good reason to ask what modern knowledge has accomplished either to destroy or to diminish the force of Cicero's contention ages ago—'the law upon which all moral obligation is founded is truly and pre-eminently the mind of the supreme Divinity. Its ultimate basis is God who commands and forbids.'<sup>1</sup> And the words of Lotze just quoted, as of one who embodied all that is latest in German philosophy, supply a true and abiding answer. Is there, then, any sufficient warrant for now pronouncing both the ancient and the modern thinker deluded? We must affirm emphatically, that there is not.

Yet again. We have seen that the prevalent doctrine of the evolution of moral ideas in us, does not affect their objectivity beyond us. But this being so, it is inexplicable on any other supposition than that they are the more or less adequate representations of the ultimate will and purpose of a great moral Author such as Theism postulates. The moral imperative—which we have seen to be far too real and too potent to be dismissed by the scorn of Schopenhauer—is rather revealed than created by the processes of evolution. Neither its reality nor its authority is lessened by the gradualness of its human attainment. The whole immeasurable difference between the intensely moral man, and the utterly non-moral thing, must be accounted for in one of two ways: other alternative there is none. Either the moral consciousness has come to pass as a result of an unlimited number of special creations; or it was potentially inherent

<sup>1</sup> *De Legibus*, ii 4.



in the primitive protyle, and evolution has only unfolded that which was already latent therein. So far as inscrutability or mystery is concerned, it matters not to Theism which of these alternatives be adopted. Neither is thinkable without a Supreme Cause adequate to the whole effect. But if, in the name of scientific truth, modern choice falls upon the latter, the philosophy of Theism is impregnable in its assertion, that a non-moral source can no more have endowed the original atoms with such potentiality, than non-being could have created all that is.

Hence it may be truly said that the moral imperative is most rationally construed, 'not as the voice of our own nature, but as the utterance of an *alter ego*, or another personality within the limits of that which it controls. We thus find a higher Agent, within the moral agency.'<sup>1</sup> That is to say, 'in conscience, or moral knowledge with oneself, there is also a knowledge of that which transcends self,' even as it is also true that 'the phenomena of conscience point to that which transcends phenomena.'<sup>2</sup> Whether, indeed, we should say, with Prof. Knight, that 'this moral dualism in human nature—the presence of two elements working together and co-operating though occasionally conflicting—is perhaps the most suggestive evidence on which Theism rests,' may be left an open question. But we cannot sum up the significance of the ethical argument in less decisive terms than those of Dr. Illingworth: 'This argument obviously corroborates those which have gone before, for it resumes them all upon a higher plane. It increases

<sup>1</sup> Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> pp. 182, 188.

our necessity for believing in a free First Cause ; it shows the reason in the world to be moreover a righteous reason ; and it intensifies the evidence of design. It thus crowns the convergence of probable arguments which spring from the very centre of our personal consciousness, and can only be even plausibly refuted on the assumption that that consciousness itself is fundamentally untrue.' <sup>1</sup>

Here, however, we once more meet with grave doubts and sometimes uncompromising denials from representatives of the new knowledge, so that we cannot let this argument thus close. Two serious questions, at least, must be faced : viz. whether, after all, this inference from man confessedly moral to a moral Creator, is warranted ; and then, even if it be permitted in thought, whether it is not so contradicted in fact as to become incredible and uninfluential. Must we believe in God, as moral beings ; and can we retain that belief 'in face of a knowledge of life and the world ?'

3. Let us consider, first, the validity of the inference.

In condensed statement one might be content to say that the moral nature and law within us, together with the moral order manifest around us, cannot possibly be without cause ; that this necessary cause to be adequate must itself be moral ; and that to be moral it must be personal. It is difficult to imagine any rational denial of this. But the theme is of such

<sup>1</sup> *Personality, &c.*, p. 57.

vast import that somewhat ampler statement is desirable.

It must be acknowledged that if a final conclusion is to be drawn from a complex series of facts, it must be not only rational, but exclusive. It must be not only a permissible, but a compulsory conclusion. No other inference must be possible. But whilst this should make us careful in applying the principle of causality to morals, it does not compel us to adopt the strange detour which commended itself to the mind of Kant. The responsibility of contradicting so great a thinker must be borne for the truth's sake. His argument, as already outlined,<sup>1</sup> is a theological assumption rather than a rational inference. The categorical imperative being assumed, it is asserted that the 'perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the *summum bonum*.' This then involves 'holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable, at any moment of his existence.' If this, therefore, is to be realized, it can only be 'on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being, which is called the immortality of the soul.' Hence such morality constitutes a practical problem which 'can be perfectly solved only in eternity.' This again 'must lead to the supposition of the existence of a Cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*.'<sup>2</sup> Now it is manifest that the worth of this

<sup>1</sup> See p. 38.

<sup>2</sup> See *Selections from the Lit. of Theism*, pp. 225-8.

whole suggestion turns upon the necessity for the completion of a perfect harmony, between the moral being and the moral law. A moment's consideration, however, shows that this is not so much an assumption as a contradiction in terms. We have no *a priori* grounds for assuming the necessity of such happiness-involving morality, even if it were possible. But it is impossible; for a necessitated moral harmony is unthinkable.<sup>1</sup> The very utmost that can be asserted is, that a complete harmony between goodness and happiness commends itself to our moral judgement, whence we may hope that at some time, somehow, it will be realized. It is perfectly warrantable in poetry to exclaim—

O yet we trust that somehow good  
Will be the final goal of ill.

But this can never be construed into a logical inference that such moral harmony is so necessary, that there must be a supreme moral Being to bring it to pass. There can be no necessity for the accomplishment of a hope. It was probably the perception of this that staggered Hume,<sup>2</sup> as it has done very many

<sup>1</sup> As Dr. Schurman puts it: 'Introspection and reflection fail to convince us of the necessary connexion between goodness and happiness. Yet unless virtue and rewards are to be adjusted, Kant has no function for the Deity and no other proof of His existence.'—*Belief in God*, p. 239.

<sup>2</sup> 'Even David Hume acknowledged the force of the theistic argument until it reached its concluding demonstration of the moral nature of God. We shall, therefore, find it no easy task to establish the conviction that in the everlasting ground of things there is a heart of goodness that answers to the supreme ideals of the moral consciousness of mankind.'—*Ibid.*, p. 230.

others. But it is better to stagger into truth than to slide into delusion. The seriousness of the suggestion of moral contingency may be fully acknowledged, without entailing the entire dismissal of an argument which has commended itself to not a few of the greatest thinkers.<sup>1</sup> It is confessedly a fair statement that 'if by the assertion that the universe is moral, is meant that it has a moral governor, then he must be shown to possess the characters which the phrase implies, and not to possess characters which are incompatible with our conceptions of morality.'<sup>2</sup> Putting the best—not the hedonistic—construction upon this last phrase, and postponing the great problem of personality, the question is whether the possession of moral characteristics in the great Source of all, can be and ought to be inferred from what we are and what we observe. The reply of a true philosophy would seem to be that there is a sufficiently real moral law within us and moral order about us, to demand an adequate cause: that neither Atheism nor Pantheism can supply such a cause: and that, therefore, no alternative is left us on grounds of reason, save Theism.

(i) What, then, are we to say to such an avowal as this, from a theistic source: 'The fact will have to be recognized sooner or later that there is no anthropic proof of the existence of God. The moral ideal of man may throw some light upon the moral character of God, but it is powerless to prove the divine

<sup>1</sup> See Flint, *Theism*, p. 211; and Knight's *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 175-89.

<sup>2</sup> Saleeby, *Ethics*, p. 114. So too Dr. Schurman well remarks that 'the relation of the universe to human ideals is the question of questions for Christian theology' (*Belief in God*, p. 236).

existence' ? <sup>1</sup> First, certainly, we may put to this able writer his own question on the following page : 'How can we explain man's recognition of moral law, apart from an innate endowment which is as distinctively characteristic of the human spirit as intelligence or will, and which, like these, must have its ground in the one infinite Spirit ?' If there be any force at all in this 'must,' it is difficult, short of mathematics, to imagine a more real proof of the existence of this one infinite Spirit. In any case, the teleological worth of moral powers in humanity is far too real to admit of rational dismissal. It is surely impossible to deny the force of Mr. Storr's remark, that 'the conception of purpose which is dominant when you consider man as an intelligent agent acting for ends, is even more prominent when you think of him as a moral being acting for moral ends and striving to realize moral ideals.' <sup>2</sup> To all except the extreme automatists, such a proposition will be undeniable. But it must carry us further. 'If we admit this, then when we transfer the conception of will to God's causal activity, it is difficult not to interpret that activity in terms of moral purpose.' Nay ; is it possible to do anything else, without emptying morality of its true contents, and sweeping away all teleology and cosmology as unworthy of consideration ? But if more sober thought acknowledges that valid indications of purpose must have a purposive source, why should moral purpose, as expressed in a moral nature correlated with an objective moral law, be any exception ? There

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 279.

is no rational answer. The fundamental maxim which for our minds is the axiom of reason, that for every event there must be adequate cause, one cannot but suggest, rather finds here its supreme application than deserves to be ignored.

For the sake of emphasis we will, therefore, reiterate it in three propositions.

(a) The moral order, both subjective and objective, is a reality which cannot be uncaused. By no rational process of thought whatever, can such moral order be evolved out of mere physical chaos, or mindless necessity. When Dr. Bowne affirms that 'moral qualities are the highest in the universe; the true, the beautiful, and the good, love, goodness, and righteousness—these are the only things that have absolute sacredness and unconditional worth,'<sup>1</sup> he does but echo the words of Professor Haeckel, 'The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, these are the three august Divine Ones before which we bow the knee in adoration.'<sup>2</sup> But that adequate cause must be found, in the name of reason, for the fall of an apple or the colour of a flower, and not for 'the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness,' together with the unquestionable potency in ourselves which responds to the power, is an attitude of mind such as neither science nor philosophy can for a moment legitimately tolerate.

(b) For this moral order, in which we find objective morality appreciated and fulfilled by human beings, nothing less than a moral cause can be sufficient. The remark that 'a great deal of ingenuity has been

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> *Confession of Faith*, p. 87.



expended in trying to evade the conclusion from the moral effect to the moral cause: much of this has been irrelevant, and all of it has been unsuccessful,'<sup>1</sup> is not too strong. For if it be, as Prof. Karl Pearson asserts, 'nonsense,' to think that a particle of matter was ever moved by a pure volition, what term in any language will express the absurdity of the suggestion that particles of matter, without mind, have brought to pass the world of morality in which mind finds its highest and noblest expression? Here to call upon 'the magic word "evolution,"' is but to invoke the nemesis of naturalism. For, as Dr. Seth says, 'Hegelianism has insisted truly that a development is not an addition of that which was in no sense there before; consequently, a developing series can only be understood in the light of its highest term. The true nature of the cause becomes apparent only in the effect. All explanation of the higher by the lower, such as the naturalistic theories attempt, is philosophically a *hysteron proteron*—a precise inversion of the true account.'<sup>2</sup> We are warranted, therefore, in affirming that the naturalism which insists upon drawing the conscious out of the purely unconscious, the intelligent from the non-intelligent, and the moral from the non-moral, must ever fail precisely in the degree in which it succeeds. For success in an irrational quest, can only involve the renunciation of reason altogether.

(c) Finally, in the very nature of the case, a truly moral cause necessitates the inference of a real moral personality. It is, indeed, pitifully interesting to note

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 251.

<sup>2</sup> *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 42.



how those who most strenuously deny this, are driven to assume it in order to express their denial. Thus Prof. Haeckel concludes his *Confession of Faith* with the prayer, 'May God, the Spirit of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, be with us.'<sup>1</sup> The pathetic unthinkableness of this invocation, in his employment of these terms, is its own sufficient comment. Suffice to point out here, that whilst mere personality without moral character would be, as Dr. Saleeby truly says, useless for theistic purposes, an adequate moral cause, such as the moral order demands, is philosophically inconceivable apart from personality. Even in its lowest hedonistic ideals, morality implies a thinking, feeling, willing, self. The morality of an abstraction, or an automaton, is utterly unthinkable. So much the more intense in the highest moral ideals—and this we know alike from experience and observation—is the reality of that acting self which constitutes the essence of personality. But if this be so in the infinitesimal effect, how—unless it be finally demonstrated that a supreme personality is impossible—can it ever be reasonable to attribute less than personality to the infinite moral cause? To say that such an inference is not logical, is not true. It is superlogical. It is logical as far as we can follow it. But to suggest that when it transcends our powers, in application to

<sup>1</sup> p. 89. The capitals are his. Besides the reference to the 'august Divine Ones' above quoted, he also commends to us Strauss' last work, *The Old Faith and the New*. There we find (p. 435) the distinguished author similarly taking refuge in anthropomorphism. 'Our God does not indeed take us into his arms from the outside, but he unlooses the wellsprings of consolation within our own bosoms. He leads us to adapt ourselves to a less perfect condition.'

the infinite, it becomes unreliable, is the same as to say that two parallel lines are only to be trusted as parallel whilst our eyes can watch them. Whereas if they are parallel at all, they are so, apart from change, on to infinity. So long, therefore, as morality in us involves personality, so long shall we be obliged to believe that personality also attaches to the moral Source whence all our highest qualities of being are derived.

Three other marginal notes upon this validity, however, must yet be made.

(ii) It is sometimes objected that the ethical argument alone does not demonstrate the divine existence. Two replies suggest themselves at once. No theistic argument professes, as above indicated, logically to demonstrate divine existence. Seeing that no man can so demonstrate his own existence, he cannot be reasonably called upon to demonstrate the divine. But there may well be reasons for faith short of demonstration, without entailing as a consequence that any one of these, taken separately, should be able to sustain the whole theistic position. The modern Theist is by no means committed to Kant's rejection of cosmology and teleology.<sup>1</sup> In fact, it is manifest to all clear thought, that the ethical argument, like the teleological, is but a phase of the cosmological. The three are really inseparable. And as it would be unreasonable to expect from any single strand of a three-fold cord the same strength which belongs to the intertwining whole, so is

<sup>1</sup> As Dr. Schurman says in regard to Dr. Bender's *Das Wesen der Religion*, 'Where we take issue with Dr. Bender is in maintaining that there is a cosmic basis for our belief in God' (*Belief in God*, p. 238).

it to treat the ethical argument alone as the sole ground for theistic faith.<sup>1</sup>

(iii) The appeal of the ethical argument, we may acknowledge, is in some respects practical rather than intellectual. 'There is probably no living belief in God,' says Dr. Flint, 'which does not begin with the conscience.' Myriads still justify the old assertion that 'with the heart man believeth unto righteousness.' This does nothing, however, to weaken the inference from the moral order. The only necessary note is that whereas every degree of the moral nature involves some degree of the intellectual, the utmost development of the intellectual powers alone would no more appreciate than they could create moral realities. The very fact that men of small mental capacity do, in varying degrees, develop genuine moral character, becomes itself a definite contribution to the actuality of the moral order. Whether it be strictly true or not that—

One impulse from a vernal wood  
May teach us more of man,  
Of moral evil and of good,  
Than all the sages can,—

it may safely be affirmed that 'a poem like *In Memoriam*, a growing affection, a strong sense of

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Flint's words are perfectly true in this regard. 'The moral argument is but part of a whole from which it ought not to be severed. It cannot be stated in any valid form which does not imply the legitimacy of the arguments from efficiency and order. It contributes to the idea of God an essential element without which that idea would be lamentably defective, but it supposes other elements, also essential, to be given by other arguments.'—*Theism*, p. 213.

justice, may do more for faith than acres of logic. But this insight into the true nature of the argument need not prevent us from yielding to it, for we have abundantly seen that it is the real basis of our whole mental life.' <sup>1</sup>

(iv) Finally, it is rather a confirmation than an impeachment of the validity of the ethical argument, that its appreciation turns largely upon personal character. 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,' admits of a philosophical quite as really as a theological interpretation. The idea of God is not one which can be rightly apprehended through intellect speculatively exercised, or operating merely on the findings of science. It requires to be also apprehended through moral experience and the discipline of life. Neither individuals nor communities can know more of God as a moral Being, than their moral condition and character permit them to know.' <sup>2</sup> As there is nothing irrational in affirming that the more thoroughly a man trains himself in music and in art, the more fully he becomes able to appreciate the laws and beauties of harmony and colour, so are we more than warranted in the thesis that the appreciation of the moral order of the universe and its witness to a supreme moral Ruler, will grow, alike in the experience of the individual and the race, in the degree in which each seeks to love and practise moral ideals. 'In this respect theistic faith itself is an ideal rather than a fully realized possession.' <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> Flint, *Agnosticism*, p. 599. So too says Dr. Bowne, pertinently, 'The deepest things are not reached by formal syllogizing, but by the experience of life itself. No one with meagre moral interests can judge of the theistic argument from man's moral nature' (p. 259).

<sup>3</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 323.

4. As to the alleged contradictions of the ethical argument in the facts of human life.

If the preceding considerations could be taken as the whole case, one might fairly claim a verdict for the reasonableness of Theism. But we come now to perhaps the most serious of all theistic difficulties, viz. the allegation that the experience of life and the world, so far from developing confidence in the ethical argument, tends rather to annul it altogether. This is, indeed, the one and only way in which the force of the foregoing inference can be broken. Granted, it may be said, a manifest and perfect or worthy exhibition of this moral order in the affairs of the world, and the ethical argument may be accepted as valid. But in face of innumerable facts to the contrary, exhibiting an unmoral if not an immoral chaos, such a plea falls to the ground, a mere theory as untenable as beautiful. So vast and complex as well as impressive is this seeming obstacle to faith, that it merits a whole volume to itself.<sup>1</sup> Here we must keep succinctly in view its relation to the ethical argument, and merely suggest items for development elsewhere.

It is interesting to note how some of those who most strenuously object to the notion of a moral Governor of the universe, insist also that morality is so potent a factor in evolution and in human nature as to need no help from theology.<sup>2</sup> Laplace's famous remark<sup>3</sup> in regard to his description of the working of the solar

<sup>1</sup> This the present writer hopes ere long to issue, to complete a series of four upon the all-important themes of God, Freedom, the Mystery of pain, and Immortality.

<sup>2</sup> See the opening chapter in Saleeby's *Ethics*.

<sup>3</sup> 'Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis.'

system without a Creator, is pressed into the service of evolutionary ethics. It is seen, however, that the objectivity of morality proves too much for the naturalistic hypothesis, hence it becomes necessary to modify it by exceptions. This is done by laying all stress upon its apparent contradictions. These are portrayed for modern times, with a lucidity and vividness never before equalled, in at least five weighty indictments, giving us a lurid series of anti-theistic impeachments, from the essays of Mr. John Stuart Mill to the recent volume of Prof. McTaggart. It must be acknowledged that they constitute a grave case. (i) The apparent violation of all ethical principle in human life ; (ii) the general mystery of suffering ; (iii) the yet graver problem of moral evil ; (iv) the ethical confusion of history ; (v) and the inexplicable lot of myriads of sentient individuals,—combine to make exceptions serious enough to disprove, rather than prove, a moral universe under the rule of a moral Governor. A careful glance, at least, must be bestowed upon each of these, if the ethical argument is to be maintained.

(i) The apparent violations of ethical principle in the general course of human life, have always troubled thoughtful minds. Long ages before the Huxleyan Romanes lecture was delivered, the Psalmist bravely faced the very same problem, with an anguish the modern Agnostic could not know.<sup>1</sup> And probably long before his time, the vivid drama of Job had only represented the pent-up perplexities of previous sufferers. The situation neither loses nor gains when expressed in

<sup>1</sup> Psalm lxxvii. 3, 'I remember God, and groan for very anguish' (אֶת־אֱלֹהִים).

modern speech. It is often put most strongly by men of faith. 'Plainly cosmic ethics,' says one, 'if there be such a thing, differs sufficiently both positively and negatively from human ethics, to give us pause in our speculations. Positively, for any human being who should imitate the kosmos in its inflictions, would be killed on the spot. Negatively, for any human being who should imitate the kosmos in its apparent indifference to our pain and sorrow, would be execrated as a monster.' <sup>1</sup>

Such candour on the part of Theism leaves nothing to be desired. Were this the whole truth, it would manifestly land us in agnostic pessimism. But it is by no means the whole truth. It is so far from being the whole truth, as to come well within the category of the half-truths which the poet well reminds us are 'a bigger matter to fight' than lies. It is no more the whole truth, than it would be to affirm that our earth rolls on in perpetual night; or that the human race is universally in ceaseless pain. The facts to which such easily multiplied statements point, are true, tragically enough, and they must be faced at their worst. But the honesty of mind which makes this demand, must also reckon fairly with two other features of the case, viz. the marvellous and mighty compensations which abound, often even in the midst of inexplicable tragedies; and the overwhelming facts, in perfect accord with moral principle, which turn these tragedies into the exceptions much rather than the rule of human life. That suffering virtue has many solid comforts, and prosperous vice unnumbered pains,

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 274.



has always been evident to clear vision. Whilst the very stress which inevitably falls upon the instances of human life that contradict our moral expectation, points to a condition of things whence such expectation arises. If, therefore, we confess that in the world of humanity the violations of the ethical principle seem to be great and grave, we may not forget that the corroborations of that principle are equally real and far more abundant. The manifest candour of the ancient writer of Ecclesiastes suggests that when he said, 'Though a sinner do evil a hundred times and prolong his days, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God,' he had sufficient facts for his guarantee. And there are myriads of facts in modern life, for those who choose to see them, which testify that Christ's benediction on the meek is a daily actuality, in spite of all the froth and foam, the fuss and fury, of 'high civilization.'

(ii) But the greater mystery of the general amount of suffering clamours for attention, and shall have it, even if in necessarily condensed form.

(a) The first note must be that Christian Theists are no more blind to the realities and apparent anomalies of pain, than atheists. Sometimes, indeed, they have fallen into the snare of sentimental abstraction,<sup>1</sup> and the dreary pit of sensational exaggeration.<sup>2</sup> But

<sup>1</sup> 'The illusion is continued by attributing to other men the distress the pessimist would feel in their position. He asks himself how he would feel in the poverty, ignorance, and squalor which he sees, and concludes that those thus living must be in utter misery. Thus he commits what might be called the fallacy of the closet philanthropist.'—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 267.

<sup>2</sup> See Mr. Mallock's *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, pp. 165, 173, 176. Here one cannot but register a protest against the gross



the more soberminded, with no less of tenderness or of honesty, may be content to say with Dr. Flint, in face of all we see and know, that 'the human mind may very probably be unable fully to answer this question. It can only hope truthfully to answer it, even in a measure, by studying the relevant facts, the actual effects and natural tendencies of suffering; general speculations are not likely to profit it much.'<sup>1</sup>

(b) When the same writer refers to the 'suffering of primaeval saurians,' and the 'agony' endured by the lower creatures ages before man appeared, he falls himself into the most common but least warranted of all errors herein, viz. sentimental exaggeration, a special exhibition of 'the fallacy of the closet phil-anthropist' suggested by Dr. Bowne. As a matter of fact, suffering amongst animals has been greatly exaggerated, both as to quality amongst the lower creatures, and quantity amongst the higher.<sup>2</sup>

(c) On the other hand, the much greater and more misrepresentation found in not a few of this writer's phrases. To say that the process of evolution, as embodying divine purpose, exhibits 'firstly its cynical cruelty, and secondly its mad stupidity,' that 'the God who created the unfit is either a dolt or a monster,' that 'he is a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent monster,' is mere coarse verbosity, natural to a second-rate Secularist lecturer, but utterly untrue to facts, and unworthy of an avowed theistic advocate.

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 246.

<sup>2</sup> 'The extent and nature of animal pain is unknown. A multitude of facts indicate that even the more highly organized animals are far less sensitive to pain than men are, while of the sensibility of the simple organic forms we have no knowledge whatever. It is plain, then, that this problem is entirely beyond us.'—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 285. This whole subject will be more fully dealt with, as already indicated, in another volume.

significant mystery of organic painlessness, is, as a rule, entirely overlooked, or treated as a trifle.<sup>1</sup> To quote once more Dr. Bowne's words, as representing the practice of the modern pessimist: 'He heaps up all the misery of all beings, past, present, and future, and forthwith makes a sum so great as to hide all well-being from his vision. Thus he resembles the man who, from long dwelling in a hospital, should heap up in one thought all the sickness of the world, and should become so impressed thereby as to conclude that health and soundness nowhere exist.'<sup>2</sup> Such a one-sided procedure can never lead to fair conclusions. Whatever may puzzle us in details, Darwin's own deliberate avowal that 'natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being,'<sup>3</sup> remains the verdict of science. Whilst as to humanity it is a thoroughly qualified and impartial observer who assures us that 'those who have failed to experience the joys that make life worth living, are probably in as small a minority as those who have never known the griefs that rob existence of its savour and turn its richest fruits into mere dust and ashes.'<sup>4</sup>

(d) Again, it must never be forgotten, nor can it ever be too plainly affirmed, that by far the greater portion

<sup>1</sup> Thus Mr. St. George Stock says (*Hibbert Journal*, July, 1904, p. 767): 'Why is there a problem of evil? Why is there not also a problem of good?' Most assuredly there is a problem of good, for the atheist or the naturalist, whatever there may be for the theist. If for the latter the problem of evil seems to be insoluble, there are abounding reasons for affirming that the problem of good is far more insoluble for the former.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup> *Origin of Species*, 6th ed., p. 162.

<sup>4</sup> Huxley, *Romanes Lectures*, p. 30.

of human suffering, physical and mental alike, arises out of the wrongdoing of men, and not at all naturally or necessarily from the scheme of things which Theists call Providence. It is 'man's inhumanity to man' which 'makes countless thousands mourn.' 'The chief ills under which man suffers are the result of his own doing.'<sup>1</sup> Nor is this all, for in regard to the lower realms of life, our latest Romanes Lecturer, speaking with all the authority of an acknowledged scientific expert, affirms that 'in the extra-human system of nature there is no disease, and there is no conjunction of incompatible forms of life such as man has brought about on the surface of the globe. It is a remarkable thing that the adjustment of organisms to their surroundings is so severely complete in nature, apart from man, that diseases are unknown as constant and normal phenomena under those conditions. Every disease to which animals are liable, excepting as a transient and very exceptional occurrence, is due to man's interference.'<sup>2</sup> And when the same authority goes on to say that 'by the unstinted application of known methods of investigation and consequent controlling action, all epidemic diseases could be abolished within a period so short as fifty years; it is merely

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 277. As these pages are being written, the verdict concerning the terrible smash at Salisbury comes to hand, with its gruesome record of thirty killed, and many more injured. Is this to come into the anti-theist account? How was it caused? According to strict and technical inquiry, by taking a known curve at headlong speed, contrary to regulations and acknowledged laws of physics, merely to make time—that is, to make money. When such dangerous doings are thus human, assuredly their results are not divine.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Ray Lankester, *Romanes Lectures*, 1905, pp. 28, 30.

a question of the employment of the means at our command'—it would seem time to protest, in the name of science, that all the usual impeachments of Providence in these respects should cease. It should be clearly understood that the reason why these evils are yet prevalent, is simply because large portions of humanity prefer to spend their means and powers on selfishness, folly, extravagance, and lust, rather than banish such suffering from our midst. Such possible alternatives of conduct, with their consequences, certainly add further and weighty testimony to the reality of the moral law and its ceaseless influence.

(e) It will, however, no doubt be said—and with much truth—that there are numberless cases of suffering which, so far as we can see, are not caused by human wrongdoing, or preventable by virtuous conduct. But even here, also, truthfulness demands that many and great modifications should be acknowledged.<sup>1</sup> When the far-reaching consequences of heredity are duly considered, very many cases of suffering are explained as simply as sadly. Due attention, moreover, ought to be paid, and that with emphasis, to the marvel not

<sup>1</sup> In his contribution to the *Cambridge Theological Essays* (p. 95), Mr. F. R. Tennant says, 'The apologetics which have sought to minimize animal sensibility and suffering, or to show that in man suffering sometimes justly punishes and sometimes educates, must frankly be denied to have touched much more than the fringe of this great difficulty.' But with all respect for the judgement of so thoughtful a writer, I, for one, must earnestly protest that this is a very large under-estimate. The discussion of the whole case must be postponed, but in careful view of all the facts one cannot but reply that such an estimate of the modifications mentioned—with others—is no more true than to say that all the medical skill and nursing devotion of to-day, public and private, only touches the fringe of modern need. It does immeasurably more.

only of normal health, but of those natural processes of healing without which all the latest surgical developments would be utterly useless.

It is especially necessary, also, to lay definite stress upon the value of pain, as an indispensable factor in human development. Amid present-day tendencies towards indiscriminate humanitarianism, this may require some courage. But the facts are real enough. Dr. Flint may well say that 'it is a plain and certain matter of fact that the activities which pain originates, are the chief sources of enjoyment throughout the animal creation. This fact entitles us to hold that pain itself is an evidence of the benevolence of God.'<sup>1</sup>

But this is by no means the whole caveat of Theism. Much more is both true and manifest. The most frequent appeal of the naturalistic school is that we should follow reason, and not emotion, in our quest for truth. Let us do so here. The notion that, human nature being what it is, a painless world would be best in all respects for all, is contradicted not less by all honest and thoughtful present-day observation than by past history.<sup>2</sup> Even if we omit the indispensable part played by pain as a physical factor of evolution in the past, all that now is really best and noblest in humanity has emerged from contact with pain. And the same potency for the highest good is daily manifest before our eyes. Whatever may be the possibility in other worlds beyond our ken, in our human midst universal painlessness would simply amount to

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> See for a good summary, Dr. W. N. Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 153; and Flint's *Theism*, pp. 247-9.

unmeasured degradation.<sup>1</sup> So far as intellect and character are concerned, the result, even in its most innocent form, would be a universal crèche. But the picture has been sketched for us by a competent modern hand. Says Dr. Guenther:<sup>2</sup> ‘Nietzsche has given us a masterly description of the Darwinian ideal of the coming race in his “last men.” It shows the complete insipidity of the theory that looks only to the common interest and suppresses the individual.’ It is a picture worthy of special modern consideration. ‘We have devised happiness, say the ultimate men, and wink knowingly. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for warmth is required. They still love their neighbour and rub against him, for warmth is required. A little poison now and then—that makes pleasant dreams. And much poison at last, for a pleasant death. They are wise and know all that has happened; so there is no end of their derision. They still fall out, but are soon reconciled—otherwise it would spoil their stomachs.’

From such an impartial authority as Dr. Guenther,<sup>3</sup> it is interesting indeed to have so frank a summary. In his own words: ‘This is the pass that things will come to if the Darwinian-ethical ideals are realized. A deadly generalness would dominate the world. Happiness and unhappiness are antitheses, and there should be no antitheses in the scientific world of ideals.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Drummond’s chapter on ‘Parasitism’ in *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*.

<sup>2</sup> *Darwinism and the Problems of Life*, pp. 420, 421.

<sup>3</sup> As witness his conclusion: ‘The whole cosmic process is aimless. There is no such thing as a sense of life. The only possible scientific ethic is resignation.’

Nothing low—but nothing high : no hatred—but no love : no depth—but no altitude : an eternally monotonous life, without struggle and without victory.’<sup>1</sup> Such is the naturalistic ultimatum. Those who are enamoured of it, as an ideal, must surely be pitifully constituted.<sup>2</sup> If manhood be anything more than animalhood ; if there be anything wise or worthy in Mill’s strong protest that ‘it is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied’ ; we are warranted in the avowal that pain is an absolute necessity to noble character.<sup>3</sup> If that be so, no further apology is required. The special incidence and amount of pain may yet be keenly felt, and by some be sincerely designated<sup>4</sup> ‘the fundamental difficulty,’ but it does not and cannot amount, on rational lines, to a paralysis of faith in the moral government of the world.

(iii) Nor does such a result ensue, even when we turn to face the yet graver problem of the mystery of moral

<sup>1</sup> p. 422.

<sup>2</sup> It brings up once more Matthew Arnold’s well-known portrayal of one of the (physically) healthiest and wealthiest eras of Roman history.

‘On that hard Pagan world, disgust  
And secret loathing fell,  
Deep weariness and sated lust  
Made human life a hell.’

<sup>3</sup> ‘In a very real sense, therefore, God could not have revealed himself to the race without suffering. And as suffering leads men to a knowledge of the cosmic manifestation of God, so also it is the indispensable condition of the emergence of sympathy and compassion in the heart of man. Without suffering and mutual needs, there could be no human fellowship and love.’—Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 250. See also Fiske, *Through Nature to God*, passim.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 43. See also Haeckel’s *Monism False*, p. 401, for Prof. Peake’s feeling hereupon.



evil. One reads, indeed, with all seriousness that 'Lotze, the one philosopher of our time who is at once a thinker of the very highest rank and wholly and unexceptionally Christian in his thoughts, has confessed that he not only knows no solution of the problem of evil, but that he does not in the least know in what direction to look for one.'<sup>1</sup> But at the risk of being condemned by a well-known proverb, and with the profoundest respect for the great philosopher named, truth compels the assertion that such an attitude is rather dramatic than philosophical. Reserving a fuller treatment of so grave a matter,<sup>2</sup> the following hints will serve our present purpose.

(a) The gravity of the problem of moral evil constitutes no excuse for its misrepresentation in fact. A couple of instances may serve as typical. Men's characters, we are told, by Mr. Mallock,<sup>3</sup> 'exhibit antagonisms of a kind so profound and startling, that since all must be *equally* referred to the same living Intelligence, it is difficult to conjecture what moral character, if any, can belong to an Intelligence which *expresses itself* in such a number of contradictory ways. This Intelligence must from all time *so have arranged* the universe that not only saints and martyrs, philosophers, heroes, poets, *shall* think its thoughts, feel with it, and *will its will*, but that every kind of savage and lecherous monster shall feel, think, *will, with it* also.'

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Students of Mr. F. R. Tennant's Hulsean Lectures for 1901-2, (second edition) on *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, will surely find reasons for coming to a more satisfactory and hopeful conclusion.

<sup>3</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 205. The italics are mine.



How an intelligent Theist can print such language passes comprehension. A moment's inspection shows plainly a double and lurid misrepresentation. In the first place, the assertion that a 'lecherous monster' could will with the will of the controlling power, leaves no room whatever for discussion as to the morality of the latter, and so begs the whole question at issue. In the second place, the words italicized take for granted the current 'determinism' which allows no scope at all in men to oppose the will of the ruling intelligence. This, again, is to beg the whole question of moral free agency ; against not only the postulate of Theism, but our own deepest experience. The will of the 'lecherous monster' is definitely opposed to the will of the ruling Intelligence. The degree of the opposition is the measure at once of the morality of the supreme power, and of the actual responsibility of the man.<sup>1</sup>

Again, when Prof. McTaggart affirms that 'a being of very moderate goodness might easily have designed a world with as large a proportion of good in it as we are able to observe in the facts around us,'<sup>2</sup> it is only too true a type of many such loose affirmations in to-day's literature. It is, however, no more true to fact, or worthy in suggestion, than it is noticeable for modesty. For (i) the assumption that the relations

<sup>1</sup> Thus Dr. Fairbairn has well said in his *Philosophy of the Christian Religion* (p. 89): 'Man, in short, is no mere physical or natural effect; he is a moral cause. As a moral cause he possesses the power of initiative. He is not simply made by the past; he is the present, and he helps to make the future.'

<sup>2</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 200. His whole representation is summed up in the declaration (p. 265), 'It is not possible that the creator can be both omnipotent and good.' How utterly unwarranted is such a dogmatic deliverance we shall presently see.

of good and ill in this present world would be truly represented by a few streaks of white upon a dark ground, is open to challenge every day, everywhere. We make bold to say that it would be much more truly represented by a few streaks of black upon a white ground. In support of which attitude, even the testimony of the daily papers would suffice, alike as to what they do report and what they leave unreported. But (ii) further, it is only a very childish proceeding to estimate the amount of good in a world like this by the 'proportion we are able to observe.' Surely a philosopher might be expected to know, and to own, that it belongs to the very nature of good to be unobtrusive. Goodness necessarily tends to hide itself, and one might as well affect to judge of the amount of virtue in all the homes in a street, by what we can see on the front doors, as to estimate the amount of good in the world by what we can observe. To such philosophy one may well commend the great Teacher's precept—'Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgement.' Behind, beneath, within, almost all the dark facts which may be observed, there throbs a soul of goodness which can no more be measured than denied.<sup>1</sup> To call it infinite would be nearer the truth than to pronounce it simply indefinite. To pit the mystery of pain and evil against it, under the similitude of comparing an enormity with a trifle, is the very reverse

<sup>1</sup> It was the vision of this which our great dramatist sought to express when he wrote:

'There is some soul of goodness in things evil,  
Would men observingly distil it out.'

of the truth. To dismiss it as comparatively unworthy of regard, is as gross an error as moral philosophy can commit.<sup>1</sup>

(b) Yet more. However grave, and perhaps ultimately insoluble for human minds, the problem of moral evil may be, there is no gain for truth in its exaggeration by unwarranted questions, unlawful assumptions, self-contradictory assertions, and the like. All these, however, are often found enlisted against Theism. Thus in his *Romanes Lecture*, even Prof. Huxley asks 'why among the endless possibilities open to omnipotence—that of sinless happy existence among the rest—the actuality in which sin and misery abound should be selected.' And he adds, 'Surely it is mere cheap rhetoric to call arguments which have never yet been answered by even the meekest and the least rational of optimists, suggestions of the pride of reason.' But, with all respect, we reply that Theism does not object to such questions on the ground of pride, but it does expect fair notice to be taken of the answers sincerely and intelligently offered to such questions.<sup>2</sup> To mention only one. Mr. John Fiske, most pronounced of evolutionists, in his little volume dedicated to Prof. Huxley's memory,<sup>3</sup> faces the whole situation frankly and fully. Besides which, the assumption in such a query as the above, is entirely

<sup>1</sup> See the testimony of Sir Henry Thompson, *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 231.

<sup>2</sup> There is assuredly no 'cheap rhetoric' in the calm and careful words with which Dr. W. N. Clarke meets this very difficulty. See *Outline of Christian Theology*, pp. 154-8. Or see Dr. A. B. Bruce's *The Providential Order*, passim.

<sup>3</sup> *Through Nature to God*.

without warrant, viz. that the existence which is sinless simply because it cannot sin, and happy only because it knows no other possibility, is the highest type of being that supreme wisdom and goodness could select! Of a truth, a world of well-fed and smiling babes, is not the Ultima Thule of moral possibility or human nobility.

Again, when Dr. Saleeby refers with scorn to 'the miserable device of the schoolmen who declared that the Deity does not make moral evil, but permits it,'<sup>1</sup> his indignation prompts him to enforce his protest by the weird illustration of handing a baby strychnine to play with! Could anything be more utterly unfair or misleading than such a comparison! When death ensues,—'you did not produce the evil, but merely permitted it. Such talk is not for serious people in our time.' Maybe. But serious people ought also to distinguish between things that differ, especially when such grave issues hang upon the distinction. The mistake in this case on the baby's part is pure ignorance, and is so far merely mechanical that it could easily be prevented by snatching matter away with muscle. Is this a true representation of the attitude of God, according to Theism, towards a moral being? Certainly it is not. The manifest difference between the babe and the sinner—which any writer on ethics should both see and acknowledge—is that the former does not know better, and the latter does. But this is the very core of morality. The philosophy which ignores this, condemns itself.

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, p. 114.

The same fallacy, in another form, amazingly displays itself in the not uncommon attitude recently voiced by a Professor of Philosophy, from whose high position one would have expected something different. In Dr. McTaggart's volume already mentioned,<sup>1</sup> we are told that 'it is quite evident that a God who cannot create a universe in which all men have free will, and which is at the same time free from all evil, is not an omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he can not do.' And this because it is a 'tolerably obvious fact that if there is anything which God could not do if he wished, he is not omnipotent.' Hence 'the depressing and revolting belief that the destinies of the universe are at the mercy of a being who, with the resources of omnipotence at his disposal, decided to make a universe no better than this.'<sup>2</sup> We have here nothing more than a strange attempt to rehabilitate Mr. Mill's well-known assertion of the dilemma,<sup>3</sup> either non-omnipotence or non-goodness. It has even been echoed by some Theists. 'We cannot assert in the same breath,' says Mr. St. George Stock,<sup>4</sup> 'the reality of evil, and the fact of creation by an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent being.' Whereas, we are bound to affirm, with all possible and respectful deliberation, that we cannot logically, or morally,

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 217, 219, 220.

<sup>2</sup> For a calm and careful reply, by anticipation, to these superficial utterances, see Dr. W. N. Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 138, the paragraph beginning, 'In relation to free beings the will of God is not an arbitrary will, enforcing itself without moral means. That would be impossible.' Also Dr. Flint's *Theism*, p. 255.

<sup>3</sup> *Essays*, cheap ed., pp. 21, 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1904, pp. 768, 776.

assert anything else.<sup>1</sup> There cannot be any 'reality of evil' except as the result of a volition which all omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence, together cannot prevent. And the probable rejoinder, even though it come from academic heights, that in such case God is not omnipotent, is as amazingly inept as that already referred to above in teleological matters. How much so, indeed, is seen in a moment if we turn to the syllogism offered us. 'God is all: God is good: therefore all is good, i.e. there is no evil.'<sup>2</sup> It is said that most people admit the major premiss here. They may, if they are Pantheists. Certainly Christian

<sup>1</sup> Inasmuch as some of the works to which for the sake of their intelligent support reference is often here made, may not be accessible to the reader, two weighty sentences are transcribed. In regard to the pseudo-dilemmas proposed by such writers as the above, Dr. Flint says (*Theism*, p. 252): 'Only superficial and immature minds will attach much weight to questions and reasonings of this kind. A slight tincture of inductive science will suffice to make any man aware that speculations as to what God can or can not do, as to what the universe might or might not have been, belong to a very different region from investigations into the tendencies of real facts and processes.' And Dr. W. N. Clarke writes (*Outline, &c.*, p. 127): 'It is often said that if there is a good God he is not omnipotent or master of all, or he would not have admitted evil; and if there is an omnipotent God, he is not good, since evil has been admitted. This moral perplexity goes deeper than the intellectual question, just as the moral and religious proof of God's existence goes deeper than the intellectual. But it seems to be established that belief in a God of moral perfection is the only alternative to moral anarchy and the denial of our primary moral certainties. If this is so, we can do nothing else than take the existence of the good God as that which must be true; we are shut up to it.'

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1904, p. 776. The writer adds: 'This is strict logic, though the tiro (*sic*) may fancy that he detects a flaw in the reasoning. Now this is the only position open to Christian Theism. But it is not open to common sense. We know in

Theism does not. Its clearest and strongest affirmation is that, morally, God is not all. He is not all, morally, inasmuch as according to Theism, He has limited Himself thus far in the creation of free beings. This being so, it is no more within the compass of omnipotence to make them unfree, or in any moral sense compel them, than it is to make a square to be at the same time round. To demand, therefore, as above, in the name of omnipotence, that a universe shall be created in which all men shall have free wills and yet shall be—i.e. shall be compelled to be—free from all evil, is neither more nor less than an utter contradiction in terms. It is merely an insistence that omnipotence, in order to be omnipotent, shall do the impossible. Which answers itself.

(c) As to the inexplicable. The Theist is quite willing to acknowledge that 'the mere existence of sin is a mystery under the government of an omnipotent God who hates sin.'<sup>1</sup> But the mystery is not intellectual. Neither can it be called moral, unless the moral be so far extended as to include what Christian Theism terms spiritual. For everywhere, as Dr. Bowne says,<sup>2</sup> 'man is made responsible for himself. There is no law of life which is in itself evil. Whether the laws shall bring bane or blessing, depends on man himself.' Even as to the law of heredity, to which so much evil is charged, it is 'in its natural operation

practice that there is evil.' But, with all respect, common sense assuredly denies that we are the automata we should have to be to make this into logic at all. It is not a 'flaw in the reasoning' that we detect, but a yawning chasm, in which all that is essentially human is swallowed up.

<sup>1</sup> Flint, *Theism*, pp. 227.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, pp. 276, 277, 280.



most beautiful and beneficent. It is human sin which changes this law into a curse, though even as it is the law works more good than harm.' <sup>1</sup>

If, indeed, we sigh for a world of humanity in which all that is bright, and pure, and noble, shall abound, instead of the contrary, Dr. Bowne is right. It is the sad but utter truth that 'all that stands in the way of this consummation is man himself. There is no inherent intractability in the nature of things which forbids it. The difficulty lies solely in human nature.' The demand that humanity shall be made good and happy, in spite of itself, is sheer irrationalism. Naturalistic philosophy condemns itself when it calls upon God to contradict Himself, and demands that He shall undertake the impossible by seeking to compel into unthinkable goodness the beings whom He has made free.

There may be real and painful mystery in the continued existence of beings capable of immorality. For it certainly comes within the scope of omnipotence to annihilate any beings, free or unfree, whom it has called into existence. But the mystery is one of

<sup>1</sup> This has always to be borne in mind, whereas it is generally quite overlooked when we find statements like those of Mr. Mallock (*Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 219), 'The theist entirely closes his eyes to the real difficulty for the evolutionist, viz. the moral disabilities, or the doom of moral perversion resulting from congenital defects in the organism of the victimized individuals.' The insinuation is that the individuals are 'victimized' by Providence working through evolution. But in almost all cases when we are able to trace them, this is shown to be false. The moral disabilities are the natural and necessary result of the sin of the parents. The only avoidance of such results would be by a ceaseless series of miracles. The naturalism which demands these, has given up its case.



mercy, not of metaphysics.<sup>1</sup> And this, when fairly considered, becomes itself a confirmation of the otherwise-suggested moral character of the ruling power of the universe. Certainly if the ghastly creation-story of Mephistopheles were true, or if man were the morally helpless automaton he is now often represented to be, there would be no mystery of mercy. But there would yet yawn the bottomless abyss of irrationalism. Even such as this. 'A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurrying through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother.'<sup>2</sup> If this be either science or philosophy, what becomes of reason? To avow that blind omnipotence has produced seeing and judging moral beings, is no 'strange mystery' at all. It is downright sheer self-contradiction. And by comparison with it, the vision of omnipotent goodness patiently tolerating moral beings who are misusing their powers, in hope of their final betterment, is a glimpse of heaven. In such light, the very continuance of the mystery of moral evil, bespeaks a higher moral character even than the goodness which created man a person and not a thing.

Instead, therefore, of being crushed into the despair of naturalism<sup>3</sup> by the gravity of the problem of evil,

<sup>1</sup> See a thoughtful chapter by J. Morris (ch. xi. pp. 263-91), in his *A New Natural Theology*, on 'The Mercifulness of God.'

<sup>2</sup> *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> That this is no 'cheap rhetoric,' the following description of what it is prepared to give us in place of Theism, will sufficiently

as contradicting ethical Theism, we may rather take large heart of hope from a fair and philosophical view of the whole truth. And it may perhaps be best expressed in the words of the ardent evolutionist above mentioned. Says Mr. Fiske, 'We are thus brought to a striking conclusion, the essential soundness of which cannot be gainsaid. In a happy world there must be sorrow and pain, and in a moral world the knowledge of evil is indispensable. The stern necessity for this has been proved to inhere in the innermost constitution of the human soul. The alternative is clear : on the one hand a world with sin and suffering, on the other hand an unthinkable world in which conscious life does not involve contrast. . . . In the process of spiritual evolution, therefore, evil must needs be present. . . . The mystery of evil remains a mystery still, but it is no longer a harsh dissonance such as greeted the poet's ear when the doors of hell were thrown open ; for we see that this mystery belongs among the profound harmonies in God's creation.' <sup>1</sup>

prove. 'That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving ; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms ; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave ; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins,—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.'—*Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 159. If this does not spell despair, language has no meaning.

<sup>1</sup> *Through Nature to God*, pp. 37, 54, 56.

Much more might be truly averred touching the naturalness of the creation of free beings by a supreme moral Personality : the reality, otherwise unattainable, of moral results of inestimable value : the already-present transcendence of the mystery of evil by the mystery of good : the limitless possibilities of moral evolution in the future history of humanity : but enough has been pointed out for our present purpose, viz. to show that the ethical argument for Theism is very far indeed from being wrecked by the alleged contradictions arising from moral evil which modern knowledge has sought to add to ancient perplexities. Upon the whole it is much more truly confirmed.

(iv) As regards the illustrations of both physical pain and moral evil which are to be found in the study of history, it is not necessary to enter into detail. When we resolutely put away what have been called 'picked facts,' an honest and comprehensive survey of past ages gives us at least as little ground for thinking of mechanism in the process, as of optimism in the result. It has been said that 'in most cases there has been no history at all, but only an aimless and resultless drift. No ideas, no outlook, no progress, only animal wants and instincts, mostly unsatisfied—this sums up the history of the vast majority of human beings who have lived or who live this day.'<sup>1</sup> Sombre even to pessimism though such a picture be, one must yet acknowledge that it is to a large extent sadly true. But whilst, at worst, it is far from meaning mere human automatism, at best, it is still farther from exhibiting the whole truth. In cases innumerable there

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 274.

has not only been the making of such history as no conceivable agglomeration of mechanism could ever make, but the pattern woven out, alike by individuals and communities, has been beautiful with forms and colours which would have been utterly and for ever impossible as the work of non-moral creatures.

Nor is even the rest of the record to be undervalued. As the landscape is but an abstraction from incalculable hosts of definite grass-blades, leaves, and flowers, so is history only the summing up of definite individualities, every one representing a whole self-consciousness. It is doubtless far beyond us to estimate, let alone to judge fairly, any one of these. But it is all the more true that 'in history—natural as well as civil—we find no mere repetitions, no absolute fixity, small scope for measurement or for mathematics. . . . How far below us, how far above, the historical extends, we cannot tell. But above it there can only be God as the living unity of all, and below it no longer things, but only the connecting, conserving acts of the one Supreme.'<sup>1</sup> Without the contingency which such multiplied self-determining consciousnesses involve, all records of the human past would indeed be 'meaningless.' But history is not meaningless. 'No lesson is more clearly taught by history than that "righteousness exalteth a nation, while sin is a reproach to any people."' The one truth which can be verified concerning the world-ground is that it makes for righteousness.'<sup>2</sup> To an unmeasured extent, the laws of morality have vindicated themselves. Despite transient appearances,

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 280.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 256.

in process of time nations are weeded out in the degree in which they dare to defy them. A really, i.e. wholly, immoral nation is now unknown, and would be intolerable if known. If it were yet present it would have no future, as Mr. Lecky has pointed out.<sup>1</sup> Whether Mr. Kidd's glowing vision of the new democracy may be accepted or not,<sup>2</sup> the reality of moral progress cannot be denied. In spite of all our social problems, the world to-day is better than it has ever been before. Negatively, immorality of all kinds and degrees is more and more condemned. Positively, larger efforts are being made for the fuller realization of noble ideals, than human society has ever hitherto witnessed. No man can say what may be the degree of amelioration attained during the twentieth century. But of such a past development and future prospect, neither the blind chance of Atheism, nor the mechanical 'necessity' of

<sup>1</sup> 'The foundation of national prosperity is laid in pure domestic life, in commercial integrity, in a high standard of moral worth and of public spirit, in simple habits, in courage, uprightness, and a certain soundness and moderateness of judgement which springs quite as much from character as from intellect. If you would form a wise judgement of the future of a nation, observe carefully whether these qualities are increasing or decaying.'—*The Political Value of History*, by W. E. H. Lecky. See Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 328.

<sup>2</sup> 'The fact of our time which overshadows all others is the arrival of Democracy. But the perception of the fact is of relatively little importance if we do not also realize that it is a new democracy. There are many who speak of the new ruler of nations as if he were the same idle Demos whose ears the dishonest courtiers have tickled from time immemorial. It is not so. They do not perceive that his arrival is the crowning result of an ethical movement in which qualities and attributes which we have been all taught to regard as the very highest of which human nature is capable, find the completest expression they have ever reached in the history of the race.'—Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 329.

Naturalism, can furnish any rational account whatever. Theology may need no little revision, but Theism here remains unshaken and unshakable as the only adequate explanation, or inspiration, of humanity's moral good.

(v) But there yet remains, confessedly, another difficulty to be met, viz. the pains, sorrows, mysteries, of individual experience. It is this which Mr. Mallock pronounces 'the crux of Theism,' and, apart from the needless and unwarranted ferocity with which he states the case,<sup>1</sup> such a recognition of actual facts may be acknowledged to be often overwhelming, in the apparent tragedies with which it confronts us. Let us take a sober yet frank statement of the difficulty. 'The question of the divine goodness is greatly complicated by the problem of the individual. In a general way a case can be made out inductively for a moral factor in the world-order. But this is not enough. The individual does not exist in a general way, but has his own concrete life and burdens. A righteousness and goodness which are discernible only for society as a whole, or in the course of generations, may leave the lot of the individual as dark and puzzling as ever.'<sup>2</sup> This must be acknowledged to be as true as candid. What has Theism to say in reply?

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the phrases already quoted from this writer, reference may be made to pp. 166, 170, of his *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, and to pp. 210, 226, in his *Reconstruction of Belief*. The fallacies of the statements are patent to any thinker, and there is no reason whatever for the contumely with which the theme of Book IV. is introduced—'Current evasions of the difficulties inherent in all theistic belief. The trickeries of theological argument.' Such language is wholly uncalled for.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 262.

It does not question the seriousness of the problem. Certainly there is no general conclusion which does not include the individual parts. If the moral order means benevolence towards all men, it must mean benevolence towards each man. But this is precisely where our vision is so often perplexed, if not appalled. Neither the gradualness nor the generalness of evolution, is any answer to the pressing questions so often arising from the inexplicable fate of individual men and women—to say nothing of children, whose sufferings and death not seldom bring us the keenest heartache of all. The progress of evolution necessarily involves innumerable physical and moral details; and it is in the mass of details that the theistic clue is lost. The individual element, which cannot be ruled out, appears only too often to exemplify the very opposite of all-comprehending benevolence. Whether humanity be considered from a physical or moral standpoint, through all the ages 'it is a case of individuals innumerable, each with his own private soul,' his own centre of consciousness and sensation. If we accept as the ultimate double proposition by which the ethical argument stands or falls, first, that human beings are God-created persons and not mechanically-fashioned things; and then, that there is no respect of persons with God<sup>1</sup>; it would seem that even the conception of Christianity, as the highest expression of divine

<sup>1</sup> Though there are manifest modifications to be added to the unlimited general assertion that 'it is the distinguishing feature of Theism to ascribe to God an infinite and equal love for every one of his human children' (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1905, p. 492). For if they are children, and not mere evolutionary automata, behaviour necessarily comes into account.



regard possible on evolutionary lines, only serves to point and weight some pressing questions. Why, one may ask, if Christianity means the highest good for every man, did Christ and His revelation make their appearance so late in the world's history? Why has their influence even now extended to so small a proportion of mankind? <sup>1</sup> Why, indeed, should there ever be millions of mankind, even in its lower stages, passing through the darkness of terrestrial existence with no clear truth here, and no glimmer of any light beyond? Such queries, though not unanswerable, are sufficiently grave to give us careful pause. But since Mr. Mallock has constituted himself a kind of *advocatus diaboli* herein, let us fairly face his emphatic putting of the case.

'The sole business of theists,' we are told, 'is to prove two propositions, namely, that the individual spirit, though evolved from universal spirit and dependent on it, nevertheless possesses an autonomous moral will of its own; and that the universal spirit, though producing individual spirits under conditions seemingly incompatible with anything but the misery of most of them, is nevertheless consumed with an equal love for all.' <sup>2</sup> The consideration of the first of these propositions may be postponed. We are here concerned with the second. The assumption in it is elsewhere expanded into the assertion that 'when we come to consider the processes of evolution in detail, and view them in the light of the only purposes they suggest, we find them to be such that a God

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1905, p. 492.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 498.



who could deliberately have been guilty of them would be a God too absurd, too monstrous, too mad, to be credible.' <sup>1</sup> Waiving now the unnecessary stress of language, is such a conclusion warranted by the facts? We reply, Certainly not. Such wild words are but added instances of the way in which Theism has too often been wounded in the house of its friends. To affirm that there are only two ways of avoiding their truculent conclusion,<sup>2</sup> viz. to postulate either 'a God who cares absolutely nothing for humanity, or a Supreme Mind which is nothing but law and order,' is as weak in warrant as it is strong in expression. The suggested dilemma is really non-existent, and merely subserves the purpose of introducing a foregone conclusion. There are other and more rational ways of applying intelligence and honesty to the facts before us. We may make no attempt here to exhaust so complex a theme, but merely to point out that we are not shut up to the ghastly conclusions above specified.

(a) Even if it be frankly acknowledged that in many individual cases we are quite unable to trace out what we should deem the proofs of love divine, it does not follow that any one of such actually is God-forsaken. Still less is there reason for inferring thence the utter absence of all divine regard for humanity.

<sup>1</sup> *Religion as a Credible Doctrine*, p. 177. The same attitude is expressed again in the *Hibbert Journal*, p. 497: 'The more fully it is admitted that conscious and deliberate purpose on the part of an Almighty God is revealed in and essential to the evolutionary process, the more hopeless becomes the task of reconciling that process, by any direct reference to its details as we ourselves know them, with the theist's conception of a God who in a Christian sense is good.'

<sup>2</sup> p. 178.

Certainly the whole cannot rationally be denied because some of the parts are to us unintelligible. A rustic might just as reasonably impeach in strong language the philanthropy of a hospital, because he had obtained a hasty glimpse of the operating-room. Or an observer of the illustrations in some of our popular journals, might with equal truth accuse it of insanity, on the ground that any one of these illustrations, when narrowly scrutinized with a lens, is found to consist of a mere congeries of black dots, which become only the more meaningless the more they are magnified. There are many realities within our ken which can only be fairly and truly judged at a distance, and as a whole. How this applies to human life, the words of Dr. Saleeby, as an impartial witness, may well be cited to show. 'What is life for? There is but one possible answer—that life is for happiness. We may or may not take this as implying the existence of a benign purpose behind things. If we admit design or purpose at all, there is no question that we must recognize it as benevolent—even if unable to work itself out save with much concomitant suffering. For the facts of biology and psychology teach unequivocally that we are entitled to a qualified optimism—a meliorism, I may say, as we have already seen.' <sup>1</sup>

(b) Again. Even if the process of evolution seems to be merciless in the individual cases that trouble us, it must be acknowledged that, on the whole, these processes are eminently just. The comparison of human life to a game of chess with a fair, just, patient player, we have noted above from Prof. Huxley.

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, p. 81.

But his further comparison is no less worth marking in this connexion. 'My metaphor will remind you of the famous picture in which Retzsch has depicted Satan playing at chess with man for his soul. Substitute for the mocking fiend in that picture a calm strong angel, who is playing for love, as we say, and would rather lose than win, and I should accept it as an image of human life.'<sup>1</sup> If that be so, there is small room for harsh epithets based upon our own short-sighted judgements. No Theist wishes to diminish the modern development of sympathy for suffering. But he is bound sometimes to protest against what can only be called low-grade sensationalism. 'If the sole goods of life are pleasurable affections of the passive sensibility, and if the aim is to produce them, then the world is a hopeless failure. But if the chief and lasting goods are those of the active nature, conscious self-development, growing self-possession, progress, conquest, the successful putting forth of energy, and the resulting sense of larger life, the matter takes on a different look.'<sup>2</sup> The apparent mercilessness of nature may thus signify something very different from the unconcern of a callous Deity, or the heartlessness of a mere law-embodiment machine. Full well we know that in any good school, the discipline applied to the individual boy is conditioned by the ideals and tone of the whole school. We do not here quote the Bible as authoritative, but its illustrations of this principle of apparent severity for the highest purposes, in love, are as pertinent as they are impressive.

<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Thompson, *Huxley and Religion*, p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 275.

(c) Yet further. Granted that in numberless cases there is suffering, alike beyond our measurement, and contrary to our perception of justice. This is no sufficient reason for persistently shutting our eyes to the plain fact that there are modifications and compensations, positive and negative, marvellous and potent, running through the whole course of human life and relieving all its darker phases. Illustrations to this effect might easily be multiplied. The truth is that they abound everywhere. The 'familiarity' which 'breeds contempt,' does, in numberless instances, work quite as much for the mitigation of ill as for the reduction of good. The habit which 'makes second nature' does avail to dull the edge of civilization's cruelties, just as surely as sometimes it may lower the moral tone. All the reality of suffering, in fact, is relative. The physical torture which would be utterly unendurable to ordinary humanity, is but a trifle to the North American Indian. The cruelties of the Chinese, which seem to us so revolting, are largely based upon the fact that the national nervelessness takes no account of ordinary pains, any more than it is troubled at the thought of death. In short, the hyper-sensitiveness of the book-writing philosopher, or the hysterical horror of the sentimentalist, is no true index of the matters in hand. We may, even tearfully, own the poignancy of such physical ills as cancer, but its inexplicableness is none the less intimately bound up with much else which ought at least to prevent sweeping condemnation of the whole Providential order. The general enlargement of human capacity and the elevation of the proletariat in every country, may indeed

be accepted as sacred duties, but the fact remains that they do not whilst in that condition suffer, either in mind or in body, to anything like the same extent as those who are seeking to uplift them.

As for the positive compensations which do most certainly enter into countless lives otherwise pitiable, they are too actual, too multiform, too persistent, to admit of easy enumeration. They are every whit as undeniable as the suffering itself. No Theist urges them as the sufficient answer to the mystery of pain and wrong; but he has perfect warrant for claiming that they shall come fairly into account, instead of being dismissed, as they generally are, with a sneer. Pessimism, however, is always one-eyed and short-sighted.<sup>1</sup> There is suffering enough in the world to give us much heart-ache, to cause many mental misgivings, and to stimulate ever more efforts to heal pain and prevent wrong. But there is also enough of good, not only inseparable from the ill, but issuing out of its very heart, to cry 'hush!' to superficial blasphemies, and bid us think, and think again, before following the counsel of Job's wife, or endorsing the creation-libel of Mephistopheles.

<sup>1</sup> Thus we find even so thoughtful a writer as Mr. R. B. Arnold broadly declaring that 'the general principle under which all living things exist is of a horrible and revolting character' (*Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality*, p. 314). Now there is every whit as good ground for saying this concerning the whole management of a well-appointed modern hospital, as in regard to human life. Nor is its unpardonable onesidedness in the least demonstrated, or justified, by adding that 'many of us may not realize the truth that the glory of civilization rests essentially on shambles, human and animal.' One need neither be a vegetarian, nor a member of the Peace Society, to give the lie direct to such a statement.

(d) And there is yet another element of the case which the naturalist wholly ignores—even where he does not utterly scorn it—but which is a perfectly lawful and indeed inalienable part of Theism. This is the pointing onward to a future state of being beyond the present scene of human activities and passivities, where that which here seems helpless may be helped, and all that has been really contrary to the actual working of a divine purpose, may be both justified and remedied. The suggestion that—

There's something in this world amiss  
Shall be unriddled by-and-by—

is, indeed, neither modern nor startling, for it has long formed part of humanity's consolation, in face of life's unexplained problems. The fact that there have been strange versions of it, that there have always been some who doubted it, that in our own time it is sometimes repudiated in the name of science, sometimes derided as a mere figment of the imagination, if not also made ridiculous by some theologies,<sup>1</sup> is no sufficient reason for dismissing it from our thought, or ruling out its subsidiary and valid support of the ethical argument for Theism. Some philosophers, indeed, whose impartiality of thought is abundantly manifest, have uttered strong words in this direction. As when Mr. R. B. Arnold frankly declares that 'in the absence of the hope of immortality we should be prepared to accept to the full the views of Schopenhauer or Von Hartmann, so far as they apply to the upshot of

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 395, 407.

human life.' <sup>1</sup> And even Dr. McTaggart feels it to be so important, that he especially protests against any imputation of unfaith in immortality as arising from his teaching.<sup>2</sup> How many able thinkers in all ages and all realms of life have shared such belief, is too well known to need emphasis. Whence it may at least be inferred that the theme should be put beyond contemptuous dismissal, and welcomed into the region of thoughtful consideration.

Theistic philosophy certainly regards the belief in God, freedom, and immortality, as a whole which cannot be dismembered. And this is generally conceded by modern thought. That Christian Theism expressly assumes human immortality, there is no need to point out.<sup>3</sup> But apart from naturalistic dogmatism, as illustrated in the school of Haeckel, it is increasingly acknowledged that the doctrine of evolution puts no real barrier whatever in the way of such a belief. Mr. Fiske's words hereon are so representative that they deserve special attention. 'The more thoroughly we comprehend that process of evolution by which things have come to be what they are, the more we are likely to feel that to deny the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in Man, is to rob the whole process of its meaning. It

<sup>1</sup> *Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality*, p. 324.

<sup>2</sup> See *Expository Times*, June, 1906, p. 429. 'I do believe in immortality, and in my *Hegelian Cosmology* I have endeavoured to give positive reasons for my belief.'

<sup>3</sup> Even the form of Christian eschatology which calls itself 'conditional immortality,' assumes sufficient post-mortem existence to allow scope for such readjustment of condition and destiny as is necessary here for the support of the ethical argument.



goes far toward putting us to permanent intellectual confusion, and I do not see that any one has as yet alleged, or is ever likely to allege, a sufficient reason for our accepting so dire an alternative. For my own part, therefore, I believe in the immortality of the soul, not in the sense in which I accept the demonstrable truths of science, but as a supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work.' <sup>1</sup> Hence Kant's assumption of human immortality, in order to create a sphere in which the moral harmony should be completed which would justify belief in God, even if invalid at the time he made it, might now be pronounced philosophically valid. For the cosmic process which science reveals, manifestly culminates in man, so far as our knowledge extends, and yet leaves him in such a condition as inevitably to suggest both the need and the possibility of a higher stage. The apparent completion of his physical specialization points to some other phase of mental development, which would necessitate another sphere of being. Certainly those who hold that life and consciousness, mind and morality, have developed without any breach of continuity out of the original protyle, ought, in all consistency, to be the last to raise here any objection. For continuity does not at any stage involve finality, but rather points ever onward from the past to a future. <sup>2</sup>

Whereas, however, Kant assumed immortality and

<sup>1</sup> *The Destiny of Man*, p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> 'In the course of evolution there is no more philosophical difficulty in man's acquiring immortal life, than in his acquiring the erect posture and articulate speech.'—Fiske, *Life Everlasting*, p. 85.

inferred God, modern Theism, based on scientific philosophy, first infers God from the subjective and objective realities of being, and then from the nature of His works, especially as exhibited in evolution, infers the completion of His purpose, alike from what we see, and do not see, of His character in the universe.<sup>1</sup> Such a suggestion, even though it be but a hope which in the nature of the case does not admit of demonstration, is yet as well warranted, as it is necessary for the maintenance of the ethical conception of the present.

In a word, Theism is not the jaunty creed of a superficial and selfish optimist, but is rather personified in the Christ of the Gospels who creates for us the rainbow of promise only because the bright beams of love divine shine through His tears of sympathy. It acknowledges with bowed head and chastened heart that, 'considered as a finality, the visible life cannot be justified.'<sup>2</sup> But it also insists, with no less thoughtfulness than emotion, that 'earth can be endured and justified, if it have relations to heaven.' Not necessarily, of course, the heaven of our nurseries,<sup>3</sup> but one worthy of the man who, with the apostle, has 'put

<sup>1</sup> 'We see in all the successive stages of Nature's evolution the self-revelation of a Personal God and the gradual unfolding of the spiritual meaning of the universe. From matter to life, from life to consciousness, and morality, and the emergence of beings who know themselves as persons and call God a Father—these are the stages through which God has been gradually revealing to men His own nature and His eternal purpose. And we wait for the completion of the revelation. For man is only in the making.'—Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 286.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 284.

<sup>3</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 407, note.

away childish things.’<sup>1</sup> The expectation of a higher stage of evolution in which individualities that here have been ‘cribbed, cabined, and confined,’ by powers they could not resist, or handicapped by a heredity for which they were not responsible, or prevented by disease from any fair share in terrestrial good, or robbed of their heritage by man’s inhumanity to man, or dwarfed by an environment from which they could never wholly escape, shall have fuller and fairer scope, is in every sense a rational hope, as well as one that ‘maketh not ashamed.’ For it is not one whit more difficult to believe, than the tale to which science demands credence in regard to the past. Above all, it is not nearly so incredible as the thesis that the whole wonder and beauty of the kosmos, with all the marvellous potencies of personality for good or ill, as at present known to us, should have emerged out of a primaeval and chaotic nebulosity, absolutely devoid of the slightest indication of any such consequence, and without any guiding influence beyond itself. Compared with that, the theistic hope of immortality, for all the burden of its promise of riddles to be solved and wounds to be healed, is reasonableness itself. Against such a hope there is no natural law, no consistent science, no valid philosophy. To it may well be relegated the questions which here our minds cannot answer, and the woes which our hearts cannot heal. We wait, with reason’s patience, for more light.

<sup>1</sup> ‘On our Christian view it is plain that human history now lies mainly in the invisible world. Our earth is little more than a cold frame for starting the plants, which are soon transplanted to other soil and skies.’—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 268.

5. In full face, therefore, of all these and other alleged contradictions, we cannot but maintain that the inference of a moral Governor such as Theism supposes, from the moral order of the universe, is reasonably justified. Pessimism, if it could be substantiated, would doubtless put an end to such an inference. But thorough-going pessimism is alike indemonstrable and inconceivable, when all the facts of human existence are fairly estimated. Dr. Newton Clarke has good warrant for saying that 'pessimism may be offered as the explanation of the mystery of life, but mankind will steadily decline to stultify itself by accepting it.'<sup>1</sup>

The desperate suggestion that life is but a malevolent illusion, is not warranted either by experience or observation. Psychology and anthropology equally protest against it. Mysteries there may well be, in the application of moral principles to such creatures as men and women. Carlyle's 'minnow in a creek' was well informed concerning the boundless ocean outside, as compared with a tiny human brain when it assumes a complete knowledge of the universe either physical or moral. Mysteries of ill, even though unfathomable, do not annihilate realities of good. And the realities of good are so many and so great, that no explanation of them can on rational grounds be adequate, short of the infinite moral Being whom Theism postulates. In regard to many dark things which are at present insoluble, it is the voice at once of science

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Theology*, p. 123, but see the whole section, pp. 118-61. The reader who has carefully pondered what is there suggested, will not be disturbed by Mr. McTaggart's hyper-subtleties or Mr. Mallock's pseudo-antinomies.

and philosophy which says by the mouth of one of our ablest teachers—‘ We can wait ; but meanwhile we need not pretend that, because we do not understand them, therefore life and will can accomplish nothing ; we need not imagine that life—with its higher developments and still latent powers—is an impotent nonentity.’<sup>1</sup> When all we can see and feel is pondered, a reasonable optimism—or, as Dr. Saleeby terms it, ‘ meliorism ’—seems fairly justified. Even though some should hesitate to believe—yet why should they ?—that ‘ if we could grasp the entire scheme of things, so far from wishing to

Shatter it to bits and then

Remould it nearer to the heart’s desire,

we should hail it as better and more satisfying than any of our random imaginings’<sup>2</sup>—they may find in sober reflection abundant reasons for endorsing such optimism as Mr. Fiske, speaking from the most modern standpoint, deliberately suggests: ‘ To say that the ways of Providence are inscrutable, is still something more than an idle platitude, and there is yet room for the belief that, could we raise the veil that enshrouds eternal truth, we should see that behind nature’s cruelest works there are secret springs of divinest tenderness and love.’

6. What, then, is the final conclusion to which we may rationally come, after a fair consideration of the whole case for and against the ethical argument ? Can it be said truly that ‘ in both the physical and

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

moral realms, the conviction of the intellectual and moral order grows with the deepening life of the race' ? The answer will turn upon the standpoint adopted, together with the powers and opportunities of observation. Our contention here is, that all our modern increase of acquaintance with mankind and with the universe, serves rather to confirm than to destroy the belief in God which rests on moral reasons. For the manifest moral freedom of normal manhood against which misnamed 'determinism' argues in vain ; the actuality and potency of morality as a factor availing equally for the past, present, and future, in the evolution of human nature ; the unquestionable and unquenchable element of moral experience in humanity ;—are all realities which can no more spring spontaneously from a non-moral source than high intelligence can issue uncaused from the non-intelligent. As in ourselves morality always and necessarily connotes personality, so can we draw no other rational conclusion from the past or present, than that the supreme source of all morality is also personal. For we cannot in sanity conceive of a mechanical necessity whereby the greater shall emerge from the less. Nor is such theistic inference to be set aside by putting emotional emphasis upon the twin mysteries of pain and evil. For not only are there modifications and mitigations of these which often avail to turn the lower elements of our nature into the higher,<sup>1</sup> but when

<sup>1</sup> 'The chief and lasting goods of life do not lie in the passive sensibility, but in activity and the development of the upper ranges of our nature. The mere presence of pain has seldom shaken the faith of any one except the sleek and well-fed speculator. The couch of suffering is more often the scene of loving trust than

the distinctively human share possible to free beings and actual in life, is subtracted, that which is left chargeable to the supreme moral Source, no more destroys the validity of the ethical inference than clouds at noon turn day into night. The general purpose of good pervading the kosmos, is left as manifest as the light of noon. There are confessedly many clouds of individual mystery, but, though they be sometimes even black with tragedies of pain, they are ever floating, and between their oft-golden edges there are multiplied rifts of blue which—to eyes not blinded by pre-judgement—reveal measureless possibilities in the azure of an infinite love. There is, therefore, no ignorance, no superficiality, no falsity, involved, when the modern Theist still declares that ‘the implicit teleology of life leads with equal necessity to the affirmation of a supreme Reason and a supreme Righteousness. The net result of human experience is faith in the moral goodness of God.’<sup>1</sup>

It is not a little difficult to view apart the five forms of theistic argument which follow : still more difficult is it to show exactly where they stand as a witness for Theism. Yet it is necessary to keep them distinct, because, whilst some are now passed over with increasing disregard, others appear to be gathering definite emphasis.

are the pillows of luxury and the chief seats at feasts. He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, but we would not forgo the knowledge to escape the sorrow. Love too has its keen and insistent pains, but who would be loveless on that account ? Logic and a mechanical psychology can do nothing with facts like these ; only life can reveal them and remove their contradictions.’—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 281.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 258, 285.



(4) *The Ontological Argument*

Concerning the technically named 'ontological' argument, as already outlined, not much can be added. The estimates of experts seem to cancel each other. On the one hand a voice from high places assures us that 'the ontological argument had very little influence at any time except among metaphysicians, and since Kant's destructive criticism it has been abandoned, by all schools of philosophy.'<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Dr. Flint, as a competent authority, declares in his latest work, that 'ignorance alone can account for the assertion often met with that the argument is generally abandoned. It has only been transformed. It has passed from a stage in which it was presented in particular ontological forms, into one in which it is set forth in a general epistemological form.'<sup>2</sup> Certainly in its antique Anselmic form, no one of repute to-day accepts it. The present position is frankly acknowledged by the educated Theist.<sup>3</sup> Lotze summarizes it when he says that any attempt to defend such reasoning would

<sup>1</sup> Prof. McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> *Agnosticism*, p. 591. Such an estimate may perhaps be best explained and illustrated in the words of Lotze (*Philosophy of Religion*, p. 10). 'This is a case where an altogether immediate conviction breaks through into consciousness, to wit, the conviction that the totality of all that has value—all that is perfect, fair, and good—cannot possibly be homeless in the world or in the realm of actuality, but has the very best claim to be regarded by us as an imperishable reality. This assurance, which properly has no need of proof, has sought to formulate itself, after a scholastic fashion, in the above-mentioned awkward argument.'

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 44-48 above.

be useless. The force which the argument has had for some earnest thinkers, may be due to the desire to provide logical form for the mind's clinging to its ideals of the true, the beautiful, and the good, which we have seen naturalism itself exemplify. Such faith is virtually 'the implicit major premiss of the soul's life. While not demonstrated or demonstrable by anything, it is really implicit in everything.'<sup>1</sup>

It is no more necessary than possible, here to examine minutely the more recent Hegelian form of the same argument. For this, truly, can only appeal to expert metaphysicians, who must be left to their own varying estimates.<sup>2</sup> The general attitude for the ordinary intelligence of to-day is well expressed by Dr. W. N. Clarke. 'Various efforts have been made to construct an argument that shall conclusively prove the necessary existence of a perfect Being. The arguments all fail somewhere, and yet thought has lingered about the subject with the feeling that valid

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> The student may be referred to the recently published volume by Prof. Mackintosh (*The World's Epoch-Makers—Hegel*: T. & T. Clark); he will also find a summary in Knight's *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 47-53; and Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism*, pp. 112-19. The strongest support accorded to the whole argument in modern times is that of Dr. S. Harris of Yale, and Prof. W. G. T. Shedd of Union Theological Seminary, New York. But Dr. Flint's summary (*Theism*, pp. 264-80) is well worthy of regard. The latest estimate of the 'possibility of adapting Hegel to modern requirements' is that by Mr. Henry Sturt (*Idola Theatri*, p. 338): 'Such philosophizing has a considerable value for culture, inasmuch as it gives breadth and serenity to one's outlook upon thought and life. But what is valuable in education may be useless in science. The complaint of the friends of progress against the all-reconciling form of Anglo-Hegelianism is that they find it a hindrance to positive philosophical construction.'

proof is somewhere to be found.' <sup>1</sup> Simply to assert, however, the existence of such a Being 'on the ground of the impossibility of the opposite,' is not likely to be an availing plea with the modern mind.

Prof. Orr has recently endeavoured to show that 'when we get to the kernel of Anselmic thought,' it is not so irrational as appears.<sup>2</sup> Relying upon Dr. H. Stirling and Prof. T. H. Green, he represents it as 'rational realism.' This means, as above intimated, that thought is a necessary *prius* of all that is. Or, in other words, that 'reason is the source of universal and necessary principles which spring from its essence, and which are the conditions of all possible knowledge.'<sup>3</sup> Whence we cannot but infer an Absolute and Eternal Reason, immanent in the universe. It may be impossible to gainsay such a statement, and yet it must frankly be confessed that even if thus an 'existence' were demonstrable, 'that bare entity' is but small contribution towards the conception of the God of Theism, 'the infinite Intelligence and Personality of whose nature the human spirit desires some assurance, if it can be had.'<sup>4</sup> How far, therefore, the ontological argument can contribute to the theistic belief, which it certainly cannot by itself make valid, must be left to the judgement of each individual mind.

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Theology*, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 103-5.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 47 above.

<sup>4</sup> Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 52.

(5) *Idealism*

(i) Whilst, however, modern thought is increasingly disposed to dismiss the Anselmic argument in any form, as a merely curious logical fallacy, it is coming to look with growing seriousness upon the suggestions outlined above under the name of Idealism. Its discussion becomes more and more voluminous. It would, indeed, require at least another volume as large as that recently issued by Mr. Sturt,<sup>1</sup> together with expert knowledge, to hold the balance between the conflicting forms of thought represented by intellectualism, subjectivism, absolutism, &c. So far as these may be classed together, it may be said with truth that 'there can be no doubt of the present-day triumph of idealism.'<sup>2</sup> But this triumph is at present limited to professional experts and philosophers.

If it be true, as Mr. Sturt suggests, that 'the man of average calibre exemplifies most unmistakably the vitality of current ideas,' it cannot be added as yet that he is becoming rapidly appreciative of idealism as an effective help towards belief in God. It is rather to be feared that Mr. Walker is right in hinting that 'one reason why idealistic arguments for Theism have so little weight generally, logically constructed though

<sup>1</sup> *Idola Theatri* (Macmillan), to which, with Dr. Newton Marshall's *Theology and Truth* (Jas. Clarke), reference may be made as illuminating summaries of modern mental developments on these lines.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1906, p. 782.

they may be, is that their basis is suspected.<sup>1</sup> Average intelligence identifies idealism with the view that there is no such thing as matter, and would be quite content with Dr. Johnson's kick at the nearest stone, as demonstration of the superior philosophy of common sense. Without knowing technical names, it catches a glimpse of solipsism, and is naturally repelled.<sup>2</sup> Whatever may be the theistic value of the argument from idealism, it is certain that, to have any weight with average humanity, its conclusions 'must be reached by a different and more empirical way—one that can give full acknowledgement to the external world, and that will carry conviction to the ordinary man as he moves about and acts in the world of his daily experience. A thorough-going idealism may lead to the most complete agnosticism or even scepticism.'<sup>3</sup> Hegel, we may rest assured, will always be 'caviare to the general,' in spite of the brilliant interpretative achievements of Prof. Caird and Dr. Stirling. To teach that 'I am I' is the formula of the universe, on the ground of the unity of thought and being, is simply untranslatable to myriads of minds for whom a modern presentation of the valid reasons for theistic belief is most necessary.

(ii) In spite, however, of all the severe criticisms to which the idealistic plea is not unnaturally subject,

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> As Dr. Bowne puts it, 'A thorough-going subjectivity would shut us up in solipsistic individualism, and deny the world of persons and objects altogether, except as a set of individual fancies. To this extreme no one would venture to go.'—*Theism*, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 186.

there is equal need and opportunity for the lucid demonstration to-day of what Mr. Macgregor calls 'the moderate idealism of Prof. Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.'<sup>1</sup> But it must be shorn of its terrors, and be made to correlate with the common sense—if not of Dr. Johnson—of the fairly educated man of our time. Apart from some such illuminating process, it is of little avail to affirm that the method of idealism 'is the one absolutely convincing and logically irrefragable argument for establishing the existence of God,' or that by it 'the existence of God is shown to be an absolute necessity of thought.'<sup>2</sup> Before such strong assertions can obtain the hearing which undoubtedly they merit, the issues between idealism and realism must be made intelligible to the ordinary intellect. Surely a difference so actual and so decisive should admit of succinct statement.

(iii) If one may venture to repeat the question already given,<sup>3</sup> the whole issue narrows itself to this: Does existence connote, or necessitate, apprehension by some mind, or not? Realism says no: a thing may exist without being apprehended by any mind at all. Idealism says, Yes: if a thing is not, never has been, never will be apprehended by any mind, it does not exist. Thus it may be said that realism stands for pure being, or being without recognition. Idealism maintains that being involves being known to be. Not that such

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1906, p. 782. This is a thoughtful paper seeking to demonstrate, against extreme idealism, the existence of things independent of experience.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> v. p. 50 above.

a condensed statement will end the matter, or close 'the perennial antinomies of realism.' It will doubtless be at once demanded whether the world of facts which a man perceives, is not manifestly independent both of his own and of his neighbour's intelligence.<sup>1</sup> Which, of course, must be answered in the affirmative. But the real and main question remains. Does this mean and involve that the world which exists apart from our intelligence, exists apart from *all* intelligence? Certainly it does not. As Dr. Bowne succinctly puts it, 'One may believe in the subjective existence of the world of things, without thereby making it a particular delusion of his own, and may also believe in the universality of the world, or in its existence for all, without admitting its extra-mental existence.'<sup>2</sup>

Granted intelligence and sincerity, it does not take long to make clear the truth that what we call our senses are not mere transmitters, but creators. Dalton, the sober Quaker, had no hesitation in putting on the stockings he found ready for him, because to him they were not red, though they were so to almost every one else. But it was simply because his apparatus of vision did not create the sensation of redness out of that which the stockings presented to it, whereas ordinary

<sup>1</sup> Thus Mr. Macgregor, in the paper above mentioned (p. 803): 'The final warrant for regarding things as having self-existence, even when unknown, is in our own experience of self-hood. It matters nothing to my reality how much other people know about it. Existence is not a concept subordinate to knowledge.'

<sup>2</sup> See *Theism*, Dr. J. J. Tigert, p. 328. The whole of chap. xv. in this work, on 'The Theory of Knowledge, or Idealistic Realism,' is worthy of study, as showing how these recondite themes may be handled in a fashion intelligible to all.



human vision does so. One such case is the clue to all. As Dr. Fairbairn truly says, 'We could go from sense to sense, from ear and eye to taste and smell, and by analysis enlarge and confirm the conclusion that the qualities which our senses perceive are not things merely of external nature, but that either they could not be, or could not seem to be, without the constitutive faculty or the interpretative Personality of man. In other words, Nature in her own right is, if not a void, yet at most a mere aggregate of mechanical properties; her pomp and beauty, her voice and all her harmonies, she owes to mind. We receive from her what we have given to her, and without us she would not be what she is.' <sup>1</sup>

This much, then, being clear to every one who will consider it, we may go farther. Let us take a calm and fair statement from one well qualified to give it.

'Whether there are noumenal and unknowable things-in-themselves, behind things which produce on our sensibility the effects which we call the properties of matter, as Kant taught; or whether Berkeley's *esse est percipi* sufficiently defines material existence, is a question which is irrelevant in this context. In either case the world, as we know it, is made by our senses and understanding. Made, however, is not created. The perceiving subject does not create its objects; we do not ourselves originate our sensations. Something, then, co-operates with our mental activity to constitute reality. And of this something we can say two things: firstly, it is intelligible, for by scientific

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 33.

methods we are increasingly interpreting it as a kosmos : and secondly, it interacts with us active subjects ; for so is our experience constituted. Either, then, it is itself intelligent and causally efficient, or else there is intelligence and causal activity behind it. And inasmuch as the only cause of which we have experience is mind, both of these two characteristics of the objective world are also characteristics of spirit. Nature, therefore, must at bottom be spiritual. Thus does reflection on the results of science lead us to an idealistic conception of the universe.' <sup>1</sup>

One would think that such a thesis, so expressed, would make an end of controversy. But the working of differing minds from different standpoints prevents such a result.<sup>2</sup> Adjectives also come in to lend their well-meant but oft confusing aid. We hear not only of idealism, but of 'subjective' and 'objective' idealism. This latter, again, is made to carry very diverse meanings.<sup>3</sup> The epistemological differentiation

<sup>1</sup> F. R. Tennant, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Mr. Macgregor says (p. 802): 'Independent reality is thinkable ; its reduction to absurdity is not made good. The complete spirituality of the world is not proved by means of the theory of knowledge.' Here manifestly discussion might begin again as to the 'independent' and the 'complete.' But it is irrelevant for our present purpose.

<sup>3</sup> Thus Dr. Tigert says: 'The system of thought and reality and their relations, set forth at large in the writings of Lotze, I prefer to designate *objective idealism*, or *idealistic realism*. By the subjective idealists it would be denied the name of idealism altogether, and classed as a realistic philosophy ; by materialists it would be repudiated as idealistic airiness or moonshine ; but it is perhaps none the worse as doctrine approximating truth, that it should be subject to this double fire from the opposition camps of a crude and crass materialism and of an unguarded and indefensible ideal-

of these does not here concern us. Intensely interesting as the views of the Cairds and Mr. Bradley are to students, and important as it is to compare the doctrines of Spinoza and Hegel with those of Dr. Martineau and Mr. T. H. Green, they are not necessary to a perception of the main fact. This, we may say unhesitatingly, is, that the modern appreciation of mind as the *prius* and *sine quâ non* of matter, and the explanation of all present no less than past existence, is becoming a more and more potent factor in testifying to the rationality of theistic belief.

(iv) If, then, we may assume that 'there are no things except those which thought affirms, and there is no objectivity in things except their validity for thought itself, that is, for experience,'<sup>1</sup> how does this warrant the further assertion that 'when thought is clear and self-conscious, we must think theistically'? The answer can only be in rational choice between two conceptions which are divided ultimately by an impassable gulf.

On the one hand, in the decisive words of Sir Oliver Lodge: 'Orthodox modern science shows us a

ism.'—*Theism*, p. 292. Dr. Newton Marshall, however, in his valuable little book on *Theology and Truth*, defines objective idealists as those 'whose principle insists that there is a metaphysical unity underlying all phenomena, and that the process of thought is one which passes through the phenomenal to the absolute, and by successive stages does actually know that absolute.' He also discusses theological idealism and free idealism.

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 46. So we find Prof. Huxley saying, 'For I am utterly incapable of conceiving the existence of matter, if there is no mind in which to picture that existence' (*Collected Essays*, i. p. 245).

self-contained and self-sufficient universe, not in touch with anything beyond or above itself—the general trend and outline of it known—nothing supernatural or miraculous, no intervention of beings other than ourselves being conceived possible.’<sup>1</sup> This, of course, involves that ‘nature, to which we entirely belong, is an unbroken continuity of necessary causes, and of these our mental conditions are simply the inefficient symbols.’<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, thorough-going philosophy declares that ‘the matter of science is matter interpreted by mind, which has meaning only for mind, and which ultimately has existence only for mind.’<sup>3</sup> And this latter, on the plain ground that ‘it is only in terms of mind that we can understand the unity, activity, and regularity, that nature presents. In so understanding, we see that Nature is Spirit.’<sup>4</sup>

Between these two alternatives, no eirenicon is possible. The choice, therefore, must be unequivocal and final. It is confessedly only initial, but it is imperative. There is increasing warrant for Prof. Ward’s avowal that ‘until an idealistic, i.e. spiritualistic, view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of Theism is but wasted labour.’ If the door be open to further thought, other revelations may reward our entering in to explore. But if the door be utterly closed and all entrance barred, there is an end of all approach to Theism, and for that matter, at the same time, to all

<sup>1</sup> *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 212.

<sup>3</sup> Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 180.

<sup>4</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. Pref. xii. ix.

real egoism and all worthy altruism. Hence it is that Theism, after the fullest scrutiny possible of the world within, in all its co-operations with the world without, grounds itself upon unshakable spiritual reality. This is well put by Dr. Schurman. 'The soul of truth lies in the recognition that all that is revealed to us in sense perception, and the processes of which are recorded in science, has a deeper ground than this material appearance—a ground which reflective analysis obliges us to hold as spiritual.'<sup>1</sup>

#### (6) *Transcendentalism*

We have already noticed the opinion that the method of interpretation of the spiritual life known as transcendental, is said to be now the 'most potent instrument of constructive and interpretative thought.' It fills up the gap pointed out by Professor Knight<sup>2</sup> as disqualifying the ontological argument, inasmuch as it supplies all those personal and moral qualities through which alone mere absolute existence could be characterized as God. Mr. R. B. Arnold has recently said that 'for the normal energetic European there must be a personal Deity, and He must be effective, or at least He must have constructed the universe, so that in the end right will prevail. Love in the highest sense, and not the fiendish struggle for existence, must be the final law of the universe. It is also fundamental that God

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 140.

<sup>2</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 52.

Himself should be capable of suffering and self-sacrifice, and this is perhaps the secret of Christianity. For it has rightly been emphasized by Browning, that were this not the case, the Creator would be morally inferior to some of His created.' <sup>1</sup> All this may be true; but it would be quite vain to ignore the fact that by critical philosophy the greater part, and by scientific naturalism the whole, of this conception of the divine, as actual and active, is unhesitatingly dismissed as untrustworthy and incredible. The reality and potency of the craving are acknowledged, but the pathetic lament of Strauss as to the uselessness of an illusion, is supposed to suffice as the reasonable warrant for the rejection of any such thought. Equally, however, in the name of science and of philosophy, transcendentalism challenges such rejection. And it must be submitted that the fiercest light of our latest knowledge, leaves its challenge unashamed. In the main, for the following reasons.

(i) The highest reality known to us is undoubtedly human nature, and all the enlargement of our acquaintance with the universe, tends rather to enhance than to diminish its significance. No authority of a great name can make us echo Kant's lament that astronomy had annihilated his own importance. The fuller development of mental science tends increasingly, not only to deliver us from the nightmare of megalomania, and oppose any belittling of humanity on the ground of the size of the human body, but to bid us rather smile than tremble at the cynical and shortsighted estimate

<sup>1</sup> *Scientific Fact*, &c., p. 266.

propounded by Haeckel in the name of his monism.<sup>1</sup> The science, or philosophy, which sees no more value for the universe at large in a man than in the smallest bacillus, may find employment for printers, but will assuredly make no real impression upon humanity. And this for the simple but sufficient reason, that 'man lives before he philosophizes, and in his thinking he can never do justice to the fullness of his experience, for thought is always in arrear of the facts of life. But it is the task of philosophy to bring to bear upon the facts the richest and most adequate conceptions which she can find, even though she can never hope successfully to mirror the concreteness of reality.'<sup>2</sup> No man, indeed, can make such a statement as that of Haeckel, without both contradicting himself and condemning his philosophy. The very intelligence and alleged sincerity with which it is made, turn into utter mockery and irrationality both the principle enunciated and the illustrations appended. To put mind and morals on a level with the 'unconscious sensation' of the monad, is to substitute imbecility for philosophy, and reduce the kosmos to chaos.

(ii) It is correspondingly refreshing to meet with the sober thought which truly asserts that 'philosophy is concerned to have before it human nature in its whole length, and breadth, and depth, and height.

<sup>1</sup> 'Our own human nature, which exalted itself into an image of God in its anthropistic illusion, sinks to the level of a placental mammal, which has no more value for the universe at large than the ant, the fly of a summer's day, the microscopic infusorium, or the smallest bacillus.'—*Riddle, &c.*, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Storr, *Development, &c.*, p. 183.



It must take man as a living person, and decline every invitation to limit its view to any one elemental feature of his life.' <sup>1</sup> To some forms of naturalism man may be nothing more than a 'placental mammal.' But true philosophy no more accepts such an estimate, than zoological science would be content to regard a mammal as a creature with four limbs. Even naturalism has to own that consciousness involves mysteries beyond solution. Now, the crowning mystery as well as reality of manhood, is personality. 'Man thinks and strives, he fears and loves, he sets valuations and works out purposes in accordance with them. When he comes to the knowledge of himself, he acts from his own self-conscious choice freely; the ends that he has selected decide his mode of conduct, and he lives in unison with like beings in reciprocal activity and mutual affection, attributing to them self-consciousness and freedom like his own.' <sup>2</sup>

Nothing less than this is involved in personal existence. But here exactly, in the reality and significance of the contents of human personality, we find the dividing line between naturalism and philosophical Theism. To this effect modern philosophy speaks unhesitatingly, and by the mouth of its most accredited representatives. The situation is so serious as to deserve the most careful survey. 'Science, these positivists say, has proved that personality, so far from being an elementary force in nature, is but a passive resultant of the really elementary forces, physical, chemical, physiological, and psycho-physio-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

logical, which are all impersonal and general in character.' <sup>1</sup> Speaking, however, for himself, Prof. James declares openly, 'In spite of the appeal which this impersonality of the scientific attitude makes to a certain magnanimity of temper, I believe it to be shallow, for so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but *as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.*' <sup>2</sup> For which reason, 'it is absurd for science to say that the egotistic elements of experience should be suppressed. The axis of reality runs solely through the egotistic places.' Such a protest is happily echoed in many directions. Dr. Schurman is but one of a host who are prepared to maintain that 'reality is vastly richer than human thought can compass. There are more things assuredly in the self-conscious life of man, than are dreamt of in the mechanical philosophy. Personality is the rock on which such naturalistic theories always suffer shipwreck.' <sup>3</sup>

When Prof. Haeckel asserts that his monism traces back 'all phenomena without exception to the mechanism of the atom,' <sup>4</sup> we are warranted in asking what is

<sup>1</sup> Prof. W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 119. So again on p. 481, 'Science, on the other hand, has ended by utterly repudiating the personal point of view.'

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 498. The italics are his own.

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 224. So again, 'Whoever treats himself as the evanescent and worthless product of blind mechanical motions and percussions, may of course reach a more or less consistent theory of the universe, but he has purchased it in violation of all the dearest rights and claims of personality.'—p. 221.

<sup>4</sup> *Confession*, p. 19.

the worth of such a thesis, even as an explanation of the self-consciousness which constitutes but the beginning of personality? Prof. Lotze's judgement ought to be as weighty as it is unequivocal. 'The materialistic attempts to generate self-consciousness from all manner of motions in brain-atoms returning upon themselves, are deserving of no respect. As they are unable in general to deduce any consciousness from motions, so is this return of the motions also unable to generate any self-consciousness.'<sup>1</sup> And if the consensus of experts be ever worth anything, in this case the reasoned dictum of Prof. Ward which embodies it, should be sufficient as finally confirmatory, when he says, 'The real world of science, the world of phenomena, is a world of mass-points transferring and transforming their motions, a world of quantitative diversity only. But naturalism which undertakes this task, unable to complete it, breaks down hopelessly when the complete facts of life and mind have to be taken into account. The naturalist cannot get back to himself as a living, thinking, acting being.'<sup>2</sup>

It is because such utterances as these, in the name of most recent philosophy, correspond to the normal consciousness of humanity, that we are emboldened to affirm that there is no prospect whatever that men who know themselves to be themselves, and as such, morally free persons, will yield up the very citadel of their being at the demand of any ambassador of naturalism, however much he may jingle the keys with which he declares he can open the door. They

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 101.

know that he can do nothing of the kind. Whether the man of average culture can translate the technical terms of metaphysics or not,<sup>1</sup> he can appreciate and will endorse what Dr. Fairbairn plainly points out, viz. that 'personality becomes the very condition through which nature, as known to science, is, while it is also the factor through which all the sciences which explain nature have come to be, and are able to continue in being.'<sup>2</sup> From which it should not be difficult to draw the plain and inevitable inference that 'the personality which makes nature was not made by the nature it makes.'

(iii) When thus personality is accorded the central position, as the very essence of the highest reality known to us by experience and observation, we have an interpretation of the whole process of evolution as philosophically significant as scientifically valid. Well did Dr. W. N. Clarke counsel the students of Oberlin to 'hold fast the conviction that the universe can be understood only in the light of the highest that

<sup>1</sup> He ought to be able also to follow clearly and fully such a statement as this, from Dr. Tigert's *Theism* (p. 310): 'The most important and far-reaching result of objective idealism, is that Personality, whether divine or human, is once for all made the abiding-place of all ontological reality; while the realm of perfectly definite phenomenal reality, universal and unchangingly ordered, according to law which is independent of finite persons, becomes the theatre of the activities of the world of spirits, and the means of communication between persons, divine and human. God, man, and the world, thus fall into intelligible relations; the world is a true universe shot through with purpose; and philosophy, though many riddles and difficulties still remain, approximately accomplishes its task of comprehending reality as a whole.'

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 30.

it contains, and that hence the life of the personal spirit is the true interpreter.' <sup>1</sup> For the current assumption, which bids fair to become yet more prevalent, after the leading of Huxley, that the only hope of solving the mysteries of the universe is to bore back into the past, is really little better than childish. As Prof. Knight remarks, 'To suppose that the beginning of things will yield us the clue by which to unravel their end, is much less reasonable than the attempt to find the oak within the acorn, or the man within the speck of protoplasm.' <sup>2</sup> But it is yet more unreasonable if the investigator, failing so to discover either, should boldly deny the latent potentiality which afterwards issues in both.

It is difficult, indeed, to conceive of a more utter reversal of the truth than the idea—which not a few appear to deem the true significance of the theory of evolution—that if we only knew the reality of all origins, we should have the secret of all things. For, manifestly, all the time that they are eagerly hunting for the lowest term of the series, they are employing the highest term to direct their quest. And as Prof. Upton says, 'No study of the physical stage of evolution would suggest that the phenomena of consciousness were destined to supervene.' <sup>3</sup> As to the latest researches into the nature of the 'ultimate atom,' and the discovery that it is not ultimate, even if we assume as finally true all that is claimed for electrons, what have we ?

<sup>1</sup> *Huxley and Phillips Brooks*, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 128. See also Prof. Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 154.

Not only absolutely nothing by way of explanation of anything that has followed since such a stage of evolution began, but the intensifying of the problem of involution beyond all expression or calculation. If, indeed, it were conceivable that all the intelligence now displayed by human research could have been brought to bear upon the primary protyle, nothing is more certain than that by no possibility could the idea of future issuing of complex chemical relations, with the later appearing of life, consciousness, human intellect, and morality, have been suggested. And, on the other hand, even if all that naturalism would now attribute to the atom be conceded, the only logical consequence would be, as Prof. Upton says, that the savant would see that 'a material atom was an infinitely more wonderful existence than he had imagined it to be, and that in order to fully understand it, it would be necessary to study the highest forms of self-conscious life.' <sup>1</sup>

Not a few earnest workers both in science and in religion, have made mistakes as serious as that of Prof. Romanes, in this very regard; but they have lacked the candour to confess it as frankly as he. 'When I wrote the *Candid Examination*,' he says, 'I did not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of human nature, as distinguished from physical nature, in any inquiry touching Theism. But since then I have seriously studied anthropology, psychology, and metaphysics, with the result of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature as a whole, whereby to investigate the

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 155.

theory of Theism.' <sup>1</sup> Thus the highest, at its fullest and best, becomes the only valid interpretation of all the rest, even of the least and lowest factors as well as the simplest processes of evolution.

(iv) The importance of this estimate of human nature is made manifest, in the proposition of Transcendentalism to transfer all these highest results of evolution, which at once explain and justify as well as crown its latest product, to the great and necessary Source of that involution without which evolution would be unthinkable. Is such a transference warranted? Is the anthropomorphism involved therein permissible? Is the enlargement of these human qualities to the divine standard even conceivable? Such questions as these, we must own, are being pressed home to-day as never before. The pressure is, however, no more inevitable than welcome. No genuine Theist wishes it to be otherwise. There is no desire whatever on the part of theistic belief either to evade the difficulties or to blink the tremendousness of the proposition. Principal Caird puts it with equal simplicity and boldness. 'If there be a divine element in man, there must be, so to speak, a human element in God, of which the whole spiritual life and history of the world is the manifestation. If this be so, if man cannot be explained without ascribing to his nature a divine element, it follows that the divine nature cannot be understood without ascribing to it a human element. A relation cannot be essential on the one side and only accidental

<sup>1</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 154.



or arbitrary on the other.' <sup>1</sup> In corroboration of this we do at least know that the forces which we recognize as our individual selves 'do not carry the ground and cause of their being in themselves, but are, by the very necessity of thought, only conceivable as dependent manifestations of an Absolute and Eternal Being.' And more. From such necessity of thought, and of relationship, 'we are surely justified in concluding that the Eternal self-differentiating Causality of the Absolute, to which finite wills and all things owe their existence, is essentially of the same nature as our own volitional self-determinations, although, from the finite and dependent nature of our personality, we cannot form an exhaustive conception of the transcendent causality of God.' <sup>2</sup>

The conclusion is confessedly vast. But if the philosophy be sound, we ought not to shrink from it. If the mathematical properties of an ellipse which can be drawn on a tiny piece of paper, be accurately deduced and stated, they will apply with equal force and reliability to the orbit of Neptune around the sun. The truth that makes us tremble, is not for that reason untrue.

(v) So we come face to face with the question which appears to be, for many minds, the most impressive argument against Theism, viz. the general incredibility of the divine personality. How is it conceivable that personality can be an attribute of the infinite

<sup>1</sup> *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. pp. 156, 157.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 166, 228. See also Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 60.

Being known to philosophy as the Absolute, and to Theism as God? George Eliot, we are told, used to wax fervid in descanting upon the absurdity of such a notion. But there has been much misdirected indignation in the course of human thought. It may be that this is a supreme instance of it. At least it is submitted that the following considerations, though brief, are clear enough to give pause to all hasty dismissal of belief in God on such a ground.

(1) The alleged difficulty has been fairly stated by Lotze thus: 'Against this faith philosophic reflection has subsequently been very unanimously directed with the assertion, Personality is conceivable only in finite spirits, and in this case rests on conditions which can have no significance for the Absolute.'<sup>1</sup> In whatever form the objection is put, it comes back ever to these two general assertions: that personality necessarily involves limitation; and that the psychology involved in the human self-consciousness, which is the fundamental essence of personality, can have no possibility of application to a Being who, by the very nature of the case, must be utterly unlimited and unconditioned in all respects in order to be the Absolute Source of all. Into the wilderness of metaphysics which is thus opened out, it is not here required of us to wander far. A few plain considerations will suffice to prevent the veto which certain thinkers seek to impose, for the reasons suggested, upon all further theistic pleas.

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 55. For a fuller and yet succinct discussion, see Dr. Illingworth's *Personality, Human and Divine* (cheap edition published at sixpence); and Dr. Rashdall's able *résumé* in the volume *Personal Idealism*, lect. viii., with the same title.

(2) Personality being the distinctive mark of a person, the prime question comes to be, What is a person? But if the answer recently put forth by an avowed metaphysician is to be taken as typical, we are bound to protest that it is entirely misleading, and simply begs the whole question at issue. Says Mr. R. B. Arnold: 'We are now in a position to inquire whether it is possible that there is a personal God. We must first determine what exactly we mean by a person. So far as our present actual observation goes, a person is an aggregate of matter acting in a particular manner. We only infer his mind from observing that his body acts according to plan, which we connect in our own case with our own mental experience.'<sup>1</sup> But how an accomplished thinker could content himself with such a definition, is indeed impossible to understand. For on such terms, not only might a dog, a fly, a fish, and a river, as acting aggregates of matter, all be equally persons with the writer—but even when limited to human beings, the 'aggregate of matter' is always in a state of flux, and so, at the utmost, is merely an accident of the person conceived. But definition by accident yields bastard philosophy. The essence or actuality of a person can only possibly be the mind which is inferred, and which, as such, connotes self-consciousness, unity, continuity. Scientific thought can no more conceive of an 'aggregate of matter' 'acting' at all, than mechanical science can conceive of an engine acting without some motive force. The definition even of a dynamo as an 'aggregate of matter acting in a particular manner,' would certainly be more

<sup>1</sup> *Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality*, p. 267.

deficient than the play of *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out. But in the much greater and graver matter of human personality, to exalt accident into the place of essence, is as utterly unphilosophical as fatal to any valid conclusion concerning it.

Furthermore, Theism has never suggested that God is a person in precisely the same sense as a man is. At its utmost the term 'personality' as applied to God, is a modest attempt to express divine reality in human speech, without any assumption whatever to have comprehended, let alone expressed, the whole truth. By its employment of such a term, Theism no more claims exhaustive exactness than does a child's reference to its father as 'daddie,' claim to express the full and exact connotation of fatherhood. Even in ourselves, limited as we confessedly are, personality is alike indefinable and unthinkable. In his Ingersoll Lecture<sup>1</sup> Prof. Royce, an expert in psychological philosophy, says openly, 'For myself I do not know in any concrete sense wherein my individuality consists. In my present human form of consciousness I simply cannot tell.' But we can tell this, that even in such a declaration, the 'I' which speaks of itself is a person, and that the *sine quâ non* of individuality is personality. How much more the latter connotes than the former, no scientific measurement can say. We are compelled to believe in the individuality of a sparrow, because a total sparrow consciousness is alike unthinkable and unworkable. But we have no conception whatever wherein sparrow individuality consists. That the individuality of a man means more than that

<sup>1</sup> For 1899, p. 71.

of a bird, no one who thinks can doubt. If, indeed, we were to define personality as human individuality, it would be as intelligible as unfathomable. But it would be measurelessly more true than to speak of a person as 'an aggregate of matter.' Dr. Schurman, therefore, is thoroughly justified in saying that 'personality cannot be rendered in terms of any abstract system, without omitting its essence. We can *be* persons, and feel the influence of persons, but personality is something other than any definition of it.'<sup>1</sup> We note that Prof. Royce, speaking as a man to men, goes on to say,<sup>2</sup> 'I know not in the least, I pretend not to guess, by what processes this individuality of our human life is further expressed. I wait until this mortal shall put on—individuality.' What, then, is the conception of personality here involved, in the name of exact psychological science? Even such, in its potentiality no less than its mystery, that it is lifted altogether out of the contempt to which naturalism would dismiss it, and becomes no unworthy pointer, at least, towards the essential nature of the Absolute Being, God.

(3) Let us, however, go on to face the spectre of incredibility as presented also by Hegel and his school. We are assured from this quarter that 'it is absurd to predicate personality, selfhood, of the Infinite, which by its very nature is the negation of personality, of selfhood, the Infinite being that which contains all, and which therefore excludes nothing.' But the modern Theist is by no means scared out of his faith by such a

<sup>1</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 253.

<sup>2</sup> *Ingersoll Lecture*, p. 80.

declaration. For, as Mr. Lilly points out,<sup>1</sup> the whole force of such alleged absurdity lies in the assumption that personality necessarily means limitation. But surely this is the very matter *sub judice*. So that here again, as so often, the anti-theistic objection resolves itself into a begging of the question under consideration.

(a) It is, therefore, quite in place at the outset, to make the simple but unequivocal affirmation that personality does not of necessity involve limitation. That human personality does so, is quite another matter. It is no more a proof of the limitation of the divine personality, than the manifest limitations of a drop are proof of precisely similar limitations in the ocean.<sup>2</sup> 'In the proper sense of the word,' Mr. Lilly rightly adds: 'Personality—Für-sich-sein—can be predicated only of the Infinite. Perfect selfhood means immediate existence. What we call personality, selfhood, in man, is but the dimmest shadow, the faintest effluence from the source and fount of Being, in whom alone is perfect reason, perfect will. The idea of personality, like all ideas, is realized only in that Self-existent—the original of all ideas—which transcends those ideas, indeed, but in transcending includes them.'<sup>3</sup> That this is a true account might easily be confirmed

<sup>1</sup> See his *Great Enigma*, p. 241.

<sup>2</sup> For an interesting physical analogy, see *Life and Matter*, by Sir O. Lodge, p. 185, 'The unexpected influence of size.'

<sup>3</sup> A pertinent remark of Lotze's is here well worthy of consideration. 'We often hear it said, "Ego and non-ego are two correlative conceptions, neither of which has in general any significance apart from its opposition to the other." Therefore—it is said—even the idea of the ego can originate only at the moment when that of the non-ego likewise originates. On this account, personality is possible only for finite beings which can be limited by a non-ego. The

from other competent sources, but it speaks sufficiently for itself, and, until disproved, it disposes of an objection to the philosophy of Theism which is at once most common and least warranted.

(b) Again, it must in truth be affirmed that personality is a matter of degree. This is latent in the foregoing protest, but merits further notice. 'The newly born infant,' says Dr. Rashdall,<sup>1</sup> 'is no more of a person than a worm, except potentially. Yet it is impossible at any period in the life of the child to say to it—"To-day thou art a person: yesterday thou wast not."' Which is undoubtedly true. But if we cannot say when, or how, or where, personality begins, assuredly we cannot pronounce how it grows, or where it ends. The idea of drawing a circle with exactly measured radii around a centre of self-consciousness in an aggregate of matter, and proclaiming that there can be no personality beyond that, is but imaginary, not to say amusing, philosophy.

When Spinoza declared that there was 'no more in common between the divine intelligence and the human, than between the puppy lying on the hearth-rug and the constellation called the Dog,' he did but barter for the moment his customary intelligent sincerity for one of those myriad quips in which anti-theism is only too wont to delight. The pseudo-illustration is as false as the correlation of consciousness with non-consciousness must always be. For however

foregoing three propositions have really no inner connexion with each other. The first of them must be pronounced perfectly absurd.—*Philosophy of Religion*, p. 62. In which case the others need no consideration.

<sup>1</sup> *Personal Idealism*, p. 374.



inexpressible may be the quantitative difference between the human and the divine, until it is finally demonstrated that there is in the necessary Cause of the universe neither purpose nor intelligence, the fact that both these are actual in man, constitutes a spiritual potentiality which can be definitely regarded as a qualitative relation to the divine. The secret, indeed, of the rationale of the universe, appears more and more to reside in such potentiality. In the conception, therefore, of human personality, as a circle around self-consciousness, rigidly limited at present by bodily relationships, yet ever enlarging, we may find at least a pointer towards the philosophical conception of the divine personality as a circle with infinite radii whose centre is everywhere.

(c) Another fallacy oft lurking in close proximity to that just mentioned, is, that if the human personality be thus credited with a potentiality which brings it into any relation with the divine, there must of necessity be inferred an exact similarity of the divine to the human. But such a suggestion must be born rather of anti-theistic determination than naturalistic philosophy. Why should the reality of a relationship involve similarity of nature? It might as truly be affirmed that a man could not love a dog without being a dog. Certainly Theism has done its utmost to make plain that, in its conception, the divine does not merely mean the infinite extension but the real transcendence of the human. Why, again we may ask, with Prof. Knight, should we not 'retain the idea of personality, although of a Personality infinitely transcending ours? May not the very conditions which limit the exercise

of free personality in man—the barriers of space and time—be removable ones? And where they are removed—in the Infinite and Absolute Being—may there not be the highest kind of personality? In thus recognizing that God is more than a person—as we understand the term—we may discern at the same time the glorification of personality, its apotheosis or perfection.’<sup>1</sup>

Even in regard to ourselves we may obtain, by means of our poor, confused, ever-groping, ever-shifting philosophies, some glimpses of the difference between quantity and quality in personality. Facts remain, though words fail us. Why, then, should the suggestion of Theism that not only in quantity but in quality the divine personality may be inferred from the human, and yet transcend it, be dismissed with hauteur as irrational? The super-personal is at least as conceivable as the impersonal. Or to put the case in the words of one who cannot be accused of theistic bias: ‘Though God is not personal in the sense of human personality, we must not say that He is impersonal, for that would appear as if divinity were less than man. The very opposite is the case. God being the prototype of a man, man being formed in the likeness of God by incorporating in himself the divine logos, we must recognize that God, the prototype of all personality, is not less than a person but more than a person; and noticing that the totality of divine thought which we trace in the laws of nature, constitutes a system not unlike the organism of a personal being, we prefer to characterize God as super-personal. The negation of the human in God does not deprive Him of anything

<sup>1</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 161.

divine ; and the divine features which make man akin to God, are better, nobler, and more divine than they are in any individual personality.' <sup>1</sup>

(d) Thus the conclusion to which thought compels us, when justice is done to all the facts, is not so much the difficulty of conceiving the divine as the human personality. Prof. Royce's cultured modesty, in suggesting that the true hope of immortality consists rather in the attainment than the prolongation of our personality, as represented in individuality, commends to us that which is worthy of deepest consideration. But in the easy rush of superficial assumptions, and especially amid the present 'deterministic' tendency to reduce personality to a puppet worked by the wires of heredity and environment, it is often as difficult as desirable to secure fair attention for the central mystery of all reality. Whence it may be well worth while here to record the deliberate pronouncements of one or two competent thinkers, on this intricate but important theme.

No philosopher of recent times, as we have been reminded, merits a more respectful hearing than Prof. Lotze. But he did not hesitate to say, in full view of all the consequences : 'All these hindrances of a perfect personality we can imagine as not existent in the Infinite Spirit. On this account, we conclude with the assertion which is exactly the opposite of the customary one : Perfect personality is reconcilable only with the conception of an infinite being ; for finite beings only an approximation to this is attainable.' <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Paul Carus, *The Monist*, January, 1906, p. 145.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 69.

This is corroborated more recently by Dr. Rashdall. 'Thus the most developed human consciousness seems to fall short of the ideal which every human consciousness suggests to us. An imperfect personality is the most that we can attribute even to the most richly endowed of human souls. If a person in the most exact sense is to exist, such personality must be found not in man but in some superior being—as far as our knowledge goes, only, if at all, in God.' <sup>1</sup>

Prof. Bowne also echoes the verdict of Lotze, in his summary. 'In fact, we must reverse the common speculative dogma on this point, and declare that proper personality is possible only to the Absolute. The very objections urged against the personality of the Absolute show the incompleteness of human personality. The absolute knowledge and self-possession which are necessary to perfect personality can be found only in the absolute and infinite Being upon whom all things depend. In His pure self-determination and perfect self-possession only do we find the conditions of complete personality, and of this our finite personality can never be more than the feeblest and faintest image.' <sup>2</sup>

Whilst Prof. Upton, in his *Hibbert Lectures*, adds the touch of human feeling which true philosophy so often needs to make it effective. 'If this Absolute Presence which meets us face to face in the most momentous of our life's experiences, which pours into our fainting wills the elixir of new life and strength, and into our wounded hearts the balm of a quite infinite

<sup>1</sup> *Personal Idealism*, p. 375.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, pp. 167, 168.

sympathy, cannot fitly be called a Personal Presence, it is only because this word "personal" is too poor, and carries with it associations too human and too limited, to adequately express this profound God-consciousness. But we cannot spare the word "personal" in this connexion, for we have no higher term.' <sup>1</sup>

Such deliberate and reasoned judgements, from such sources, should at least suffice to put an end to the superciliousness with which this theme is sometimes dismissed, and procure for it both sincere and earnest consideration.

(vi) It only remains to add that such personality may and must connote as real, on the transcendent scale, all the moral as well as the intellectual elements which on the infinitesimal scale we find so real in ourselves. If it be true, as Mr. Protap Chunder Mozoomdar said in his remarkable Boston address,<sup>2</sup> that 'the personality of God, without which spiritual religion is impossible, is a truth which is revealed by human personality,' then certainly the moral capacity which forms the crowning feature of the human, cannot possibly be lacking in the divine.

To summarize, therefore, the whole postulate of Theism in regard to the reality and contents of the divine personality, there are four distinct features to be maintained.

(1) Unity : quite as real as Pantheism affirms, though unmistakably distinct therefrom.

<sup>1</sup> p. 363.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Prof. Upton in his *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 361, 363—remarkable as coming from such a source.

(2) Ubiquity : for which expression is sought in the phrase the 'immanence of God,' meaning thereby a personality so inexpressibly vast as to be always accessible to our own and every human personality.

(3) Intellectuality : as including self-consciousness beyond defining ; also intelligence, exhibited in the intelligibility of the universe ; and will, as incarnate in the inscrutable but everywhere necessary and everywhere manifest causality of nature—through which we ourselves form organized part of a kosmos, and are not mere incoherent atoms of chaos.

(4) Morality : finding transcendent expression in the character manifested by nature's general but undeniable benevolence, despite our inability to justify all its details ; and pointing to a divine love which we find feebly yet really intimated in ourselves, even as the sun is mirrored in a dewdrop.

Such personality, Transcendentalism declares, in the well-considered words of Dr. Caldecott,<sup>1</sup> to be 'the Reality to which reason, moral purpose, feelings, sociality, and the unitary nature of the human spirit, conduct the inquiring mind of man. This final judgment presents itself as rational, giving the rationale of our human nature.' Moreover, it is not open to the charge of anthropomorphism in the belittling sense, for it is self-protected from such a delusion. 'That God infinitely transcends our view is also our rational faith ; for the reason which tells us that the spirit of man is the image of the divine Spirit, tells us also that the image is not the reality.' When Transcendentalism is thus understood, and thus applied, it ceases

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 141.

to be either mystical or imaginary, and becomes a valid method of true thought which 'transforms the venerable methods of proof known as the *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments, and sets them in fresh strength and beauty as pillars of theistic faith.' <sup>1</sup>

### (7) *Intuition*

As regards the argument from Intuition, there is little to add, from modern sources, to the sketch already given.<sup>2</sup> That which is as earnestly repudiated by one class of Theists as affirmed by another, can never become a universal ground of belief. Yet it merits something more than the thoughtless contempt with which it is often spurned by naturalism. There are, certainly, good reasons for agreeing with Dr. Caldecott that 'mysticism is as illegitimately separatist as empiricism is: the empiricist can see only things mundane and holds that all else is illusion: the mystic claims that we can enter into the supermundane sphere, and that it is only then that we have quitted illusion and found reality. We urge that both of these separations are illegitimate and must be repudiated.'<sup>3</sup> Yet it should be instructive, as Prof. James has pointed out in his *Gifford Lectures*, to examine and estimate aright those workings of the human mind which have been

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 142. For a further development of this argument, see presently under ch. v., 'The Larger Monotheism.'

<sup>2</sup> See p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 142.



to many—and these by no means unintelligent or insincere—the main grounds of a high morality and a real spirituality. Perhaps all that we can do is to listen carefully to the voices on either side, and endeavour to accord them equal justice. The following appear to be the chief elements of the case.

(i) We are bound to acknowledge, as already intimated, that all truth and reality are not to be attained by purely logical processes. It may indeed be accepted as a theistic axiom that ‘faith which is not rational, is faith which ought to be rejected.’<sup>1</sup> But this does not make every kind and degree of appeal to intuition irrational. Whilst the simple affirmation by the same writer, that ‘the opinion that man has an intuition or immediate perception of God is untenable; the opinion that he has an immediate feeling of God is absurd,’ has no more decisive value than any ordinary assertion of opinion, We are not seldom reminded, as by Prof. Fraser,<sup>2</sup> that theistic faith is the condition of all proof, being itself incapable of scientific proof. ‘Did you deduce your own being?’ asks Coleridge. ‘Even this is less absurd than the conceit of deducing the Divine Being. Never would you have had the notion, had you not had the idea.’ This is at least as true as Dr. McTaggart’s academic pronouncement, above mentioned, that ‘the only way of coming to any conclusion on matters of religious dogma’—including the existence of God—‘is by means of metaphysical arguments,’<sup>3</sup> so that ‘we are thus driven to the con-

<sup>1</sup> Flint, *Theism*, pp. 83, 85.      <sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, pp. 291, 293.

clusion that, whether any religion is true or not, most people have no right to accept any religion as true.' Against such a dogma of irreligion, protest may well be made in the name of all reality. There is both room and reason for the counter-statement of Dr. Bowne, that however instructive and disciplinary for beginners the 'method of rigour and vigour' may be, 'it is a traditional superstition of intellect that nothing is to be accepted which is not either self-evident or demonstrated.'<sup>1</sup>

Hereupon, the late Prof. Romanes supplies us once again with a significant biographical note. Referring to his early 'undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions,' he says frankly, 'Never was any one more arrogant in his claims for pure reason than I was—more arrogant in spirit though not in letter, this being due to contact with science—without ever considering how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his other and higher faculties.'<sup>2</sup> Any attempt to minify the reasoned candour of such a testimony from a distinguished man of science, on the ground of failing powers through illness, is as false in fact as irrelevant in application.<sup>3</sup> If the argument from intuition served no other purpose than as a rational bulwark against the tyranny of logic and the encroachments of mechanism, it would be alike valuable and timely.

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 101.

<sup>3</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 518.

¶(ii) There is no scientific or philosophical disproof of the assumption that the divine so far inheres in the human as to make intuition possible. The only valid disproof, indeed, of such an assumption, would be the complete demonstration of atheism. Which is, in the nature of the case, impossible. With all rightful precaution against subjective illusion, we may not conclude that the mystical is always necessarily the vacuous. Let it but be granted—and who can intelligently deny it?—that the inner mikrokosm of the human spirit is as complex as indefinable, and Prof. Tiele's significant words find ample sphere.<sup>1</sup> 'The origin of religion consists in the fact that man has the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it.'

Two things, surely, one may here insist upon, as being beyond controversy. First, that come whence and how they may, human nature is capable of, and in its best specimens does exhibit, an appreciation of and devotion to the true, the beautiful, and the good, which contain the very essence of what we cannot but deem to be worthy of God. And secondly, that it is this highest reach of human development, this crowning moral excellence of human nature, which has to be accounted for, alike in its origination, its persistence, and its promise. To ascribe all this to the blind necessity of the mindless clash of atoms in a suppositional protyle, is but the mockery of reason. If such be the best answer that naturalism can give to our earnest inquiry, its philosophical inanity needs no further demonstration. For sheer relief of mind no less than for assurance of heart, we turn to such

<sup>1</sup> See Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 78.

a rationale of the facts as Prof. Upton supplies in his *Hibbert Lectures*<sup>1</sup>: 'Were it not for the immanence of the Infinite Love in our spirits, the higher forms of human affection, with their marvellous power of annihilating all self-seeking, would be unknown. All these considerations powerfully endorse the intuitive judgement which we cannot help forming, that our finite life, and the life of all finite energies and finite minds, is immediately dependent on and indivisibly connected with that Universal Self-existing Life which in the case of self-conscious man, reveals itself in such ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness as immediately assert in the soul their universal character and their absolute worth.'

(iii) The belief in God which, generally speaking, humanity exhibits, has two characteristics meriting here definite reaffirmation, viz. ethical value and intuitional basis. If it be too much to infer the direct intuition of the divine from the relativity of knowledge, as some Theists suggest,<sup>2</sup> yet neither the reality, nor the potency for good, of the popular intuitive reverence for the divine, can be honestly denied. 'It would be overwhelmingly ludicrous,' says Dr. Bowne, 'to require the mass of men to think for themselves.'<sup>3</sup> So far as thinking implies metaphysical argumentation, undoubtedly

<sup>1</sup> p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> 'The finite, if we take it alone, is as inconceivable as the infinite if we take it alone. I maintain, therefore, that we have a positive knowledge of the Infinite. Whosoever says that the Infinite cannot be known, contradicts himself, for he must possess a notion of it before he can deny that he has a positive knowledge of it.'—Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, p. 138.

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 22.

both he and Dr. McTaggart are right. 'The great majority of men must follow some other road.' But what road can they follow, save that of intuition? When it is asserted that the intellect of the community is the only safe standard for them to follow, it amounts much rather to a confirmation than a denial of the reality of divine intuition, as an element in the consciousness of humanity. For the intellect of the community is but the aggregate of the minds of individuals, and in matters of moral conviction there must plainly be not only an appeal, but something to appeal to. It is never true to say

We needs must love the highest when we see it,

unless there be something in the 'we' which makes the highest high at all. Poetry can never be highest to a dog, nor self-denial to a libertine. If this something be not, at all events initially, an intuition of the divine, it rests with naturalism not only to find for it a truer source, but also to bestow upon it a better name.

Nor do all the much-belaboured malevolences of religion—which are after all nothing more than its by-products—justify the common underestimate of the ethical worth of theistic faith, in the course of human history and the constitution of civilization. There is, for instance, neither misleading nor exaggeration in such an avowal as this: 'The power of theistic belief over human nature is such that it has frequently quickened the faculties into more vigorous life. Its moral leverage has been vast; while it has sharpened the aesthetic sense in some of its most delicate per-

ceptions, and in some instances has given a new accession of intellectual power. The intuition which men trust in the dark, gradually leads their whole nature towards the light.’<sup>1</sup> This may be pronounced to be as true on the scale of history, as verifiable every day in experience and observation. The exceptions only bear the same proportion to the rule that lunatics do to the rest of humanity. Certainly, whatever be the moral and social problems of our modern civilization, the reclaiming and uplifting influence of faith in God are always being proved in numberless cases, not one of which can be paralleled in the whole scope of Prof. Haeckel’s naturalistic monism, or Dr. McTaggart’s infallible metaphysics.<sup>2</sup> Yet surely it must be owned as a moral axiom that ‘error cannot permanently educate. No illusion can survive as an elevating power over humanity.’<sup>3</sup> The same learned author who claims the right to prophesy, from the standpoint of modern knowledge, that ‘the number of people who wish to hold a religion but are unable to do so, will become larger’<sup>4</sup>—also adds, with commendable candour,—‘And this will increase the amount of human suffering.’ Probably a more pertinent or more typical illustration could not be suggested, than that all the ‘converted’ soldiers and officers of the Salvation Army, should be put back where they were when that instrument of belief found them, and treat their wives and children as they were then accustomed

<sup>1</sup> Knight, *Aspects*, &c., p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance, merely as specimens, the record of a year’s work at any of the great Christian Missions in London, Manchester, Newcastle, &c.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Some Dogmas*, &c., p. 293.

to do, until naturalism similarly 'saved' them, by means of the assurance that without metaphysical demonstration all thought of the divine was but a delusion. The mental suffering voiced by many cultured doubters, would also serve, only too pathetically, for the refined echo of all grosser forms of irreligious unhappiness.

The high intellectual authority just referred to, says feelingly, 'It is sad, but I do not know why it should be thought strange' that we should lose religion, 'almost the best of all earthly things'—through not knowing how to argue it metaphysically. But will he tell us of any one of life's other best realities which comes to us through this same channel? If love, to wit, be part of religion, it is also mercifully part of human life. Does it, then, enter into our experience, either in the romance or the routine of our daily environment, through metaphysical demonstration? If the statement be true that 'no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study,'<sup>1</sup>—it is every whit as true if 'loving' be here substituted for 'religious.' And then we may indeed add, in the writer's own words, 'The result is sufficiently serious.' It is. For a loveless world would be hell. But every loving heart, and every home in which love abounds, laughs to scorn such an idol of the schools as that love can only be justified by metaphysics. The suggestion of an unargued, intuitive conviction that God is, that He is love, that He is near, may be, as Sir Oliver Lodge says, 'a marvellous and bewildering thought.' But it is with undeniable warrant that he

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 292.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1906, p. 658.



adds, 'This is the truth which has been reverberating down the ages ever since Christ; it has been the hidden inspiration of saint, apostle, prophet, martyr, and, in however dim and vague a form, has given hope and consolation to the unlettered and poverty-stricken millions.' When all that this includes is fairly considered, one is disposed to think that the truest word in this recent would-be nemesis of faith by metaphysics, is this: 'Once more, if our interest is for the happiness of mankind, we may console ourselves with the reflection that the large majority of men, while human nature remains what it is, are not likely to give up traditional opinions merely on the ground that they have no logical right to hold them.'<sup>1</sup> Truly they would be foolish if they did, in this case. To give up love because it cannot be psychologically defined, or logically proved, would be but moral insanity.

(iv) Upon the whole, it may be freely conceded that the argument from intuition cannot alone bear the burden of a valid theistic faith. But this is seldom claimed for it. Perhaps Mr. Lilly represents at once the most and the least that can be urged on its behalf. 'Mysticism is the proper complement of Rational Theism; its office is to point from the phenomenal to the noumenal, from that which seems to that which is. It is based upon what I take leave to call the indubitable fact, that the spirit of man comes into contact with a Higher Spirit whose manifestations carry with them their own proof, and are moral in

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 295.

their nature, are out of time and place, enlightening, purifying.' <sup>1</sup>

Or it may be put as Prof. Knight earnestly suggests: 'It is not that we, the members of the human race, cannot rid ourselves of the notion of the Infinite, but that the Infinite cannot by any possibility quit its hold of us.' <sup>2</sup> In the degree in which that can be realized as true, it becomes indeed the one anchor of the soul both sure and steadfast, beyond words, above logic, the vision of a Holy Grail which comes to those who truly seek, but is manifest ever to the eyes of a pure heart, rather than to the cynical peering of an audacious intellect. There remains, therefore, good reason for saying that 'to dislodge the Theist from his stronghold, the Agnostic must succeed in proving that the theistic intuition is as baseless and unauthenticated as a dream.' <sup>3</sup> And that is as far as ever from being accomplished. In spite of all the reiterated difficulties of faith, both metaphysical and practical, belief in God forms still an unmeasured part of the life of humanity.

### (8) *The Psychological Argument*

The effect of modern thought and life upon the psychological argument as outlined above, is rather practical than intellectual. It arises more from larger

<sup>1</sup> *The Great Enigma*, p. 255.

<sup>2</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 117. Compare Heb. ii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

liberty of speech than from increase of knowledge. On the one hand the sense of dependence is manifest in the growing numbers of Christian churches and congregations throughout this land, whilst there appears to be no serious diminution in the numbers of devotees of other religions throughout the world. The expression of Augustine, 'My God, Thou hast made me for Thyself, and I am restless until I find rest in Thee,' may be articulate in the comparatively few, but it is as real as inarticulate in the many. The assertions of non-theists or anti-theists, loudly made whenever opportunity offers, that Christian Theism is dying out and the need of religion no longer felt, now that the air reverberates with the magic word 'evolution,' are merely the expression of the wish of those who make them. The consciousness of the average individual human being 'that his individuality is in no way self-existent, and that he is compelled by the necessity of thought to think of himself as dependent on that which is absolutely real'<sup>1</sup>—is as deep as ever in myriads of minds, both cultured and uncultured.<sup>2</sup> Naturalists apart, it may be said with truth that philosophy never voiced more definitely or more insistently than now, the yearning of the normal human soul for an object of trust and love and worship Who shall be at once personal, infinite, morally worthy, and directly accessible.<sup>3</sup> The truth concerning the

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 223.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Sir Oliver Lodge concludes his *Romanes Lecture* (*Modern Views on Matter*, p. 27), with the affirmation that even concerning the material universe, 'when we know it, the truth will be such as to elicit feelings of reverent awe and adoration.'

<sup>3</sup> 'Religion is not an arbitrary product of the soul. Even in

attitude of vast numbers of the people who are to-day, we know, practically outside the churches, is not that they have become definitely irreligious, still less anti-religious, but that other influences tend increasingly to reduce to a practical minimum their thought of God and sense of dependence upon Him. These influences are in the main threefold.

(i) The ever-intensifying struggle for existence on the part of the great majority of modern populations, through the increasing complexities of international commerce, and under the pressure of unchecked competition. Hence it comes to pass that to-day, in spite of the accumulation of enormous wealth, every civilized nation has an appalling and increasing number of those whose energies are inevitably and almost wholly expended upon one engrossing task, viz. the labour of obtaining food, clothing, and shelter.

(ii) As to those who have time and opportunity for something more than bodily needs, the unmeasured development and influence of education have poured such a veritable flood of new conceptions, ideals, and problems into the world, as tends to submerge all else. Thus literature and science, politics and civic interests, sensationalism and extravagance, sports and excitements, to say nothing of indubitable moral evils, all combine to form an atmosphere in which it is more and more difficult for the human instinct after the highest to preserve its vitality. Ineradicable it may be, as witness the religious potentialities of

the lowest and poorest religions we see something struggling into consciousness—a want, a desire, a need—which is not measured by the extent of its actual knowledge of the divine.’—Dr. Orr, *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 112.

childhood. But as even the best seed may die in a barren soil, or be choked by thorns and briars, so may the religious instinct die of atrophy, or be trampled down in the rush of civilized animalism.

(iii) Another potent influence, developing now more rapidly than ever before, is the ceaseless propaganda of an energetic minority of anti-theists, who, as Atheists, or Secularists, or Agnostics, or sometimes as Socialists, spare no pains to make everything theistic appear irrational. Their main endeavour is, as one of them expresses it, 'to sweep away at once and for ever the whole tottering structure of conventional religion and worship.' With all the facilities now at their command through an ever-cheapening press, it would be strange indeed if vast numbers of ordinary folk, into whose ears these negations are continually dinned, were not to a very real extent affected.

From these sources in their indescribable co-operations springs the oft-reported religious indifference of our time, with its loss of the sense of sin, and neglect, without compunction, of public worship. To say, however, that this kind and degree of superficial indifference means that the modern world is turning from Theism to Atheism, so as to demonstrate that human nature in general has no need of 'the God hypothesis,' is simply false. Effective religious literature also abounds to a greater extent than ever, and, whether it be orthodox or heterodox, at least testifies to the reality, the potency, and the inextinguishableness of the religious instinct. Whether we need a new theology or not, it is only the blindness of fact-proof prejudice which can proclaim the world of to-day to be generally tending

to Atheism or even Agnosticism. The average modern Englishman is still as religious at heart as the ancient Peruvian.<sup>1</sup> The popular boast of the anti-Christian propagandist that he has no religious thought or care,<sup>2</sup> can be estimated in several ways. As Dr. Jevons says, "The realm of music and the world of art can scarcely be pronounced illusions in order to gratify the stone-deaf or the colour-blind, who cannot believe, or wish not to believe, in the existence of what they cannot appreciate."<sup>3</sup> The 'human cry'<sup>4</sup> will not cease because a certain section of humanity prefer to revert to the dumbness of the lower animals.

The whole case, therefore, as regards what is termed the psychological argument, is fairly expressed in the words of Dr. W. N. Clarke: 'Religion is natural to man,

<sup>1</sup> 'O Pachamac, Thou who hast existed from the beginning and shalt exist unto the end, powerful and pitiful, who createst man by saying "Let man be"; who defendest us from evil and preservest our life and health; art Thou in the sky or in the earth, in the clouds or in the depths? Hear the voice of him who implores Thee, and grant him his petitions. Give him life everlasting, preserve us and accept this our sacrifice.'—Prayer of the ancient Peruvians: see G. L. Brace's *Unknown God*, p. 321.

<sup>2</sup> 'I never pray, nor feel the need of praying' (*God and my Neighbour*, by R. Blatchford, p. 81). The worth of such a sentiment, and the natural sequence between the first and second clause, may be exhibited in a moment, by applying it to any other wise or necessary habit, such as reading or thinking.

<sup>3</sup> *Religion in Evolution*, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> See Tennyson's *Poems*, p. 533. How far a man may make himself callous to all higher feeling or deeper emotion by persistently ignoring or dismissing it, is sufficiently illustrated in the well-known case of Darwin himself. 'It is an accursed evil to a man to become so absorbed in any object as I am in mine. I cannot endure to read a line of poetry; I have tried lately to read Shakespeare and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures or music.'—*Life and Letters*, i. 101; ii. 139.

and practically universal. It does not wait for proof of the existence of God ; it springs up from an intuitive sense of unseen realities. Man looks upward and prays ; he thus bears testimony to his sense of dependence and obligation ; he thus recognizes a power and an authority above him ; and he thus assumes that there is some one to whom his prayer may properly be addressed. Religion may be crude and superstitious, and the object of worship unknown and misjudged, but the universal impulse and practice declare that religion belongs to the nature of man, and so far suggest that there is a Being above man for him to worship. Thus the very constitution of man implies, as a correlative, the existence of a God whom he may worthily address in prayer.' <sup>1</sup> Whatever name be found for such religious instinct, it is as ineradicable and potent an element of human nature, as it is conspicuously absent from all other animal nature.

(9) *The Consent of Mankind* ( ' e consensu gentium ' )

It may be freely acknowledged that the argument for Theism from the general consent of mankind, has not gained much through our wider knowledge of the world and our larger acquaintance with comparative religion, beyond the fact, universally confirmed, that man is unquestionably a religious animal. Yet it would be quite untrue to assume that it has lost all its significance and no longer merits regard. It has never

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Theology*, p. 118.



been urged as a primary argument, nor is there any disposition to-day so to employ it. But its worth as a subsidiary testimony confirmatory of other considerations, is by no means reduced to nothing, as a brief statement of the present attitude in regard to it may show.

(i) The issue in cheap form of Mr. J. S. Mill's *Three Essays on Religion*, containing his contemptuous dismissal<sup>1</sup> of this argument, has undoubtedly influenced not a few. But for those who will fairly face the replies to it,<sup>2</sup> such effect is insignificant. The semi-sneer that 'to see in this blunder of primitive ignorance the hand of the Supreme Being implanting in his creatures an instinctive knowledge of his existence, is a poor compliment to the Deity,'<sup>3</sup> is sufficiently met by Mr. Spencer, when, in reply to the suggestion that all derivatives from a false primitive belief must themselves be false, he says, 'Unexpected as it will be by most readers, the answer here to be made, is, that at the outset a germ of truth was contained in the primitive conception.'<sup>4</sup> It does not follow, of course, that the germinal truth was precisely as Mr. Spencer states it;<sup>5</sup> the important fact is the acknowledgement of a germ of truth, with potentiality for development into larger

<sup>1</sup> pp. 67, 70.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Flint's *Theism*, pp. 348-50, &c.

<sup>3</sup> p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, p. 659.

<sup>5</sup> 'Namely, the truth that the power which manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond consciousness.' This will come under consideration presently.

following truths. Seeing that the evolutionist everywhere requires only a germ from which to proceed, it ought to be with him rather a matter of expectation than surprise, that the idea of God should become both universal and highly developed. To say, indeed, that 'the final outcome of the speculation commenced by the primitive man, is that the Power manifested throughout the universe, distinguished as material, is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness,' is a mixture of misstatement with unwarranted assumption. Yet it points to the fact that the immanence of God as the Supreme Spirit, is traceable back to the first efforts of earliest human beings to feel after God 'if haply they might find Him,'<sup>1</sup> as no other creature on earth has ever done, or shows the least sign of doing. When man emerged from the animal, his first cry was for God as surely, even if as inarticulately, as the new-born babe's first cry is really for parental love and care.

But here, as ever, the worth and significance of the germ must be judged by its after development. As Mr. Spencer himself says: 'Without seeming so, the development of religious sentiment has been continuous from the beginning; and its nature when a germ was the same as is its nature when fully developed.'<sup>2</sup> So that what has to be accounted for, even at the beginning, is not the grovelling of a fetish worshipper, but the theistic conception, the moral standard, the spiritual yearning, of a Martineau, a Gladstone, a Paul, a Christ. To grow an oak we require an acorn, but the acorn is only of avail because it has the oak

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvii. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Study of Sociology*, p. 310.

already potential in its heart. Whence it is, after all, the oak which has to be explained. As Archimedes said, 'Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum strong enough, and I will move the world,' so may the evolutionist here say, 'Give me a germ true enough, and a potentiality full enough, and I will explain the noblest religions of mankind.' But who will give him these? Assuredly not the mechanical necessity of naturalism.

(ii) It is well known that Lord Avebury has endeavoured to show that there are peoples wholly without religious ideas, feelings, or practices. This is a question of history, beyond the pale of discussion here.<sup>1</sup> The judgements of Profs. Tiele and Tylor, already given,<sup>2</sup> must be taken as sufficient. It is at least beyond controversy, that the exceptions here emphasize the rule, and the rule is that which constitutes the matter for discussion.

(iii) The attempt to exhibit Buddhism as a proof that vast portions of the human race have been and are con-

<sup>1</sup> See Flint's *Theism*, pp. 259-82. Also Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 106.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 61 above. When Mr. Fiske says, 'Travellers have now and then reported the existence of races of men quite destitute of religion or of what the observer has learned to recognize as religion, but no one has ever discovered a race of men devoid of a belief in ghosts' (*The Idea of God*, p. 66), the force of his remark is quite obscured by the employment of the term 'ghosts,' which now has fallen into irreparable disrepute. Its real significance is much more clearly seen in Prof. Tylor's words—'We have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance; whereas the assertion or absence of such belief, must apply to either ancient tribes or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones' (*Primitive Culture*, p. 425).

tent with atheism, is beyond all honest maintenance.<sup>1</sup> Nor is there any more truth in the representation that Buddhism has triumphed as atheism, than in the common notion expressed in the words of Schopenhauer, 'It must be a satisfaction to find my teaching in such agreement with a religion professed by the majority of men.'<sup>2</sup> This notion of the majority of mankind as being Buddhists and therefore atheists, however industriously propagated by anti-theists, is doubly untrue. They are not the majority, and they are not atheists. In addition to other witnesses,<sup>3</sup> a competent observer has quite recently pointed out that 'the entire number of true Buddhists in the world cannot be reckoned as much above one hundred millions.'<sup>4</sup> Whilst Dr. Fairbairn's reference to the case is borne out by all thorough study of the facts. 'Buddhism has been cited as an illustration of how a highly and potently ethical faith can exist not only without a personal God, but even without any deity whatever. Such citation however, is essentially incorrect; for nothing could be farther than the soul or system of the

<sup>1</sup> For fuller proof of this than is here possible, see Flint's *Theism*, pp. 282-8; Fairbairn, *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 250-64; Dr. Murray Mitchell, *The Great Religions of India*, pp. 200-4. So too Dr. Copleston, speaking from personal knowledge as Bishop of Colombo, says (*Buddhism, Primitive and Present*, p. 478): 'To what extent in each instance the thought in the mind is the idea of a single supreme God, it is difficult to say. But that the idea is personal, there can be no doubt whatever. The living Buddhist does as a fact believe in personal Deity; and herein his belief is better than his creed.'

<sup>2</sup> See *Great Religions of the World* (Harpers), p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 544.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Murray Mitchell, *The Great Religions of India*, p. 174.

Buddha from what we mean by atheism.’<sup>1</sup> The truth might rather be summed up by saying that Buddhism has been chiefly disseminated and maintained by its popular belief in many gods and its apotheosis of Buddha as the chief supreme among them. Buddhism, at its best and utmost, is the cult of ‘our Lord Buddha.’

(iv) Emphasis is not seldom laid upon the fact that many great men have been, if not avowed atheists, at least such thorough agnostics as to destroy all thought of the need or value of theistic faith for the production of noble character. The days have happily passed when men of faith indiscriminately accused unbelievers of moral depravity because of their unfaith. But it is certainly significant that—as Mr. Harris points out<sup>2</sup>—out of the 543 men and women whom Comte singled out in his Positivist calendar, as being ‘the salt of the earth,’ ninety per cent. were convinced believers in supernatural religion, and of the rest very few carried their scepticism so far as seriously to doubt the existence of a God.’ When Dr. McTaggart asserts that ‘those who deny a personal God were never so numerous as at present,’ it is a fair and sufficient reply that it may well be so, seeing that the numbers of those who believe in Him are also more numerous than ever. But that the proportion of convinced atheists—which is the point in question—is becoming such as to affect the general truth that the human heart as a whole cries out for God, is as untrue as the cognate assertion that ‘the great

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 242.

<sup>2</sup> *Pro Fide*, p. 108.

majority of the race have for ever abandoned Christianity.' <sup>1</sup> As matter of fact the churches of Great Britain never had so many members and adherents ; whilst foreign missionary efforts were never so vigorous or influential or promising. The simple truth is that they are to-day only embarrassed by their own success.

Whilst, therefore, Theism is ever prepared to pay all proper respect to any man, learned or unlearned, who has honestly formed an anti-theistic conclusion, it cannot regard such special cases as affecting the general fact that the religious instinct is real, universal, ineradicable, potential for the highest. Mr. Spencer's words, written thirty years ago, have lost none of their force in the interim. ' No one need expect, then, that the religious consciousness will die away, or will change the lines of its evolution. Its specialities of form, once strongly marked and becoming less distinct during past mental progress, will continue to fade ; but the substance of the consciousness will persist. That the object-matter can be replaced by another object-matter, as supposed by those who think that the ' Religion of Humanity ' will be the religion of the future, is a belief countenanced neither by induction nor by deduction.' <sup>2</sup>

(v) On the other hand, the positive facts which testify to the immeasurable hold which religion in general, and Theism—even Christian Theism—in particular, have upon the mind and heart of mankind, are too many and too far-reaching to be here exhibited. Many representative summaries might be given which

<sup>1</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> *The Study of Sociology*, p. 311.

merit entire respect. So far as regards the past, Mr. Fiske speaks only the truth when he says that 'religion, ushered upon the scene coeval with the birth of humanity, has played such a dominant part in the subsequent evolution of society, that what history would be without it is quite beyond imagination. None can deny that it is the largest and most ubiquitous fact connected with the existence of mankind upon the earth.'<sup>1</sup> For which reason it is quite accurate to affirm that 'the facts from which the Science of Religion proceeds, are not facts of merely individual experience, but of the common experience of mankind.' Thus 'the testimony of the Science of Religion is that belief in God is simply ineradicable.'<sup>2</sup>

As for the future of theistic belief, the desire of those who are working so earnestly for its extinction, is undoubtedly doomed to disappointment. Modifications there may be, and ought to be, but it is no shallow optimism which can affirm deliberately in the fierce light of the present that 'after two hundred years of almost continuous criticism, supernatural faith, in spite of a certain amount of unsettlement on particular points of doctrine, remains practically unshaken. In many ways religion seems to be showing greater vitality than ever.'<sup>3</sup> Mr. Spencer's dictum, therefore, that 'religion expresses some eternal fact,' is overwhelmingly corroborated, and supplies in itself sufficient answer to all modern suggestions that 'even the highest religious

<sup>1</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Jevons, *Religion in Evolution*, pp. 43, 127.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Pro Fide*, p. 115.



beliefs are mere useless survivals.' But Mr. E. Crawley puts it more exactly when he says 'the answer is to the effect that religious beliefs are rooted in human nature, from which they are a natural and inevitable growth.'<sup>1</sup>

What shall we say, then, as to the real cause of this enormous fact? Let Mr. Spencer again reply. 'To suppose that these multifarious conceptions of religion should be one and all absolutely groundless, discredits too profoundly that average intelligence from which all our individual intelligences are inherited.'

(vi) It is no part of our present task to enter into the history of the origin and manner of religious development. The fact with which we are concerned remains, viz. that 'both in the race and in the individual it is a normal psychical development from the primal instinct of human nature. From this we infer firstly, that religion in its original form is permanent, that it exists, and always will exist, whether we recognize the fact or not. And in the second place, that its essential concern is with the elemental side of life.'<sup>2</sup> Or if it be preferred in Mr. Spencer's putting—'A religious system is a normal and essential factor in every evolving society.'<sup>3</sup> Now, it is this same philosopher who insists that 'when we inquire what is the meaning of the effects produced in our senses, we are compelled to regard them as the effects of some cause.'<sup>4</sup> Which is undoubtedly true. Only it is still more

<sup>1</sup> See Crawley, *The Tree of Life*, pp. 132, 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup> *Study of Sociology*, p. 313.

<sup>4</sup> *First Principles*, p. 27.

applicable here. For an indestructible element in human nature which is one of the most potent factors in social and moral evolution,<sup>1</sup> there must as assuredly be an adequate cause, as for a noise sounding in our ears, or a vision that floats before our eyes. Such a cause Theism supplies, whilst naturalism can only fall back upon an inevitable involution for which it can find no cause at all, and of which it can offer no explanation whatever.

(vii) The most remarkable illustration that the world has ever seen, at once of the varied nature and undiminished vitality of the religious instinct, was presented a few years since at Chicago, in the Parliament of Religions which assembled in connexion with the World's Fair. No more remarkable collection of writings in the name of religion has ever been put into print, than the two large volumes in which are recorded the contributions of representatives from almost every form of religion on earth. As surely as all the variations in the kaleidoscope testify to the reality of the light, so do all these strong differences of sincere enthusiasm bear witness to the ineradicable depth and indestructible force of the religious faculty in human nature. Dr. Abbott's words on that occasion were as significant as catholic: 'We welcome here to-day in this most cosmopolitan city the representatives of all the various forms of religious life from east to west, and from north to south. We

<sup>1</sup> See Dr. Lyman Abbott's interesting paper, on 'Religion as an Essential Characteristic of Humanity,' at the Chicago Parliament of Religions; vol. i. pp. 494-9.

are glad to welcome them. We are glad to believe that they, as we, have been seeking to know something more and better of the divine from which we come, of the divine to which we are returning. What is it that this universal hunger of the human race seeks? Is it not these things—a better understanding of what we are, and what we mean to be, that we may fashion ourselves according to the idea of the ideal being in our nature, a better appreciation of the Infinite One who is behind all phenomena, material or spiritual? All religions are the result of man's seeking after God. The whole human race seeks to know its eternal and divine Father.' <sup>1</sup> Such a welcome, in the name of Christian Theism, to such an assembly, supplies the most realistic comment upon the saying of Mr. Grant Allen, that 'the world has never really had more than one religion—of many names a single shape.' But still more vividly does it testify to the fact that the world has never had less than one. It is for the honest and earnest student of anthropology to do philosophical justice to a reality at once so unquestionable and so immeasurable.

### (10) *Convergence and Culmination*

One other consideration remains, as above intimated, viz. the effect of the whole, over and above that of each

<sup>1</sup> *The World's Parliament of Religions*, i. 500. These two volumes merit the careful study of every one who desires to know how much force there is in the argument *e consensu gentium*.

of the constituent parts. The foregoing arguments, whatever their individual strength or weakness, all contribute to one conclusion, and for that reason must have cumulative weight. The rejection of one or other of them, is not the refutation of all, much less of the whole plea which they combine to make.

Nor is it enough, as was hinted before, to speak merely of their combined worth. It is necessarily a case of multiplication, not addition. It is not their parallel force, but their convergence to a point, that has to be met and overcome by modern naturalism or agnosticism. 'The influences which awaken and sustain religious life are manifold. These influences affect different minds with different degrees of cogency, and it is to be noted that they rarely operate singly, but generally conspire together in producing a conviction of the being and character of the Absolute and Eternal One. Hence it often happens that stimulants to faith which, if isolated from each other, would fail to give rise to complete satisfaction, may when they blend together prove quite adequate to overcome all negative considerations.'<sup>1</sup>

Kant, we have seen, declared<sup>2</sup> that there were only three ways of establishing the being of God on grounds of reason—the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological. But, with all respect, such a statement may be very misleading. Quite apart from the stress which he laid upon the ethical argument, the question of Prof. Fraser demands answer. 'Does the reason-

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Upton, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> See *Selections from the Liturgy of Theism*, p. 189; and above, p. 38.

ableness of our philosophic interpretation of things not depend upon complex influences, other than those that are determined by the scientific understanding measured by data of sense?''<sup>1</sup> For the 'complex influences' include not only the existence and force of the 'categorical imperative,' but the relations of these four to each other, and to the whole. Thus they cannot but produce a combined effect which can only be dissipated upon the assumption that there is nothing worth regard in any of them.

Three straight lines, we know, may enclose a space, although no two, however real and long, can do so. And even a threefold cord is not quickly broken, unless one or more of the strands is untrustworthy. Much greater, therefore, is the total conclusive force of the reasons for Theism, when it is remembered that here are at least three times three definite considerations which, in their very unlikeness and inequality, are, like the vertebrae of the spine, all the more closely interlocked and mutually strengthened. Dr. Flint's simile is perfectly true and applicable. 'A man, quite unable to break a bundle of rods firmly bound together, may be strong enough to break each rod separately. But before proceeding to deal with the bundle in that way, he may be required to establish his right to untie it, and to decline putting forth his strength upon it as it is presented to him.'<sup>2</sup> The man who professed to represent Beethoven by playing each part separately,

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 74. 'The various theistic arguments are, in a word, but stages in a single rational process, but parts of one comprehensive argument. They are naturally and, as it were, organically

would not be more unfair to the genius of the great composer, than the philosopher who contented himself, and influenced others, by examining and dismissing, seriatim, each particular plea on behalf of Theism.

More especially is there need to urge that the distinct contributions of head and heart, should not only be recognized and appreciated, but combined. Neither alone is a safe guide to the greatest truths. The tendency on the part of so-called Rationalists to dismiss emotion as suspicious and unworthy of regard, is sometimes paralleled by the disposition on the part of religious people to treat intellectual processes as unnecessary. But both procedures are as mischievous as unwarranted.<sup>1</sup> Concerning the relations of mind and heart, it must ever be affirmed that he who does not recognize both, does justice to neither.

It is many years since the late Dr. W. B. Carpenter pointed out, in his *Mental Physiology*, that in science not seldom 'our conclusions rest not on any one set of experiences, but upon our unconscious co-ordination of the whole aggregate of our experience; not on the conclusions of any one train of reasoning, but on the convergence of all our lines of thought toward one centre.' The application of this principle in all matters requiring careful thought, becomes ever more emphatic as knowledge increases. For an instance we may take the relations

related—they support and strengthen one another. It is, therefore, an arbitrary and illegitimate procedure to separate them any further than may be necessary for the purpose of clear and orderly exposition.'

<sup>1</sup> 'The heart must be appealed to and satisfied as well as the head. But not apart from or otherwise than through the head, or the appeal is sophistical and the satisfaction illegitimate.'—Flint's *Theism*, p. 354.

between the teleological and ethical arguments, as outlined above. These, in spite of the weight which attaches to the great name of Kant, are manifestly complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and the later as well as truer attitude is accurately expressed by Mr. Storr when he says: 'We must and habitually do adopt, in the last resort, beliefs which reason can never completely justify. Such is our attitude in the case of the argument from design, an argument which carries with it great weight, and which is strengthened when taken in connexion with other arguments for God's existence. Behind the terms of logical inference, in which the argument is cast, lies the larger conviction, and this will always remain operative despite any explanations which science may give of adaptations in nature.'<sup>1</sup> The reasonableness of such an attitude increasingly commends itself to honest inquiry, both as regards the quantity and the quality of theistic evidences. Probably no better summary of the present position could be submitted than that of Dr. Flint, who, from long scrutiny of the whole case, has earned the right to a respectful hearing. After pointing out that modern influences as applied to the 'proofs' for the divine existence, involve their modification but not rejection, he adds that 'the closeness and character of the connexion of the proofs have also come to be more clearly seen. They are perceived to constitute an organic whole of argument, each of them establishing its separate element and thus contributing to the general result—confirmatory evidence that God is, and complementary evidence as to what God is. The

<sup>1</sup> *Development and Divine Purpose*, p. 269.



explanation of this doubtless is that the apprehension of God is itself an organic whole, a complex and harmonious process, involving all that is essential in the human mind, yet all the constituents of which are so connected that they may be embraced in a single act and coalesce into one grand issue.<sup>1</sup>

### *Concluding Summary*

The weight and worth of all arguments for Theism, however presented, must in the end be left to each man's own mind and heart. Belief is always and necessarily a function of a personality. No mere animal, no pure automaton, can ever believe anything. As the act of a person, belief can never be brought to pass by any kind of compulsion. Even if there were, in regard to any fact or proposition, such quantity and quality of evidence as would appear to make rejection of it rationally impossible, it would still be possible for any real personality so to manipulate or disregard the evidence as to remain unconvinced.<sup>2</sup> Such a possibility of either appreciating or ignoring evidence, yielding to or resisting its rightful force, constitutes the very essence of moral responsibility. As a matter of morality, all the evidence there is, *ought*

<sup>1</sup> *Agnosticism*, p. 589.

<sup>2</sup> So, truly says Prof. Curtis, 'A man of sanity, intelligence, and entire honesty, can follow the process of theistic evidence step by step and yet not be convinced that there is a personal God.'—*The Christian Faith*, p. 97.

to be fairly and fully accepted at its truest. But such an 'ought' expresses also the sacredness of a personal right, as to which no man can claim to judge another. Here, therefore, we must leave the present plea. Nothing remains but to suggest a summary of the main points which rationally merit plain reiteration.

(i) Theism does not claim to demonstrate the being of God, or to give absolute proofs of His existence. Prof. Curtis says truly that 'the word "demonstration," when exactly used, means an argument of such cogency as to compel any one who understands the process to accept the conclusion. In this exact sense, the theistic argument is not a demonstration.'<sup>1</sup> In the face of such a problem, 'deduction of the rigour and vigour type is impossible and absurd in our human conditions.'<sup>2</sup> To give good reasons for belief, is a very different thing from attempting resistless demonstration. What Theism seeks to show, is, 'that the order of the world cannot be understood without intelligence as its cause, and that reason itself falls into discord and despair without God.'<sup>3</sup> Thus the whole purpose of Theism is attained if it can be shown that, on the principles of reason, a man ought to believe in God. Such a result supplies a rational justification for some well-known words in the New Testament which have been all too long misrepresented in the archaic English of pulpits,<sup>4</sup> equally by putting

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Faith*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 321.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> Mark xvi. 16, Revised Version. How any educated and thoughtful Christian can go on reading in public in these days, as, alas! many

every man into the crucible of his own responsibility, and by leaving him there. If there could be absolute demonstration, there would be no room left for theistic belief. Demonstration manifestly commands assent. Rational evidence simply asks for it. Belief implies that room has been left for the play of moral character.

(ii) Theism does not for a moment assume or suggest a complete and final conception of God. When, for instance, on the grounds of idealism it is asserted that 'all things must exist for God, must be eternally present in the mind of God,' the question necessarily arises, 'What do we mean by present? What do we mean by the thought of God?' Then, it is best, as Dr. Rashdall says, 'to confess frankly that we do not know.'<sup>1</sup> And this is but the modern putting of the ancient agnosticism which is so forcibly expressed in the Book of Job, and has been echoed by every reverent thinker from that day to this. The truth concerning the attitude of Theism, in this regard, to-day, cannot be better expressed than in Mr. Fiske's words, in which latest science is represented no less than valid philosophy. 'Though we may not by searching find out God, though we may not compass infinitude or attain to absolute knowledge, we may at least know all that it concerns us to know, as

do, that 'he that believeth not shall be damned,' passes comprehension. Apart from the employment of language which resistless custom has now made coarse and malignant, a moment's reflection shows that disbelief differs by a whole morality from mere unbelief. The point to be emphasized is moral action, upon which all judgement must ever turn.

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 22,

intelligent and responsible beings. They who seek to know more than this, to transcend the conditions under which alone knowledge is possible, are, in Goethe's profound language, as wise as little children who when they have looked into a mirror turn it around to see what is behind it.'<sup>1</sup> No agnosticism is at once more real and reverent, than that which lies in the very heart of theistic faith.

(iii) Theism, again, certainly necessitates no quarrel with science, as such. All it asks is, that there should be fairly recognized the division of territory between science and philosophy. 'The former traces the uniformities of order in experience, the latter deals with their meaning and causation. Both inquiries are necessary to the full satisfaction of the mind and the complete mastery of experience.'<sup>2</sup> So long as science is purely scientific, it cannot, as Huxley so often insisted, conflict with Theism. When exact science and theistic philosophy are each true to their own tasks, there can be no more collision between them than between two trains which approach one another on different lines of rail. 'Theism is content to affirm a divine causality in the world, and leaves it to science to discover the modes of its operation.'<sup>3</sup>

(iv) But Theism is bound in self-defence to assert that it rests on quite as valid foundations as the best-known scientific theories. Its postulates are as reliable,

<sup>1</sup> *The Idea of God*, pref., p. xxix.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*]

and its induction as wide. If the acknowledged impossibility of demonstration should ever be alleged against theistic conclusions, it is quite sufficient to point out that in regard to the facts of the universe with which science has to deal, such as time, space, matter, motion, gravitation, life, and our own self-consciousness, 'every one of them, if we only think out our conception of it, is quite as self-contradictory as the theologian's conception of God' may seem to some minds to be.<sup>1</sup> The notion industriously disseminated by some who profess to be teachers, that science is solving one by one the riddles of the universe,<sup>2</sup> is entirely untrue from the philosophical standpoint. Not only are all the ultimates of being untouched, let alone unsolved, in their mystery, but it may be stated as an unvarying rule, that the more 'simple' things are, in the reality through which we know them, the less expressible or explicable are they in terms of logic or in forms of speech.

So that when any or all of the difficulties considered above as obstructing the way of faith, are pressed home upon the student until he becomes, like Darwin in later years, sometimes 'hopelessly muddled,' he

<sup>1</sup> Mallock, *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 247. The self-contradiction which Mr. Mallock imagines that he shows in regard to Theism, need not be acknowledged, for the simple reason that it is not true. But the position he here adopts is quite sound, viz., that no amount of mystery or inscrutability, in regard to the being or nature of God, can consistently be deduced in the name of modern science as valid ground for the philosophical rejection of Theism. As he himself adds, a few pages later: 'We need only under Mr. Spencer's guidance meditate for a quarter of an hour, and a half-penny becomes as unthinkable as the theologian's God' (p. 255).

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 572.

may at least be requested to remember that the very same result can be obtained, at any time, from the application of the same processes to the simplest and surest of scientific hypotheses—such for instance as the law of gravitation—which are continually taken for granted as working certainties. ‘It is not, therefore, without good warrant that Dr. Tigert says, at the close of his volume on this theme,<sup>1</sup> that ‘as against the atheist and the materialist, I must add that the argument for the existence of God is of the same kind and the same cogency as the argument for the existence of man.’ The reverent Theist acknowledges, as freely as any sincere agnostic, that ‘no man hath beheld God at any time.’ But if the attempt be ever made to infer therefrom that God is not, because the eye of the mind can no more view Him than the body’s eye can scan the universe, it is the duty of the Theist to point out, that, on precisely the same principles, it must be confessed that no man hath at any time beheld man. If in the lesser case the inference is intolerable, it is no less unreliable in the former.

(v) Such negative warrant, however, by no means expresses the whole theistic plea. Modern agnostics sometimes say that they ‘would really like to know the intellectual position of “educated theists.”’<sup>2</sup> It is rather a curious attitude in view of the number of works—quite as intelligent, sincere, and well informed, as any

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, p. 340.

<sup>2</sup> *Literary Guide* for February 1, 1906, in which under a wholesale and entirely untrue charge of ‘misrepresentation,’ in regard to *Haeckel’s Monism False*, the writer expresses the opinion that ‘a great opportunity has been lost.’

on the opposite side,<sup>1</sup> already issued upon this great subject. Still, one need not hesitate to reiterate such position once again, for sheer truth's sake. It is, in the succinct words of Dr. Bowne—himself a fair type of a modern and intellectual Theist—that ‘when these points,’ in the careful statement of Theism, ‘are duly regarded, atheism will appear in its crudity and baselessness; and science and religion will be seen to have their common justification in Theism.’<sup>2</sup> In shortest summary, Theists are such because Theism is more philosophical than any other theory of the universe. This is, of course, not a mere dogmatic asseveration on their part, but a reasoned plea. ‘When we look upon the universe,’ says Prof. Curtis, ‘as a problem to be explained, then the theistic argument grants us the most rational explanation of that problem from the standpoint of our personal experience.’<sup>3</sup> And seeing that, in Huxley’s phrase once more, our personal experience is ‘our one mental certainty,’ we can scarcely have a better standpoint for the discovery of truth. Prof. Ward, indeed, affirms that ‘religion and philosophy had worked their way to the sublime idea of a Supreme Being, the intelligent First Cause and Substance of all things, long before science had accomplished its laborious task of abstractly formulating these things in terms of matter and motion.’<sup>4</sup> Yes, but why? Because intelligence preceded philosophy, as really as philosophy preceded science. The ego, knowing itself to be not a chaos, but a mikrokosm, looked

<sup>1</sup> See Bibliography at the end.

<sup>2</sup> p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> *The Christian Faith*, p. 97.

<sup>4</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 265.



forth upon a non-ego which it also saw to be a makrokosm. Sanity served for philosophy, and waited for science to confirm the verdict that the intelligible could only come from intelligence. That which required mind to appreciate, required mind to bring to pass. In face of all the accumulated knowledge of the last two centuries, we may boldly affirm that such a position is neither open to rational denial, nor to philosophic modification. Let one with greater competence express it in modern language: 'And when this vaunted formulation of all nature is complete, and we are enabled to conceive a mechanism, intelligible therefore, though not intelligent in working, but too inert ever to start, or alter, or stop itself, how then can the questions we have asked be evaded? And if they cannot, what answer is there but that which philosophy and religion would give?'<sup>1</sup> Theism avows that there is none.<sup>2</sup> Is it, therefore, any wonder that Mr. Fiske, as another educated Theist, should say that 'nothing can persuade us that the

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 266.

<sup>2</sup> For emphasis, *per contra*, one has only to turn to the latest utterances of the naturalist school as exhibited in the works of Prof. Haeckel and his friends. This has been done critically in *Haeckel's Monism False*. As to the only reply made, viz. the charge of misquotation, all the references are given, so that the reader has only to see and judge for himself. A succinct and trenchant summary of 'the natural history of popular atheism,' is given by Dr. Bowne in his *Theism*, p. 119. Its critical perusal will show not only that there is no 'misrepresentation' in it, but that, in terms as true as terse, the naturalistic philosophy as opposed to the theistic may be thus summed up: 'The appeal to chance is vacated by all the principles of rational thinking. The explanation by law and mechanism is tautological. The atheistic solution has no positive value whatever' (p. 118).

universe is a farrago of nonsense. Our belief in what we call the evidence of our senses, is less strong than our faith that in the orderly sequence of events there is a meaning which our minds could fathom were they only vast enough'?<sup>1</sup> Hence it is that Theism has been welcomed by some of the greatest minds in history, viz. as combining the sublimest thought with the surest reason and the deepest sense of dependence, all of which must ever enter into any sane and sound philosophy of the universe. 'In explaining the world, the alternative is Theism or nothing.'<sup>2</sup>

(vi) However greatly Theists may desire to keep on good terms with men of science, they cannot for a moment concede that the mixture of philosophy and science now advocated under the name of Naturalism, and Haeckel's 'monism,'<sup>3</sup> is either the one or the other. Consider fairly what it amounts to. Here is a careful summary, which is no caricature. 'And so because a certain portion of one moiety of the world has been found capable of description, from one partial point of view, with some though by no means complete success, in terms of mechanical representation, the apparatus of which grows more cumbersome and is put to greater shifts the more the demands upon it are multiplied, we are asked to believe that the world is a mechanism

<sup>1</sup> *The Idea of God*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 321.

<sup>3</sup> The attempt of the Haeckelian school to monopolize this term for its own peculiar tenets, cannot be too strongly repudiated. Sir Oliver Lodge well says, 'But the monopoly should not be granted' (*Life and Matter*, p. 9). To this we must presently return.

and nothing more.' <sup>1</sup> Can such a procedure be regarded as scientific at all? If science be based upon induction, can anything be less scientific? If philosophy depends upon rational inference, can anything be more unphilosophical? Can we wonder that Dr. Howison, after acknowledging that 'reason is the final authority from which religion must derive its warrant, and with which its contents must comply,' should go on to protest against the unreasonableness of irreligion. 'We are even told that science, with its now settled principle of evolution, must hold by this kosmic impersonal or super-personal God, or else by no God at all. But I confess that the logic of such cries, whether agnostic or pantheistic, seems very queer to me. For what is the doctrine of evolution, as it has now taken definite form at the hands of its illustrious promoters, but the doctrine of the ever-growing reasonableness of things?' <sup>2</sup> But to argue from mind to matter <sup>3</sup> as its source; to infer an indubitable kosmos from unhelped chaos; to derive an intensely conscious mikrokosm from an utterly unconscious makrokosm; to posit an imaginary necessity as the only cause of real freedom; to base the dictum that the infinite must be impersonal upon the findings of a finite personality; to claim such a knowledge of the whole universe as naturalism supposes

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *The right relation of reason to religion*, in *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 270.

<sup>3</sup> Or a 'substance' with two 'aspects,' viz. force and extension. There is no warrant whatever, either in science or philosophy, for making motion=force=energy=spirit=thought, as Haeckel's pseudo-monism does.

from the scanty opportunities for scrutiny afforded by human science: these all constitute a veritable conglomeration of unreasonableness. Dr. Howison's closing words in the brilliant essay referred to,<sup>1</sup> voice the protest which rises in the mind of every Theist, in face of such irrationality. 'Let those who would assail the value of the method of inductive science if they will. But those who value that method—and who in these days does not?—must in consistency with its tacit logic conclude that the voice of reason is for God, the God of Christ and of Christianity; and that as reason is essentially religious, so true religion is essentially rational.'

(vii) Yet further. The true value of any theory, or principle, must be found not in its powers of destruction, but of construction. Here, certainly, if not before, all forms of anti-theism reveal their inherent weakness. 'No theory can be judged by its ability to make grimaces at opposing views, but only by its own positive adequacy to the facts.'<sup>2</sup> But it is precisely this adequacy which naturalism has never shown, nor ever can show.<sup>3</sup> This must be the more affirmed from a critical survey of the latest productions of naturalism.<sup>4</sup> For what do we find, by way of construction? Simply

<sup>1</sup> p. 278.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> The same writer is perfectly warranted in saying that 'every one acquainted with atheistic treatises will recognize that their chief force has been in picking flaws in the theistic argument. There has been comparatively little effort to show any positive sufficiency of atheism to give a rational account of the facts' (p. 41). See also pp. 148, 149.

<sup>4</sup> Probably the best known popularly are Haeckel's works, including Mr. McCabe's defence of them, together with Mr. Clodd's *Story*

the wholesale assumption of just everything that is required in order to make evolution a working hypothesis.<sup>1</sup> And this is styled the explanation of the universe! The more the literature of the subject is studied, the more thoroughly justified appears the strong summary of Dr. Bowne: 'As soon as atheism is required to develop a theory of life and thought and knowledge from its own resources, further argument is needless.'<sup>2</sup>

(viii) But besides the rational constructiveness which is concerned with intellect, there is another constructiveness to be considered, even that which relates to morals and practical life. What has naturalism to offer here, in place of the Theism which it contemns? Practically nothing.<sup>3</sup> It is not enough to say that 'the denial of God and immortality lends no new sacredness to life, no new tenderness to sorrow, no higher inspiration to duty, no special sanctity to death.'<sup>4</sup>

of Creation. For the more studious, the works of Tyndall and Huxley have doubtless been reinforced by such writings as those of Mr. Samuel Laing and Prof. Karl Pearson. Whilst the latest issue of academic anti-theism is that of Dr. McTaggart, as here oft mentioned; a work so confessedly negative—with the possible exception of a pluralist immortality based on pre-existence—as to close with a mere wail that religion is too good to be true, but that the tragedy this involves cannot be helped.

<sup>1</sup> For justification of this assertion, reference must be made to the volume *Haeckel's Monism False*, passim.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, p. 314.

<sup>3</sup> This estimate does not forget, or ignore, either the popular or academic representations to the contrary. They are sufficiently met in detail elsewhere.

<sup>4</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 309; but see the whole section, pp. 304-14; a sufficient answer in itself to all the popular plausibilities of so-called rationalism, or the metaphysical meanderings of *Some Dogmas of Religion*.

The plain truth is, that, according to naturalism—i.e. the apotheosis of mechanism, which in all life's higher ranges reduces everything to animal automatism worked by necessity—there can be no sacredness in life at all. On its terms duty is a delusion, and heroism mockery. As to happiness, there is neither room nor reason for any beyond sensationalism, more or less refined. The fact so often emphasized, that many avowed naturalists exhibit all the higher qualities in their character and conduct, is but an additional testimony to the falsity and failure of the principles they advocate. Their happy inconsistency only serves to illustrate 'the position of the religious nature in modern atheistic systems. They cannot get along without it, and they are utterly at a loss to get along with it.' <sup>1</sup>

Thus it comes to pass, as Dr. McTaggart pathetically acknowledges, that 'we are here confronted with one of the great tragedies of life. Many men desire passionately to know the truth as to the great problems of religion.' <sup>2</sup> But they cannot know it unless they are expert metaphysicians.<sup>3</sup> And then they will only know that God is unthinkable.<sup>4</sup> So that the supreme

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 313.

<sup>2</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 297.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 292.

<sup>4</sup> 'All that the doctrine of a non-omnipotent God can give us, is a person who fights for the good and who may be victorious. But it is at any rate better than the doctrine of an omnipotent person *to whom good and evil are equally pleasing*' (p. 260). (Italics mine.) Imagine this latter clause, as a literary critic's representation of Theism! It is, however, on a par with other writings of the same school. As witness this from the *Hibbert Journal* of July, 1905 (article by Mr. G. M. Trevelyan, 'Should Agnostics be Miser-

comfort for all men, now left as religionless as apes, is, as noted above,<sup>1</sup> that 'the man who has no religion, cannot have a bad one.' Oh wise, and brave, and helpful, moral reconstruction !

Yet it is another writer in the same strain, who frankly owns that 'communion with a personal God of whose existence no doubt is entertained, is best for some people, and will for long centuries continue to produce some of the finest fruits of our civilization.'<sup>2</sup> Is this, too, a specimen of the moral reconstructiveness of naturalism or agnosticism ? If so, it provokes some very pertinent questions. How delusion can be 'best' for 'some people,' assuming them to be moral beings, just because they do not happen to know that it is a delusion, is a problem for casuists. Still, conceding such communion to be a delusion, the query remains, as to how some finest (moral) fruits of civilization could ever issue therefrom. If this is not moral philosophy stood upon its head, one is at a loss how else to characterize it. Theists, at all events, are pledged to believe that the truth which may make them miserable, is better than a lie which would comfort them. Space limitations alone compel the dismissal of other similar

able ?' p. 675): 'The belief in a God who is *all* powerful and *all* good is rendered impossible by the present imperfect arrangements of this world.' If acknowledged tragedies were not involved, such an avowal would be positively comic in its childishness. The italics are his, as if there was some special force in them ! But it is precisely the argument which I, for one, remember using when, as a little child in scarlet fever, I was kept in a hot bed, although everything within me pointed to the profit and delight of running about a cool room. In adults, such philosophy is beyond appeal.

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 294.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. G. M. Trevelyan, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1905, p. 677.



instances of the pitiful failure of all the forms of anti-theism, to give either to the mind or to the heart of men any real equivalent, let alone superior, substitute for those moral and spiritual sanctions which naturally issue from Theism, as the inspiration of life and the hope beyond death. There is, it must be avowed, good ground for the affirmation that 'theistic faith is such an implication of our moral nature and practical life, that atheism must tend to wreck both life and conscience.' <sup>1</sup>

No thoughtful man acquainted with the history of naturalism or agnosticism, will imagine that any such restatement as the foregoing of the valid reasons for Theism, will prove either universally acceptable or final. But the confirmation of previous findings on the part of able thinkers, even if some modifications be inevitable, is by no means wasted effort. It is, therefore, submitted that a fair consideration of the preceding pages leads to a rational endorsement of Mr. Fiske's deliberate avowal, that 'throughout all possible advances in human knowledge, so far as we can see, the essential position of Theism must remain unshaken. In its fundamental features the Theism of Jesus and Paul was so true, that it must endure as long as man endures.' <sup>2</sup>

Real as would be any sincere writer's satisfaction at concluding in his own words an important discussion, it may well here be laid aside, to allow one to speak whose labours in this field have been as valuable as

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 314.

<sup>2</sup> *The Ideas of God*, pp. 61, 78.

those of Dr. R. Flint. In his latest volume, a fair and true summary is given of the influence of modern knowledge upon the reasons alleged in bygone days for belief in God, when he writes as follows: 'The changes adopted in the methods of theistic proof have all tended in one direction—namely, to remove or correct extreme and exaggerated conceptions of the divine transcendence, and to produce a true appreciation of the divine immanence—to set deism aside, and to enrich Theism with what is good in pantheism.' Thus true philosophy offers to the present age 'a Theism which, while maintaining the personality of God, recognizes God to be in all things, and all things to be of God, through God, and to God.' <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Agnosticism*, p. 592.



# IV

## THE CASE FOR MONISM

‘ In nature we have a unity of plan pervading the endless diversity that everywhere prevails, simply because the endless and almost infinite diversity of molecular movements takes place according to unity of plan.’

DR. JAS. CROLL, *The Basis of Evolution*, p. 138.

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‘ The leaf is built up molecule by molecule. The thing to be accounted for is not what moves the molecules or particles in its formation, but what guides or determines the motion of these particles. The leaf could not be formed did not each particle move in the right direction and stop at the proper time and at the proper place. The mere motion of the molecules is produced by force ; but what directs or determines this force to move each particle along its special path ? The mystery lies deeper still. Not only are the paths of the molecules different, but they must all be adjusted in relation to one another ; for it is to the proper adjustment of the paths that the form of the leaf is due. In other words, the motion of each molecule must be determined according to the objective idea of the leaf.’

DR. JAS. CROLL, *The Basis of Evolution*, p. 136.

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‘ The exertion of force and the determination of force, the production of motion and the determination of motion, the production of an act and the determination of an act, are absolutely and essentially different.’

‘ It is absolutely impossible that the exertion of a force can be determined by force, or that motion can be determined by motion or action by action.’

DR. JAS. CROLL, *The Basis of Evolution*, pp. 12, 16.

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‘ The principle of the conservation of energy is supposed to preclude any operation of myself as efficient cause, except an operation in which I am merely directive. But as a matter of plain fact, the operations of physicists are so restricted that they do not know whether the total energy of the universe or even of any system within it—for example myself—which cannot be shut off from the rest, is or is not constant.’

*An Agnostic's Progress*, p. 93.

## IV

## THE CASE FOR MONISM

EVEN if it may be assumed that the foregoing considerations, when fairly weighed, give reasonable warrant for theistic belief, the whole theme cannot here be concluded, because there are yet other features of modern knowledge which demand recognition. The Theism which is to maintain its hold upon the men of to-day, will certainly have to reckon with all that can be shown to be true or valuable in the suggestions of Pantheism and Monism. The latter, especially, more than any other philosophic principle, sums up within itself the results, the tendencies, the aims of present-day science. Monism is not yet either welcomed or understood by all persons of ordinary intelligence, but like the term 'altruism' in another sphere, it is fast becoming familiarized to modern ears, and as a philosophic principle is as surely come to stay as the now well-worn word 'evolution.' Prof. Ward displays his usual sagacity when he says, 'If, however, the desiderated monism is forthcoming, the practical conveniences of a dualistic phraseology will prevail against it as little as our familiar use of the language of the Ptolemaic astronomy against the new astronomy of Copernicus and Newton.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 206. In face of all the facts

For our present purpose it is necessary to estimate two developments of fact, and ask thereupon two pertinent questions.

(1) It is quite impossible for the student to mistake or overrate the growing tendency to an insistence upon some doctrine of monism, in the science and philosophy of to-day. (2) But this tendency admits of several distinct kinds of monism, with many accompanying shades of opinion. (3) It is consequently as difficult as it is necessary, to outline and establish some kind of monism to which above all others the name may be most truly and worthily attached. Hence the question, What constitutes valid Monism ? (4) The more clearly this can be made out, the more obligatory it becomes to correlate it with Theism. Thus one cannot but ask, finally, assuming a true Monism, what is its effect upon Theism as already conceived ? These four items must

of the case which are here rightly assumed, it is worse than useless for writers in religious journals (*Methodist Times*, September 6, 1906), to head columns with a semi-sneer at 'The Monism Bogey.' Such references do small credit to the intelligent sincerity of modern churches. It is not a question whether 'Christian beliefs can be firmly established on the lines of monism,' but of what monism really means, and whether its meaning is true. And for all who do not live in religious conservatories, it is manifestly far from the whole truth to say that 'there are men of reflective and thoughtful turn of mind who simply are unable to rest in the position which satisfies the plain good man.' For the plain man is fast becoming better acquainted with the results of modern research than his religious teachers, and the question as to whether he shall be good, on Christian lines, will have to turn more and more on what he can find to be true. No doubt evolution, Arminianism, Galileo's astronomy, Paul's Christianity, were all 'bogeys' to the plain good man of the time, but they had to be faced, and they prevailed simply because they were found to be true. The case is the same in regard to monism,



receive attention before we can profitably consider the relations between Theism and Pantheism.

(1) *The Monistic Tendency*

It would be easy to fill these pages with demonstrations of the truth of Prof. Ward's remark that 'monism has become the order of the day.'<sup>1</sup> Even if the bold assurance of Mr. Picton, that 'in fact monism holds the field, and though the evolution of human opinion is very slow, it appears safe to predict that the triumph of that world-theory is assured,'<sup>2</sup> be accounted too confident, there are many signs of the times, besides the issue of *The Monist*, to 'show how eager scientific men are to help in the new construction.' In order to appreciate the situation, it will only be necessary to adduce one or two typical utterances from the four main quarters whence come the influential voices of to-day in these respects.

(i) The loudest and most confident proclamation of monism undoubtedly issues from naturalism. In this country, thanks to the cheap publications of the Rationalist Press Association, monism has become almost wholly identified with the writings of Prof.

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. Picton, *Pantheism, its Story and Significance*, p. 88.

Haeckel. It will manifestly be through no lack of confident insistence on the part of himself and his friends, if his German or English contemporaries have any doubt left that his monism is the entirely new and only true monism open to the human mind.<sup>1</sup> In its most succinct expression, this monism 'teaches that the universe really deserves its name, and is an all-embracing unified whole—whether we call it God or Nature.'<sup>2</sup> In Prof. Haeckel's own fuller statement, 'We adhere firmly to the pure unequivocal monism of Spinoza: matter or infinitely extended substance and spirit (or energy) or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two fundamental attributes, or principal properties, of the all-embracing divine essence of the world, the universal substance.'<sup>3</sup> In the fullness of his following exposition this form of monism needs no comment, as being absolutely opposed to, and exclusive of Theism.

(ii) Apart from the reiterated anti-theism of the foregoing, science *per se*, speaking without any philosophical or theological bias, gives expression to very similar sentiments. The late Prof. Romanes summarized it fairly when he said, comparing his views with those of Prof. W. K. Clifford, 'I am in full agree-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge puts the case very mildly when he says, 'This system of monism, though not now in favour with philosophers, is the most militant variety of all; and accordingly it has in some quarters managed to obtain, and it certainly seems anxious to obtain, a monopoly of the name' (*Life and Matter*, p. 9).

<sup>2</sup> *Wonders of Life*, p. 402.

<sup>3</sup> Riddle, &c., cheap edition, p. 8. For other expressions to the same effect, see *The Confession of Faith*, pp. 3, 4b; Büchner's *Last Words on Materialism*, pp. 115, 116; Mallock's *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 180; *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 47 et seq.

ment with him in believing that monism is destined to become the generally accepted theory of things, seeing that it is the only theory of things which can receive the sanction of science on the one hand and of feeling on the other.' <sup>1</sup> For more recent days, the estimate of the erudite Principal of Birmingham University is as significant as reliable, when he says that 'many men of science have likewise been impressed with the probability or possibility of some such ultimate unification.' <sup>2</sup> And Prof. Schurman puts it into a word, in pointing out that 'the indispensable postulate of science—the universality of the laws of nature—is only the expression of a conviction of the unity and universal inner connexion of all reality.' <sup>3</sup> Thus 'the principle with which science starts as its postulate, and which it verifies as its last conclusion, is that all phenomena, from the stars to the thoughts of man, result from a single system of interconnected causes, or are so many modes of a single undivided substance which are all alike transient, and all equally necessary.' <sup>4</sup> So Mr. Walker is entirely warranted when he asserts that 'science is certainly leading us to some form of monistic conception of the universe, and the harmony with religious faith of such monism as can be scientifically established needs imperatively to be shown.' <sup>5</sup>

(iii) That in the realm of philosophy, Kant, Goethe,

<sup>1</sup> *Mind and Motion and Monism*, p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> Mallock, *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> *Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism*, p. 182.

Spinoza, Hegel, Spencer, and other more recent thinkers, have all tended in the same direction, quotation is not needed to show. The further words of Sir Oliver Lodge admirably sum up the whole position: 'The truth is that all philosophy aims at being monistic; it is bound to aim at unification, however difficult of attainment; and a philosopher who abandoned the quest, and contented himself with a permanent antinomy—a universe compounded of two or more irreconcilable and entirely disparate and disconnected agencies—would be held to be throwing up his brief as a philosopher, and taking refuge in a kind of permanent Manichaeism, which experience has shown to be an untenable and ultimately unthinkable position.'<sup>1</sup>

(iv) Nor can it be said that theistic philosophy is in any degree lacking in its appreciation and corroboration of such monistic development. Prof. Fleming, writing from the distinctively Christian standpoint, says, 'The insight we have gained into the fundamental principles underlying the operations of the material universe, into the nature of matter, and the relation of matter and energy, tend more and more to abolish the old dualism between matter and mind or spirit, and to move us in the direction of a spiritual monism which regards both the laws and realities of the external

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 10. Thus Prof. McTaggart says, 'Monism then, whether it be materialism or idealism, is more attractive to the majority of inquirers than dualism is' (*Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 81). See, to the same effect, Prof. Ward's *Gifford Lectures*, Parts IV and V; *The Monist*; *Quarterly Magazine* (Kegan Paul); and for a number of testimonies of leading thinkers, Mr. Walker's *Christian Theism, &c.*, pp. 179-86.

world as the thoughts of an Eternal mind.' <sup>1</sup> Mr. Walker also, in his recent volume, admirably summarizes the general position, in saying that 'monism, professing to give us the unity which the mind craves for, building as it does on the facts of science, points to a deep truth—any theory true of the universe as we know it, must be ultimately monistic.' Such references might easily be multiplied. <sup>2</sup> One more will suffice. 'Everywhere, unities are being perceived—what the poet and the artist see instinctively, what the metaphysician and the theologian reach deductively, biology is striving to establish inductively: the unity of nature. And physics has attained to the realization of this ideal of unity far more perfectly than has biology. Thus all science approaches one aspect of the theologian's idea of God.' <sup>3</sup> It is no wonder, therefore, that one who seeks to open a way 'from agnosticism to theism,' should say, 'That all the phenomena of existence are translatable into the conception of one universal life, present everywhere, of whom Power, and Mind, and Love, are so many names, seems to me vastly more satisfying and rational than anything else which we can say.' <sup>4</sup>

So much for the undeniable and resistless tendency of modern thought towards monism.

<sup>1</sup> *The Evidence of Things not Seen*, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> See Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., pp. 11-15, 66, 82-4, 182; Bowne, *Theism*, pp. 50, 82; Prof. Upton's *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 185, 218; Dr. Caldecott in *Cambridge Theological Essays*, pp. 135, 136; Principal Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. p. 96; Prof. Schurman, *Belief in God*, pp. 57, 84, 165, 217; Mr. Newman-Smyth, *Through Science to Faith*, p. 12, &c. &c.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. F. R. Tennant, in *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> C. F. Dole, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1903, p. 120.

(2) *Monistic Diversities*

Whilst, however, all these voices appear to be one in their appreciation of and desire for unity, it is immediately evident that their aims are by no means identical. The unity for which they plead, is in many cases a real diversity. The difference, indeed, between monism and dualism, or pluralism, is not so great as between the main varieties of monism. It has thus been well pointed out that whilst monism may be in the air—a procedure ‘common to all philosophers, whether professional or amateur’—the real and ‘only question at issue is, What sort of monism are you aiming at?’<sup>1</sup> Or as Prof. Ward puts it, ‘Even when dualism is abandoned by reflective minds, there ensues only a struggle of diverse monisms to take its place.’<sup>2</sup> Prof. Haeckel refers to monism as being ‘differently expressed in the philosophical systems of an Empedocles or a Lucretius, a Spinoza or a Giordano Bruno, a Lamarck, or a David Strauss,’<sup>3</sup> but adds that ‘in later times there have been many other attempts to set forth the same fundamental thought.’ Except indeed this one common denominator, it is difficult to find any other bond of real relationship between such varying systems as those of Hegel, Büchner, Vogt, Haeckel, Clifford,

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 202.

<sup>3</sup> *Confession, &c.*, p. 4.

Romanes, Carus, Lloyd Morgan, Herbert Spencer, Prof. Caird, Dr. Martineau, Prof. Ward. It is truly only the very least that can be said, when Prof. Morgan remarks that 'monism, in general, is an assumption which leaves plenty of room for many divergences and even differences of opinion.' In the main, however, as Prof. Ward says, 'There are three leading forms of monism, viz. Materialism, Idealism—or as I should prefer to say, Spiritualism—and the neutral or Agnostic monism now in vogue amongst scientific men.'<sup>1</sup>

We may go farther. The first of these we may safely ignore: science no longer defends that. But when it seems as if the choice of a valid monism lay between spiritualism and agnosticism, we are swiftly reminded, as the Gifford lecturer does not fail to point out, that this agnostic monism 'is scientifically popular mainly because it is essentially naturalistic.' But to all intents and purposes, and despite all verbal protests, this is materialism, and 'escapes the absurdities of the old materialism more in seeming than in fact.' The new face has not radically changed the old nature. That is why Sir Oliver Lodge says so truly that 'the monopoly of the name should not be granted. The name Materialism is quite convenient for it, just as Idealism is for the opposing system. If either of these titles is objected to, as apparently too thorough-going, then the longer but more descriptive titles of Idealistic-monism and Materialistic-monism respectively should be employed.'<sup>2</sup> The position

<sup>1</sup> *Confession*, &c., ii. p. 206.

<sup>2</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 9. See Ward, ii. p. 16; *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 8, 188-90.



to-day certainly seems to be such that the strictly agnostic monism may be left out of account. 'If idealism is unsound, there seems to be no resting-place between materialism and spiritualism.'<sup>1</sup>

All that has been urged, therefore, by competent philosophy against the absurdities of materialism, has definite application to the monistic system of which its leading exponent avows, that it 'belongs to that group of philosophical systems which from other points of view have been designated also as mechanical or as pantheistic.'<sup>2</sup> Waiving for a moment the pantheistic system, the mechanical certainly is also the materialistic in essence, whatever strong assertions may be made to the contrary. And if, as has been sufficiently shown, the choice for us lies between materialistic monism and idealistic or spiritual monism, decision ought not to be long deferred.

To enter upon an elaborate refutation of materialism in these days, would be simply to slay the slain. For that we have the emphatic assurance of authorities so competent and impartial as Profs. Huxley and Tyndall. The only point about which a question can be raised, would be the identification of naturalistic monism with materialism. And this is, after all, a question as simple as weighty. The reality of the spiritual element in us, the nature of 'experience,' as Prof. Ward puts it,<sup>3</sup> is beyond controversy. Its true appreciation alone, is sufficient to show 'the

<sup>1</sup> Ward, ii. p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Haeckel, *Confession of Faith*, &c., p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> 'All that we know, and feel, and do, all our facts and theories, all our emotions, and ideals, and ends, may be included in this one term—experience.'—*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. 110.

untenability both of dualism and of the neutral monism that is nominally to supersede it.' To the crucial question whence it comes, naturalistic monism has absolutely no answer. That it should spring from nothing, by the new creation of an omnipotent Will, is a suggestion which would be at once dismissed with lofty scorn. But it is assuredly not one whit more scientific or philosophical, to affirm that it can be evolved out of nothing by an eternal regress, or by chance, or by necessity. For no one of these has in it the vestige of a true, i.e. an adequate, cause. To posit 'substance' as giving birth to matter and motion—or energy—is of no avail. For the slipping in of the identification of energy with spirit, and then of spirit with mind, however neatly done,<sup>1</sup> is nothing but a huge *petitio principii*. Mr. Walker's estimate of this proceeding is perfectly accurate. 'What such monists begin with is not really Spirit; it is really neither one thing nor another. Spirit cannot be something insentient and unconscious. To assert Spirit in this way at the beginning, is merely surreptitiously to introduce that spirituality which is known to appear in the long-run and which has to be accounted for.'<sup>2</sup>

And even if such a proceeding should not be deemed sufficient to ensure the final condemnation of any monistic system guilty of it, proofs are abundant, as Prof. Ward has shown, to show that 'when confronted with the relation of mind and body, naturalism

<sup>1</sup> 'Matter or infinitely extended substance and Spirit (or energy) or sensitive and thinking substance' (*Riddle*, p. 8). The calm and simple identification of physical energy with thought, here, is characteristic.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 115.

is driven, in the endeavour to maintain its mechanical basis inviolable, to broach psycho-physical theories in flagrant contradiction not only with sound mechanical principles and sound logic, but with the plain facts of daily experience.’<sup>1</sup> In a word, nature, including both the makrokosm of outer phenomena and the mikrokosm of unquestionable though subjective experience, is alike unintelligible and inexpressible in any other terms than those of mind. Those who deny this, prove the contrary even in the very act of their denial. This alone ought to be guarantee that if there is a credible monism at all, it must be one of which the essence is mind. That is to say, in Prof. Ward’s words, ‘A spiritualistic monism remains the one stable position.’ In order, however, to make this as clear as possible, it will be well to summarize, in swift review, the positive essentials of such a valid monism.

### (3) *What Constitutes a Valid Monism?*

It has been said, with only too good reason, that ‘the most pronounced non-theistic and atheistic schemes of our time, label themselves monism, although not always showing the clearest appreciation of what true monism means and requires.’<sup>2</sup> But nothing can

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Preface, p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 50.

be more necessary than that this should be clearly apprehended, before we can consider to any profit what are the relations between Monism and Theism. Speaking generally, no better definition of Monism can be desired than that which Sir Oliver Lodge has given us. 'The name "monism" should apply to any philosophic system which assumes and attempts to formulate the essential simplicity and oneness of all the apparent diversity of sensual impression and consciousness, any system which seeks to exhibit all the complexities of existence both material and mental—the whole of phenomena, both objective and subjective—as modes of manifestation of one fundamental reality.'<sup>1</sup> But granting that this is, as Kant says, 'a grand philosophy,' every reasonable man must agree with him that 'the desirable thing is that it should also be a sound one.' Let us consider what are the indispensable conditions of such a monism. Six items at least will be involved.

(i) It must be intelligible, or it will yield us no system of thought at all. That the naturalistic system which is promulgated under Prof. Haeckel's name is not such, has been shown elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> The loudly vaunted explanation of all things by the reduction of everything, including ourselves, to an assumed finality in matter and motion—which is itself a pseudo-finality, seeing that this involves a *tertium quid*, as utterly essential as it is absolutely unknown, whether as to essence or even existence—is a mere jungle of

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 7, and front page.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 573, 579-81.

words in which the most sincere and earnest inquirer is least likely to find his way.<sup>1</sup>

As to 'the secret of Hegel,' it is yet a secret indeed. Only the courage of a philosophical expert can be equal to the task of facing such an intellectual labyrinth. And when he comes safely through it, emerging with the assurance that he has found a pearl of great price, the man of average intelligence must perforce, for courtesy's sake, believe him. But it will be an act of faith. The monism which insists that 'the ultimate unity which is presupposed in all differences is the unity of thought with itself—in other words, that  $I=I$  is the formula of the universe,'<sup>2</sup>—may be a very brilliant discovery in the eyes of the psychologist or epistemologist, but it will never be more than a dazzling nebulosity to ordinary intelligence. That thought and being are one, and that the real is the rational, may well constitute the fundamental principles of a system the keen intellectuality of which compels our utmost respect.<sup>3</sup> But even if, as Prof. Fraser suggests,

<sup>1</sup> 'As long as the two aspects remain merely side by side, or are only related in an unknown Substance, Reality, or Activity, a genuine monism, such as will account for the world that we know in experience, cannot be reached. We have still a dualism which is not reduced to any intelligible unity' (Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 181). That in the case of Haeckel's monism we have not merely a dualism, but an inevitable and acknowledged trinitism, has been already shown. See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 497, 581.

<sup>2</sup> See Walker's *Theism*, &c., p. 199.

<sup>3</sup> 'Hegelian dialectic might be taken as an exhaustive intellectual elaboration of what is only put in a tentative and practical way in the cosmological argument; which is founded on the craving for cause that finds rest only in the agency of Divine Spirit or, as one might say, in the universal consciousness.'—*Philosophy of Theism*, p. 113. It would be difficult to find a better summary of the relations of Hegel's monism to Theism than in this volume of

'Hegelian dialectic becomes Christian Theism *sub specie aeternitatis*, as Spinoza would say,' yet it can never be assumed that for the average mind the monism which he aims to establish, is intelligible enough to be influential, either for or against the claim of Theism to be the true and only valid monism.<sup>1</sup> Neither of these forms of monism, therefore, the Haeckelian or the Hegelian, can pass the first test of validity. They represent, indeed, the most extreme antitheses of conception, but as extremes they meet in common unintelligibility.

(ii) Again, a valid monism must not involve the rationally inconceivable. In other words, it must not contradict itself. But this is precisely what naturalistic monism does.<sup>2</sup> The normal mind of man cannot accept any system of philosophy which, while vehemently asserting one sole source of everything,<sup>3</sup>

Prof. Fraser's (pp. 112-41); though the student will find an excellent *résumé* of Hegel's life and work in the little volume of Dr. Mackintosh published by Messrs. T. and T. Clark in their series of the World's Epoch-makers. Sympathetic erudition has therein done its utmost to make Hegel intelligible and interesting.

<sup>1</sup> 'The fundamental unity of Hegel's philosophy is perhaps elastic enough to admit of being interpreted so as to comprehend, in some mysterious way, the world of successive nature, and the world of human spirits—without spoiling our experience of the actuality of the world, or the morally necessary conviction of the freedom of each man to create actions referable exclusively to himself for their responsible causation. But then this is no more than an assertion of faith at last. If there is here more than amended verbal articulation of the old difficulties, one fails to find it.'—*Ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 80-8.

<sup>3</sup> 'Monism strives to carry back *all phenomena without exception* to the *mechanism* of the atom.'—*Confession*, &c., p. 19. Italics mine.

is utterly unable even to think of such a source without contradicting itself in the very act ; and in the following processes cannot take a single step without assuming and employing the very realities which have been ostentatiously ruled out of consideration. When mind is identified with mechanism, there is an end of all reasoning, and philosophy becomes nothing more than a meaningless rattle of vocables.

(iii) A valid monism must satisfy the main principles of modern science, so far as they can be discerned and applied. As Mr. Tennant has truly said, 'A philosophical system, in interpreting nature, must take into account the established facts of natural science, keep in touch with them and abide by them.'<sup>1</sup> It has become to-day an accepted principle, that 'if we would recommend religion, especially to men acquainted with science, we must first of all be loyal to fact.' Be it so. Yet it is none the less true and applicable when men of science would recommend monism to those who, without claiming to be experts, are none the less able to appreciate both facts and inferences. For to be loyal to facts, must mean not only that their actuality is acknowledged, but that in regard to every one of them, great and small alike, we must be true to the rational axiom that for every event there must be an adequate cause. If that postulate is trampled under foot, science and philosophy are at an end. But if it be maintained, naturalistic monism is at an end. For such a system provides no adequate cause for anything. All it can do is to

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 74.



fall helplessly back upon the supposition of an infinite and eternal universe, which is at once the largest and least availing assumption that any self-asserting philosophy can make.<sup>1</sup> This has already been sufficiently considered,<sup>2</sup> so that it is here only necessary to lay stress on one or two points.

(1) As there is no warrant for such an assertion, so, in the nature of the case, there can be no proof of it.

(2) There is no philosophical value in it. If matter and motion be regarded as eternal, an eternal cause becomes just as necessary for them, as for the matter and motion of the pen with which these words are written.

(3) Even if they are assumed as eternally existing, such an assumption, *per se*, is as useless to account for the present kosmos, as the offer of a turnip would be for material out of which to make a watch. There must inevitably be the further assumption of just that precise matter, and those exact motions, which will constitute an involution out of which the subsequent evolution may rationally arise. But such a procedure is neither more nor less than masked Theism.

(4) As to the origin of life, the Theism of former days is condemned, we know, as unscientific, because it involved a breach of continuity. This, however, is at least conceivable, granted divine working. But the

<sup>1</sup> 'The extent and duration of the universe are infinite and unbounded. It has no beginning and no end: it is eternity.'—Haeckel's *Riddle*, &c., p. 86. 'Recognizing always that matter and motion are eternal, we no longer look for a beginning, neither do we look for an end to the universe.'—Hird, *Easy Outline of Evolution*, pp. 186, 211.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 27, 28, 78, above.

supposition of naturalistic monism is far less rational, in that it is quite inconceivable. For it assumes a continuity without a start. Whilst, therefore, we decline to accept the desperate conjectures<sup>1</sup> with which such monism seeks to fill this apparent chasm, a true monism will manifestly be only confirmed, if there shall be hereafter found reliable grounds for believing in the rise of the living out of the non-living. It would be only the revelation of the latent indwelling in matter of the one source of all life, beyond all the previous vision or thought of science.

(5) The same will apply to the origin of mind initially in consciousness, together with its further development into intelligent self-consciousness and moral self-direction.

But a monism which is driven to the bald assertion that matter and motion are eternal; that without any cause they are just such as could not help developing into the present kosmos; so that all we see and know is the result of mere mechanical necessity; whilst consciousness is nothing more than the sum total of molecular vibrations,<sup>2</sup> and moral responsibility a delusion,—such a monism is so plainly contrary to sober science as to be unworthy of serious discussion.

(iv) A valid monism must certainly be philosophically true. This is of course a platitude, but it is none the less significant and noteworthy. Indeed it is only too significant, for it involves a verbal attempt to put the ocean into a teacup. Yet one may illustrate

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 93-132.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 135-96.

a great subject on a small scale. In order to appreciate the symmetry of a vast cathedral, it is not necessary to examine minutely every point and pinnacle. So here, all that need be emphasized is that reality, as known to us, involves a dualism so undeniable that any valid monism must reckon with it in some fashion. The manner of such reckoning will constitute a sufficient test as to whether the name of monism is philosophically earned, or obtained by false pretences. Mind and matter, subject and object, self and the world, self and others, are all realities inevitably involving a dualism which may be transcended, but may not be trampled on. The latter, however, is all that naturalistic monism can do. For the former we are compelled to turn to idealistic or spiritual monism. Only space is required to illustrate this, in regard to each antithesis. We must be content for the moment to submit, as the test of a genuine monism, that it must preserve, not destroy, these antitheses; as surely as water preserves the two gases which, though distinct, are unified in its liquidity.

As to the world of mind and matter; it is undoubtedly true that these 'are not double over against each other in Cartesian opposition and separation.'<sup>1</sup> No spiritual monist suggests that there should be a 'great gulf fixed, dividing one part of experience from another.'<sup>2</sup> He does not even ask, in the words of Dr. Carus, that there should be 'an insurmountable gulf between the two empires, the thinking and feeling on the one side, and the not-thinking and not-feeling on the

<sup>1</sup> Tigert, *Theism*, Pref., p. ix.

<sup>2</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 111.

other side.' But he does insist that each of these sides is equally real and distinct, and, whichever may be accounted the more influential, they must both be included at their full value.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Saleeby has well said that 'the difference between mind and matter is greater than all other differences.' So great, indeed, is it, that no exuberant verbosity whatever will avail to fuse them into the *tertium quid* of some purely hypothetical 'substance' with two inseparable 'aspects.' Such fusion is sheer confusion. To our human minds, at least, they not only are, but must ever be, so distinct, that monism through fusion is unthinkable. To treat spirit as an aspect of substance, and an interchangeable synonym for energy, or thought, interworking no one knows how with matter, no more deserves the appellation of monism, than does the psycho-physical parallelism of mind and brain which gropes about for a pre-established harmony.<sup>2</sup>

Again; as to subject and object. There is really no need to plunge headlong into metaphysical abstractions. The two sides here are as distinct in their reality, as they are inseparable in the no less real unit of the self. It is not a case of the old dualism between matter and mind, which, under the naturalistic hypothesis, is as unthinkable as inevitable. What we have to

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Walker has expressed this with admirable succinctness. 'Scientific monism affirms the working in the Universe of a single Power which is revealed in the two aspects of Mind and Matter. It ought, therefore, to give at least equal value to the two sides, or aspects. It is only in their union that we can have a real Monism.'—*Christian Theism*, &c., p. 179.

<sup>2</sup> See Mallock's *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 61.

face is the inseparableness of subject and object in a single consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Thus Dr. Rashdall says, with truth, that 'it may be admitted that the idea of a subject without an object is an impossible one.'<sup>2</sup> We can no more think of a subject without connoting an object, than we can think of a gift without a giver, or of a coin with only one side. Yet such inseparableness never blurs the real distinctness which constitutes duality. Not that this necessitates the 'dualistic scheme' to which Prof. Herbert referred;<sup>3</sup> but it does assume and insist upon 'the duality in unity of subject and object' with which Kant started.<sup>4</sup> For however much we emphasize, for clearness' sake, the distinction between subject and object, 'the unity of the knowing mind,' as Dr. Caldecott says,<sup>5</sup> 'penetrates throughout. All down the scale of Knowledge we must stand firm to the duality of subject-object; the mind contributes, but there is something present to it all along.'

It goes without saying that any valid monism must also recognize the reality of the duality involved in

<sup>1</sup> As Dr. Tigert truly says (*Theism*, p. 259), 'Subject and object exist, and can only exist, within the unitary experience of a common consciousness.'

<sup>2</sup> More fully, Prof. Lloyd Morgan says, 'Throughout the whole range of experience, from the most primitive sense experience to the highest ranges of conceptual thought, subject and object are inseparable. There is no subject without an object. There is no object without a subject. The problem of psychology is the question how this two-faced unity has had its origin.' See Walker's *Christian Theism*, &c., pp. 188-92.

<sup>3</sup> *Modern Realism Examined*, p. 333. 'If we take the distinction between subjective and objective to be real, we affirm a dualistic scheme in which matter and mind co-exist.'

<sup>4</sup> See Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 110.

<sup>5</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 108.

the relation of the individual self to other selves. To this we shall have to return in another form, so that it must here suffice to aver that the solipsism which is driven to assert that 'I alone exist,' and that there is no reliable proof of the existence of any other consciousnesses than one's own, and still less ground for acknowledging the reality of the communion between other selves and one's own self, is as opposed to true philosophy as to daily experience.

(v) This brings us to another necessary feature of a true monism, viz. that it must cover the whole of human experience. It must render intelligible account of the whole complex mikrokosm of the human ego. Taking all experience as a fact, it must render it intelligible. But the monism which bases itself upon an unknown something, which is yet known to be not mind but to work only mechanically and according to necessity, cannot assuredly do this, to any extent or in any case. To it the experience which, as at least an apparent reality, cannot possibly be denied, can only be explained as an inexplicable illusion.

Making no attempt whatever, here, even to outline the whole area of human experience, there are three of its most distinctive elements on which we must lay stress, and which we may take as tests. These we know to be real, if we know anything. If, then, they cannot find room for existence under an alleged monistic scheme, it must be regarded as sufficient proof that such monism is rather a species of intellectual choke-damp than a pure philosophic atmosphere.

(a) Certainly experience includes consciousness. This

is at once an unmeasured complexity, and an unfathomed simplicity. Whence, then, does it come? The flippant assertion, borrowed from Mr. Mallock,<sup>1</sup> that 'consciousness arises out of the unconscious every day,' is really unworthy of philosophic regard, as being simply one of the half-truths which ever lend themselves to palpable falsities. The offspring of a conscious being can never be, at any stage of its existence, a true instance of the unconscious developing into the conscious, seeing that consciousness is latent in its very nature. How out of life which had never known consciousness, the latter should arise, is a problem of the same nature as how out of matter which had never known life, the living should arise. The same answer applies to both. 'Except as the product or manifestation of a spiritual Power, consciousness can never be accounted for. Neither matter nor physical Energy could ever produce it.'<sup>2</sup>

(b) It is equally certain that human experience includes self-consciousness. That this is the very essence of personality, cannot be denied consistently with sanity. No monism can be valid which reduces this to a vanishing point. Yet it is here that both the Hegelian and the Haeckelian extremes most manifestly condemn themselves as well as each other. The former does not 'admit the existence in man of a personality and will in any way distinct from and independent of God's

<sup>1</sup> *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 58. See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 142, for fair estimate of it.

<sup>2</sup> See Walker, *Christian Theism*, pp. 211-18; 'A merely physical non-spiritual power, could never produce our spiritual consciousness, or make its appearance in even the faintest form of consciousness' p. 227). See also *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 135.



being and causality.' <sup>1</sup> The latter, being bound up with modern 'determinism,' is doubly misleading. First, because the only true determinism is that of the personality which determines consciously its own course of thought and will. Secondly, because in denying this, naturalistic monism reduces selfhood to a mere unit of consciousness, and makes it the mere consequent of mechanical antecedents, which is not so much contrary to, as an end of, all human experience. For the 'pre-established harmony' which this connotes, moreover, there is no more proof in science than there is explanation in philosophy. Any form of monism which can do nothing with this Gordian knot of psychology but cut it, owns itself beaten, however loudly it may proclaim itself the solver of riddles.

(c) Certainly the sense of moral freedom is the very core of personality. As this will come under fuller consideration presently, all that need here be said is that the monistic system which is compelled to treat as an illusion the deepest reality of our nature, shows itself incompetent to deal philosophically with anything. If the very centre and essence of 'our one mental certainty' be an illusion, what is left that we

<sup>1</sup> See *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy*, by Prof. Upton, p. 157. Upon this Dr. Newton Marshall (*Theology and Truth*, p. 181) comments somewhat strangely. 'Prof. Upton,' he says, 'resolutely maintains his position that the selfhood of man is as true and radical a selfhood as that of the Absolute. Now this is more than dualism: it is pluralism. Each self must be a distinct and isolated substance, capable of intercourse with, but not of absorption in other similar substances, among whom God must be reckoned as one.' But neither of these inferences follows. The writer indeed answers himself; for certainly distinction by no means necessarily involves isolation, here, any more than the distinction between subject and object involves the isolation of either.

can trust? Prof. Seth has put succinctly the irrefragable truth to which a spiritual monism alone can do justice. 'In the purposive "I will," each man is real, and is immediately conscious of his own reality. Whatever else may or may not be real, this is real. This is the fundamental belief around which scepticism may weave its maze of doubts and logical puzzles, but from which it is eventually powerless to dislodge us, because no argument can affect an immediate certainty—a certainty, moreover, on which our whole view of the universe depends.' <sup>1</sup>

(vi) Furthermore, equally ample justice must be done by any valid monism to the makrokosm as to the mikrokosm. This just demand, which from the philosophical no less than from the scientific standpoint must be accepted without mitigation, might well give men pause in scheme-forming. If the microscopic portion of matter which we call the brain of the ant—in Prof. Huxley's estimate 'the most marvellous morsel of matter in the universe'—provides us with utterly insoluble problems; if the comparatively tiny aggregation of matter which we distinguish as the human brain, is an unfathomable ocean of mystery which those who know it best confess that they least comprehend; what shall be said about a world immeasurably full of such marvels and mysteries—let alone the enveloping universe whose vastness and complexity alike transcend all our widest thoughts?

Two points therefore, at least, demand emphasis here.

<sup>1</sup> *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 46.

(a) Monism, to be monism, must include and account for all. It is absolutely a case of all or none. This does not admit of any valid systematizing upon picked facts. But it has been pointed out by one of acknowledged competence that, in regard to the recent propaganda of the chief exponent of naturalistic monism, 'the facts which he chooses gratuitously to deny, and the facts which he chooses vigorously to emphasize, are arbitrarily selected by him according as they will or will not fit into his philosophic scheme.'<sup>1</sup> This is truly an old foe with a new face. For before the time of Bacon, even more than since, it had been the custom to make a theory first and then look for facts to establish it; or, speaking technically, to postulate an imaginary induction from a previously determined deduction. But science worthy of the name has 'put away' such 'childish things.' We cannot, indeed, make an induction of the whole universe: but we can at least include in our induction all that we know to be real. This, however, naturalistic monism certainly does not do.

(b) Whilst any suggestion of a philosophic monism, in regard to such an overwhelming and enormous complexity as the kosmos of which we form part, should be received with the utmost caution, this must apply most of all to a scheme which of necessity involves 'the eschewing and throwing away of any part of human experience, because it is inconsistent with a premature and ill-considered monistic or other system.'<sup>2</sup> There is, thus, ample warrant for the conclusion of the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

erudite Principal of Birmingham University, that 'the promulgation of any such negative and destructive scheme, especially in association with free-and-easy dogmatism, should automatically excite mistrust and repulsion. A premature and cheap monism is, therefore, worse than none at all.'

(vii) All the foregoing considerations compel us, in the philosophic search for a true and all-comprehending monism, to turn in the direction known as idealism, or spiritualism. This cannot certainly be called cheap or premature, for philosophers in plenty have supported Prof. Ward's avowal that 'once materialism is abandoned, and dualism found untenable, a spiritualistic monism remains the one stable position.'<sup>1</sup> Here, and here alone, can it be said with truth that 'the dualism of our human knowing is founded and transcended in a monism of the infinite, the source of both the finite spirit and the cosmic order.'<sup>2</sup>

It is naturally impossible to find adequate verbal expression for such a conception.<sup>3</sup> We have yet

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Pref., p. xii.

<sup>2</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, see pp. 144, 145.

<sup>3</sup> It may be helpful to suggest, as the simplest illustration, 'the spoken or written word in which the material side is, clearly, only the symbol or the expression of the spiritual thought or meaning' (Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 203). But this does not warrant the conclusion that 'there is thus no mystery at all in that which we term spiritual monism.' It may be 'not an idealistic construction, but a conclusion to which we are led empirically and objectively. We have it constantly before us when we listen to and take in the meaning of words which come to us as ærial vibrations.' But no one knows better than the accomplished writer of these words, that here is the impassable and unfathomable gulf of mystery which, as Prof. Tyndall frankly acknowledged, science sees no prospect whatever of bridging.

everything to learn; and when all the best thoughts of science and philosophy combined have done their utmost, 'there are things which cannot yet be fitted in as part of a coherent scheme of scientific knowledge.'<sup>1</sup> But so far as we are able at all to understand ourselves, and to look out upon the immeasurable vastness beyond, no monistic scheme can be tolerated which does not both do us justice and transcend us. And certainly a monism which treats the world of phenomena as real, whilst regarding as illusory, or as ultimately mechanical, the world of noumena, sufficiently discredits itself. Spiritualistic monism is not guilty of the latter, nor can it be denied that it fairly fulfils the former.

However impossible it be to formulate an exact definition of such monism,<sup>2</sup> we can apprehend the reasons for regarding it as the true philosophy to which the facts of science point. That spirit, as exemplified in the consciousness which culminates in our own thought, should be the merely accidental or the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> As near an approach as perhaps is possible, is given in the following terms by Mr. Walker (*Christian Theism*, &c., p. 202): 'The term "spiritual monism" is adopted in order to set forth both agreement with science in acceptance of its facts, and difference from the interpretation which some in the name of science give to these facts. It acknowledges the two-sidedness that is everywhere manifested, and sees everything and every being in the world to be the result of the working or unfolding or development in its conditioned form of a single power manifested as both material and spiritual. But instead of giving the predominance to the material side, or equal value merely to the two sides, or leaving them both unexplained, it regards the spiritual side as that which is logically first and deepest, that which the material side only expresses and serves—that which manifests its supremacy in our own consciousness.'

mechanically necessary outcome of matter, is inconceivable. Even physically, we cannot conceive of matter as the source of force or energy. On the other hand, how near science has brought us already to the conception of force or energy as the source of matter, may be well illustrated in the recent brilliant Romanes Lecture of Sir Oliver Lodge.<sup>1</sup> But that in ourselves thought can express itself, and must express itself, through matter and motion, is beyond question. It is true that we cannot even guess how thought, as immaterial, sets up material, i.e. cerebral or nervous, or molecular motion. But this is, after all, irrelevant. We know that it does do so, and that suffices to make spiritualistic monism conceivable, even though its method of working be utterly beyond our powers to trace out. If, therefore, any monism at all be thinkable, it must be spiritualistic. No other form of monism can either give a rational account of its origin in the universe, or explain its actual culmination in our own indubitable personality.

<sup>1</sup> 'It becomes a reasonable hypothesis to surmise that the whole of the atom may be built up of positive and negative electrons interleaved together, and of nothing else.'

'It is possible, but *to me very unlikely*, that the electron as we know it contains a material nucleus in addition to its charge, so that in that case it need not be so concentrated, because a portion of its mass would be otherwise accounted for.'

'Until a positive electron can be similarly isolated, the hypothesis that an *atom is really composed of electricity*, that is to say, of equal quantities of positive and negative electricity associated together in a certain grouping of little bodies, each of which is *nothing more* than a concentrated charge of electricity of known amount, must remain a hypothesis.' The italics are mine. The indicated opinion of the lecturer, as a physical expert, should certainly have weight. (*Rom. Lecture*, pp. 11, 12.)

(4) *Spiritualistic Monism as related to Theism*

Assuming that what has been outlined above as Spiritualistic Monism, is the most valid presentation of the facts of existence—alike as to experience and observation—sanctioned by our modern knowledge, it remains to ask how the Theism which recommends itself to us on other grounds, is affected by such a conception. Putting aside as mere verbiage the dogmatisms in which naturalistic monism so often clothes its rejection of God, freedom, and immortality,<sup>1</sup> a dispassionate summary of the relations between spiritualistic monism and Theism, will include at least the following items.

(i) There is certainly no contradiction, and need be no collision between them. In order to make this clear, all that is required is, simply, that each should

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, chap. i. When Mr. Walker says, 'The very wide and ready reception which Haeckel's writings have met with, gives evidence of the tendency of thought in the direction of monism amongst all classes of people,' he not only points to an unquestionable fact, but supplies sufficient reason why Christian churches and teachers in general should pay more attention to the distinct needs of their human environment. Prof. H. Jones's protest in this regard (*Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1903, pp. 251-2), is only too well founded. The policy of letting such tendencies 'severely alone,' or merely calling them 'bogey,' is no more Christian philosophy than it is common sense.



be purified from the non-essentials of narrowness or mistake. Between the fundamental thought of each, no more disharmony can prevail than between two concentric circles, even though one should be immense and the other infinitesimal. The foundation truth of Theism is the reality and capacity of the human self; the vast and confessedly overwhelming suggestion of spiritual monism, is a universal Self. Between these, as true objects of thought, there may be perfectly harmonious relationship. Prof. Ward has accurately expressed the situation. 'From a world of spirits to a Supreme Spirit is a possible step. So far as we succeed in solving these problems—how to transcend agnostic monism and establish a spiritual monism—so far we shall have secured a basis for a Natural Theology.'<sup>1</sup>

An interesting testimony to the same effect, from an entirely independent standpoint, is borne by Mr. R. B. Arnold. 'We suggest that the monistic intellectual conception of the universe does not exclude even the probability of the ultimate validity both of God and immortality for ourselves. This monism seems to be supported both by the scientific evidence of gravitation and of the physiological necessity of matter to mental existence, and by the reasoning of previous metaphysical writers based upon the analysis of each type of fact taken separately.'<sup>2</sup> We have seen above, how Prof. Romanes endorsed the findings of Prof. Clifford as regards the acceptance of the main principle of monism. It is pertinent here, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 202.

<sup>2</sup> R. B. Arnold, *Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality*, p. 298.



to note also his additional caveat. 'But I disagree with him in holding that this theory is fraught with implications of an anti-theistic kind. In my opinion this theory leaves the question of Theism very much where it was before. That is to say, while not furnishing any independent proof of Theism, it likewise fails to furnish any independent disproof.'<sup>1</sup> And even apart from the judgement of experts, only ordinary intelligence is required to see that if any contradictions are to arise between spiritual monism and Theism, it must be upon pantheistic grounds. These will presently be shown to be invalid.

(ii) It is also plain that there is no necessary lessening of the force of the reasons already submitted for Theism. Certainly spiritual monism does not permit, let alone demand, the dismissal of God as an 'unfounded hypothesis.'<sup>2</sup> Science no more pronounces the hypothesis of Theism to be unfounded, than did Laplace in his oft-quoted reply to the emperor. But when science becomes philosophical, as in the hands of the naturalists, then the verdict of spiritual monism is well expressed by Dr. Schurman: 'On no account, if we are to interpret the universe by a single principle, as science, philosophy, and theology alike demand, can we forgo our hypothesis of anthropocosmic theism.'<sup>3</sup> For the sake of severe accuracy in dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Mind and Motion and Monism*, p. 116.

<sup>2</sup> This is how Laplace's famous reply is quoted in Haeckel's last work (*Last Words on Evolution*, p. 20). It is a misquotation that speaks for itself. There is no warrant whatever for the interpolated word 'unfounded,' except in the anti-theistic animus of the quoter. Yet on the same page he talks of 'heated partisans'!

<sup>3</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 211.

cussion, Theism may be styled a hypothesis, but it is really much more. It is the one and only suggested explanation of the unquestionable realities of being, which is at once rational and sufficient. We are told, indeed, bravely enough, that 'the same force may at one time strike a church as lightning, and at another time may be the mother-love which rocks the cradle.'<sup>1</sup> And such a statement is certainly dramatic. But is it true? We are bound to say, with all emphasis, that it is not. Nay, more. The very semblance of truth, which is all that there is in it, rests upon an utterly unwarranted assumption, viz. that spirit, or mind, or thought, is nothing more than molecular motion. This is, of course, only the usual, though gross, begging of the whole question, to which naturalism is naturally driven. It is at the same time, palpably, the old rank materialism which has received a hundred death-wounds. But if, on the other hand, spiritual monism affirms, in view of these and kindred facts, that the Universal Spirit thus expresses itself—in the lower form through physical, in the higher through mental phenomena—such affirmation much rather demands than dismisses Theism as a rational explanation.

For it is conceivable that the higher should be the source of the lower; it is inconceivable that the lower should be the source of the higher. The less may spring from the greater; but the greater cannot by any chance, or by necessity, issue from the less. Evolution never did, and never can, mean that. All the seeming rise of the complex out of the simple, of the organic, as representing a higher realm, out of a

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Dennis Hird, *Easy Outline of Evolution*, p. 184.

lower inorganic, is, it must be reiterated, absolutely unthinkable on scientific lines, without the assumption of a preceding and latent involution. And of this, the only adequate philosophical source is something transcending, both in content and competence, the very highest evolutionary product known to us. Rightly, therefore, is it said that 'reason is spirit, and it is only rational spirit which can account for the universe that we know culminates in our rational selves.'<sup>1</sup> To acknowledge a world of spiritual consciousness real enough and reliable enough for the construction in thought of a monistic theory of the universe, and then trace this back to nothing but the 'mechanism of the atom,' is a species of philosophy compared with which the old Hindu cosmogony was rational. The naturalism which seeks at one and the same time to dismiss the 'God hypothesis,' and establish monism, is really cutting the ground from under its own feet. It might certainly entrench itself impregably in a purely scientific domain. But monism is necessarily philosophical, and, as we have seen that a true philosophy conducts us to a spiritual monism, so is Theism the true and only key to such a monism. As the thought of a circle connotes both a centre and a circumference, and each of these implies the other, so does the philosophic conception of the universe on scientific lines connote a monism which inevitably implies Theism, to make it either thinkable or workable.

(iii) For only a little further reflection is required to make plain that the refusal of Theism to treat

<sup>1</sup> See Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 84.

‘the God hypothesis’ as a mere supposition, or abstraction, is endorsed to the uttermost by spiritual monism. The case is put in clear light by Mr. Tennant. ‘If Nature is one consistent whole, does it not presuppose One Ground, and therefore One Supreme Intelligence and One Cause; in other words, One originating and conserving Mind? If so, God is not a superfluous hypothesis, though science may have no need of such a concept. The concept of God as universal Mind, seems indispensable for rounding off the knowledge we derive from the several physical sciences, and for securing reality for the universe which science seeks to interpret.’<sup>1</sup>

But this is not all. If science, when it becomes philosophical, points us to one supreme Mind, it is impossible, with such powers of thought and perception as we now possess, to combine the conceptions of unity and mentality in any other final form than personality. We are furthermore constrained to regard personality as the greatest thing in the universe, so far as the latter can be at all apprehended by us. Of this greatest thing a fraction, as real in quality as infinitesimal in quantity, inheres in ourselves. Whence, then, can this have come, save from that which is one with it in kind, though transcendent in degree? Words may well fail us here, for the realities of consciousness are always extra-verbal. But so far as thoughts can be definite and words expressive, nothing more or less must be said than that personality can only come from personality. The process of derivation is irrelevant. It matters not by what means a teaspoonful of sea-water be

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 87.

conveyed to the chemist's laboratory, he knows from his analysis that it can never have come from the neighbouring rivulet, or from a land-locked lake. Physical illustration of spiritual fact is necessarily inadequate, but the analogy is true. Evolution or no evolution, if philosophical science culminates in a Monism which gives us a veritable spiritual unity as the source of all, that spiritual unity constitutes the archetype of personality whence our own personality, in itself far too great to be derived from anything less than itself, may reasonably find its true origin and ground of being.<sup>1</sup>

(iv) Again. Theism, we know, refuses to treat man as an automaton. Our mental world must be acknowledged to be our one certainty ; for without that, as the rock on which to build, all philosophy is but a castle in the air. But the very soul and centre of our mental world is our sense of moral freedom. With that, the reality of personality stands or falls. Here also spiritual monism ratifies Theism. Until a man can reason himself out of his own consciousness, logical deductions and metaphysical subtleties alike must fail to convince him that he is not a person but a thing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Into the question of Traducianism it is not at all necessary to enter here. The intermediacy of parentage is irrelevant, because the parents themselves are persons. For a succinct note hereupon, see Dr. W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Theology*, p. 217 ; Prof. Upton's *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> In accordance with his usual style, Prof. Haeckel assures the readers of his latest work (*Last Words on Evolution*, p. 104), that 'Theoretically, determinism, or the doctrine of the necessary character of our volitions, was established long ago.' Upon which one is driven to say plainly that the impertinence of such a state-

But nothing can save naturalistic monism from the necessity of affirming this latter. Prof. Guenther, indeed, voices for us with refreshing frankness, what we may expect ethically from naturalistic science. 'Good and bad are antithetic and dualistic terms that have no place in a unified conception of the world. The word "improve" would only have a meaning if we recognized any value in the nature of animals. But that is entirely wrong. Dualistic ideas of that kind should have no place in a monistic system. Science cannot have an ethics, because this has no meaning unless the moral laws that it sets up, and especially the life of man and the improvement of it, are regarded as having worth. For science there is no such thing as an aim, an end, or a value, in the world. There are only changes in accordance with eternal laws. The whole history of humanity consists of certain changes that take place on a speck of dust, and occupy only a second of the world's time. All man's actions, all his struggles and efforts, are so many phenomena that follow necessarily upon other phenomena; they are as void of worth as the fall of the meteor, or the roll of pebbles on the beach.'<sup>1</sup> This is indeed an inspiration towards the cultivation of science, and an inviting glimpse of the cheerful prospect afforded by naturalistic monism.

ment—in face of the deliberately published conclusions of psychological experts like Prof. W. James, and physical scientists like Sir Oliver Lodge—is only equalled by its falsity. No amount of scientific assertion whatever, constitutes philosophical establishment. Whilst even if it were 'theoretically' true, it could no more avail against the irrefragable testimony of consciousness, than a logical demonstration that he was dead would convince any living man that he was not alive.

<sup>1</sup> Guenther, *Darwinism and the Problems of Life*, pp. 375, 425.

It is, however, a bastard monism which thus openly proclaims its own ethical worthlessness. Certainly no man has more definitely pointed out than Prof. Haeckel himself, the impossibility as well as worthlessness of such science.<sup>1</sup> 'As queen of the sciences, philosophy has the great task of combining the general results of the other sciences and of bringing their rays of light to a focus, as in a concave mirror.' Be it so. But so soon as we enter the realm of philosophy, immediately we have to reckon not only with personality, but with moral personality. All deep human experience echoes Tennyson's protest, that we are, as men and women,

Not only cunning casts in clay :  
 Let science prove we are, and then,  
 What matters science unto men ?  
 At least to me, I would not stay.

Spiritual monism, on the other hand, takes as its very starting-point this deepest reality against which all the waves of controversy rush and roar in vain. Its manifest centre is the free personality of man to which consciousness testifies, and its circumference the personality of God which transcends without annihilating our own. It is quite ready to acknowledge, and indeed insist, that the radii of the circle of His being are infinite, whence it absolves itself from the necessity of attempting any definition of the divine.

<sup>1</sup> 'There are many scientists who still contend that the sole object of science is the knowledge of facts, the objective investigation of isolated phenomena, that the age of philosophy is past, and science has taken its place. This one-sided over-estimation of experience is as dangerous an error as the converse exaggeration of the value of speculation.'—*Riddle, &c.*, p. 7. See also *Wonders of Life*, p. 471.



But that which cannot be defined, can be both inferred and experienced. Herein Mr. Crawley, referring to the philosophy of religion, says truly,<sup>1</sup> 'Though not careful of metaphysical precision, it affirms reality, without falling into the materialistic or the subjective-idealist extremes. Its philosophical monism is unique, in so far as it will not define. Its monistic assumption is no metaphysical sophistication, but an immediate inference from the self-evident fact of existence.' Upon this firm basis, Theism and spiritual monism build together. And when the structure of their philosophy is complete, it is no modern Tower of Babel, but a worthy temple consecrated to the highest, in which man is 'crowned with glory and honour' by his investiture with the equal dignity and responsibility of a free moral being. What this involves in the relations between God and man, as Theism and spiritual monism alike conceive them, must be surveyed presently in the suggested light of pantheism.

(v) It must be frankly acknowledged that spiritual monism demands the purification and enlargement of Theism as sometimes presented in religious phraseology. There is little educated tendency to-day to revive the Deism of the eighteenth century, but there is great need yet to protest against the insufficiency, the inanity, the untruthfulness, the harm, which characterize no small portion of well-meaning but thoughtless religious speech and literature. If spiritual monism should do nothing else than save Theism from degenerating on careless lips into

<sup>1</sup> *Tree of Life*, pp. 297, 298.



mikrotheism, its service to the cause of true religion will be at once vast and timely. The current sneer of some naturalists that the Churches live upon 'the astute calculation that the ignorant masses do not reflect on these great problems,'<sup>1</sup> may be righteously repudiated. But it is none the less true that popular Theism needs to-day, more than ever before, just such a corrective and expansive influence as spiritual monism is calculated to supply. It is no discredit to myriads who have little time or ability for philosophical study, that their thoughts of God tend too much towards anthropomorphism, and thus produce a devotion which can fill a little Bethel with sincere doxologies, but withers away into dumb ignorance in presence of the stars. Such a tendency is natural, and to a certain extent is harmless. But the religious instinct which still permeates civilization has shown itself capable of much learning and unlearning during the last century; and this, instead of being the butt of naturalistic sneers, or the ground of nervous apprehensions on the part of believers, ought rather to afford reasons for the conviction that it will respond to the whole demands of a spiritual monism in the days to come. If it be true that 'from the nebula to man we find no break in the continuity of evolution,'<sup>2</sup> then, as Dr. Rice suggests, 'these changes in our thought of the

<sup>1</sup> Haeckel, *Last Words on Evolution*, p. 21. Compare this with the lofty assertion of his translator (see *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 137), that 'thousands of working men are more intelligent than Christian teachers generally.' Such utterances are on a par with the Professor's further assertion (*Last Words*, &c., p. 78), that 'untruth is permitted and is meritorious in the service of God and His Church.'

<sup>2</sup> Dr. W. N. Rice, *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*, p. 402.

universe, cannot but work corresponding changes in our thought of God and of His revelation to man. The carpenter-God has vanished from a universe which we have come to regard as a growth and not as a building.' Such an enlargement of conception is no more a loss or danger to philosophical Theism, than the passing from childhood to adolescence is a menace to manhood.

(vi) The direction in which such expansion of theistic thought is already taking place, and will doubtless continue, need here only be briefly indicated. It consists in a twofold development. (a) The fuller recognition of the divine immanence. (b) The blending of such an apprehension of the never-failing immanence with that of an equally real transcendence.

(a) It may be said, with as much truth as simplicity, that the modern knowledge which, as we have seen, rationally leads to spiritual monism, reduces Theism to a dilemma succinctly expressed in the division of a single word. God is either *now here*, or He is *nowhere*. The letters are the same, and in the same order, but the different line of division involves the theory of the universe. Divine immanence, or divine vacuity, is the choice pressed home upon the modern thinker by the conclusions of philosophical science. The more the thoughtful mind shrinks from the latter, the greater the earnestness with which it must address itself to the appreciation of the former. Prof. Haeckel's words might well serve us here to express the truth: 'The monistic idea of God, which alone is compatible with our present knowledge of nature, recognizes the divine

spirit in all things.’<sup>1</sup> Only, when he adds that this type of monism ‘can never recognize in God a personal being, or in other words an individual of limited extension in space or even of human form,’ the unphilosophical definition of personality, together with the unwarranted limitation of the divine to the human, suffice at once to rule such monism out of further consideration.<sup>2</sup> For of what avail is its pseudo-religious avowal in the next sentence? ‘God is everywhere,’ is, in such a case, the mere clatter of syllables without meaning. The only intelligible sense in which it can be said that God is everywhere, is that enforced by spiritual monism. ‘With respect to the universe as a whole, that which unifies it is the divine mind that is over all, and that is, in some measure, expressing itself in everything.’<sup>3</sup> When all phenomena are regarded as the expression of the mind and will of an ever-present, real, though transcendent, Personality, the remarkable words in the Oxyrhyncus Logia are invested with far-reaching significance. ‘Jesus saith, Wherever there are two, they are not without God: and where there is one alone, I say I am with him.

<sup>1</sup> *Confession of Faith*, p. 78.

<sup>2</sup> The same applies to other similar statements, of which the very latest (*Last Words on Evolution* the last page) is as follows: ‘Our Monistic god, the all-embracing essence of the world, the Nature-god of Spinoza and Goethe, is identical with the eternal, all-inspiring energy, and is one, in eternal and infinite substance, with space-filling matter. It lives and moves in all things, as the Gospel says.’ This last pseudo-quotation is on a par, for accuracy, with the rest of the philosophical jumble here exhibited. The identification of this monistic god with energy and matter, is surely sufficient to brand such monism as a hopeless tangle, and the object of its adoration as a mere fetish of the naturalistic school.

<sup>3</sup> Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 203.

Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me ; cleave the wood, and there am I.'<sup>1</sup> Such expressions might, confessedly, be employed as pointers to pantheism, but spiritual monism leads us rather to understand and appreciate the fact that the laws of nature are really the exhibition of the mind of God, and the working of those laws constitutes the everywhere-present manifestation of the divine nearness.

(b) To combine in exact thought the reality of divine immanence with divine transcendence, is undoubtedly beyond our powers of mind. Yet so far as such limitation of human faculty is concerned, it is equally applicable to the blending of mind with matter, or brain with thought, in our own consciousness. No man living has any more exact conception as to how the material and the immaterial work together moment by moment in his own conscious life, than he has as to how God, according to monistic Theism, can be at once immanent and transcendent in the universe. When, therefore, theistic philosophy bids us 'recognize that God is, at one and the same time, the life of all that lives, and yet distinct from the universe which He animates and sustains,'<sup>2</sup> it is in spiritual monism that we may find the greatest help towards an apprehension as to how that which must be, may be. Perhaps no words can better express the truth here than those of Dr. W. N. Clarke. 'This thought of the immanence of the transcendent God is a magnificent conception that is destined powerfully to influence religion, theology, science, and common

<sup>1</sup> Griffinhoofe, *The Unwritten Sayings of Christ*, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Knight's *Aspect of Theism*, p. 149.

life. It is at once so vast and so new an idea as scarcely to have begun its work. If God thus pervades the universe with His presence, purpose, and action, then indeed every place is hallowed ground. Nothing is profane, all is sacred. By this thought, worthily grasped, all life will be elevated and purified. Religion will be freshly inspired, theology will be transfigured, and science will become a spiritual worship.' <sup>1</sup>

It is with this vision before him that Prof. Bowne says, 'Upon the whole the theistic outlook is most encouraging.' <sup>2</sup> There are good reasons for such an estimate, in spite of all the difficulties which are continually being raised. 'The testimony of the manifestations of mind to the purpose of God,' says Mr. Morris, 'is the best corrective of the monism which looks backward,'—and finds the explanation of everything in the mechanism of the atom. 'A truer monism is to be found in looking forward: a monism which not only unifies, but which also gives what the prevalent monistic doctrine does not do, a meaning to the course of evolution: a monism which tells us that God will be one with His universe, and His universe one with Him.'

Manifestly, the modern knowledge which by searching criticism prunes away all the useless and hindering tangles of a thoughtless anthropomorphism, breaks down the narrowing limitations of a too-confident theology, shows the mistake of a Deism which would exclude God from His own universe, opens out the

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Theology*, p. 158. See also the closing words of the thoughtful volume on *A New Natural Theology*, by Rev. J. Morris.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, Pref., p. vi.

unfathomed depths of human personality as a true analogue of the Divine, and compels all sincere thought on these high themes to recognize as inseparable the immanence and transcendence of the Supreme Source and Sustainer of all,—is doing everything that human reason with its present powers can do, to rescue Theism from the impotence of a shallow familiarity, and make it yield, as never before, the worthiest, truest, most inspiring conception of the origin, worth, and destiny of mankind.



V

THE LARGER MONOTHEISM



‘The Proton Pseudos, the besetting temptation of philosophy, not only in the present but in every other age, is the inclination to overlook the kinetic and dynamic character of human experience.’

HENRY STURT, *Idola Theatri*, p. 8.

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‘Man is first in himself a creation of God, but he is also in his own mind equally a creator. He has the power of creating a universe of his own, which is as real to and for himself as the universe outside his thought. The universe, though not depending for its existence upon his mind, depends upon his creation within his mind of corresponding relations, before it can be known to him. It is in this delegated creatorship that the possibility of sin and error exists.’

*The Faith of a Christian, by a Disciple*, p. 24.

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‘There can be no true personality without the assertion of the self in man. This constitutes man’s individuality. Until the self is asserted there is no distinction between man and the animal, or man and the rest of creation. However much we may trace sin to this root principle of the assertion of the self in man, in opposition to the will of God, we must not lose sight of the fact that an assertion of the self is an essential for the realization of the divine idea of man.’

*The Faith of a Christian, by a Disciple*, p. 24.

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‘God not only eternally defines Himself, and so is self-existent eternally, but He is likewise freely defined as self-existent by every other self-defining being. The created as well as the Creator creates. Self-activity that recognizes and affirms self-activity in others, freedom that freely recognizes freedom, is universal; every part of this eternally real world is instinct with life in itself.’

DR. HOWISON, *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 356.

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‘God who is everything, is not really so much as if He allowed the most exalted free agencies to exist side by side with Him.’

PROF. JOWETT, *Life*, by Abbott and Campbell,  
vol. ii. p. 151.

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‘Spinoza fell into the same initial mistake as Xenophanes and his school. Instead of beginning with the observed order of nature and the human mind which observes, and so reasoning up towards the unity it is the business of philosophy to discover, he started with a definition of God, and then had to make the facts of the universe fit in with that arbitrary assumption.’

T. V. TYMMS, *The Mystery of God*, p. 54.

## V

## THE LARGER MONOTHEISM

It has been well said that the fundamental religious problem which presses upon the modern mind is not so much, if at all, whether there be a God, as what kind of a God there is.<sup>1</sup> Men may say what they please in the name of science, or philosophy, or both combined, but the human mind is so constituted that it simply cannot believe that there is no cause, or that there is an inadequate cause, for all that we see and know, including ourselves. Dr. Momerie's strong appeal to mathematical improbability,<sup>2</sup> may be accounted metaphorical, after the fashion of the last verse in the Fourth Gospel, but its substantial meaning is equally well warranted. We have seen that the immediate reply of naturalism to-day is to repudiate the notion of chance, and substitute that of necessity. But this

<sup>1</sup> 'Reason has for its subject-matter the problem of essence, not of existence; the question is, What is God? not, Is there a God?'—*Lux Mundi*, p. 103.

<sup>2</sup> 'Let every human being now alive upon the earth spend the rest of his days and nights in writing down arithmetical figures; let the enormous numbers which these figures would represent be all added together; let this result be squared, cubed, multiplied by itself ten thousand times, and the final product would still fall infinitely short of expressing the probabilities against the world having been evolved by chance.'—*Belief in God*, p. 68.

has been elsewhere shown to be only a subterfuge.<sup>1</sup> Undirected necessity is ultimately nothing but a synonym for chance, and to regard this as the adequate source of the order and law everywhere manifest around and within us, involves a credulity to which the average intelligence of mankind cannot stoop. Without having recourse to the desperate Pyrrhonism which Mr. Mallock so trenchantly advocates, we may yet endorse his general position, viz. that the common sense of mankind, and the desire to live a really human life, will ever suffice to prevent men from falling into the Scylla of atheism on the one hand, or the Charybdis of determinism on the other.

What, then, is left for us to consider? Prof. Upton has said that 'the philosophies of religion between which the thoughtful mind is called upon to choose in the present day, may be divided into Theism and Pantheism.'<sup>2</sup> Whilst Mr. Fiske, as a pronounced evolutionist, openly declares that 'the advance of modern science carries us irresistibly to what some German philosophers call "monism," but I prefer to call it "monotheism."'<sup>3</sup> But the term 'monism,' as we have seen, is by no means confined to Germany, and the really resultant question is whether the monism which, one must own, represents the trend of all our modern knowledge, ultimately means Monotheism, or leads us inevitably to Pantheism. Such a question cannot be lightly dismissed.

The first plain necessity of the case is a careful

<sup>1</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 433; Mallock's *Reconstruction of Belief*, pp. 168-82.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 328.

<sup>3</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 22.

consideration of the significance of these terms. Pantheism can scarcely be better defined than in the words of Principal Caird, as 'the theory which so emphasizes the infinitude and absoluteness of the divine nature, as to reduce the world to an illusory appearance or semblance of reality, and virtually to annul the freedom and moral life of man.'<sup>1</sup> All that this involves, we will presently consider.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to have a clear understanding concerning Monotheism. In ordinary speech, it is true, Theism implies Monotheism. But in more exact discussion, the latter term bespeaks an emphasis which must not be disregarded. As applied to the religion of Israel in days gone by, or to more recent Islam, or, again, to many forms of idol-worship in Eastern lands or savage tribes, it stands manifestly as a protest against polytheism. Such significance is, however, theological and practical, rather than theoretical and philosophical, and does not here concern us. Modern knowledge compels us to take a much broader view, from a higher standpoint than any of these suggested.<sup>2</sup> The survey of the universe in the light of

<sup>1</sup> *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> 'As for polytheism, it has ceased to exist in the civilized world. Every theist is by a rational necessity a monotheist.'—Aubrey L. Moore, *Lux Mundi*, p. 59. It is curious, in the light of such a generalization, which would seem to be fairly justified, to find a philosopher of the calibre of Prof. Wm. James saying that all that the practical needs and experiences of religion demand is a power 'both other and larger than our conscious selves. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us which has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still to-day.' It certainly needs 'another book,' as promised, to justify alike such a philosophical spectre and such a practical innuendo.

evolution, is a very different thing from the view of nature which led men to believe in and compare local deities, or the narrow-minded bigotry which inflamed the furious propagandism of Mohammed's followers. The superhuman powers revered by primitive races, were suggested by the most superficial acquaintance with the nearest phenomena of their simple life. On the other hand, 'the Deity revealed in the process of evolution,' says Mr. Fiske, 'is the ever-present God without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground, and whose voice is heard in each whisper of conscience, even while His splendour dwells in the white ray from yonder star that began its earthward flight while Abraham's shepherds watched their flocks.'<sup>1</sup> Thus whilst 'the infinite and eternal Power that is manifested in every pulsation of the universe, is none other than the living God,' yet when the term 'monotheism' is honestly employed, 'it is no empty formula or metaphysical abstraction which we would seek to substitute for the living God.'<sup>2</sup> This summary, which gives us a moral Being as the supreme source and sustainer of all, is diametrically opposed to the tenets of naturalistic monism, whilst it is no less foreign to the conclusions of some other schemes of modern thought.

In a word, Theism, if it is in these days to hold its own, must emphasize and justify its inclusion of a larger monotheism, in face of a definite and double

<sup>1</sup> *Through Nature to God*, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> *The Idea of God*, pp. 166, 167. Those who in the interests of Haeckel's monism call Mr. Fiske a pantheist (*Haeckel's Critics Answered*, p. 14), are referred to his own words (see whole extract in *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 311), 'we know that God is in the deepest sense a moral Being.'

opposition. It has to make a firm and final stand, first, against Pluralism, and secondly, against Pantheism. Against the latter, Theism is compelled to utter a twofold protest, viz. that it is at once too small, and too great, to be tolerated by human thought. It necessarily involves either the impersonal or the over-personal; thus in the one case crushing out the personality of man, in the other ruling out that of God. Against the former, Theism alleges scientific unreality and philosophical insufficiency. So that if we should assert, from preceding considerations, that nature points to a spiritual monism, and this in turn to Monotheism, such a conclusion cannot be regarded as a positive and final pronouncement, until three affirmations have been sustained. (1) Against Pluralism, that God as the All is One; for the many, even if eternal spirits, are so only in Him. (2) Against Pantheism, that God as the All, including all, is a personal Being. (3) Against Necessitarianism, whether Pantheistic or Deterministic, that God as the all-including Personality, does not crush out other personalities. These we will now fairly face, even though it can only be in summary.

### (1) *Monotheism versus Pluralism*

In ordinary theistic advocacy, little mention is made of Pluralism. Still less does it enter into the realm of practical religious consideration. Those who

are brought into most frequent touch with the 'common people,' find least justification of the strange assertion of Prof. James, that such always have been and still are polytheists. One cannot but wonder what is hereby intended. Even Romanism would not for a moment consent to such an inference from their adoration of saints. But when the same writer passes out of the practical sphere into the philosophical, his high authority compels attention to the deliberately published judgement that 'a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it.'<sup>1</sup> And this the more, because it is also echoed from very different quarters. Thus Dr. Howison proclaims himself 'glad of an opportunity to protest against this all-engulfing monism,' and to advocate instead 'an eternal or metaphysical world of many minds, all alike possessing personal initiative, real self-direction.'<sup>2</sup> Whilst Dr. McTaggart, from the academic heights of a Cambridge Lectureship, strongly insists that 'we may hold that reality consists of a system of selves'; and that upon his theory 'the harmonious system of selves, is the fundamental fact of the universe.'<sup>3</sup> Here are manifestly serious suggestions which must be seriously regarded.

Pluralism, in general, may be defined as 'the hypothesis of many independent, underived intelligences, co-eternal and uncreated.'<sup>4</sup> From which

<sup>1</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 526.

<sup>2</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, Pref., p. x.

<sup>3</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, pp. 247, 248.

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Personal Idealism*, p. 380.

it is inferred that 'the ultimate reality may be the totality of individual spirits in their community.'<sup>1</sup> And when this is carried out to its logical issue, we get the thesis 'that the Absolute is not a person, not conscious, not a monistic being for itself in a central way, but a divine city, a spiritual college, a union in which the unity is resident in the members, and rises to consciousness only in them.' We have seen how Prof. James goes still further, in his suggestion that for the needs of religion, 'anything larger than ourselves will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression; and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all.'<sup>2</sup>

Now, the problem which most impresses an ordinary intelligence, in face of these views, cannot but be how it is possible for men of such high attainments to arrive at such conclusions. Nor is it by any means sufficient to say, So much the worse for the ordinary intelligence. For amongst such must be classed Mr. John Stuart Mill, who pertinently remarks that, however respectfully such a theory may be treated, 'at least, if a plurality be supposed, it is necessary to assume so complete a concert of action and unity of will among them, that the difference is for most purposes immaterial between such a theory and that

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 136.

<sup>2</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 525.



of the absolute unity of the Godhead.’<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, Dr. Caldecott points out that the infinite number of finite units here supposed, is useless for ‘the purpose of this theory, without the added assumption that each unit spirit is perfect and eternal.’<sup>2</sup> One may well ask for scientific or philosophical justification of such unbounded assumptions. Though even if these were granted, there is still room to reply, with definite emphasis, that ‘unitary monistic spiritualism finds in an infinite pluralism of finite equals, no satisfaction for the demand for infinity in goodness and love which we found to be made by our finite, emotional, and ethical nature.’ Three other considerations, however, would seem to be here as necessary as sufficient.

(i) Such pluralism as this is, according to Prof. James’s own acknowledgement, neither more nor less than an inflated form of polytheism. So that whatever difficulties may inevitably attach to the idea of one eternal and uncreated personality, they are here multiplied by infinity.

(ii) The manifest unity which pervades all the myriad changes and complexities of relationship in nature, makes it ‘impossible to explain it as the result of dependent, jarring, and mutually hostile wills.’<sup>3</sup> The laws of nature, alike in their marvellous minuteness of application, and in their awful sweep beyond the Milky Way, are left absolutely without source or explanation. An infinite number of finite equals, or

<sup>1</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, cheap edition, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 28.

unequals, gives no rational account whatever of one single universal law.

But (iii) such a complete concert of action and will among them as is absolutely necessary to account for nature's undeniable and immeasurably complex unity, is, one must assert with Mr. J. S. Mill, a pure assumption. And for it there is no ground whatever, either in science or in philosophy. But the case is so well put by the eminent logician named, that the intervening forty years leave it more pertinent than ever. 'The reason, then, why monotheism may be accepted as the representative of Theism in the abstract, is not so much because it is the Theism of all the more improved portions of the human race, as because it is the only Theism which can claim for itself any footing on scientific ground. Every other theory of the government of the universe by supernatural beings, is inconsistent either with the carrying on of that government through a continual series of fixed laws, or with the interdependence of each of these series upon all the rest, which are the two most general results of science.' <sup>1</sup>

These are by no means the only difficulties attaching to the suggestion of Pluralism, as outlined above. Dr. Rashdall has pointed out that (a) it fails to account for the unity of the world ; not merely the uniformity of nature, but the fact that we all think in the same categories, &c. Also (b) that 'our souls in all their experiences are dependent upon modifications of a bodily organism which, from our point of view, must be regarded as due to the thought and will of God.' And (c) that the very limitations and progressiveness

<sup>1</sup> *Three Essays on Religion*, cheap edition, p. 60.

of our minds, point by analogy to an eternal and unoriginated mind. Whilst (iv) for the pre-existence which is essential to the theory, 'experience gives us no evidence, and we are not justified in going beyond experience.'<sup>1</sup> But enough is found here to relieve us of the necessity of going further. Even if idealism does lead us to 'a view of the universe which finds all reality in souls and their experiences,' this in turn not only permits but endorses the inference that 'the human mind, like all minds, is derived from the one supreme mind.'

Hence it may be said with confidence, that if, as Dr. Caldecott suggests, 'the theory of a Pluralist Absolute seems likely to win some favour in the present temper of philosophy,' it will have to take some other form before it can effectively recommend itself to our modern intelligence. This is apparently perceived by Dr. Howison, who, whilst strongly advocating a pluralism of his own, says plainly, 'At the same time, the aim is not at all to promote a certain other style of pluralism, which one might well enough call individualistic in the bad sense, whose dogmatic ideal is the dissolution of reality into a radically disjunct and wild multiverse—to borrow Prof. James's expressive coinage—instead of the universe of final harmony which is the ideal of our reason.'<sup>2</sup> The plural note of this 'personal idealism'<sup>3</sup> is sounded clearly enough, as the following shows. 'A pluralist does not believe in the least that the ultimate interest of philosophy is to find the

<sup>1</sup> *Personal Idealism*, pp. 380, 381.

<sup>2</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, Pref., p. xi.

<sup>3</sup> See Pref., p. xlviii.

One Reality that lies behind the innumerable diverse phenomena of the world. Pluralism is precisely the stubborn denial that the ultimate reality is any such One and Sole Being, in which every other being is but a component and fragmentary factor with none but a derivative reality.' <sup>1</sup> And yet this species of pluralism just as clearly asserts, and strongly emphasizes, the being of God. 'Creation,' we are told, 'must simply mean the eternal fact that God is a complete moral agent.' Or in other words, 'Creation means such an eternal dependence of other souls upon God that the non-existence of God would involve the non-existence of all souls, while His existence is the essential supplementing reality that raises them to reality: without Him they would be but void names and bare possibilities.' <sup>2</sup> These be brave words, confessedly. But it would seem to be beyond ordinary intelligence to piece together such statements. The protest is strong against a merely 'derivative' reality, for every other being than God. And yet His reality alone 'raises them to reality.' Surely the philosophy which is based upon such a split hair as this, must be thin indeed.

Although detailed discussion is here impossible, it is at least evident, as this erudite writer affirms, that the pluralist in general divides implacably from the monist. If, however, we assume that spiritual monism is our best present explanation of ourselves and the universe, the Monotheism which issues from it can come to no terms with the Pluralism which utterly dismisses the thought of God, and cares

<sup>1</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, Pref., p. 410.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Pref., pp. xvi, xvii.

not whether He be regarded as omnipotent or non-omnipotent.<sup>1</sup>

But with the Pluralism which requires God as the absolute condition of its own validity,<sup>2</sup> it ought to be more than possible for Theism to arrange an eirenicon. Thus we are told that 'monists are a proud and weighty company ; in fact, of resistless weight if you grant their fundamental assumption—that the highest and controlling category of true thought is the category of cause construed as Efficient Causation.' To which is added that this pluralism 'reduces Efficient Cause from that supreme place in philosophy which it has hitherto held, and gives the highest, the organizing place, to Final Cause instead.'<sup>3</sup> But in true monotheism, as issuing from spiritual monism, there is no such rivalry as is here supposed, between efficient and final cause. For to it they are inseparable and mutually supplementary. Whatever the mechanical theory which calls itself monistic science may say, according to Monotheism efficient causes only become such by reason of their dependence upon final causes. For the Monotheist, a world of phenomena exhibiting causality, is just as full of illustrations of purpose. Here, it may be truly said, that what God hath joined together no man can put asunder.

<sup>1</sup> McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, chaps. vi. and vii.

<sup>2</sup> 'God is God alone, there is but one God, and the souls are at best but His prophets.'—*Limits of Evolution*, p. 372. See also pp. 355-9, for a distinct and definite demonstration of the existence of God based upon the reality of the self—a rehabilitation of the Anselmic argument which certainly merits respectful consideration.

<sup>3</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, p. 411, Pref., p. xvii.

So that instead of proclaiming a philosophical Jehad between this kind of pluralism and theistic monism, it might be suggested, by way of harmonization, that they both seek to appreciate the same realities, although they place their points of emphasis so differently. This pluralism is especially anxious for the real personality, freedom, initiative, of the individual. It dreads monism on the ground that 'it directly annuls moral agency and personal freedom, in all the conscious beings other than its so-called God.' But such an apprehension, we shall presently see, is an utter mistake in regard to the Monotheism which issues from spiritual monism. On the other hand, Monotheism is no less concerned for the supreme reality of God, as God. The very name connotes for it the Reality whence all other realities must be, and are, derived. Such derivation can never mean absolute, but may always mean relative independence. If man is created a moral, i.e. a free, being, then the creation must ever involve a dependence as real as is the independence involved by the freedom. Recognizing this, Monotheism is saved from the *impasse* to which Dr. Howison's pluralism reduces itself, in postulating a God who *ex hypothesi* cannot be God. If the term 'monistic pluralism' be a contradiction, it is no more so than the conception which this kind of personal idealism seeks to express. In a word, the Pluralism which acknowledges the necessity of God, can only be consistent with itself by deriving the many from the One, and thus capitulating to Monotheism. All other pluralisms fall to pieces from their own inherent incoherence.

(2) *Monotheism versus Pantheism as the Divine Impersonal*

The second stand of Monotheism has to be made against what is generally known as Pantheism. This conception of the origin and relations of the universe, has existed through many ages and in many forms. The most venerable type, although it is equally modern, undoubtedly comes from the East. Long ages ago Brahmanic thought believed itself to have found the secret of the universe in its doctrine that 'beneath all surface appearances there is one and only reality, one Being that is and never changes, and that is Brahma. . . . God is the only reality, the substance of all things, the only Being who really is ; and the apparent reality of all other things and beings is only phantasmal and illusory.' <sup>1</sup>

To-day, thanks to the combined influence of Spinoza and of modern physical science diffused through international intercourse, there would seem to be reason for the opinion that the signs of the times 'presage an increase of the influence of Oriental thought on the mind of the world.' <sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly the strange adoption by pronounced naturalistic pantheism, of

<sup>1</sup> Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. pp. 97, 99. So again in the *Fernley Lecture* for 1902, by the Rev. Henry Haigh, *Some Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, pp. 56, 62: 'In the universe there is One, no other, nothing else ; there is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he ; that is the burden of this high philosophy. It is the constant refrain of all its music ; the theme, with infinite and most ingenious variations, of all its writings. Behind all, before all, in all, and beyond all is the One. This affirmation of the sole existence of Brahma dismisses everything else into the limbo of unrealities.'

<sup>2</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 139.



Spinoza as its philosopher and Goethe as its poet, has done not a little towards creating a popular atmosphere which appears most to satisfy those who least know what it involves. For whilst Pantheism, as a religious-philosophic creed, unquestionably justifies the description given of it some forty years ago by Dr. Liddon,<sup>1</sup> the great names just mentioned have been used as a kind of charm by Haeckel and his sympathizers, with vastly misleading effect. As a matter of fact it may be truly said that no man living knows where, in relation to Theism, either of these great men really was. Spinoza, with his eight definitions, seven axioms, and thirty-seven propositions, might seem to be the very ideal of philosophic precision. But what can be made of a philosophy which at one time asserts that 'reality is to be found only in God; that in all the universe there is no reality save in Him';<sup>2</sup> and then at another time affirms, as stated above, that 'the human intelligence has no more in common with the divine intelligence than the animal we call dog has with the constellation in the heavens to which we give the

<sup>1</sup> *Bampton Lectures* for 1866, p. 448. 'God, the pantheist must assert, is literally everything; God is the whole material and spiritual universe; He is humanity in all its manifestations; He is, by inclusion, every moral and immoral agent; and every form and exaggeration of moral evil, no less than every variety of moral excellence and beauty, is part of the all-pervading, all-comprehending movement of His universal life. If this revolting blasphemy be declined, then the God of pantheism must be the barest abstraction of abstract beings. Pantheism must either assert that its God is the one only existing being whose existence absorbs and is identified with the universe and humanity; or else it must admit that He is the rarest and most unreal of conceivable abstractions; in plain terms, that He is no being at all.'

<sup>2</sup> See Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, i. p. 103.



same name.' The epithet of 'God-intoxicated,' not seldom applied to him, is as meaningless as it may be true. For the notion of God becomes in his hands, as Dr. Martineau points out, 'an indefinite and sterile blank called being.'<sup>1</sup> So that God simply comes to be, for his philosophy, an infinite vacuity. For which reason Mr. Picton's enthusiastic estimate of 'the gospel of the God-intoxicated man whom the counsels of the Eternal reserved for the fullness of times'<sup>2</sup> certainly deserves to be styled 'much ado about nothing.' Assuredly the apotheosis of an eternal and infinite blank, can bring neither light to the minds nor comfort to the hearts of men.

Such an inflated estimate, moreover, is not in the least justified by the added encomium of Prof. McTaggart, that 'sixteen centuries after the death of

<sup>1</sup> See *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy*, by Prof. Upton, p. 201. This same philosophical vacuousness as applying to Hindu pantheism is well expressed by Mr. Haigh (*Fernley Lecture*, pp. 64, 65): 'With unflinching thoroughness the philosophers of India have divested Brahma of all relationship—and thereby robbed it of all content; for unrelatedness and emptiness are practically synonymous terms. A Being without relationships is, for us, a Being without content; and a Being without content can be of no help or interest to us. How such an Absolute can be known to exist at all, since it is unable to reveal itself through relationships, is a problem past solution.' And as another similar problem we may add the query how any man, be he philosopher or dullard, can be 'intoxicated' with such vacuity.

<sup>2</sup> *Pantheism* (Religions Ancient and Modern Series), p. 52. It would truly be interesting to know, from Spinoza's standpoint, who or what this reserving Eternal can be. How the impersonal and unrelated Absolute could select a human being and keep him for a purpose, is verily an ultra-metaphysical problem which only the pantheist can solve.

Jesus, the Jewish race produced another great religious teacher, in whom philosophical insight and religious devotion were blended as in no other man before or since.' <sup>1</sup> For not only ordinary minds, but experts of the calibre of Dr. Martineau, are driven to the conclusion that what is here termed blending is but a euphemism for destruction. To a consistent Spinozist, 'devotion' is as impossible as love of the atmosphere. Well says Prof. Upton, 'For nothing, I feel assured, will posterity be more grateful to Dr. Martineau, than for the lucidity and force with which he has shown that the facts of our ethical and religious experience, imply and demand that the voluntary nature of man must be saved from pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as within its sphere, a free cause other than the divine, yet homogeneous with it.' <sup>2</sup> Without such freedom 'religious devotion' is an empty sound, in reality as unthinkable as the enthusiasm of a telescope for the Milky Way. What is the use of Spinoza's central definition that 'God is a Being absolutely infinite: in other words, God is substance constituted by an infinity of attributes each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence,' <sup>3</sup> when his most confident scientific exponent acknowledges without reserve, that 'this essence of substance becomes more mysterious and enigmatic the deeper we penetrate into the knowledge of its attributes—we do not even clearly know whether it exists or not' ? <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 290.

<sup>2</sup> *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy*, p. 203.

<sup>3</sup> See Flint's *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 363.

<sup>4</sup> Haeckel, *Riddle, &c.*, p. 134.

Concerning such a pantheistic system, therefore, a competent critic may well affirm that for an avowed philosophy 'a less solid or secure foundation there could not be.'<sup>1</sup> Whilst as to religious devotion, its doctrine that God is all, which when thoroughly worked out comes necessarily to mean that God is nothing, can no more touch, let alone satisfy, the human heart than a spectre can take the place of a loved one lost.<sup>2</sup>

The recent attempts of Prof. Haeckel to renew and popularize this philosophy, have only served to throw into lurid relief its failures and impossibilities.<sup>3</sup> It is a mere play upon words to 'maintain that the divine existence is the one true existence,' when what is thereby connoted is the existence of an unknown and unknowable substance which possibly may not exist at all. To speak of 'divine' in such a connexion, is nothing more than a verbal mirage. Such a philosophical phantasm can no more satisfy the demand

<sup>1</sup> 'Substance in itself, which is what is defined, is simply what no human mind has ever apprehended or can apprehend. Every attempt to define substance in itself or to reason on it, must be repelled as a violation of the laws of human thought and of the essential limitations of human knowledge. Spinozism is a system founded on this error.'—Flint, *Anti-Theistic Systems*, p. 365.

<sup>2</sup> This much Dr. McTaggart frankly confesses. 'By love of God I mean something entirely distinct from reverence and admiration and gratitude. That of course must go, if it is believed that the person that was loved never existed.'—*Some Dogmas*, &c., p. 290. It was in reference to this utter vacuity that Dr. Martineau wrote to Prof. F. W. Newman concerning Spinoza: 'I was myself misled in my early study of his *Ethica* into an admiration of him, resting upon wrong grounds. I credited his theistic language with a meaning which I now see it did not contain.'—*Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> See Haeckel's *Riddle*, &c., p. 8; *Haeckel's Monism False*, chap. viii.

of the human mind for cause, or the yearn<sup>1</sup> of the human heart for an object of devotion, than a vacuum can satisfy the need of human lungs. By no sophistry of thought or speech, can an infinite indeterminable become a divine unity.<sup>2</sup> There may be truth in Dr. Flint's remark that 'the pantheist errs not so much in what he affirms of the great First Cause, as in what he denies to it.'<sup>3</sup> But the denial is unmistakably fatal to everything divine, no less than to everything human. Let us consider first the destruction of the divine.

(i) *The Divine Personality*

Dr. Howison has pointed out that the doubly deadly influence of the philosophical creed we are now considering, may be indicated by the accentuation with which the word 'pantheism' is pronounced. PANtheism conveys the signification that in one aspect God is utterly lost in the All. PANtheISM suggests the opposite result that the All, of which assuredly the most important part for us is the human, is altogether lost in God.<sup>4</sup> We have to consider first how the Monotheism which issues from spiritual monism, protests against the former of these errors.

<sup>1</sup> *Sic.* I see no reason why this expressive term, with all respect to the reviewer, should not be a substantive, quite as lawfully and usefully as 'love' or 'look,' &c. Such an artificial canon of speech as that 'a look,' may mean 'a looking,' but 'a yearn' cannot mean 'a yearning,' merits only disregard, custom notwithstanding.

<sup>2</sup> See *Modern Scepticism: A Course of Lectures* (Hodder & Stoughton), lecture on Pantheism, by Dr. Rigg, p. 42. 'Let us look at this word "unity" and consider closely what it must mean.'

<sup>3</sup> *Theism*, p. 127.

<sup>4</sup> See *Limits of Evolution*, p. 62. The two forms may evidently

Prof. Haeckel's conception of the pantheistic God, is, as we have seen, 'the infinite sum of all natural forces, in which there can never be any connotation of personality.' Putting aside once more the flimsy definition of a personal being as 'an individual of limited extension, or even of human form,' we are here face to face with the great affirmation of Monotheism and the corresponding denial on the part of Pantheism. So direct and serious a contradiction cannot be lightly dismissed. In the unmitigated antithesis thus involved, there are at least five distinct elements.

(a) The distinction of God from the universe. Here we must assume that the universe is real, including ourselves; and that there is necessarily a Supreme Source of all. The affirmation of Monotheism is that 'there is no identification of the media through which the disclosures of Intelligence, Feeling, Will, are made, with the Being, Substance, or Power, which thus discloses itself.'<sup>1</sup> But when, on the other hand, we are assured by Prof. Land that 'in Spinoza's view, God is no more the efficient cause of the world than the world is the efficient cause of God,' we have at once, in succinct expression, the unmistakable revelation of his Godless doctrine of God, the true essence of his naturalistic pantheism, and the very core of the philosophical delusion against which Monotheism protests.

be also termed atheistic and akosmic respectively. The one puts the sensible universe in the place of God, and so cancels His being; the other annuls the reality of the kosmos by reducing it to mere modes of the one and only universal being.

<sup>1</sup> Knight's *Aspects of Theism*, p. 153.

In his interesting little volume upon Pantheism, Mr. Picton refers to the attitude of the Church Fathers towards this 'perennial problem of the Many and the One,' and he particularizes Augustine as one who 'would seem to deny to the world any separate creature existence, when he says that but for the divinity everywhere in it, creation would cease to be. But in his insistence on the creation of the world from nothing, he directly contradicts pantheism, because he must necessarily be taken to mean that there is now *something other than God*.' <sup>1</sup> The words italicized undoubtedly express the substance of the Pantheist's objection to Monotheism. It may be acknowledged as one worthy of respect. Yet this otherness, rightly apprehended, is no necessary contradiction to the all-comprehensiveness of the divine. If we substitute for Augustine's 'creation of the world from nothing' the derivation of the world from Himself—which is what the Monotheism based on spiritual monism affirms—the otherness of the kosmos remains as consistent with the actuality of the divine nature, as with the manifestation of causality and purpose which our minds cannot help observing in the universe. In which case, a true philosophy both must and may contradict Pantheism.

Certainly, as Mr. Walker says, 'a monism, whether physical or spiritual, which makes no distinction between God and the world, cannot rise above pantheism, or really give us God.' <sup>2</sup> And if it be objected that such distinctness of God from the universe

<sup>1</sup> p. 54. The italics are mine.

<sup>2</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 279.

involves dualism, the answer may well be that, even if such dualism be real, 'it is not an absolute but a strictly relative dualism.' We may not be in a position now to affirm that it is temporary, but we are at once free and bound to avow that monism can only be valid in recognizing and absorbing such dualism, even as the certainty of the unity of our own consciousness always connotes the distinction between mind and body. With the alteration of one word, we may, therefore, fully adopt the impartial finding of Dr. Paul Carus: 'Nomotheism is not pantheistic. Pantheism identifies God and the universe, and according to Nomotheism, God is different from the concrete and material universe. God is in the universe, and it so happens that the old paradox is justified, that the part is greater than the whole.'<sup>1</sup>

(b) Monotheism justly affirms the reality of mind and will, as manifest in the interworking everywhere of the whole kosmos. Accepting as axiomatic Mr. Spencer's above-quoted avowal that 'amid the mysteries which become more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty that man is ever in the presence of one infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed,' we are bound by our own consciousness of volitional force, as emanating from mind or spirit, to translate that energy in terms of spirit, and then trace to it as source, the potentialities of spirit which

<sup>1</sup> The *Monist*, January, 1906, p. 146. How little here Nomotheism differs from Monotheism, may be understood from the writer's preceding statement that 'God, the prototype of all personality, is not less than a person, but more than a person.'



in ourselves find expression as thought, emotion, will.<sup>1</sup> For it is with good philosophical warrant that Principal Caird has said, 'It is of the very essence of mind or spirit that it contains in it the necessity of self-manifestation in objective form, and therefore that which we speak of as the creation of the world, must be conceived of as the expression not of arbitrary will, but of the very nature and being of God.'<sup>2</sup> Certainly will is none the less really will, for not being arbitrary; nor is thought or emotion less actual, for transcending our human powers in extent or mode. But derivation does not involve identification. Rather is Dr. Rashdall justified in saying that 'once admit a causative relation between the supreme Spirit and the other spirits, and we shall avoid all identification between the spirits and God.'<sup>3</sup> Yet if there is to be for philosophical thought any necessary dissolution of all possibility of personality on the part of the 'infinite and eternal energy' in the totality of the universe, such as Pantheism supposes, it must assuredly begin with the realm of spirits. If it be not true there, much less can we think of its derivation from the material world. If the acknowledged actuality of the universe does

<sup>1</sup> In chap. iv. of his *Reconstruction of Belief*, Mr. Mallock gives reasons for his summarizing assertion that, 'accepting the arguments of the most celebrated exponent of the doctrine that the universe as a whole can have no character at all in any way congruous to man's, we have seen that these very arguments, if only they are taken strictly, compel us to impute feelings and thoughts and purposes essentially resembling in kind those which we know ourselves, to an ever-widening range of natural facts and processes' (p. 201).

<sup>2</sup> *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 34.



not annihilate our own personality—as witnessed by our powers of thought and will—there is nothing in the whole range of observed phenomena, to suggest that the divine personality is incompatible with the reality of the sum of things.

(c) Furthermore, this recognition of the reality of mind, i.e. thought, feeling, will, in the Supreme Source of all, connotes the oneness of that original will. If the universe is to be referred to mind at all, science is itself insistent that it must be referred to a single mind. No form of Pluralism can gainsay the testimony of science in this respect. Such an affirmation we have sufficiently justified above. Whence we may surely proceed to ask, with Mr. Haigh, ‘If human personality, properly understood, is an example of strict unity, why should the Vedantist, or any one else, in the interest of unity hesitate to ascribe personality to God?’<sup>1</sup> The elements of the human personality, we know, are many and distinct. Yet each living person knows that he is one in his essential being. If, then, an infinitesimal personality maintains its unity in complexity, there can be no philosophical reason for denying the infinite personality on the ground that the unity of nature which points to it is infinitely complex.

Certainly the final oneness to which, according to science and philosophy, nature seems increasingly to point, can no more be reached through atheistic Pantheism than through Pluralism. A mere incoherent infinitude, either of spirits or of non-spirits, supplies no ground for unification whatever. In

<sup>1</sup> *Fernley Lecture*, p. 70.

Prof. Flint's words, 'Order, life, mind, and morality, are all facts, as unexplained by materialism when professing to be monism, as when confessing itself to be multitudinism. For it is the profession which is erroneous, and the confession which is correct. Unity can never be reached by materialistic pantheism, nor can variety ever be explained by it.'<sup>1</sup>

(d) Monotheism further proceeds to aver that the divine personality which is connoted by spiritual monism, ought not to be deemed incredible on the ground of difficulty in conceiving it. Having already dealt with this objection, we need only now point out, with Prof. James, that the Monotheist is not by any means called upon to solve all the mysteries of the divine nature, or of the relations of the divine to the human. 'It is sufficient for him to know that he himself simply is, and needs God; and that behind this universe God simply is and will be for ever, and will in some way hear his call.'<sup>2</sup>

The commonest objection to this ascription of personality to the divine nature, when it is acknowledged as equally immanent in the universe and transcendent, is that it is an unwarranted anthropomorphism. That is, it involves thinking of God in human categories, and describing Him in human terms. But Monotheism is perfectly clear in its threefold reply.

(i) It does not attribute human personality to the divine. That is a pure invention of anti-theism, as illustrated in Haeckel's definition already quoted.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 415.

<sup>2</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 135.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 392.

(ii) The employment of anthropomorphic terms is quite harmless when intelligently and sincerely apprehended. As Prof. Knight has put it: 'In making free use of anthropomorphic language, we know that it is of necessity partial and inadequate; and we exclude from our notion of personality every anthropomorphic feature that savours of limitation, while we retain the notion of a Being who is personal and yet infinite.' <sup>1</sup>

(iii) Such anthropomorphisms may be as useful as they are inevitable. After all, be our thoughts of the Divine what they may, we have no other than human terms in which to convey them, and it is essential at least to start with the comprehensible in our search for the reality of the incomprehensible. 'On the other hand,' rightly says Prof. Knight, 'if we discard symbolic thought to begin with, we may easily find ourselves in a still vaguer region; and the coloured clouds of metaphor may hinder our vision of the Infinite less than the haze of abstract thought.' <sup>2</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 167. See also Mr. Fiske's *Idea of God*, p. 166. The Editor of the *Monist*, moreover, cannot be suspected of any 'orthodox' bias when he writes: 'That aspect of God which is formulated by science is only a part of His being, and important though it be, it is not the only important one. There are other aspects within the reach of our knowledge, and other additional possible ones. None of them is sufficient to exhaust the significance of the divine presence in which we live and move and have our being. No fault can be found with any attempt of the human mind to reach out in appreciation of the divine spirit, nor in any yearning for a closer and more intimate union with Him, if only those who accept these several aspects remain conscious of their insufficiency.' January, 1906, p. 146.

<sup>2</sup> *Aspects of Theism*, p. 156. So too says Prof. Upton: 'Though reflection suggests that there are essential limits in our human personality which can have no possible application in the case of

a word, anthropomorphism could only be fatal to Monotheism if it proclaimed itself literally exhaustive. Which is the last thing in the world it would ever think of doing.

(e) Finally, it is certain that whatever may be the difficulties encountered by Monotheism in predicating a real divine personality distinct from the universe, those of the Pantheism which insists upon an impersonal divine are far greater. It was this which Dr. Martineau had in view when he referred to the objections to the divine personality as being 'not less intellectually weak than they are morally deplorable.'<sup>1</sup> Nothing has been established by modern science, or suggested by modern philosophy, which in the least weakens the force of what Dr. Rigg wrote some forty years ago: 'It is much simpler to believe in a personal God than in such an impersonal divinity as this Protean Force. Every difficulty which belongs to the thought of God's existence belongs to this also. Is it reasonable to object to the doctrine of a personal Deity because of its inconceivability and its stupendous difficulties, and yet to believe in such a primal, essential, immaterial, creative, blind and unintelligent force as this? Surely no contradiction could be greater. The conception of God as from everlasting *is* stupendous. But an infinite Protean Force from everlasting,

God, yet there are substantial reasons for concluding that these limitations may be dropped without affecting the essence of the idea, and that, in truth, our finite human personality suggests a deeper personality which is not, as ours is, dependent on another cause to create it, and on an external world to awaken and develop it.'—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 337.

<sup>1</sup> *Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 205.

destitute of intelligence and will, yet continually operative as the life, soul, wisdom and providence of all things, is nothing less than contradictory and absurd.' <sup>1</sup>

The absolute and impersonal unity of Pantheism is, indeed, as helpless as it is unthinkable. According to its own definitions, its 'God' must be the Absolute to the uttermost. Yet certainly the more absolute it is, the more useless it is. For it is well said that 'from absolute unity nothing but absolute unity can come, or rather absolutely nothing can come.' <sup>2</sup>

It may be that the curious recrudescence of Polytheism in some recent philosophies, is, like the Polytheism of ancient Hinduism, an inevitable reaction from the barrenness of pure Pantheism. When, therefore, Mr. Bradley, in his *Appearance and Reality*, insists that 'the Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true,' the revolt of the human heart as it cries out 'what, then, have we to do with the Absolute?' is ratified by every thoughtful mind. For who can help endorsing Prof. Seth's estimate of such philosophy? 'Striving to exalt the Divine into a region beyond thought and beyond expression, it leaves us with nothing in our grasp at all.' <sup>3</sup> What, we are bound to ask, with all respect, is

<sup>1</sup> *Lectures on Modern Scepticism*, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 415. And there are numbers of the ablest witnesses from the mission field to endorse the further statement, by way of illustration, that 'Hinduism finds polytheism to be the indispensable supplement of its pantheism. It is the personal gods of Hindu polytheism, and not the impersonal principle of Hindu pantheism, that the Hindu people worship. No people can worship what they believe to be entirely impersonal' (p. 380).

<sup>3</sup> *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 56.

the result of all this metaphysical travail, in which language is tortured into senselessness and thought reduced to vacuity, by reason of the desperate attempt to get everything out of nothing? Is it any wonder that a philosophical abortion presents itself, as unacceptable to man as contemptuous of God? What, in such a case, is the worth of the pseudo-compensating assertion that the Absolute is 'super-personal'? If the super-personal be not even moral, nor true, nor beautiful, where does the 'super' come in? Any person within the reach of our acquaintance who altogether lacked these character-qualities, would be certainly regarded as entirely infra-personal. Is there not here, truly, occasion to recall the warning—

Hold thou the truth, define it well,  
 For fear divine philosophy  
 Should push beyond her mark, and be  
 Procureess to the Lords of Hell?

And when the distinguished Professor of Jena concludes his 'confession of faith' with the dramatic words—'May God, the Spirit of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, be with us!' we cannot but first mark what it does not mean, and then wonder what it does mean. As to the former, it is manifest that this form of Pantheism has no Absolute as its centre, because the Absolute cannot be any of these. For the latter one is left in hopeless perplexity, and the King's despairing cry in *Hamlet* comes back upon us irresistibly:

My words fly up, my thoughts remain below:  
 Words without thoughts never to Heaven go.

It is no parody so to say. For how is it possible to attach thoughts to words, when with one breath God is defined as 'the infinite sum of all natural forces,' and the next is invoked as the 'spirit of the good'—whilst the spirit itself is declared with all emphasis to be impersonal, so that out of the impersonal, the good, the true, the beautiful, morally—which are nothing if not personal—are adjured to issue. Truly this is not merely philosophic madness, but there is not even method in it. On the other hand, there is nothing contradictory, nothing absurd, nothing inconceivable, in the final conclusion of the Monotheism which rests upon spiritual monism. 'It is assured in its confidence that the True, the Good, the Beautiful, are in their perfection characters of Infinite Personality.'<sup>1</sup>

### (ii) *The Human Personality*

There is, however, another phase of Pantheism, fairly expressed when emphasis is put upon the last syllable, which is not content with denying the divine personality, but leads on to the obliteration of the human also. The All which constitutes the impersonal conception of God, is regarded as not only all-comprehensive, but at the same time so all-controlling, that no room is left anywhere in nature's interstices for the existence or activity of a free, i.e. a causative, personal being. Here, then, the conflict becomes even more pronounced between the Monotheism based on spiritual monism, and the Pantheism which would not only dissipate the divine but crush out the human personality. Hence

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 139.

the strong protest of the former is, that the attitude of the latter exhibits a double fallacy. Such a philosophical scheme as it involves, is alike contrary to fact and to itself, whether we consider its psychological or its moral bearings.

1. Let us first view the case psychologically.

No controversy is possible concerning the fact that man is a thinker.<sup>1</sup> How, then, may we not ask at the outset, can a thinker under any circumstances be less than a person? It is no doubt easy for a scheme of universal 'mechanism' to represent thought as nothing more than molecular vibration, each wave set in motion by the preceding wave. But apart from the difficulties, physical and psychical, with which such a scheme is riddled, the simple answer to it always is, and ever will be, that it does not give us thought at all. The very essence of real thought, as distinct from mere sensation-consciousness and memory, is that it is creative, and involves a creating ego, a unitary self-consciousness without whose volitional action thought would not be at all. The power of thought, therefore, which is confessedly required even to construct a pantheistic philosophy, is its own witness to the fallacy of any system which denies mental initiative to the human person, on the ground that he is but a fraction of a mechanical All. But it is surely manifest that no system of thought can possibly be more self-contradictory than that which reduces a man to an unthinking thing.

<sup>1</sup> The position of Haeckelian naturalism that thinking is nothing more than the molecular vibrations of the phronema, involves a crass materialism which no longer really merits discussion, though it is here mentioned in passing.



(a) That such is the ultimate issue of Pantheism, there can be no real question. Take, for instance, its latest definition from an eloquent and enthusiastic exponent. 'Pantheism,' says Mr. J. A. Picton,<sup>1</sup> 'is the idea of the Universe as one living Being, of which all creatures and things are parts and proportions, and therefore *in themselves nothing*.' Here the dilemma for such Pantheism seems as simple as sufficient. Either man cannot think at all—in which case one would have to ask how Pantheism itself ever became thus an object of thought—or, 'nothing' can think. And if this be so, then verily, in face of a thinking nothing, it is time to cease to talk of religious miracles by comparison.

Let us, however, weigh the words of the 'God-intoxicated man whom,' we are told, 'the counsels of the Eternal reserved' for our enlightenment. Says his special advocate, 'In his view, then, man is a finite mode of the two divine attributes, extension and thought. Thus both the extended body and the conscious mind have their substance and reality in God. But the essence of man does not necessarily involve his separate existence.'<sup>2</sup> Here, then, the representation of Pantheism, taken at its best, is that the spiritual part of man is a mode of thought which has no separate existence. But thought, to be thought, must be the volitional consciousness of one thinker. That two thinkers should conspire to produce one thought, is psychologically inconceivable. Whence it follows that half a thinker could not think

<sup>1</sup> *Pantheism* (Religions Ancient and Modern), v. 95. Italics mine.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

at all. What kind of thought, then, would it be which emanated from the infinitesimal fraction of an infinite thinker? It would of course be no thought at all. In other words, if man be only a mode of thought, he is no thinker—i.e. he is no man. Man without separate psychical existence, is as much a contradiction in terms as a two-sided triangle. Hence all that Pantheism can give us is, not a man, but the shell of a man. Or, as our psychological expert puts it, ‘Our private selves are like the bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea—epiphenomena, as Clifford, I believe, ingeniously called them—their destinies weigh nothing and determine nothing in the world’s irremediable current of events.’<sup>1</sup> In which case, man has disappeared, and only his mocking pantheistic ghost is left.

(b) The associated philosophical doctrine of the Absolute, only contributes vacuity to difficulty, and intensifies the nothingness to which human nature is reduced. To illustrate this, it is no more necessary than it would be profitable to plunge into a shoreless sea of metaphysics. ‘We do not,’ as Dr. Rashdall says, ‘get to any fuller or deeper Reality by supposing an existence in which God, or the Absolute, no longer distinguishes himself from the selves, or the selves from God.’<sup>2</sup> The Absolute which would engulf us, need not concern us. For the very process of thought by which such engulfing is contemplated, necessitates a thinking reality which can only cease to be what it is by annihilation. The Absolute which connotes universal annihilation, becomes either a monstrosity or a nonentity. Really it is the latter. For an

<sup>1</sup> James, *Varieties*, &c., p. 495.    <sup>2</sup> *Personal Idealism*, p. 386.

absolutely unrelated Absolute, is nothing but a philosophical nightmare. Prof. Seth gives us, in a word, at once the maximum and the minimum of the whole possibility. 'Rightly agnostic though we are regarding the nature of the Absolute as such, no shadow of doubt need fall on the truth of our experience as a true revelation of the Absolute for us. Hegel was right in seeking the Absolute within experience, and finding it too; for certainly we can neither seek it nor find it anywhere else.' <sup>1</sup>

(c) In plain speech, our personality, as individuals, is too real to be crushed out of us by any philosophy whatever. It so radically and utterly constitutes the self of which we are conscious—'our one mental certainty'—that an impersonal self is inconceivable in fact, even if it were not also a contradiction in terms. Let us consider well the following expert statement. 'The argument by which monism makes the human soul a part or an element or aspect of, and therefore in some sense identical with, the divine, is grounded upon one supreme fallacy. That fallacy is the assumption that what constitutes existence for others is the same as what constitutes existence for self. A thing is as it is known: its *esse* is to be known: what it is for the experience of spirits, is its whole reality: it is that and nothing more. But the *esse* of a person is to know himself, to be for himself, to feel and to think for himself, to act on his own knowledge and to know that he acts. In dealing with persons, therefore, there is an unfathomable gulf between knowledge and reality. All the fallacies of our anti-

<sup>1</sup> *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 61.

individualist thinkers come from talking as though the essence of a person lay in what can be known about him, and not in his own knowledge, his own experience of himself.' <sup>1</sup>

This should surely be beyond controversy. It comes in a word to this : 'I am I,' is the rock of unshakable reality upon which Pantheism is helplessly shattered, whether it be predicated of the human being or the divine. How such pluralism as it involves is related to spiritual monism, we have already seen. But as regards Pantheism it justifies its view of the separateness of the individual self-consciousness, by simple appeal to fact which cannot be denied without committing us to universal scepticism. In which case all philosophies would be alike delusions. Monotheists are content to point out that the opposite to this self-conscious separateness of personality, cannot be rationally expressed. Dr. Martineau's representation here holds good : 'You cannot even declare yourself a pantheist without self-contradiction ; for in doing so you reserve your own personality as a thinking and assertive power that deals with all else as objective.' <sup>2</sup> Or, in Principal Caird's words : 'The mind which perceives and pronounces on the nothingness of the finite world, cannot itself be identified with that world.' <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rashdall, *Personal Idealism*, p. 382.

<sup>2</sup> *Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 203.

<sup>3</sup> *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, i. p. 106. The same truth may be expressed, of course, in many ways. Dr. Tigert, with equal force, puts it thus : 'If any finite being exists capable of acting from itself and for itself, it has in that fact the certain test and mark of reality as distinguished from phenomenality. This mark occurs only in human spirits or persons.'—*Theism*, p. 336.

(d) We are, indeed, philosophically brought to this, that the divine which would by its sheer existence crush out the human personality, would thereby, so far as we are concerned, crush itself. For the reality of human personality is the highest and final evidence of the divine. They stand or fall together. On the one hand, 'if it be admitted that the human spirit has an existence of its own, not identical with the divine, the admission should remove any lingering scruples about the ascription of personality to God.'<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, if we have sufficient reason to believe in the personality of the Supreme, the very reality of that personality guarantees to us the non-quenching of our own. For until it is made philosophically sure that this is a world of things only, not persons, the Supreme Personality cannot but find its truest reflection in the personalities derived from itself, and these in turn their ultimate reality, as well as fullest liberty, in relation to Him.<sup>2</sup> The sense in which they and He 'stand dualistically apart,' is at the same time a confirmation rather than a contradiction of spiritual monism.

(e) Finally, the witness of consciousness to personality, as the foundation of all else relating to the protest of Monotheism against Pantheism, is to be regarded as beyond controversy. The thorough-going

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> So does Dr. Howison well point out, that 'this logically necessary connexion (i.e. connexion put by the pure spontaneity of each intelligence) between the idea of each mind and the idea of God, while leading to nothing if it stands by itself, leads inevitably to the reality of God, as soon as the reality of any single mind is assured.'  
—*Limits of Evolution*, p. 357.

Pantheist, whether Eastern or Western, does not shrink, we know, from the logical inference that our own consciousness, just in the degree in which we know it for our own, is an illusion. Such an illusion must, indeed, be invented by the Vedantist, because 'self-consciousness, which is of the very essence of personality, implies other consciousness and seems to create a duality.'<sup>1</sup> Such subtle sophistries are on a level with the denial of the unity of a coin because it has, and must have, two sides. The illusion, in each case, is not in the fact but in the imagination. Such philosophy is fairly represented by the famous rope trick of the Hindu Yoghis, who are said to fling one end up into the air, where it remains so firm that they can then climb up it. Illusion of some kind, in such an exhibition, it is agreed there must be, for in the light of modern science such a phenomenon is unthinkable. But if the rope that is to bear a man, or even its own weight, cannot scientifically be suspended from nothing, still less can any true philosophy be based upon the reduction to nothingness of human personality. Upon an illusion, only an illusion can rest.

Impermanence is another matter. In all things known to us, including ourselves, undoubtedly impermanence must and does obtain. Consciousness gives no witness against it. The reality of life as translated in our consciousness, is rather enhanced than diminished by the actuality of impermanence. But in no sense does impermanence connote unreality. On the contrary it assumes reality. For 'nothing' cannot be subject to change. Only that which is,

<sup>1</sup> Haigh, *Fernley Lecture*, p. 68.

can become other than it is. Hence, in relation to our main consideration here, Prof. Seth is well warranted in saying that 'without this assumption of the infinite value and significance of life, argument about God is simply waste of time. The man who does not start from this assumption'—i.e. he who can suggest that his own deepest and clearest consciousness is but an illusion—'is not accessible to any argument. For him the world has no serious meaning. He has denied his calling, or as Fichte puts it, he has elected to be a thing and not a person.'<sup>1</sup> Unless even this be too much. For if a man cannot trust his own consciousness, he is scarcely in the world of things at all. He is but a dreamer. Yet in the degree in which he affirms even that, he contradicts himself. For he must postulate the reality of his dream-consciousness, even to affirm that it is a dream and nothing more.

From such a pitiful quagmire of pessimistic self-contempt, the Monotheism which is securely based upon spiritual monism happily redeems men, and sets their feet upon the rock of a nobler reality. It represents the divine and human personalities as reciprocal. The reality of the divine is guaranteed by the actuality of the human, about which, so long as consciousness remains, there can be no profitable controversy. The reality of the human is connoted in the very nature of the divine, which, having given birth to offspring worthy of itself, cannot prove itself a self-contradiction in thenceforth crushing them.

2. But from psychological considerations it is

<sup>1</sup> *Two Lectures, &c.*, p. 63.



equally necessary that we should pass to moral. It is indeed the greater half of personality which now awaits our careful estimation. The very soul of human personality resides in the existence of moral freedom, with consequent responsibility, in every human being meriting the name. The full discussion of all that is involved in the modern recrudescence of 'determinism' may be postponed. All that is here required is to show how valid is the protest of Monotheism against the pantheistic or naturalistic assertion that either the divine nature, or the reign of law, reduces man to an automaton. A mere outline, therefore, of the distinctive issues of spiritual monism in this regard, and their justification, will now suffice.

(a) It must be clearly understood at the outset, that if moral freedom be dismissed, personal responsibility, morality, personality, are lost. That such an inevitable consequence did not deter the old Calvinistic theology, does not here concern us. Such a Theism as it connotes, has had its day and ceased to be. But we are concerned to the uttermost in the falsity of the conception itself, and in the moral ruin which ensues when modern science, assuming the philosopher, assures men in authoritative tones that moral freedom is no more, and that moral responsibility is at an end.

That such is the meaning and result of modern determinism,<sup>1</sup> there is no manner of doubt. To take

<sup>1</sup> Once more, by reason of the vast issues involved, we may reiterate a protest against the name employed. The only true determinist is he who knows, and therefore insists, that he himself, and no other, determines his own thoughts and actions. The outcome of mechanical naturalism, as applied to human nature, is sheer automatism and nothing else.



but two specimens out of many. 'To-day it must suffice us,' says M. Hamon, as a University Lecturer, 'to have shown that there is no such thing as moral responsibility, and that all men are irresponsible.'<sup>1</sup> If we turn from the academic to the popular realm, we learn that 'no man can under any circumstances be justly blamed for anything he may say or do.' And this because 'everything a man does is, at the instant when he does it, the only thing he can do.'<sup>2</sup> In face of such principles and their practical issues, it is quite out of place to say that from Spinoza's standpoint—which we have seen is publicly adopted by Haeckel and his school—'the quibbles about free will cease to have any meanings.'<sup>3</sup> For all the meaning of human life is bound up in the acceptance or rejection of such an attitude. What, indeed, but manifest self-contradiction, can be exhibited in the plausible avowal that 'pantheism regards obedience to God as the ultimate and most inspiring application of that principle of the loyalty of the part to the whole which runs through all morality'?<sup>4</sup> For the God here mentioned is the impersonal All, to which obedience or disobedience can be no more distinguishable than music or discord to the atmosphere. The 'loyalty' here assumed as a principle, is as meaningless as the loyalty of a piston to a cylinder in an engine. The morality predicated is unthinkable, for no unfree being can by any possibility be moral.

<sup>1</sup> *The Illusion of Free Will*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *God and My Neighbour*, p. 137 ; *Not Guilty*, p. 202, by R. Blatchford.

<sup>3</sup> See *Pantheism*, by J. A. Picton, p. 74.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

(b) So serious a statement as that Pantheism is incompatible with morality, will of course be challenged. But however respectfully it may be phrased, the truth remains firm that a moral Pantheist is unthinkable. One might as well speak of a devoted wave, or a virtuous doll. For, on the pantheistic system, there is left in manhood no more moral potentiality than in these. Dr. Flint said truly some time since,<sup>1</sup> that ‘pantheism is not only an inadequate religion, but it strikes at the very roots of morality. If human personality and freedom are illusions, then must obligation, guilt, and retribution, be the absurdest fictions.’<sup>2</sup> In a word, from pantheistic premisses we can only legitimately infer that whatever is is right, or that might is right.’ If this should seem to some a hard saying, let them ponder the instance from life given by Mr. Haigh as an Indian experience. ‘Far more than can be imagined by strangers to India, men are blaming back upon God their meannesses and impurities, their sorrows and crimes, and gaining thereby the peace of irresponsibility. At an up-country station jail once I saw a man standing with hands pinioned, in charge of a small band of sepoys, and was told that he was just being taken to be hanged. When I expressed my regret at the trouble which his crime had brought upon him, the man’s eyes flashed and he said : “ I didn’t kill the man ; it was God that did

<sup>1</sup> *Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 396.

<sup>2</sup> This is precisely what Mr. R. Blatchford says they are. ‘Man is what he is by the act of God, or the results of heredity and environment. In either case he is not to blame.’—*God and My Neighbour*, p. 143, &c. In which case no ‘he’ is left, and therefore no possibility of morality.

it. Don't you know that all we do is God's doing ? ” That was no mere excuse. I have no doubt the man sincerely believed himself to be the irresponsible agent of a Power that he could neither resist nor escape.’<sup>1</sup> He was thus perfectly true to the Spinozism recommended by Prof. Haeckel, and the determinism of Prof. McTaggart, and exemplified in himself what Prof. Upton expresses in philosophical language : ‘The pantheist sees in his own inner life only phases or modes of the life of the kosmos,’ so that whatever there may be of the sensual or selfish in his conduct, ‘he cannot consistently, as Spinoza admits, feel repentance or remorse.’<sup>2</sup> What this would amount to in actual life is not here our task to set forth. Enough to make plain that the pantheistic glamour that God is All, carries with it the consequence that man is nothing but a marionette. Never, therefore, were words more true, more timely, more significant than those of Dr. Howison : ‘Let us not fail to realize that pantheism means not simply the all-pervasive interblending and interpenetration of God and other life, but the sole causality of God, and so the obliteration of freedom, of moral life, and of any immortality worth the having ; in a word, of the true being of God Himself.’<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Fernley Lecture*, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 332. See also Principal Caird, *Fundamental Ideas*, &c., i. pp. 109-13. ‘A thorough-going pantheism knows nothing of moral distinctions. With the ideas of freedom and individuality the ideas of responsibility and of moral good and evil disappear. If in the universe there be no being, no life but one, a finite moral agent becomes a contradiction in terms.’

<sup>3</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, p. 81.

(c) It is manifest at a glance, that whatever else this wild dream may be, it is no solution of the mystery of evil. No knot is ever untied by throwing it into the fire. No equation is ever solved by simply wiping out both sides. 'Pantheism,' well says Dr. Rigg, 'has only one way in which to escape from the mystery of evil, and that is to deny all distinction between right and wrong, between moral good and moral evil. Of course there can be no such thing as sin for the pantheist, because all, according to his creed, is nature and development and necessity.'<sup>1</sup> Thus Pantheism professes to end all our difficulties by assuring us that there are none; the strangest part of the whole case being that there should be men of apparent intelligence and sincerity, willing to accept such a pseudo-solution. Whether, however, such self-styled determinism be pantheistic, or atheistic, or naturalistic, the issue is the same. The notion that this relieves the mystery of evil, is as patent and as dire a delusion, as for a drowning man to imagine that his only hope of safety consists in denying the reality of water.

(d) The protest of monotheism against this mock-philosophy, is not more uncompromising than it is well grounded. We may well accept, as a summary of both the attitude of monotheistic spiritualism and its reasons, the conclusion of Dr. Martineau, that 'it is in the freedom and causality of this transcendent human self and in the felt relationship between this self and the transcendency of the perfect Personality of God, that all that is most truly ethical and spiritual

<sup>1</sup> *Modern Scepticism*, Lectures, p. 70.

in the inner life of men both takes its origin and finds its explanation.' <sup>1</sup>

For the rock upon which such genuine moral philosophy rests, is the same as that which makes unshakable the reality of human personality, viz. the testimony of consciousness. 'The sense of freedom is a fact of immediate and universal consciousness,' says Dr. Illingworth. If this be pronounced mere assertion, to whom shall we turn for final judgement? Undoubtedly Prof. James is right in his remark that 'the number of volumes is not what makes the philosophy.' <sup>2</sup> Yet if in these days of specialism, expert knowledge is ever to have weight, why not here? And if such a man as Prof. Sidgwick—whom Dr. James describes as 'the most incorrigibly and exasperatingly critical and sceptical mind in England'—felt himself bound, in face of all the evidence, to say, 'It is impossible for me to think, at each moment that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and the motives acting upon it,' <sup>3</sup> one might, without rashness, regard such a word as an end of controversy. At the very least, one may claim for such a verdict the endorsement of philosophy, when Prof. James avows that 'the solving word for

<sup>1</sup> *Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 209. Prof. Upton's own epitome is no less true and applicable. 'Thus does Dr. Martineau give further confirmation to the argument for Theism, by showing that while it contains enough of determinateness to meet all the needs of science and morality, there still is left a sphere of indeterminateness adequate for the existence of true moral responsibility, and of the highest and deepest spiritual communion between God and the soul' (p. 213).

<sup>2</sup> *The Will to Believe*, p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> See *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 210.

the learned and the unlearned man alike, lies, in the last resort, in the dumb willingness and unwillingness of their characters, and nowhere else.' Such doctrine is well crowned by the witness of poetry, for the truth of truths concerning ourselves is—

Not matter, nor the finite-infinite,  
But this main miracle that thou art thou,  
With power on thine own act and on the world.

But two other notes must yet be made.

(e) We are now in a position to apprehend the truth concerning the divine attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, viz. that they can and do only find expression in a world of free spirits. Such attributes of the divine personality no more crush out the reality and spontaneity of human personality, than the waters of the ocean destroy the vitality of the fish that live therein, or the diffusion of the atmosphere prevents the soaring and singing of the lark.<sup>1</sup> 'Genuine omniscience and omnipotence are only to be realized,' says Dr. Howison truly, 'in the control of free beings, and in inducing the divine image in them by moral influences instead of metaphysical and physical agencies; that is, by final instead of efficient causation.'<sup>2</sup> In other words, the only thinkable moral necessity, is that personality in relation to personality, *must* work by love, not by law, by inducement, not by compulsion. And whatever flaws may lurk in such a scheme, both the aim and the results are the highest conceivable.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See page facing Preface.

<sup>2</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> Prof. Upton speaks truly in affirming that 'the ethical Theist does not believe that the highest aim of God in the case of human

(f) Such a monotheistic conception, emanating from spiritual monism, is at once the most true, most worthy, most hopeful, approach to a solution of the great mystery of evil. The clearest mind and the tenderest heart may together embrace the doctrine of such a Personal God. Even One who, revealing Himself by constant immanence in the world, ever seeks to transform it into His own image, through the agencies of moral freedom. For this is not only truest to all that we know to be best within ourselves, but to all that we cannot help hoping to be best in God. It both relieves Him of the awful responsibility for the evil that cannot be denied, in past and present, and at the same time opens the door of hope to a vision of the future, alike worthy of Him and satisfying to the human heart. 'A God indwelling as the central guiding light, in a realm of self-governing persons who immortally do His will in freely doing their own, and fulfil their own in doing His.'<sup>1</sup> If the human conflict with moral evil shall issue in such result, even our limited vision can see that it will be far more than justified.

### (iii) *Monotheism and the Double Duality*

It will, however, be seen, and must be frankly acknowledged, that such monotheism as is here outlined, whilst it is the logical outcome of a spiritual

spirits is the mere development of reproductions of Himself under temporal limiting conditions, but rather that His own infinite love can only find adequate expression and response in giving existence to rational beings with some real power of free self-determination.'—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 333.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Howison, *Limits*, &c., p. 61.



monism, yet involves a double duality, viz. the combination of transcendence with immanence on the part of the divine, and the blending of freedom with dependence on the part of the human. These may both alike defy analysis or definition, but that does not of necessity diminish their reality, any more than the indefinableness of the human ego disproves its being or significance.

(a) Without doubt the greatest of all modern truths to be apprehended and emphasized in the larger monotheism, is the combination of the divine immanence and transcendence. Concerning these two we are compelled to affirm that the doctrine which does not do justice to both, does justice to neither. Either taken alone is insufficient, untrue, misleading, dangerous. If in reference to such an ultra-psychical theme one may employ, *longo intervallo*, a physical illustration, one would say, that the human mind and heart can no more be satisfied with either of these conceptions, severed from the other, than the human body can quench its thirst either with oxygen or hydrogen alone. It is the blending into the liquidity of  $H_2O$  which assuages the body's craving. No less truly is it the divine when conceived as being both ever-present in nature yet never identified with it, which alone supplies the demand of the human mind and answers to the yearn of the human heart.

The inspiring doctrine of the immanence of God in all nature and in all souls, must not, as Martineau protested,<sup>1</sup> be allowed to 'degenerate into an unmoral pantheism, lest it should become a worse foe to the

<sup>1</sup> See *Martineau's Philosophy*, Upton, p. 203.



truth than the deism which it has replaced. Deism was but a childish guess at transcendence.<sup>1</sup> Yet there is a danger lest in putting away childish things, the kernel of truth should be flung away with the husk of error. Here is need, therefore, of the truth embodied in the Monotheism which springs from spiritual monism. For it proclaims an eirenicon between the conflicting principles of Deism and Pantheism, by acknowledging the truth that lies at the heart of each error, and blending them both in the unified conception of the divine transcendent immanence. This is finely expressed by the late Aubrey L. Moore: 'Religion demands, as the very condition of its existence, a God who transcends the universe; philosophy as imperiously requires His immanence in nature.'<sup>2</sup> And the response of spiritual monism, as distinct from naturalistic pantheism, to this double demand, is, that whilst on the one hand 'God is the inner ground and substance of this illimitable ever-existing universe,' yet, on the other hand, 'He is no more identical with the world than a man's self is identical with his body.'<sup>3</sup>

Thus, God who should be either one with nature, or severed from nature, would not be God at all. The

<sup>1</sup> 'The philosophy of the doctrine of the divine omnipresence should begin with the swift banishment of deism. How that unspeakable curse hides and lingers in the Christian Church! What is needed as a substitute for deism is a universe entirely and constantly dynamic of God, a universe which is nothing other than God in cosmic action.'—Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 478. Here is an instance of the possibility contemplated by Dr. Martineau. 'God in cosmic action,' might well stand for the most thorough-going pantheism.

<sup>2</sup> *Lux Mundi*, p. 94. See also Howison, *Limits of Evolution*, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 174.

oneness of nature is but the expression of the being of God, who is behind and beyond nature, although ever working in and through nature. In a word, nature is but the unified totality of the sphere of which God Himself is alike centre, radii, and circumference.<sup>1</sup>

(b) But as, herein, all figures of speech must necessarily fail, and yet the inexpressible truth remains, so may we be prepared to find an analogous result when we contemplate in the human unit the duality of freedom and dependence. As every living man is unconscious of the pressure of the atmosphere, and yet is not only always subject to it but ceaselessly kept in well-being by it, so is the freedom of man, as a moral being, only realized in and through his utter dependence upon the all-environing and all-saturating divine presence. Nothing is farther from the truth than Strauss's amazingly crude notion of a concrete heaven, and court of angels, as being absolutely necessary to the reality of the divine personality.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'The Christian doctrine maintains that which is dear to the Unitarian—the transcendence of God—without dissociating Him from His universe; and that which is dear to the European pantheist—the immanence of God—without obliterating His personality; and that which is vital to the Vedantist—the real unity—without denying the reality of God's world.'—Haigh, *Fernley Lectures*, p. 73.

■ *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 124. 'The retinue of angels is necessary, however, to the idea of a personal God. A person must needs have society, a ruler his court. With heaven, therefore, no more his palace, with no angels assembled round his throne; with neither thunder and lightning for his missiles, nor war, famine, and pestilence for his scourges—with all these but effects of natural causes, how, since he has thus lost every attribute of personal existence and action, can we still continue to conceive of a personality of God?' Surely as strange a jumble of poor philosophy and false psychology, as ever came from a writer of reputation.

The only parallel to it would be the correlated notion, that the reality of an infinite personality would necessarily involve the obliteration of every finite personality.

Certainly no expressions must be used, whether anthropomorphic or idealistic, as Dr. Rashdall rightly insists,<sup>1</sup> 'to disguise either the causal dependence of the human soul upon the divine will, or the distinctness of God from such souls when once they have appeared.' Rather the truth to be maintained is, as expressed by Dr. Caldecott, that 'in Monistic Spiritualism which regards finite spirits as derivative and created, existing within the Divine Spirit, we have a philosophy of human nature which refuses to relinquish its base, and yet which advances to a view of Reality that both includes and transcends it.'<sup>2</sup>

In these practical Western climes, doubtless the sense of freedom is more and more developed through the vigour of social, commercial, political intercourse. Hence the religious indifference which Churches lament, relates more especially to the ignoring of dependence upon the divine, natural laws being supposed to be substitutes for divine working. But in the more quiescent and dreamy East, where there is generally time to think, it is rather the reality and responsibility of freedom which needs to be enforced by the philosophy of religion. If, as there seems good reason to believe, Eastern thought is likely in coming days to influence more effectively our Western ideals, both of philosophy and religion, it is to be hoped also

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 139.

that Western realization of human nature's responsibilities will avail to quicken the pulse of moral life, sufficiently to save the Vedantist from his self-annihilating absorption, and the Mussulman from his hopeless Kismet.

#### (iv) *Concluding Summary*

We see then, in conclusion, that the larger Monotheism which issues naturally and necessarily out of spiritual monism, is as distinct from Pantheism as day is from night. It is, moreover, as well warranted in maintaining such distinction, as is the protest of any sane man that he is a person, not a thing. Modern Monotheism 'in asserting God, asserts the moral freedom and the immortality of the soul; but Pantheism, whilst apparently asserting God to the extreme, denies His moral essence by cancelling all real freedom and therefore all immortality of worth.'<sup>1</sup> Between these, therefore, there is no thinkable eirenicon. The definite choice between them, becomes increasingly the burden which developing intelligence puts upon every sincere mind. Mere assertion is, of course, unavailing on either side without reason given. But it is with reasons, based on expert knowledge, that Prof. Bowne declares that 'philosophy is coming to see the emptiness of all philosophizing on the mechanical and impersonal plane; so that the choice for both science and philosophy is either a theistic foundation or none.'<sup>2</sup>

Nor is it difficult to confirm this estimate from

<sup>1</sup> Howison, *Limits*, &c., p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> *Theism*, Preface, p. vi.

considerations appreciable by every ordinary intelligence. Persistent and costly efforts, worthy of a better cause, are being made in this country to popularize what Prof. Haeckel calls 'our monistic religion.' It is fairly easy by such means to create a verbal glamour which will influence many. It sounds almost sublime when men are assured that 'we effect at last the truly beatific union of religion and science so painfully longed after by so many to-day'—so that now for the first time 'we gain the pure idea of God.'<sup>1</sup> But unfortunately, before a steady gaze, this mirage of words melts away, and leaves us with no conceivable God at all, no object of worship whatever, wherewith to form the basis and bond of a religion. Rather it gives us, instead of science, a pseudo-philosophy which does uttermost injustice to the deepest realities of human nature. It is therefore not without sufficient reason that Mr. Mallock writes: 'The moment we examine Prof. Haeckel as to the contents of his religion, he is dumb. And so are all those who attempt to reason like him. Their substitutes for Theism are nonsense, or else they are Theism in disguise. Their doctrine, as stated by themselves, merely amounts to this: that life would be low, uncivilized, and deserving of nothing but contempt, if it were not uplifted by an ideal contemplation of nature; and when we ask what this contemplation consists of, we find that it means spending half our time at a telescope merely in order to assure ourselves that there is no man in the moon.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Confession of Faith*, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 127. Mr. Mallock's figures are always vivid and his remarks forceful, whether we can agree with them or not. In this case his caustic illustration seems only just.

It is small wonder that, even in the hands of its ablest expounders, such a creed should yield no more real inspiration, than the grandest piano under the fingers of a Paderewski would yield harmony when all its wires had previously been abstracted. Well might Romanes, when in the grip of this mechanical system, say that 'with this virtual negation of God the universe to me lost its soul of loveliness.'<sup>1</sup> One might as well call upon a lover to embrace with rapture the desiccated skeleton of his once best-beloved, as to talk of 'adoration before the three august Divine Ones,' when there is absolutely no 'One' at all, and no 'Divine' that is even conceivable.

'The true, and the beautiful, and the good!' We might well ask, 'What is truth?' with more than Pilate's disdain, if on all hands nature put us to permanent intellectual confusion, by the imitation of purpose and benevolence, and the suggestion of thought and will all around and within us, when really there is at the foundation of the universe nothing but mechanical necessity.

'Will Romeo and Juliet find their passion improved when they see in the sunset merely the official notice, "You care for each other, but Nature cares nothing about either of you"? Lovers who under these conditions could find nature "uplifting," would be nothing so much as a couple of sentimental schoolgirls ogling a bricked-up window and trying to believe that it was the dancing-master.'

<sup>1</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 28. And it is even more significant that so cool-minded and fearless a philosopher as Herbert Spencer, when life drew towards its close, should become conscious of a need which his own religion of the inscrutable was quite unable to satisfy. That it should be to him 'the most saddening of all reflections that there might at the back of the universe be no consciousness at all' (see Mr. Mallock, *Reconstruction*, &c., p. 134), is a witness of the human heart too honest to be doubted, too cultured to be superstitious, too deliberate and impressive to be dismissed as the mere plaint of senility. Its naturalness is its sufficient endorsement.

Wherein consists the 'beautiful,' if the be-all and end-all of human life, everywhere, is merely a blind and deadly struggle for existence, with the survival of the physically fittest and the mere casting of the weak—who may be morally the fittest by far—to the rubbish-heap of the universe? How can there be any 'good,' if all, 'without exception,' is due to 'the mechanism of the atom'? If the universe is ultimately nothing but a mighty atom, with suns playing the part of electrons, and human souls nothing more than electrons of these, it can assuredly never be other than the mere rattle of verbal mechanism to talk of goodness at all, whether on the larger or the smaller scale. Indeed, it were difficult to say which would be the more sickening creator of despair—the contemplation of the makrokosm, or that of the mikrokosm. Dr. Howison puts it very mildly when he says that 'to no theory of the world can man give a willing and a cordial adhesion, if it strikes at the heart of his personal reality, and contradicts those hopes of ceaseless moral growth that alone make life worth living.'<sup>1</sup>

The pseudo-gospel which opens its evangel with the assurance that man, with eternity in his heart, is of no more value to the universe 'than the smallest bacillus,' deserves to perish under the withering indignation of those whom it thus contemns. In place of this darkness that can be felt, the larger Monotheism comes as the cheer of dawn after a cold and dreary night. It is confessedly solemn gladness, but only such is worthy of creation's masterpiece. It is at least a true and inspiring philosophy which avows,

<sup>1</sup> *Limits of Evolution*, p. 77.

with Lotze, that 'the Eternal God who by the partial differentiation of His own essential being calls into existence the world of nature and humanity, has also, while remaining immanent in all His creatures, given to these finite and dependent existences in progressive degree a real selfhood ; which selfhood culminates in that self-consciousness and moral freedom in man which enables him both to know and even to resist God.' Nothing less, nothing else, than such a philosophy, appreciates equally all that is bright and dark, great and small, in the vast universe of which we form intense, even if infinitesimal, part. Nor does there come from any other source such valid inspiration for the present, or trustworthy hope for the future. It is therefore with truth that Prof. Bowne affirms, concerning such Monotheism, that it 'more and more appears as the supreme condition of both thought and life.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Theism*, Preface, p. vii.





VI

THE FINAL THEOMONISM

‘Natural laws are nothing more than observed successions of phenomena, and if they are never broken, the reason is not that no power in the universe is able to break them—for this is more than we know—but that if they were broken we should cease to call them laws. What we mean by saying that the physical universe is governed by general laws, is that knowledge is impossible unless the whole system is at least a rational unity, whatever else it be. And this means that if a Force be its moving power, there must be one Force and no more; and if God, there must be one God and no more.’

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DR. GWATKIN, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 51.

‘Diese Gotteswissenschaft, eine echte, rationale Theologie, hatte gleichfalls die Aufgabe, drei Gegensätze zum Ausgleich und zur Einheit zu führen und in einer Dreieinheit ihr Wissensgebäude neben- und übereinander systematisch aufzurichten: Einheit des innerweltlichen und des ausserweltlichen Gottes: Einheit des Personal- und des Allgottseins: Einheit des Gottes der Religion und der Philosophie. Das war die hier zu Ende gehende Wissenschaft der Gotteseinheit (Theo-Monismus).’

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DR. J. RÜLF, *Wissenschaft der Gotteseinheit*, p. 442.

‘Once more, the doctrine of Evolution restores to the science of Nature the unity which we should expect in the creation of God, Paley’s argument proved design, but included the possibility of many designers. Not one design, but many separate designs, all no doubt of the same character, but worked out independently of one another, is the picture that he puts before us. But the doctrine of Evolution binds all existing things on earth into one. He who uses the doctrine of evolution to prove that no intelligence planned the world, is undertaking the self-contradictory task of showing that a great machine has no purpose, by tracing in detail the marvellous complexity of its parts and the still more marvellous precision with which all work together to produce a common result.’

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DR. TEMPLE, *Bampton Lectures*, 1884, p. 121.

‘I have said that although I am no longer agnostic in the popular sense, I am in another sense agnostic still. This is because I hold that God overpasses all things, and that our knowledge of Him and of His Kingdom within us, while always progressing, can never be complete. Therefore I hold also that the pilgrimage of man will go on even when it has brought him to the open Vision of the Blessed, and when every step in it is new fulness of joy.’

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*An Agnostic’s Progress*, p. 168.

## VI

## THE FINAL THEOMONISM

ENOUGH has been set forth in the preceding pages to illustrate and justify what is known as the modern tendency to monistic thought.

But when we have acknowledged this tendency, we are, as Sir Oliver Lodge reminds us, at the beginning, not the end, of the matter. The real question, we have seen, is, What sort of a monism do we propose? It is comparatively easy to join in the stream which has set in against dualism,<sup>1</sup> but it is so difficult to construct a system of monism which shall contain the whole truth and nothing but the truth, that we may well endorse the opinion of the eminent physicist just quoted, that it will only be possible to formulate it 'some day far hence.'<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, to judge from a fairly wide induction, modern knowledge seems to compel us to own that, in some form, any true theory of the universe must be monistic. With all respect to the thoughtful pleas for pluralism which have been mentioned above, it

<sup>1</sup> 'Der Dualismus ist der böse Feind allen Philosophischen Gedankenarbeit.'—Rülf, *Metaphysik*, VI *Gotteseinheit*, p. 438. This thoughtful and able work is unfortunately not translated into English, but merits the student's careful attention.

<sup>2</sup> *Life and Matter*, p. 11.

cannot be said that science or philosophy, observation or experience, allow, let alone confirm, this advocacy of an 'eternal or metaphysical world of many minds, all alike possessing personal initiative, real self-direction, instead of an all-predestinating single mind that alone has real free agency.'<sup>1</sup> The independence of origin here claimed, together with the heterogeneous incoherence involved, are not more opposed to Christian theology than they are to the prevalent monistic philosophy which is based on science.

When, however, thought settles down to monism, and the further demand for a justifiable type of monism presses, then it would seem, from all the knowledge we can gather and all the consideration that we can bring to bear on it, that the true, thoughtful, and final conclusion is what must be called Theomonism.

To most English ears such a term may sound strange, but it is encouraging to some who in this country have first thought it out for themselves,<sup>2</sup> to find that elsewhere it is by no means a novelty, whilst it certainly serves a most necessary as well as timely purpose in clear delineation. According to Dr. Rülff,<sup>3</sup> it involves the task of bringing into structural unity three antitheses, and so yielding :

- (1) The oneness of God in the *inner* and the *outer* world subjectively and objectively.
- (2) The oneness of God as the *All* and the *Personal*.
- (3) The oneness of God as presented in *religion* and in *philosophy*.

<sup>1</sup> See p. 404.

<sup>2</sup> As did the present writer, only finding afterwards that it appears upon the title-page of Dr. Rülff's volume as Theo-Monismus.

<sup>3</sup> See his *Gotteseinheit*, ix-xiv, p. 442.

For the special discussion of these, we must be content to refer to his thoughtful work. They constitute the philosophic groundwork, undoubtedly, of what he terms a 'genuine and rational theology,'<sup>1</sup> but this is here beyond our scope. Our only present aim is, as Prof. Ward hints,<sup>2</sup> to find a secure basis for natural theology. Such is given in the Theomonism which expresses in one word the three main findings of our preceding scrutiny. These are :

(1) That Spiritual Monism is the only legitimate conclusion of philosophical science.

(2) That Theism is the only valid type of Spiritual Monism.

(3) That Theistic Monism involves a larger Monotheism which includes as essential, not only the personality of God, but the equally real personality and moral freedom of man. This becomes, therefore, the true and final representation of Theism.

These are, confessedly, religious 'dogmas,' as Dr. McTaggart defines them,<sup>3</sup> but they are no less inevitable when considered as philosophical conclusions from science, than when taken to be the basis, that is, the beginning, of a genuine and rational theology. Even if it were true—which it certainly is not—that 'the only way of coming to any conclusion on matters of religious doctrine is by means of metaphysical

<sup>1</sup> The student in search of such, will find the best succinct *résumés* in the volumes of Dr. W. N. Clarke and Prof. O. A. Curtis, as often quoted above.

<sup>2</sup> See *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii., p. 202.

<sup>3</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 8. 'I propose to class as dogmas all propositions which have any metaphysical significance, and to define as religious dogmas those whose acceptance or rejection by any person would alter his religious position.'

arguments,'<sup>1</sup> it must be suggested that there is nothing in Theomonism beyond the comprehension of that majority who, 'as the world stands at present, have not the disposition, the education, the leisure necessary for the study of metaphysics.' Theism is nothing if not practical in its issues, and for the benefit of those who exemplify the forceful epigram of Mr. A. L. Moore—'human nature craves to be both religious and rational, and the life which is not both is neither'<sup>2</sup>—we may here recapitulate in brief summary the grounds of these three propositions which, in their inseparableness, give us Theomonism as the larger Monotheism, i.e. in one word, the true and final type of Monism.

(1) *Spiritual Monism is the only legitimate conclusion of philosophical science.*

The science which is so pure that it does not touch philosophy may pass unnoticed. It may be perfectly true, but it is correspondingly useless for all life's higher purposes. Life can never be made worth living by being assured that the vertebrate type of animals includes all except the invertebrates; or that certain portions of the human brain subserve definite functions; or that electricity is a mode of motion; or that atoms are composed of electrons. That things are what they are, and that we need to treat them accordingly, is

<sup>1</sup> McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 291. Still less does it follow that 'no man is justified in the religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study' (p. 292), unless the lessons of metaphysics are interpreted, as they well may be, in the language of common sense.

<sup>2</sup> *Lux Mundi*, p. 109.

good as far as it goes. For human purposes it never goes far enough, until we also ask both how and why they are as they are, and not otherwise.

Without such philosophy, as Prof. Haeckel has well pointed out, there can be neither satisfaction in the present nor progress for the future. True philosophy bids us not only go to the roots of things, but dig down ever deeper in search of the root of roots. At least it insists upon the search to see if such there be. And the ever-accumulating witness of nature asserts that there is such an ultimate principle. True, we have to speak tremblingly, even about our little planet, for a fish's acquaintance with the ocean is the true symbol of all our knowledge concerning it. When, however, we use the term 'universe,' and mean it, thoughts as well as words fail us. The knowledge possessed by the youngest child in a kindergarten concerning all the affairs of Europe, would be no unfair figure of our real knowledge of the universe. In daring imagination we project our thoughts beyond their lawful reach, and trust the rest. But the very trust with which we extend our finite parallels to the infinite, assured that they will be parallel still, becomes the sublime background for the exhibition of other phenomena close at hand, so that the whole manifests itself as a real unity in an immeasurable diversity.

Nature, we see, is inexpressible for the multitude of its complexities. But it is a kosmos, not a chaos ; it is a web, not a tangle. The unity of the work of some great artist, expressed in a myriad details, is not more real or more manifest than is the unity of nature which science discloses, and of the universe



so far as we can apprehend it. If, therefore, 'every educated and thoughtful man who strives to form a definite view of life is a philosopher,'<sup>1</sup> he cannot but be impressed with the unity of nature just in the degree in which he is able to contemplate it. From such contemplation there may ensue conflict between differing monisms, but it must end in a monism, not a dualism, nor a pluralism. 'The law of parsimony forbids the assumption of two ultimate causes when one is sufficient. Matter alone is not sufficient. But mind, which originates the universe when matter is given, could presumably have created its materials as well as it can control them.'<sup>2</sup> Whence we may well infer that the 'objects we perceive by sense, must be interpreted as moments of one underlying reality which, to explain all their characteristics, can only be conceived as an infinite spirit.'<sup>3</sup>

The failure of 'substance' as a *tertium quid* beneath matter and energy to supply the necessary and sufficient source of all, has been already shown.<sup>4</sup> It is no begging of the question, therefore, to affirm here that the witness of science, in so far as science can suggest philosophical theory, to spiritualistic monism, grows continually stronger. The suggestion that the advance of science means an ever-enlarging realm of law, and an ever-widening application of mechanism—whether molar or molecular—to the explanation of phenomena, does not affect the case. For, as Prof. Romanes put it, 'the pleading which Monism is

<sup>1</sup> Haeckel, *Wonders of Life*, p. 471.

<sup>2</sup> Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>4</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 451.

here able to supply, can never be silenced—just as the operations of my friend's mind can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of his body, so it may very well be that the operations of the Supreme Mind can only be revealed to me through the mechanical operations of Nature—everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical and the physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.' <sup>1</sup> Thus science speaking through philosophy has everything to say on behalf of a Spiritual Monism, and nothing to urge effectually against it.

(2) *The only valid type of Spiritual Monism is Theism.*

In the struggle between diverse monisms, it is right that only the fittest should survive. That is naturally the fittest which can most rationally explain all the phenomena known to us to be real. But the naturalistic monism, championed by Haeckel as scientific, explains nothing.<sup>2</sup> It assumes everything in a surreptitious involution, and then proclaims evolution to be the 'magic word' by which every riddle is solved. But as the cryptic beginnings of evolution can only be revealed in the manifest latest stages, even as the contents of a scroll can only be known when unfolded, what reason demands is an adequate source for the mind or intelligence, will or

<sup>1</sup> *Mind and Motion and Monism*, pp. 110, 111, 114.

<sup>2</sup> See *Haeckel's Monism False*, pp. 569-81; Mallock's *Reconstruction of Belief*, pp. 293-4.

force, which we find everywhere embodied in law ; for the personality exemplified in man ; and for the moral order of the kosmos.

In the face of these actualities, the explanation given by naturalistic monism 'disappears into nothingness when critically examined, as bubbles when they are touched.'<sup>1</sup> No amount of discovery of what are called 'mechanical principles' in nature, can remove the necessity for intelligence working in and through the mechanism. The very conception of mechanism involves intelligence, and is unthinkable without it. The difference of scale, as between the human and divine, is here irrelevant. Intelligence can never be evoked by nothing out of non-intelligence.<sup>2</sup> As surely in a universe as in a babe, if intelligence is to be evolved, there must be a potentially latent intelligence through a preceding involution.

But naturalistic monism is here utterly helpless. The very intelligence which constructs it, sits in judgement on it. For it results from the constructive action of the human mind, working upon realities which can only be regarded as the expression of thought.<sup>3</sup> Such a process points to a thought-world which is only explicable, as Prof. Bowne points out<sup>4</sup> 'on the plan of idealistic Theism.'

<sup>1</sup> Bowne, *Theism*, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> 'The problem then arises how to deduce the conscious from the non-conscious, the intelligent from the non-intelligent, the purposive from the non-purposive, and freedom from necessity. But psychology shows the hopelessness of such a task.'—*Ibid.*, p. 120.

<sup>3</sup> 'Both psychology and epistemology absolutely refuse to assimilate thoughts to things. It only remains to assimilate things to thoughts by making them the products or expressions of thought.'—*Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Again, if it be true, as Dr. Ovenden believes,<sup>1</sup> that 'recent discoveries point to the conclusion that infinite force, emanating from eternal thought, may be the ultimate explanation of the structure of the universe,' the Monism which embodies such a conception must, to be consistent with itself, maintain 'that intelligence, feeling, will, exist at the very heart of the universe; that they pervade it from centre to circumference, and that these are characteristics which we may legitimately attribute to the infinite substance which is at the same time the ultimate cause of whatever happens within the sphere of phenomena.'<sup>2</sup> But this is Theism.

The well-worn objection that such Theism involves personality, and that personality involves limitation which cannot be ascribed to God, has been shown to be but a fallacy of the schools. Limitation is the human accident, not the necessary essence, of personality, and there are sound philosophical reasons for the conclusion that 'the principle of unity which binds free finite spirits together, is itself a personality, the personality of God.'<sup>3</sup> The reality of our own personality becomes thus a witness that cannot be silenced, for the real personality of the Supreme Source of all. And the greater is no more indefinable than the less. All that we know is that the personality must express itself upon the moral plane. And although our eyes are altogether too small to be able to see the whole case, and our minds too limited to pass a

<sup>1</sup> See *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1905, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 151, 155.

<sup>3</sup> Jevons, *Religion in Evolution*, p. 132.

true judgement upon the moral order of the world, we may see and feel enough to know that Mr. Fiske is well warranted in his avowal 'that God is in the deepest sense a moral Being.'<sup>1</sup> If, therefore, we acknowledge with Kant, that 'monism is the deepest demand of the reason,' we are bound to go further, and, by the very reality of the moral nature which we know ourselves to possess, insist that this very 'unity of the world, requires the transcendental inference to a Monistic Spiritual Being whose universe it is, and within whose nature the individual units know and act.'<sup>2</sup> Thus, to be scientific, Monism must be idealistic or spiritual; and to be philosophical it must be theistic.

(3) *Theistic Monism involves the Larger Monotheism which is expressed in the one word 'Theomonism.'*

Theistic monism, we have seen, involves the larger monotheism, and this includes, as essential, not only the true personality of God, but the equally real personality and moral freedom of man. To the question, May we argue from the personality of man to that of God? the philosophy of science replies that we can do no other. When, further, the question arises,

<sup>1</sup> *The Idea of God*, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 136. Dr. Schurman also thus summarizes: 'We could find nothing but living spirit that was able to solve the problem of holding together in a unity those modifications or moments into which our analysis of causality compelled us to resolve all finite things. In a last analysis cosmic force and intentionality alike converge in God.'—*Belief in God*, pp. 169, 208. See also Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., pp. 38-42.

What if the reality of an infinite personality should necessarily mean the obliteration of all other personalities, so that no real selfhood should be left at all to the human individual? philosophy replies again, that there is no more necessity for this in thought than there is experience of it in life. No sane man can say, 'I think, therefore I am—an automaton.' For it belongs to the very conception of an automaton that it cannot think.

When, indeed, all the unfathomed and immeasurable significance of the simple formula 'I am I,' in the mind of the most ordinary man, is considered, there does emerge some reason for asking whether the transcendent significance of the name 'I AM,' if truly applicable to the Divine, as suggested in Exodus (iii. 14), does not so engulf all else as to involve the nonentity of every other being. Is not this pantheistic avowal that God is one and there is no second, at once all-comprehensive and all-exclusive? How can there be any room for the finite self in the presence of the Infinite Self? Doubtless it was to save personal experience from the nemesis which such a doctrine carries with it, that the theory of pluralism has been suggested. Consciousness not only refuses to be crushed into an illusion, but insists also upon the reality of its causal capacity. Not all the assumptions of a 'pre-established harmony,' or the naïve agnosticism of a psycho-physical parallelism, or the unblushing self-sufficiency of the ascription of all powers and experiences of mind to the 'molecular vibrations of the phronema,' can ever avail to make a normal man confess himself a mere conscious automaton, a self-deluded, unfree, piece of mechanism, or

aught else less than a person, when he deliberately declares 'I will.' The philosophy which collides with that certainty, is but as the ship which strikes mid-channel upon a solid rock. It were difficult, indeed, to say which wreck is most complete—the shattering of naturalistic monism upon the rock of consciousness, or the foundering of philosophic pluralism, without help or hope, in a boundless ocean of incoherent, independent entities.

But it is manifest that the Theomonism which represents the larger monotheism, as it issues from spiritual monism, is not exposed to either of these perils. It does not pander to the notion of an infinite number of uncreated, unconnected, and eternal spirits—either with God or without—for if the nature-unity which points to monism be true, such a conception must be false. It equally refuses to become entangled with a philosophy which reduces all philosophy to a delusion. For it, for ever, pluralism postulates too much, and automatism too little, freedom for humanity. The former cannot but be false to God. The latter is necessarily false to man. In these days it may perhaps be more needful jealously to guard the latter, by reason of the setting of the tide, sometimes shallow, sometimes deeper, towards a misnamed determinism which, when driven into a corner, acknowledges itself to be but ancient fatalism rehabilitated in modern phrase.

Against all such pseudo-philosophies Theomonism erects its solid bulwark. Accepting all the facts which modern science, labouring industriously within her own true sphere, can give us with sufficient guarantee, Theomonism establishes its claims to the allegiance of

all thoughtful minds, by its protests against the misuse of those facts, to construct a mechanical theory of man by means of atheistic pantheism. It also emphasizes the following considerations against this reduction of manhood to thinghood, or nothinghood, under the guise of philosophical science.

(i) Such a theory is not a necessity of philosophical thought. Haeckel's patronage of Goethe's lines—

By eternal laws of iron ruled  
Must all fulfil the cycle of their destiny,

is quite unavailing. For 'iron laws' can no more rule moral destiny, than a hammer can smash an idea. 'Unvarying law, that is, unvarying sequence among phenomena,' well says a writer of acknowledged competence, may be 'the consistent and natural expression of such a perfect will' as spiritual monism discovers in the universe. But in such case 'the iron necessities of nature which now seem to be at the opposite pole from all that we mean by freedom, would be the complete expression of the highest freedom.' Whatever logical puzzles may be woven out of subtle words, in regard to the processes and effects of human thought, the clue to the whole is and must ever be that 'the lower causality of nature is interpreted by the higher causality of man.'<sup>1</sup>

(ii) It is no more required by the divine personality which Monotheism infers from nature, than it is proved by the Pantheism which rejects all divine personality. In either case the human personality retains its reality and its freedom. Pantheism is a theory; free

<sup>1</sup> See V. F. Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, pp. 284, 285.



personality is a fact. When these conflict, the theory must yield to the fact. Monotheism postulates the infinitude of the divine personality ; and not only is this as thinkable as the human, but it is unlimited by the human. 'We may nevertheless think of God as infinite,' rightly says Dr. Rashdall, 'inasmuch as He is not limited by anything outside Himself.'<sup>1</sup> It is in Him, not apart from Him, that, as genuine personalities, 'we live and move and have our being.' There is as much room for the free play of our lesser and finite personalities in His greater and infinite personality, as there is for the waves of sound in the atmosphere, or the molecular vibrations which give us heat and light, in the all-pervading ether.

(iii) The attempted reduction of conscious personalness to an illusion, is intolerable to our humanity. Dr. Illingworth's words, above cited, are not in the least too strong. They may well be reinforced by the deliberate judgement of one of our ablest living physicists. Prof. Poynting writes openly : 'I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility, than of any other fact, either physical or psychical. We are certain all of us, in everyday life, that this power of choice exists, whatever conclusion we may come to in the quiet of our studies. It is better to face the situation boldly, and claim for our mental experience as great certainty as that which the physicist claims for his experience in the outside world. If our mental experience convinces us we have freedom of choice, we are obliged to believe that in mind there is territory which the physicist can never annex. Some of his

<sup>1</sup> *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 46.

laws may still hold good, but somewhere or other his scheme must cease to give a true account.’<sup>1</sup> When philosophy, therefore, shall have demonstrated that this self-evidence is a delusion, it will have annihilated both humanity and itself. Until then, all that is human within us repudiates such a suggestion—whether it comes from the pantheistic, naturalistic, or agnostic quarter—as but a kind of philosophic *delirium tremens* which would rob us of the very essence of our manhood.

(iv) For the Theist it is a no less impressive consideration that it would also rob God of His highest attributes. The worthiest philosophical conception of the Divine is neither the causal energy which lies at the heart of cosmology, nor the sublime purpose upon which teleology in full view of evolution insists, but the moral goodness which, upon a sufficiently wide induction, is pledged to us by the ethical argument. In its simplest yet fullest expression this would be that ‘God is love.’ But love cannot possibly crush love. Only a morally free being can appreciate and respond to moral goodness. It were the most pitiful of all contradictions to prove goodness in the Supreme Source of all, and then infer that such goodness could leave no room in the universe for other goodness. To the truly Divine, as conceived by philosophy no less than by theology, belongs not only the necessity for self-impartation as the veritable essence of creation, but the consequent necessity also of permitting such fractions of Himself to be true to Himself, even as the drop cannot be less liquid than the ocean.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1903, pp. 741, 743.

<sup>2</sup> See a thoughtful paragraph by Mr. Walker (*Christian Theism*, &c.,

(v) Certainly pantheistic non-entity, equally with naturalistic automatism, is impracticable, even as Dr. Poynting suggests. Herein a few naturalistic writers are consistent, and propound a theory of conduct which would not be tolerated for an hour in any decent society. As when M. Hamon roundly declares that 'it is only by a collection of fictions that moral responsibility subsists in our codes and customs . . . for man is as much an automaton as a tiger or a rock.'<sup>1</sup> But the greater number cover up the plain issues by occult reference to mechanical 'restraint' such as, by the way, is only applied to criminals and lunatics. Certainly the case is frankly stated by Prof. Guenther: 'The foundation of the monistic structure and all the columns that support it imply a disregard of all values. Hence monism cannot frame an ethic unless it abandons all its supports which are inconsistent with values. In that case monism breaks down.'<sup>2</sup> The lucidity of this avowal may be commended to those who eulogize Prof. Haeckel's 'monistic religion.' Meanwhile, Mr. Cotter Morison supplies the crowning touch by his suggestion that 'the sooner the idea of moral responsibility is got rid of, the better it will be for society and for moral education.'<sup>3</sup> Which is manifestly the same as saying that the sooner we get rid of brains, the better it will be for intellectual development. This scheme may be tried in Mars. No man or society

pp. 306-7), ending with the words, 'A Spiritual Monism shows, without the need of any expansive argument, our direct natural kinship to God and the possibility of our rising into still higher ethical sonship.'

<sup>1</sup> *The Illusion of Free Will*, pp. 115, 134.

<sup>2</sup> *Darwinism and the Problems of Life*, p. 426.

<sup>3</sup> *Service of Man*, cheap edition, p. 111.

has ever ventured upon it in this world, or ever will, so long as sanity remains to humanity.

It is unnecessary to dwell longer upon these valid protests of Theomonism, on behalf of human reality and potency. Any philosophy which can only continue to exist by contradicting itself, may be dismissed as but one of the many inexplicable curiosities of the human mind. It may serve the same purpose as did the drunken Helots in old Sparta, but nothing more. On the contrary, 'the only system of beliefs on which human civilization can sustain itself,' is forcefully summarized by Mr. Mallock. It is the creed which 'attributes to the Cosmic Principle as a whole mind, intelligence, purpose, feeling and goodness, in a sense congruous to the sense in which we recognize these qualities in ourselves; which, in spite of our own dependence on the universal Cause, attributes to ourselves also a true causal personality; and which, in spite of our dependence on the body of which our mind seems the mere function, attributes to ourselves individual permanence also.'<sup>1</sup> In still more succinct clearness it is expressed by Dr. Schurman: 'The phenomena both of the universe and of human life, require the thinking mind to postulate a Supreme Ground of things which we are entitled to describe as self-conscious Spirit and loving Father.'<sup>2</sup>

Thus Monism, when founded upon as complete induction as is possible, and carried to its logical conclusion, necessitates Theism. Theism, when fully stated with all its inevitable implications in modern

<sup>1</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> *Belief in God*, p. 266.

light, gives us a larger monotheism. Such Monotheism, when rightly apprehended, ensures to us alike the reality of the infinite and finite personality. We, as human beings, are the self-conscious children of a true Father of free spirits, through willing relation with whom alone, can genuine morality be cultivated in the present life, or any higher hope be established for the future. As the expression of this whole finding, no better term can be employed than 'Theomonism.' And as to what this Theomonism really includes and involves, no clearer statement can be desired than that already furnished by Dr. Caldecott.

'We look around and above, and see God encompassing us everywhere ; we look into our own personality, and below its depths an unfathomable deep tells us of His inner presence. But in our knowing this, we never quit our hold upon our selfhood and the selfhood of our fellows ; in our activity when we say we identify our wills with the divine will, we always mean not suppressing and merging, but concordant unity ; in our life of feeling the emotion is reciprocal, and is from ourselves toward Him, as well as from Him to us. The Fatherhood we revere is to us unthinkable and beyond our power of appreciation, except in relation to us and others as the children.'<sup>1</sup>

### *Conclusion*

It is naturally impossible that such a dogma as the foregoing Theomonism involves, should be held with-

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 142.

out important consequences. To do these justice would require volumes. Three main reflections must here suffice.

1. Christian Theism, as presented to the modern mind, must be correlated with the main principles embodied in Theomonism. No amount of sincerity in pulpits or practical philanthropy in missions will avail to make sufficient for Christian purposes the comparatively small, semi-deistic, hyper-anthropomorphic conceptions of God, which not seldom yet prevail, but which have been as surely ruled out of true thought as the Ptolemaic astronomy. The need, more especially, for the enlargement of many popular presentations of Theism, is too plain to call for exposition ; yet it must be as firmly as respectfully pointed out. It is not true, it is one of the most mischievous of fallacies, to assume that anything in the way of theistic doctrine will do for practical purposes. As in our modern hospitals, into which all without respect of persons are admitted, the very latest attainments of surgery and therapeutics are imperatively demanded and utilized, so in present-day Christian efforts there must be equal acknowledgement of the imperfectness of all our theologies, and the constant need for ceaseless purification of thought and enlargement of mind. Dr. Flint rightly avers that 'there are no grounds for supposing that the mind of man will ever cease to seek after God, or to strive to enlarge its knowledge of His ways.'

But assuredly theology, if it is to endure, and so give worthy expression to valid dogma as to retain

hold upon the modern mind, must keep pace with science and philosophy. This is the truth that lies at the heart of Dr. McTaggart's plea for a metaphysical religion. 'The knowledge of God, on this view, consists in no mere inference reached through a process of theological argumentation, but in an ever-growing apprehension of an ever-advancing self-revelation of God; and all philosophy, science, experience, and history, must necessarily work together to promote it.'<sup>1</sup> Such a statement is as well warranted as it is wise. It is but one of many which ought to suffice to put an end to the semi-sneer so often hurled at theistic 'apologists.'

Time was when the question that most loudly demanded answer, was whether this our globe was stationary or moving. The question that now presses, alike for the Churches in their belief, and the world of civilization in its disbelief, is whether man's thought of God and His methods is stationary or moving, really, and in the right direction. In this region doubtless growing-pains may be more acute, and may deserve more tender sympathy, than in any other. Nevertheless the law of nature—i.e. the law of God, which works here as elsewhere—is, adaptation to environment, or death. And if the elements of change in the environment be part of the divine order, what are Churches or dogmas that they should either resist or deplore them? Theomachy has wrought all the mischief, within as well as without Christendom, during the whole history of Christianity.<sup>2</sup> Here therefore, again, be wise words and weighty: 'Acknowledging

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Flint, *Agnosticism*, p. 797.

<sup>2</sup> Acts v. 39.



the progressive way in which truth has been acquired hitherto, Christian philosophy anticipates with confidence that the future will show knowledge and faith to be one, the single truth of God. General philosophy always assumes that truth is single; Christian philosophy must do the same. Rather it rises to the confidence that much Christian truth hitherto held on the authority of historical revelation, will be seen to be the truth which is also disclosed by philosophy as the interpretation of life.' <sup>1</sup>

It is not here our duty to point out in detail the directions in which these principles must be fulfilled. Yet there are a few features which pre-eminently merit notice, and cannot be overlooked. They are such as these.

(i) The Divine Personality will have to be more carefully guarded from excessive anthropomorphism.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) The reality of spiritual communion between man and God, must be protected from the unwarrantable familiarity of popular catch-phrases in religious parlance. No 'Mission services' can afford to be irreverent.

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Caldecott, *Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 146.

<sup>2</sup> 'When we say that God is person, we mean that there is infinite good-will using almighty power, by all the methods of intelligence, for the highest welfare of all beings. Here is the thought of a person to reverence, to love, to obey, to be glad in for ever. In this sense, sublime and transcendent as it seems, personality is nothing vague or abstract. It is near and immanent, reaching every life. Whatever words or names we use, He or It, God, the Father, the reality is greater than our words; they are only symbols. The Person is that which loves, and therefore can be loved.'—C. F. Dole, *The Theology of Civilization*, p. 163. Such a statement does not profess to be the whole of theology, yet there is enough truth here, one would have thought, to have prevented the denunciation of this volume by 'orthodox' religious journals.



(iii) The conception of the Trinity, as applied to the divine nature, must be jealously distinguished from Tritheism. 'Rightly understood,' well says Mr. Walker, 'the doctrine of the Trinity is an endeavour to express an important practical truth with respect to the Divine Being, which is as necessary to philosophy as to theology. Even an ardently monistic writer like Dr. Carus affirms that we *must* think of God as Triune.'<sup>1</sup> 'Rightly understood,' certainly involves in equal measure the clear strength of intelligent conviction on the part of those who hold it, with the entire absence of denunciation in regard to those to whom it presents insuperable difficulties.

(iv) There must be a fearlessly extended appreciation of love in the divine nature, together with its fuller application to all the varieties of the human struggle for light. Such notions as that the heathen are perishing for want of missionaries, that Unitarian theology is to be pronounced a curse,<sup>2</sup> that all religions other than Christianity are to be regarded only as embodiments of untruth, or dismissed with scorn,<sup>3</sup> &c., must

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 317. On the next page the author quotes also Prof. Ritchie as saying, 'The doctrine of the Trinity may be thought of as a mere magic puzzle to charm oneself out of hell with, but it may be and has been the greatest of all formulæ ever used in the attempt to grasp the relation between the universal and the particular.'

<sup>2</sup> The language actually employed recently in an Evangelical meeting.

<sup>3</sup> Thus when the great Parliament of Religions was held at Chicago in 1893, to which representatives from all earth's religions were cordially invited—and the response in person constituted it the most remarkable religious gathering ever held in human history—the reply of the Archbishop of Canterbury was that he could not send a note of approval, much less be present, because 'the Christian

be deemed unworthy, certainly, of the belief which is true to Theomonism. The protest against all this recently issued in the name of Spiritual Monism, is a right worthy one. 'Another distinctive characteristic of Christianity in its conception of God in His relation to the world and of the world in its relation to God, too much overlooked by our popular theology, is brought into clearer light by science and monistic philosophy—viz. universality. If there is only one sole principle of the world's life, we are led to see very clearly the unity of Humanity before God, the Source of our being and the Eternal Father of men.'<sup>1</sup> The Theomonistic philosophy which insists that in the all-supreme Divine Personality there is ample room for the reality, and development into closer fellowship with Himself, of every human personality, is bound to find room in its own claim to comprehensive truthfulness for the comparative value of other philosophies at least as sincere as itself.

(v) The all-prevailing solemnity of law in the moral sphere must be at once reaffirmed, and rescued from all relation to vindictiveness. 'All's love and yet all's law,' is assuredly the true and only deduction from Theomonism. By it the theology of the future will certainly stand or fall.

religion is the one religion, and I do not understand how that religion can be regarded as a member of a Parliament of religions without assuming the equality of the other members and the parity of their position and claims.' Such an attitude is a curious ecclesiastical note on Luke xiii. 29. A different and more catholic spirit was happily shown on behalf of Christianity by Dr. Momerie. See *The Parliament of Religions*, vol. i. p. 20.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Walker, *Christian Theism*, &c., p. 312.

(vi) There will have to be a larger recognition of the inevitableness of an agnosticism which is as real as reverent, as full of humility as of sincere conviction. This will apply equally to the thought of God now, and the destiny of men hereafter. We are here only concerned with the former. Prof. Curtis in his admirable volume <sup>1</sup> gives us indeed a conception of God which may stand. 'The God of the Christian faith is one Spirit, personal, moral, absolute, and triune.' But when he adds, 'a better definition for homiletical use is this. The God of redemption is a personal Trinity, the God of absolute moral love,' it is necessary to draw breath. For 'definition' of God there neither is nor can be. There is no conceivable definition of the human finite personality, much less can there be of the infinite. The new-born babe will fully and accurately define its mother, before man at his best and utmost will ever define God. In this case Mr. Mallock has not spoken too strongly when he says, 'No theologian or theist has ever maintained that God, though He revealed Himself twenty times over in twenty different Bibles, could ever be known by man as what God actually is. . . . The theistic conception of God, even according to Christian thinkers, is merely a conception of certain associated modes or manifestations of a Power whose entire nature can never be made manifest.' <sup>2</sup>

The result of such an inevitable acknowledgement should plainly be as large a charity towards our fellow men, as unmeasured reverence in face of the Divine.

<sup>1</sup> *The Christian Faith*, p. 475.

<sup>2</sup> *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 257.

The confession which cannot be withheld that we are all, at the farthest reach of our clearest thought, like

An infant crying in the night,  
An infant crying for the light,  
And with no language but a cry.

ought to make every convinced believer not merely tolerant, but sympathetic, towards all who share alike his longing for the truth, and his human hindrances in its pursuit. The two main warnings, therefore, issuing in this regard from Theomonism, are, that ignorance is not the mother of devotion, and bigotry is not the hall-mark of truth.

2. When, however, these idols of the temple are set aside, and the great truths for which Theomonism stands are held with larger charity and deeper humility, we are warranted in cherishing a cheerful view concerning the religious philosophy of the future. A swift review of the whole case will best show cause for such an estimate.

The tendency in modern thought to a monism of some kind is indubitable. But amid the struggle of divers monisms, that which has least chance of survival as the fittest is the naturalistic system which attempts to make for itself a monopoly of the name 'monism.' And this for the simple reason that no theory can survive when it cannot even be stated without self-contradiction. On the other hand, the perception is growing that idealistic or spiritual monism is not open to any such charge negatively ; whilst positively,

it is increasingly seen to be both well warranted and sufficient. The alleged inconceivability of an Infinite Personality can no longer be maintained by an impartial philosophy, and at the same time the reality and significance of the human personality are impressing themselves more and more upon the modern student. Not only have the patient labours of scientific psychologists contributed to this result upon what may be called ordinary lines, but the special development of psychical research in the hands of explorers equally critical and fearless, has opened out a new realm of possibilities only appreciated by those who have been at pains to study it.<sup>1</sup>

The realm of law has indeed become to-day all-comprehending. But it is correspondingly clear that if law is to be law, if it is to stand for anything more than an accidental series of antecedents and consequents, it implies and involves a divine will, quite as really as the very conception of law in human affairs always connotes intelligence and volition. If, moreover, it be granted that a mechanical explanation of phenomena is winning its way so as to cover not only the inorganic realm, but large portions of the organic, it becomes increasingly plain that the more extensive and complex the mechanism, passing from the molar on into the molecular, the greater is the philosophical

<sup>1</sup> See *Twenty Years of Psychical Research*, by E. T. Bennett. When such men as Profs. H. Sidgwick, W. James, Paul Richet, W. Barrett, and Sir Oliver Lodge attest, after thorough scrutiny, the genuineness of the facts and the importance of the problems thus raised, the scornful dismissal of this whole branch of psychology as profitless and foolish is but another example of the credulity of ignorance. See *Haeckel's Monism False*, p. 379.

necessity of predicating some cause for it outside and beyond itself. Hence, whatever has been lost from the older teleology which pointed to directness in particular detail, has been more than replaced by a higher teleology which emphasizes the directivity inherent in the very potentialities of living protoplasm.

The theological doctrine of divine transcendence is confessedly being compelled to correlate itself with the ever-deepening conviction of the divine immanence. But none the less is the philosophic insistence, in the name of science, upon the divine immanence—God everywhere if anywhere—being driven to acknowledge that this very immanence requires also transcendence to make it either workable or thinkable.

Again, as human sensitiveness increases with developing civilization, so that a thorough-going philosophy has now to reckon with a knowledge and deprecation of suffering hitherto unparalleled, so do corresponding explanations and mitigations manifest themselves. The inevitable result of the Theomonism which enforces the highest conception of human as well as divine nature, is to show to what an appalling extent men only reap what they need never have sown. It is ever more pitifully as also terribly true, that 'man's inhumanity to man' alone makes the vast majority of innocent sufferers. The responsibility for this, we see, cannot be rolled off upon God; nor upon fate; nor upon heredity plus environment; nor upon anything which does not include the wilful wrongdoing of moral beings.

Hence the morality which is based upon Theomonism, brings to pass, more than any other ethical system

known to philosophy, an equally tender sympathy for the oppressed, together with stern condemnation of the oppressor. Furthermore, inasmuch as such morality invests the present life with the utmost possible value, and yet acknowledges with sad candour that there are in our human midst individual tragedies innumerable which mock at all our conceptions of applied love and justice, so does it lead on to a sober hope that this tragic

Something in this world amiss,  
Shall be unriddled by-and-by.

Having proved that the foundations of theistic faith are broad and deep and firm, whilst the structure of human character rising upon them exhibits thus far so much that is noble and worthy and promising, Theomonism protests against the suggestion that the wondrous work of evolution is to terminate in an immeasurable fiasco. It utterly prohibits the notion that the purpose of the Divine Mind, manifest even in such knowledge of the universe as we can attain, can merely be a series of meaningless, profitless, hopeless, cycles of evolution and devolution.<sup>1</sup> So long as Theomonism has any hold upon the human mind, assuredly this world can never be regarded as the mere charnel-house of blighted hopes, imperfect lives, wasted love, and useless striving.

<sup>1</sup> For ghastly illustration *per contra*, take the representation of Mephistopheles (see *Ideals of Science and Faith*, p. 158): "And God smiled, and when he saw that man had become perfect in renunciation and worship, he sent another sun through the sky which crashed into man's sun; and all returned again to nebula. "Yes," he murmured; "it was a good play, I will have it performed again." "



In a word, God, freedom, and immortality, are, according to the reasoned convictions represented in Theomonism, so joined together that no man can put them asunder. The subtleties of certain doubting metaphysicians on the one hand, and the coarseness of some popular oppositions on the other, no more avail to uproot this triune conviction from the normal human mind and heart, than the impossibility of defining life on the one hand, and the possibility of degrading it on the other, rob it of its sweetness and value for all such as live soberly, righteously, and devoutly. There are thus reasons in abundance why thoughtful minds may not only retain their theistic beliefs and hopes, but may regard with something more than equanimity the many and great objections to such faith, which continually recur in the mental atmosphere of to-day. They can only have the same effect upon Theomonism which the westerly gales of summer, or even winter's easterly blizzards, have upon the sturdy oak, in strengthening its roots and stimulating its development.

3. There yet remains, however, a practical issue which cannot be altogether omitted. The question whether Theism is essential to human welfare and happiness has been often discussed, but in modern times by none perhaps more subtly than by Prof. McTaggart in his recent volume already mentioned. To show the regrettable fallacies which vitiate almost every page of it, is not our duty here. But it is needful, for the truth's sake, to expose some of the more glaring. Take one out of the many. 'Some things in the



universe are good, and some are bad. And since *everything would be exactly as an omnipotent creator would like best to have it*, such a creator must sometimes like things that are good and sometimes things which are bad.<sup>1</sup> It were difficult indeed to say here which is the greater fallacy, the wholesale assumption of human automatism, or the ignoring of Christian fact and philosophy to the contrary. From the scheme of thought, however, which bases itself upon such a manifest travesty, nothing whatever of value can be expected.

Certainly the way out of the mystery of evil will never be found by an illegitimate and unnecessary splitting of the divine nature into an omnipotent and non-omnipotent God—as though one were at liberty freely to choose between the two! Enough has been said above to point out ‘a more excellent way.’

But on practical matters, Theomonism is bound to make a definite stand. For as nothing is so practical as love, the dismissal of the love of God, both objectively and subjectively, as impossible, cannot but call forth its most earnest and definite protest.

If, on the one hand, the love of God be taken in its subjective signification, and our reverent love for Him is to be jettisoned at the behest of metaphysics,<sup>2</sup> it by no means follows that ‘the non-existence of God would leave it as possible as it was before, that love should be the central fact of all reality.’ How pluralism could ever take it upon itself to guarantee such

<sup>1</sup> *Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 263. Italics mine.

<sup>2</sup> ‘The love of God of course must go if it is believed that the person that was loved never existed.’—*Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 290.

a statement is incomprehensible. But Theomonism meets it with blank denial. For without the existence of the God of whom we can truly affirm that He is love, and therefore worthy of our love—(i) There is no ‘central fact’ of reality at all. Certainly pluralism has no centre. (ii) Still less is there any guarantee that love is the central reality of the universe. (iii) To affirm that love as the central reality of the universe is possible, is a mere verbal vacuity, as useless philosophically as theologically or practically. In such a case, love, however real in human hearts, becomes nothing more than an accident in the universe, a mere sport of molecular vibration, without cause, without significance, without permanence, without hope. Such a suggestion Theomonism rightly regards as monstrous.

If, on the other hand, in its objective sense, the love of God for us is also to be given up, as the mere mirage of the pious imagination, then the estimate of Strauss is assuredly much nearer to the truth of what ought to be felt, than the cool dismissal of the whole matter as a mere trifle of individual perplexity.<sup>1</sup> Strauss, indeed, asks, as we have noted above, ‘What is the use of having recourse to an illusion?’ But the Theomonist is not one whit more minded to do so than was the great Continental sceptic. His demand is that the ‘illusion’ must be proved to be such, before we reject it.

<sup>1</sup> ‘This sense of abandonment is something awful.’—Strauss, *The Old Faith and the New*, p. 435.

‘Whether the friends whom all men may find, could compensate for the friend whom some men thought they had found, is a question for each man to answer.’—*Some Dogmas, &c.*, p. 290.

If the question be seriously asked, 'Should agnostics be miserable?'<sup>1</sup> an answer in the negative may well in some cases be returned, on the ground that 'when a man lives in the universe as if it were righteous, that man is a Theist in act if not in belief.'<sup>2</sup> And the ranks of naturalism supply many brilliant illustrations of this principle. Mr. Dole says elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> 'Thus Haeckel, I take it, does not study and write in order to coin his power into money, but to persuade men's minds, to teach what he holds to be truth, to increase human welfare. This is exactly the kind of conduct which corresponds to the theistic interpretation of the universe.' Which every Theomonist would endorse. But what is really connoted here is, that the naturalist, or agnostic, will not be miserable, just in the degree in which he is inconsistent with his creed.<sup>4</sup>

Still, not being miserable, is, after all, a very different thing from happiness, to say nothing here of the deeper and higher connotation of the Christian term 'blessed.' How far from conducing to happiness is the naturalistic creed, one may find as significantly as truly expressed in the pathetic words of Prof. Romanes: 'When I think, as think at times I must,

<sup>1</sup> Title of article in *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1905, p. 668, by Mr. G. M. Trevelyan.

<sup>2</sup> C. F. Dole, *The Theology of Civilization*, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1903, p. 121.

<sup>4</sup> 'If that of which we are only the children were futile or bad, or if goodness only consisted in an accidental arrangement of nerve cells, I cannot see why we should recognize any obligation to be good. Where does the obligation arise, unless in the nature of things? But this obligation is a spiritual force, and to my thinking presupposes a spiritual reality. This is the very fact which men have groped after under the name of God.'—*Ibid.*, p. 122.

of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it—at such times I shall ever find it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible.’<sup>1</sup> Such a lament may of course be attributed by a metaphysical agnostic to a neurotic temperament. But a full and fair induction from all the better types of theistic believers, to whom for other specimens one may turn, does not warrant such a suggestion.

It is not, indeed, claimed for Theomonism that it yields such reasons for gladness and hope as are inherent in complete Christian Theism. But the former naturally leads on to the latter, and so tends towards happiness more actually than any other system of philosophy or religion. One only objection would be fatal to such optimism as Christian Theism creates, viz. the demonstration that it was all built upon an illusion. From such nemesis of faith, Theomonism is the final and sufficient defence. Apart from this, the only possible criticism of the practical value of such a belief, would be that those who hold it often fail to exemplify it. This must be taken at its proper worth. A true estimate would undoubtedly be much more favourable than that which is generally found in the literature of anti-theism.

But it must be frankly acknowledged that whatever optimistic views may be cherished concerning

<sup>1</sup> *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 28. It is particularly to be observed that this estimate was penned when Romanes was in his prime, so that the usual—but false—insinuation that his return to faith was due to failing powers, cannot here be even insinuated.

the future of Christian Theism, they are always and necessarily conditioned. The openness of mind which transforms Theism into Theomonism, and the sincerity of heart which leavens character and conduct with its larger sympathies, are both essential for the continuance, let alone the progress, of such faith. Happily in this respect also, the signs of the times are in marked degree inspiring. Never in the history of religion, one may say with confidence, has there been such emphasis put upon the value of truth in the realm of religious philosophy, or upon faithfulness in practical life to its profession. Never certainly, in all the history of Theism, has there been so little encouragement for narrow-minded bigotry to rear its ugly head, so great stress upon character as the hall-mark of faith, so large insistence upon love as the bond of perfectness. Never was theology so philosophical in its developments; never so catholic in its appreciation of the sincerity of heart and nobility of life which often characterize differing human conceptions of divine realities. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy are dying natural deaths hand in hand, whilst the brotherhood of a loftier faith and a more actual love, is preparing for them a respectful but real interment.

At the close of his recent anti-theistic thesis, Dr. McTaggart speaks of an 'exclamation reported of Jesus' as having been 'twisted into a canon of knowledge' which puts a premium upon false humility.<sup>1</sup> In so far as this is said to involve 'the confident assertion of propositions which a man will not investigate and cannot prove,' it is far from being a fair comment. For the

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21.

merest tyro in New Testament knowledge could show that such an intention was utterly foreign to the mind of Christ and His apostles.<sup>1</sup> Waiving that, however, one cannot but notice the further quotations which this erudite author proceeds to make, with the added recommendation that they should be remembered: 'The kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a merchant seeking goodly pearls: and having found one pearl of great price he went and sold all that he had, and bought it.' Upon which this writer's comment is, 'All that he had—but if it is too little? The greater the price, the fewer can pay it.' But for all its luxuriously large print, one cannot discern whether this question is asked in the tones of tragedy which befit it. Some preceding expressions may perhaps be taken as indication that the suggestion is not wholly heartless or cynical.<sup>2</sup>

Mercifully, however, for the ordinary man, and in clear accord with the message of Jesus to humanity in general, there is another, and, with all respect, a truer interpretation of Christ's parable. All that a man has can never be too little, when expended on behalf of truth. A farthing's worth of pure sincerity, according to the Christian Theism which is based on Theomonism, will bring a human soul nearer to the love which radiates from the great Heart of the universe, than a millionaire's purchase of metaphysical lore, without 'truth in the inward parts.' There is no

<sup>1</sup> See Luke xii. 57; 1 Thess. v. 21, &c.

<sup>2</sup> 'This is sad and would be sad, even if dogma were not essential to religion,' p. 297. Yet the last word in the book is sarcasm. 'Of course it is only ignorant orthodoxy that is childlike simplicity. Ignorant heterodoxy is childish superstition.'

'great price' of intellectual accumulation to be paid for the spiritual reality which constitutes the essence of Christian Theism. For that matter, no deep reality worth cherishing, within experience, is purchasable on such terms. Still less is the love to which this same writer clings as a human possibility, when the love of God is dissolved away in metaphysics. 'Love will not cease,' we are told. 'There are other persons to love.'<sup>1</sup> To which we may well say, Amen.

But will any of these loving or lovable ones have to wait for the metaphysical definition of self and the psychological demonstration of free-will, before love can either be offered or reciprocated? Alas, for poor humanity, if it were so! Is it really the fact that 'the truth of religion can only rest on foundations too controversial to be taken on trust, and too obscure for many people to investigate'? We have only to substitute here either 'digestion,' or 'love,' for 'religion,' to obtain a fair estimate of such a principle, whether applied to the need of body or of soul. No physiological theme is more controversial and ultimately 'obscure' than digestion. No reality of the higher life is so 'obscure,' so logically indemonstrable, as love. The ensuing inference that they should both be given up in the interest of humanity, would be quite as rational, and as practically valid, as the assumption that the only way to reality in theistic faith is a prolonged and weary wading through metaphysical bogs.

There is 'a more excellent way.' If we too may be permitted to quote, in concluding a non-theological work—'If any man be willing to do His will, he shall

<sup>1</sup> p. 290.



know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.’<sup>1</sup> If a nation could but be found to practise Christian Theism—i.e. to practise the presence of God as revealed in Jesus Christ—it would yield more than all the proof that the human mind or heart could demand, on behalf of Theomonism, both as the philosophical or metaphysical inference from the spiritual Monism to which science increasingly points,<sup>2</sup> and as the valid basis of a fuller Christian theology.

In the closing stanzas of his immortal *In Memoriam*, the poet uses an ambiguous phrase. To many minds the ‘living will’ of which he speaks, stood apparently to mean the will of God. But his latest cultured interpreter tells us that ‘Tennyson explained this to mean that which we know as Free-will, the higher and enduring part of man. Free-will was undoubtedly, he said, the main miracle, apparently an act of self-limitation by the Infinite, and yet a revelation of Himself by Himself.’<sup>3</sup> And this may be quite true. Yet spiritual Monism, issuing philosophically as it does from modern science, and finding its only full

<sup>1</sup> John vii. 17.

<sup>2</sup> ‘How little the woes of life depend upon the system, and how much upon human sin and folly, will appear if we reflect on the changes that would result if men at once began to love God and righteousness with all their hearts and their neighbours as themselves. This one change would carry with it the immediate amelioration of all our woes, and the speedy removal of most of them. Wrong-doing would cease, with all its consequences. All the social energies now expended in repressing wrong-doing would be free for the positive service of the community.’—Bowne, *Theism*, p. 279. The whole of the section upon Optimism and Pessimism, may be specially commended to the student’s attention.

<sup>3</sup> *In Memoriam*, edited, with commentary, by A. W. Robinson, B.D., p. 260.



and worthy expression in Theomonism, may well be forgiven for suggesting that both these two interpretations are really one. And in such oneness rests the highest hope of every human soul, together with the surest guarantee of noble destiny for humanity. Whether in the man or in the race, the human will only really wills, and nobly wills, as it co-operates with the divine Will, which is in essence universal Love. Thus the truest statement of that final Theomonism which satisfies the mind, and the deepest comfort concerning the shadows which yet fall upon our hearts, are found enshrined in the concluding prayer of the noblest poem of the nineteenth century. This, therefore, as embodying all that is worthiest in the preceding pages, may well here be quoted once again :

O living will that shalt endure  
When all that seems shall suffer shock,  
Rise in the spiritual rock,  
Flow thro' our deeds and make them pure,  
That we may lift from out of dust  
A voice as unto Him that hears,  
A cry above the conquered years  
To one that with us works, and trust,  
With faith that comes of self-control,  
The truths that never can be proved  
Until we close with all we loved,  
And all we flow from, soul in soul.

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PRINTED BY  
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,  
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.







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32

Ballard, Frank, 1873-1931.

Theonomism true; God and the universe in  
modern light. London, C.H. Kelly [1906?]  
xxvii, 523p. 23cm.

"A sequel to 'Haeckel's Monism false'."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Theism. 2. Apologetics--20th cent. I.  
Title. II. Title: God and the universe in  
modern light.

CCSC/mmb

A022203

A022203

